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
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Geo. L. Raymond

An Art Philosopher's Cabinet

Being Salient Passages from the Works on
Comparative Æsthetics of

George Lansing Raymond, L.H.D.

Former Professor of Æsthetic Criticism in Princeton University

Selected and Arranged According to Subject by

Marion Mills Miller, Litt.D.

Editor of "The Classics—Greek and Latin," etc.

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1915

Chief Source of the Selections

A System of Comparative Æsthetics

By George Lansing Raymond, L.H.D.

- I. ART IN THEORY
- II. THE REPRESENTATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF FORM
- III. POETRY AS A REPRESENTATIVE ART
- IV. PAINTING, SCULPTURE, AND ARCHITECTURE AS
REPRESENTATIVE ARTS
- V. THE GENESIS OF ART FORM
- VI. RHYTHM AND HARMONY IN POETRY AND MUSIC,
TOGETHER WITH MUSIC AS A REPRESENTATIVE
ART
- VII. PROPORTION AND HARMONY OF LINE AND COLOR
IN PAINTING, SCULPTURE, AND ARCHITECTURE
- VIII. THE ESSENTIALS OF ÆSTHETICS: BEING A COM-
PENDIUM OF THE SYSTEM, DESIGNED FOR A
TEXT-BOOK

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PREFACE

The epigram, that most convincing form of argument, while it effectively destroys unsound opinions prevalent among people who let some one else do their thinking, may itself become the mother of error when it is in turn accepted without examination as to its positive truth.

Of this the popular epigrammatic definition of critics, so effectively used by Benjamin Disraeli in his novel of *Lothair*, as "the men who have failed in literature and art," is an example. It attacks unwarranted pretense on the part of those assuming to be authorities in these subjects, and unquestioning acceptance of them as such by the general public, and, at the same time, appeals by its slur to the element of malice latent in the human breast which springs gleefully into expression when that which is conceived to be a mask concealing real character and motives is removed. For these reasons, this epigram has been successful in its purpose where a plain statement of the need of examining the credentials of those sitting in judgment would have made no impression.

The error which the epigram propagates is in its sweeping assertion that all those who assume to be critics are failures as creative artists,—a patent untruth, but accepted for the sake of the slur without regard to the injurious effect that it may have on uninformed minds. Thus this epigram has been popularly exalted to a postulate; qualification to criticize has been accepted as proving inability to create; and, as an inevitable corollary, criticism has been deemed an inferior form of writing, indeed practically worthless.

To confute these errors, a plain statement of facts showing that great artists like Leonardo da Vinci and great poets like Coleridge have been supreme critics does not seem all that is demanded. Those who surrender to the force of epigrams appear often to bring about situations from which none but the champions of other epigrams can

deliver them. There is a sense, therefore, in which it may be said that the false conceptions just mentioned required a master of epigram to expose them, even if he had to do this at that cost to truth which is always incurred when answering a fool according to his folly.

Oscar Wilde in his most brilliant essay on *The Decay of Lying*, exploded the vital element of the epigram in question—namely, the deduction that criticism is an inferior form of writing—by frankly granting the failure of critics as creative artists, and boldly claiming that this was due to their special ability in a higher field of literature. Criticism he declared, supporting his statement with great ingenuity, was the supreme order of literary composition.

The concession that he made was, perhaps, necessary to secure the essential quality of surprise in his succeeding epigrammatic presentation; but it has proved very injurious to certain subservient minds ever ready to follow an original genius who proclaims himself an authority. These followers, without examining Wilde's argument for positive and permanent truth, indeed not desiring to do so, since ingenuity is more attractive to them than wisdom, have accepted his impudent assertion at its face value, and have found license to pose as critics without qualification for the office and with no other thought than to make their judgments seem striking and plausible. Their utterances are unsound and insincere, and effective only for the destruction of accepted beliefs, true as well as false. Lacking the constructive ability to create a new pantheon in place of the idols overthrown, they have deified the hammer which their master, the supreme iconoclast, taught them to wield,—the two-headed paradox as destructive in the rebound as in the blow. Indeed, one of them, George Bernard Shaw, too proud to acknowledge discipleship to Wilde, but, nevertheless, a member of the cult, and, in fact, its chief living representative, has attempted to develop the principle of the paradox into a working philosophy for constructive as well as destructive purposes. This is more than was ever contemplated by Wilde himself, who was not serious even in smashing things, but rather wanton, breaking old and sacred windows in the social temple just to hear the glass crash, and not to let in the pure air and sunlight—although this was, happily, often the result.

Shaw's doctrine of contrariety that attempts to find

wisdom in palpable absurdity, and to show that the apparently impracticable method is the only sure means to achievement, is most patent, and hence ineffective for evil, in politics and economics. This is shown by the general contempt that has dubbed him Bernhardi Shaw because of his recent criticisms of Great Britain for not defending Belgium by leaving it defenseless, and by the repudiation on the part of even his fellow socialists of his late theory that equality of income is practicable without equality of opportunity to secure the income.

It is in the field of art and letters, however, that his principle is most subtle, because there it is based upon his elusive personality, and hence is most subversive of sound principles. He is certainly not one of those critics who have failed in literature. As a dramatist, he has been eminently successful. But these very facts tend to uphold Wilde's contention that such a man cannot be a great literary critic; and one who wanted to confirm this conclusion could point out that, perhaps, no writer to such an extent as Shaw has ever adapted his general philosophy of composition, especially play-writing, to his own special abilities and limitations. Shaw has done this with such success that, by his method, Shakespeare is condemned and he himself commended. The first requisite for acceptance of his views is acceptance of himself, with all the whimsical contradictions of his nature, as the ideal artist.

The sensible view of the relation of the critical work of an author to his creative achievements—a perfectly natural connection which has been artfully exalted into a subject for debate—is that creative ability is a desirable qualification for criticism when the critic is not an egotist, but is a detriment to him when he has his own case continually in mind as a standard for judging other creative artists. Criticism must, first of all, be impartial. Success as a creative artist is simply a conclusive proof of one kind of ability. Nor is the fact that a writer has abandoned creative for critical work evidence of a lack of creative ability. On the contrary it may be a proof of it. A man who has worked out for himself, and demonstrated to his own satisfaction, principles of art, if the altruism of the teacher is strong in him, may sacrifice the joy of creation for the higher pleasure of imparting his knowledge to others. This was the case with John Ruskin; in his youth he was a painter of promise,

yet gave up his career as an artist with pencil and brush impelled by the irresistible desire to teach, combined with a consciousness of ability to do this through his mastery of the artistry of language.

Wilde's contention that criticism is itself a kind of creation, while untrue, is nevertheless valuable inasmuch as it strikes at the truth. Criticism is one of the factors of creation, but not creation itself. In the language of philosophy, interpretation of the message of a work of art to the world is an effective cause of the fulfilment of the final cause or purpose of the work. The whole truth is that both creator and interpreter are essential agents to this end, and, in this respect, both deserve honor. The precedence of the one or the other must be determined, if at all, by comparison of the relative position which each holds in his own profession. But comparisons are particularly odious, and, as a rule, wholly useless, when instituted between persons of different pursuits.

The rounded work of a critic is both destructive and constructive, the former, in its office of preparation for upbuilding, being in character no less creative than the latter. For effectiveness there must be fixed purpose in the work from the beginning, and a determined and original method of achieving the ultimate object. In short, a true critic must be a philosopher in the domain of his activity.

And when, as in the case of art, this domain is a broad and diversified one, containing many separate fields, each distinct in character, and as such generally localized, but with merging and ill-defined boundaries, and with common but differently employed riparian rights to the streams of influence which flow through them all, the critic must be a comparative philosopher in particular, if he would be practically helpful.

His requirements do not stop here. Not alone must he be true to himself, to his own abilities and attainments in the choice of his subjects, and be true to the nature of the subject itself in treating it, but he must be able to present truth to others in a form suited to their understanding and acceptance. In order to meet this requirement, it seems well-nigh essential that he should have had a certain amount of experience as a teacher of at least some of the principles of the branch to which he has devoted himself.

If our contention be justified, if the ideal critic in general,

and of art in particular, be one who is himself a creator of artistic forms, with inborn ability cultivated by study and practice; and be also a philosopher of analytic and synthetic powers reinforced by wide knowledge of his subject; and have had experience in the work of explaining and presenting what he has to impart, we are in possession of a standard by which to judge any particular critic under discussion.

We believe that George Lansing Raymond, the author of the only complete system of art-interpretation that has yet been produced in any country,—complete because of its analytic and synthetic unity, treating its theme equally in its historical and theoretical aspects, and applying identical principles to both subject-matter and form as used in every one of the higher arts,—is a critic who conforms to this standard in each of these regards, and with an unusual degree of excellence in all of them. He won distinction as a poet and orator in early life, and has constantly increased his reputation since then. For poetry, he has chosen themes that are fitted for poetic treatment, and presented them in a style whose lucid artistry, by the aptness with which it performs its function, not only enhances the thought but acquires reflected value in its own æsthetic character. Some of his poems are dramatic in form, and in these as well as in other slight, perhaps, but successful excursions into regions demanding ability to interpret human nature and to portray personal character, he has not been found wanting, whether judged by the inferences of common sense, or by the canons of criticism; while his essays, addresses, and even technical treatises on æsthetics and various other subjects which he has taught, all reveal, in their natural yet original methods of presentation, the literary artist.

In more direct, though not more essential, relation to his work as a critic, it may be claimed that Dr. Raymond has eminently the mental habit of a philosopher. A reader of a single book of his, or even a chapter, will be impressed by the manner in which he resolves forms existent in art into their essential elements, and from these reconstructs the ideal forms; and a student who has examined his entire system will realize, as never before, the interrelation of all the arts and their common foundation on broad physical and psychological principles, which may be harmonized in a general æsthetic philosophy applicable to every branch of the subject. As evidence of such a realization by readers of

even single volumes, we quote from a review of "The Representative Significance of Form," in *The Scotsman* of Edinburgh: "Professor Raymond goes so deep into causes as to explore the subconscious and the unconscious mind for a solution of his problems, and eloquently to range through the conceptions of religion, science, and metaphysics in order to find fixed principles of taste." And this, from a review of "The Genesis of Art-Form," in the *Philadelphia Press*: "It is impossible to withhold one's admiration from a treatise which exhibits in such a rare degree the qualities of philosophic criticism." This also from the *Portland (Me.) Transcript's* review of "Proportion and Harmony": "It is scientific and mathematical to the core without destroying the beauty of the creations it analyzes. It is, above all, logical and methodical, maintaining its argument and carrying along from one subject to another the deductions which have preceded." And this from the *Portland Oregonian*, in speaking of "Rhythm and Harmony": "The analysis is, at times, so subtle as to be almost beyond the reach of words, but the author's grasp of his subject nowhere slackens, and the quiet flow of the style remains unclouded in expressing even the most intricate phases of his argument." A reviewer in the *New York Times* tells us that: "In a spirit at once scientific and that of the true artist, he pierces through the manifestations of art to their sources, and shows the relations, intimate and essential, between painting, sculpture, poetry, music, and architecture."

As a final qualification for the great work to which Professor Raymond has devoted the larger part of his life may be noted his experience as a student and his activities as a teacher of the subjects. A personal appreciation appearing in the *New York Times* in connection with a review of one of his books contains the following: "We consider Professor Raymond to possess something like an ideal equipment for the line of work he has entered upon. His own poetry is genuine and delicately constructed, his appreciations are true to high ideals, and his power of scientific analysis is unquestionable." He "was known, when a student at Williams, as a musician and a poet—the latter because of taking, in his freshman year, a prize in verse over the whole college. After graduating in this country, he went through a course in æsthetics with Pro-

fessor Vischer of the University of Tübingen, and also with Professor Curtius at the time when that historian of Greece was spending several hours a week with his pupils among the marbles of the Berlin Museum. Subsequently, believing that all the arts are, primarily, developments of different forms of expression through the tones and movements of the body, Professor Raymond made a thorough study, chiefly in Paris, of methods of cultivating and using the voice in both singing and speaking, and of representing thought and emotion through postures and gestures. It is a result of these studies that he afterwards developed, first, into his methods of teaching elocution and literature" (as embodied in his *Orator's Manual* and *The Writer*) "and later into his æsthetic system. . . . A Princeton man has said of him that he has as keen a sense for a false poetic element as a bank expert for a counterfeit note; and a New York model who posed for him, when preparing illustrations for one of his books, said that he was the only man that he had ever met who could invariably, without experiment, tell him at once what posture to assume in order to represent any required sentiment."

In his early manhood, Professor Raymond taught oratory, rhetoric, and English literature in his Alma Mater, Williams College; and, in the fulness of his mental powers, founded and, for many years, conducted the department of Oratory and Æsthetic Criticism at Princeton University. In later life, he retired from the class-room, and, taking up residence in Washington, lectured before the George Washington University and various societies in that city upon his system of æsthetic philosophy which by this time he had completely developed. He is now a resident of Los Angeles, where, in the congenial climate of the "American Italy," his mind is still actively engaged in recording in book-form the thoughts which he has derived from a life full of research, and rich in experience as a teacher and writer. At present he is engaged on a work having to do with ethics—a subject which he will undoubtedly approach from the direction, among others, of æsthetics. This is a view-point which sadly needs a sane and sincere exposition after its gross mistreatment at the hands of Oscar Wilde and others belonging, more or less, to the same school—a cult which has brought a genuinely philosophical subject into much popular disrepute.

It must not be inferred from the foregoing that Dr. Raymond has excluded from his former works consideration of the bearing of art upon human conduct. On the contrary, his books are full of it. It is this that makes them so vital,—so unlike all other works save Ruskin's of the same order. In the comparative æsthetics, the soul as well as the body of art is made the subject of interpretation at every point.

This latter fact would furnish a sufficient reason, perhaps, for the preparation of a collection of extracts as in the present volume. But the book is not designed for those interested exclusively in any one phase of art or its influence. The thoroughness, and consequent comprehensiveness, of Professor Raymond's discussions have placed a great deal of what he has said practically beyond the reach of many busy people who cannot take from other necessary occupations the time needed for studying his system as a whole. The editor is convinced that readers of this kind, whether artists, poets, art-lovers, critics, editors, teachers, or preachers, will welcome an opportunity afforded them for becoming acquainted, in a very few moments, with any one of the more important of Professor Raymond's contributions to any phase of the general subject.

Similarly selected quotations from Professor Raymond's poetical works have already been published in a book entitled *A Poet's Cabinet*. To this, the present book, giving extracts from his prose works, forms a companion, the two cyclopedias supplying comprehensive mental and spiritual co-ordinates whereby the reader may be enabled to test not only the personality of the author but the completeness and applicability of his philosophy of art and life, and may be guided and inspired by their suggestions.

MARION MILLS MILLER.

The Authors Club, New York.

ILLUSTRATIONS

- I. The Author *Frontispiece*
 From a photograph

The following have been selected from the many hundreds in Professor Raymond's volumes on account, mainly, of the self-explanatory testimony which they all furnish to the truth of one of the most important of his fundamental propositions. This is that the primary and most universal endeavor of the imagination when influenced by the artistic tendency is to form an image that is made to seem a unity by comparing and grouping together effects that, when seen or heard, are recognized to be wholly or partially alike.

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An Art-Philosopher's Cabinet.

ACCENT (*see also* QUANTITY, RHYTHM, TUNE, *and* VERSE).

Some may doubt whether (in poetry) accent is the basis of rhythm and tune, but it is really about all that the majority of men know of either. With exceptions, the fewness of which confirms the rule, all of our English words of more than one syllable must necessarily be accented in one way; and all of our articles, prepositions, and conjunctions of one syllable are unaccented, unless the sense very plainly demands a different treatment. These two facts enable us to arrange any number of our words so that the accents shall fall on syllables separated by like intervals. The tendency to compare things, and to put like with like, which is in constant operation where there are artistic possibilities, leads men to take satisfaction in this kind of an arrangement; and when they have made it, they have produced rhythm.

A larger rhythm makes prominent as in prose, every second or third accent; but metrical rhythm, *i. e.*, *metre*, regards every accent. When reading verse, the accents seem to mark it off; if marching, our feet would keep time to them. Hence, as many syllables as can be grouped about one syllable clearly accented, are termed a *measure* or *foot*,— words synonymous as applied to English verse; though the classic measure sometimes contained two feet. —*Poetry as a Representative Art*, II.

ÆSTHETICS, AS DEVELOPED IN PROFESSOR RAYMOND'S BOOKS.

(*Recapitulation.*) In the volumes following "Art in Theory," the order of thought adopted in that book is reversed. Having begun the discussion of the general subject by observing forms as they have been produced by art, and drawing inferences from them, ending with the final inference that all are necessarily expressive of a certain

significance, it seemed natural that the endeavor in subsequent volumes to determine how art should fulfil the requirements indicated in the introductory volume should start with significance, and work outward, showing what different conceptions it is possible to express in art, and how these determine its form. In pursuing this line of thought, the first thing to do, of course, was to examine the connection between significance and form in general. This subject was assigned to the volume of the series entitled "The Representative Significance of Form." The next thing to do was to examine the connection between significance and the possible forms of each of the different arts in particular. This was done in the volume entitled "Poetry as a Representative Art"; also in that part of the volume entitled "Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music" which is devoted to the discussion of "Music as a Representative Art," as well as in the volume entitled "Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts." Having examined the methods of representing significance through form in general, and in each class of forms in each different art in particular, the next thing to do was to examine form in itself—that is, as something which, though influenced by significance, and in practice always connected with significance, may, nevertheless, for the purposes of analytic study, be considered as existing apart from anything else, and as developing according to laws having to do mainly, if not solely, with that which pertains to the appeal to the senses. Here, in analogy to the course pursued when studying significance, attention was directed first to the sources, methods, and effects of form in general. This was done in the volume entitled "The Genesis of Art-Form." Next, what had been learned with reference to form in general was applied to form as manifested in each of the arts. This was done in the two concluding volumes of the series, "Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music," and "Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color in Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture."—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, XXVI.

ÆSTHETICS, AS INFLUENCING MANNERS.

What is the reason that a man of æsthetic culture is the last to come into his home swearing like a cowboy, cocking his hat over the vases on the mantelpiece, or forcing his boots up into their society? Because this sort of manner is

not to his taste. Why not? Because, for one reason, he has learned the value of little matters of appearance; and for any man to learn of them in one department is to learn of them in all departments.—*Essay on Art and Education*.

ÆSTHETICS, AS INFLUENCING SCIENCE AND RELIGION (*see also mention of the first under ART, RELIGION, and SCIENCE*).

Æsthetic studies, among which one may include anything that has to do with elocution, poetry, music, drawing, painting, modeling, building, or furnishing, whether we consider their influence upon the artist or upon the patron of art, are needed, in order to connect and complete the results of education as developed through science alone or through religion alone. These studies can do for our minds what science cannot, crowning its work with the halo of imagination and lighting its path to discovery. They can do for us what religion cannot, grounding its conceptions upon accuracy of observation and keeping them true to facts. Art unites the separated intellectual influences of the two other spheres. It can not only hold the mirror up to nature, but it can make all nature a mirror, and hold it up to the heavens. In times of intellectual and spiritual storm and stress, when night is above and waves below and winds behind and breakers ahead, the voice of art can sometimes speak peace to conflicting elements, and bring a great calm; and then, in the blue at our feet, we can see not only a little of the beauty of a little of the surface of the little star in which we live, but something also of the grandeur of all the stars of all the universe.—*Idem*.

ÆSTHETICS, MEANING OF.

The word *æsthetics* is traceable to a work termed "*Æsthetica*," published in Germany in 1750, by A. G. Baumgarten. The word was derived from the Greek *αἰσθητικός* meaning "fitted to be perceived," and is now used to designate that which is fitted to the requirements of what philosophers term *perception*; in other words, fitted to accord with the laws, whether of physiology or psychology, which make effects appealing to the mind through the organs of perception—i. e., through the senses—satisfactory, agreeable, and, as we say, beautiful. If such effects need to be "fitted" to be perceived, they, of course, need to be made to differ from the condition in which they are presented in nature. That which causes them to differ from this is *art*. *Æsthetics*

is the science of the beautiful as exemplified in *art*. The latter has to do with the processes through which a sight or a sound may be "fitted to be perceived"; the former, with the effects after it has been put through these processes. One cannot be *artistic* without being able to design and produce; he may be *æsthetic*, when able merely to appreciate and enjoy the results of design and production. The German term for the science, which some have tried to introduce into English, is *æsthetic*. But this term, except when employed as an adjective, seems to be out of analogy with English usage. According to it, the singular ending *ic*, as in *logic* and *music*, commonly designates some single department in which the methods of the science produce similar results. The plural ending *ics*, as in *mathematics*, *physics*, *mechanics*, and *ethics*, commonly designates a group of various departments, in which similar methods produce greatly varying results. The many different departments both of sight and of sound in which can be applied the principles underlying effects that can be "fitted to be perceived," seem to render it appropriate and important that in English the science treating of them should be termed *æsthetics*.—*Essentials of Æsthetics, Preliminary Note.*

ÆSTHETICS *vs.* UTILITY (*see also* ART EXPRESSING THOUGHT).

Of course, in certain respects, these (æsthetic) arts may be as useful as any that are termed *useful*: but the utility in them is always such as produces not a material but a mental result, and even no mental result except indirectly through an effect upon the senses.—*Art in Theory*, II.

ALTERNATION AS RELATED TO PROPORTION.

The pillars alternate with the spaces between the pillars. In such cases, if all the pillars, as compared with one another and not with the spaces between them, are of like apparent dimensions, and also all the spaces, as compared with one another and not with the pillars, then it is not necessary that the ratio between the dimensions of the pillars and the dimension of the spaces should be easily recognized. . . . Whatever may be the ratio, the mind will take in at a glance the fact that one pillar is to the space next to it as a second pillar is to a second space. In Cologne Cathedral towers, it is important that the storeys, as they have been termed, should seem—though gradually diminished in order to increase the apparent height—of like height, and that the

same should seem to be the case with the cornices or mouldings separating these storeys; but it is less important that the exact ratio between the height of the storeys and the height of the mouldings should be recognized. In all these cases, too, it is important, that, while the alternating measurements seem alike, the intervening ones should seem sufficiently unlike the others not to confuse the mind by suggesting likeness where it is not intended to be suggested.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, x.

ANALOGY, ARGUMENT FROM.

An argument from analogy is always derived from a few forms that are representative, on the one hand, of a whole series of forms, and are representative, on the other hand, of a certain mental significance that is expressible through forms alone, and is actually expressed through the particular forms thus used.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XII.

ANALOGY IN ART (*see also* ART, THE CONNECTING LINK).

How now is it with art? Its conceptions have been said to partake of the nature partly of those of religion and partly of those of science. They must, therefore, be partly indefinite and partly definite; and their expression, therefore, must partake of the nature partly of suggestion and partly of formulation. An indefinite suggestion is imparted through definite formulation according to the method not of logic, but of analogy; and a formulation of that which cannot be definitely communicated, but only indefinitely suggested, cannot be said to be presented, but only represented. These are the reasons for maintaining, as will be done in this chapter, that an artistic conception tends to expression through *analogical representation*.—*Idem*, XI.

The fact that the conceptions of art, as distinguished from those of religion and of science, cannot communicate significance except through the use of analogically representative forms, involves a limitation, which, like all limitations, is, in one sense, a source of weakness. But, in another sense, it is a source of strength, and a source of this in the exact degree in which its limitations are clearly recognized and no effort is made to overstep them. What but a consciousness of these limitations has caused all our great artists, when desiring to make their presentations of truth accord with the degree of knowledge or the phase of thought

of their own period or country, to content themselves, in place of discussing and explaining conditions, with merely describing their appearances? But notice that it is precisely because they have contented themselves with this, that progress in knowledge and thought, which is constantly rendering obsolete the results presented in science and philosophy, and even systems of religion, does not interfere with the enduring influence of works of art. In these works, certain appearances of material or human nature have been selected for reproduction. Through unique combinations of these, the significance behind them has been brought out more uniquely, yet the inferences which are drawn from them, so far as art is strictly and solely representative, can be drawn with as little arbitrary bias as from nature itself. Art of this character can appeal to the intelligence and the sympathy of all audiences of all periods. Its significance can be perceived and felt wherever men have eyes or ears, for its products continue always to be what they were when first conceived—faithful images of the real life by which humanity is constantly surrounded.—*Idem*, XII.

ANALOGY, WHAT IT IS AND HOW USED.

Imagination is accustomed to jump the steps of logic. Yet often, as we have found, through subconscious intellection, it reaches exactly the same conclusions as are reached by investigation. How does imagination do this? Through arguing not logically but analogically. The term analogy is derived from two Greek words, *ἀνά*, signifying *thereon*, and *λόγος*, signifying *a word*. The conception underlying the term, therefore, seems to be that a natural appearance, *i. e.*, a form to which the term is applied, has the effect of a *word*;—that it is a part of that whole of nature which is frequently called the “unwritten word.” Moreover, analogy implies, beyond this, that some one natural appearance or form has been compared with at least one other, which is found to furnish *a word thereon*, or *a word in addition*, so that the two or more appearances taken together can be considered as words of the same meaning or significance. It is an argument from an analogy between not two but many—in fact, as many as possible—different appearances, that causes the conception of the unity of nature.—*Idem*, XII.

A work of art completes our ideal of that which should

characterize an image of nature, in the degree only in which it is *a word in addition*, in the sense of being something that both suggests nature in appearance and, at the same time, exemplifies the laws that operate in nature. We term the work one of creative imagination mainly because, in both form and significance, in the way in which it appeals to both the physical senses and to the whole mind, it seems to be a continuation of the work of creation.—*Idem*, XII.

ANGLO-SAXON WORDS, WHY POETIC (*see* WORDS, FOREIGN).

The principles just unfolded are closely related—in connection, however, with one or two other considerations—to that preference which almost all English poets exhibit for words of native or Anglo-Saxon origin. . . . The words of Anglo-Saxon origin include most of those used in our youth, in connection with which, owing to long familiarity with them, we have the most definite possible associations. Whenever we hear these words, therefore, they seem pre-eminently representative.

Then, too, we hear in the Anglo-Saxon derivatives, to a greater extent than in the foreign, the sounds which, when originally uttered, were meant to be significant of their sense. In fact, almost all the words instanced in another place as having sounds of this kind were Anglo-Saxon. On the contrary, almost all our words derived from the Latin through the French have suffered a radical change in sound, both in the French language and in our own. Therefore their sounds, if ever significant of their meanings, can scarcely be expected to be so now.

Again, we know, as a rule, the history of our Anglo-Saxon terms, inasmuch as we still use them in their different meanings and applications, as developed by association and comparison. But foreign words are usually imported into our language in order to designate some single definite conception, and often one very different from that which they designated originally. All of us, for instance, can see the different meanings of a word like *way* or *fair* and the connections between them; but to most of us words like *dunce* and *pagans*, from the Latin *Duns* and *pagani*, have only the effects of arbitrary symbols.

One other reason applies to compound words. If the different terms put together in these exist and are in present use in our own language, as is the case with most of our

native compounds, then each part of the compound conveys a distinct idea of its separate meaning; so that we clearly perceive in the word its different factors. For instance, the terms *uprightness*, *overlook*, *underwriter*, *understanding*, *pastime*, all summon before the mind both of the ideas which together make up the word. We recognize, at once, whatever comparison or picture it represents. In compound words of entirely foreign origin, on the contrary, it is almost invariably the case that, at least, one of the factors does not exist at present in our own tongue. *Integrity* meant a picture to the Roman. But none of us use the word from which its chief factor is derived. So we fail to see the picture. Nor do we use either factor of the words *depravity*, *defer*, *retire*.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, xvii.

ARCHITECTURE (*see mention of it under* COMPARISON, COMPOSITION, PROPORTION, *and* REPRESENTATION).

ARCHITECTURE AND MUSIC, WHY BUT SLIGHTLY IMITATIVE.

The musician constructs an entire symphony from a single significant series of tones, and the architect constructs an entire building from a significant series of outlines. At the same time, there is, in both arts, an occasional return to nature for the purpose of incorporating, if not imitating, in the product some new expression of significance. But the fact that they are both developed from this sustained and subjective method of giving expression to a first suggestion, makes such a return to nature much less frequent in them than in the other arts.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, xvii.

One more point of similarity between music and architecture ought, perhaps, to be mentioned. It is this, that while, as among very young children, for instance, the inarticulated tones that develop into music antedate the articulated words that develop into poetry, the artistic forms of music, as in melody and harmony, are developed much later than those of poetry. In the same way, too, while the building of huts that develops into architecture antedates the drawing, coloring, and carving that develop into painting and sculpture, the artistic forms of architecture, as in ornamental columns, pediments, and spires, are developed later than painting and sculpture of, at least, sufficient excellence to merit recognition. Of course, the human being is obliged at a very early stage in his history

to provide means of shelter. But he is not influenced to construct that which he erects in such a way as to give expression to his thoughts and emotions, which is essential for an artistic motive, as early as he is influenced to draw pictures for the same purpose. A boy, or a boylike savage, using a pencil or knife, will enjoy expressing his thoughts and emotions by way of imitation for its own sake, long before he will enjoy doing the same for the sake of ornamenting what would be just as useful without ornamentation. In the former case, his mind begins by being at play; in the latter, by being at work; and his first desire always is to be rid of work. —*Idem*, XVII.

ARCHITECTURE, ARTISTIC, DEVELOPED FROM USEFUL CONSTRUCTION (*see also* ORNAMENT).

Using as a theme a few notes representing a mood of mind as indicated by a song of nature, the musician goes on to compose a whole symphony to correspond with them. So, from a few outlines of windows, doors, or roofs, the architect goes on to construct a whole building to correspond with these. This method he applies not only to the development of new forms, but to the ornamentation of old forms. In doing this, he merely carries out a principle exemplified in the action of the human mind in any like relation. For instance, a man, for practical purposes, produces a piece of woven cloth or something made through the use of it. That the cloth may not ravel at its edge, a section of it is purposely unraveled there, or a hem is made here, or, if two pieces of cloth be used, a seam is produced where the two are joined. After a little, according to a law which the mind always follows, the imagination begins to experiment with these necessary contrivances, and then the unraveled edge, the hem, the seam, each respectively, becomes a fringe, a border, or a stripe; *i. e.*, each is developed into one of the well-known ornamental resources of the art of the tailor or the upholsterer. It is the same in architecture. When the imagination begins to play with the underpinnings of buildings, or with the means of approaching and entering them, it gives us foundations, steps, or porches; when with the parts upholding the roof, it gives us pillars, pilasters, or buttresses; and when with the upper or lower parts of openings, it gives us caps, or sills, of doors or windows; when with the roof and its immediate supports, it gives entabla-

tures, eaves, gables, domes, or spires. All these features, moreover, are representative. If the foundations be apparent and large, they indicate support and sufficient support. If the steps or entrances be broad, they indicate accommodations on the inside for a multitude. If the windows be high or wide, they indicate a high or wide room on the inside. In thoroughly successful architecture, the walls are especially transparent, as it were, revealing the internal arrangements. Horizontal mouldings or string-courses show where the floors are, and vertical buttresses or pilasters, where are the partitions. Roofs, when artistic, are visible. In public buildings, at least, they should indicate the shapes of the ceilings under them. A dome is out of place unless it span a vast space; and towers and spires are inexcusable unless they be adaptations of features that are useful.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, VII.

ARCHITECTURE, COLD AND WARM COLOR IN (*see* COLOR.)

As applied to architecture, it is evident that, aside from the effects of form, which in certain cases may entirely counterbalance those of color, the colder the color, the more massive, as a rule, will appear not only the building itself but also the grounds about it; the effect of the cold color being to make the house and its parts seem at a greater distance from the observer, and, therefore, greater in size than it would be at the supposed distance. Hence, another reason for using cold colors in grand buildings. The same principle applies to the painting and the papering of an interior. The warm colors cause an apartment to seem smaller and more cozy, and the cold colors exactly the opposite. The latter on the walls, therefore, not only for the reason suggested on page 204, but because of these uncozy effects, are objectionable. But for ceilings, especially of public halls and churches, blue at least is rightly popular. Thus used it suggests largeness and elevation, as in the sky which it seems to resemble; and it also furnishes, as a rule, an agreeable contrast to the warmer colors appropriate for the walls.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XI.

ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPED FROM ORDINARY BUILDING.

The earliest human dwellings are supposed to have been caves, or very rudely constructed huts. According to the views presented in "Art in Theory," so long as men expended

no thought or emotion upon these beyond that needed in order to secure an end of utility there was no art of architecture. But it is impossible to conceive that the human mind would not begin very soon, in this department as in all others, to pay some attention to æsthetic ends. . . . The earliest traces of architecture indicate endeavors to make pictures—of course, as the material used was stone, to make sculptured pictures—out of that which was being constructed. Fig. . . . for instance, represents one of the earliest attempts at architecture, that has been discovered in Asia Minor. Looking at it, one would suppose that it was a cave, in front of which a framework of wood had been erected. Not at all. . . . These apparently wooden columns and beams have been carved out of the native stone of the cave. Why has this been done? Can any one doubt the reason of it? Can any one fail to perceive in them the influence of a picturesque and statuesque motive? Can even those who prophesied so confidently that the theory of this series of essays was sure to break down when it came to be applied to architecture, be so dull as not to see that this wellnigh earliest architecture of which we know was distinctively representative? Observe, too, that it was representative of both mental conceptions and material appearances. No one looking at the entrance of the one cave, or the interior of the other, could fail to recognize both that a man had been at work upon it, and also that he had been at work for the purpose of reproducing that which he had seen elsewhere. It would represent the man, because one would know that the person who had planned the carving had been accustomed to wooden constructions, and it would represent his thought or feeling with reference to these, because it would show his appreciation and admiration of certain of their effects. Otherwise he would never have tried to reproduce similar effects through the use of material infinitely harder to shape.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, xvii.

ARCHITECTURE DIFFERENT FROM ORDINARY BUILDING.

While no one confounds poetry, painting, or sculpture with the early inartistic form of expression from which it is developed, there are many who suppose that everything used for the purpose of shelter, even the rudest hut of the savage, is an exemplification of architecture. But one

might as well suppose everything of the nature of language to be an exemplification of poetry. It has a relation to poetry. It contains the germs from which the art grows; but this is all. So with the hut of the savage, and with many constructions more pretentious. An ordinary woodshed has no more to do with architecture than the cry of our nursery, the talk of our kitchen, the sign of our barber, or the rock of our curbstone has to do with the respective art to which it seems allied, whether music, poetry, painting, or sculpture.—*Idem*, xx.

ARCHITECTURE, EXPRESSION IN.

Underlying architecture too, there are subjective modes of expression. There are the ideas, for instance, of support and shelter; and these ideas it is by no means impossible or unusual to represent by gesture. Moreover, in all the other arts too there are objective products intervening between the subjective and the artistic forms. Artificial resonant sounds, spoken and written language, hieroglyphic drawings and carvings are conditions that antedate music, poetry, painting, or sculpture, no less than house building antedates architecture. House building, moreover, according to the principles that have been unfolded, is no less truly a form of natural expression than these others are. It springs from the nature of the primitive man, precisely as nest-building or dam-building from the nature of the bird or the beaver.

That architecture does not reproduce the forms of nature in as strict a sense as do poetry, painting, and sculpture is true; yet, as we shall find hereafter, its products are modeled upon these forms in as strict a sense as is the case in music. This art, like it, is evolved from the unfolding of the principles underlying nature's methods of formation even more than from a reproduction of its actual forms. And yet architecture does reproduce these latter. The portico of the Greek temple is acknowledged to be nothing more than an elaboration in stone, for the sake merely of elaborating its possibilities of beauty, of the rude wooden building with a roof supported by posts, which was used by the primitive man in his natural state. A Chinese or Japanese temple or palace, with its many separate small structures, each covered by a roof sagging downward from the apex before moving upward again at the eaves, is

nothing more than an elaboration in wood, for the sake of elaborating the possibilities of beauty in it, of the rude tent used by the nomadic ancestors of these people in their primitive natural states. That Gothic columns and arches are merely imitative elaborations, for the same reason, of the methods and manners of support suggested by arrangements of rows of tree-trunks and their branches, has been strenuously denied and even ridiculed. But the fact remains that an avenue of trees with bending branches invariably suggests the effect of a Gothic cathedral. If so, why could it not have suggested the conception of a Gothic cathedral to the architect who first planned one? . . . There is nothing in the art itself necessarily removing it from a sphere identical with that of painting and sculpture. Its products, it is true, must fulfil the purely technical principles of mechanical contrivance. But so must works of music fulfil the principles of harmony, to say nothing of the technique of execution. So must works of poetry or painting or sculpture fulfil the principles of grammar, rhythm, rhyme, color, or proportion. But in all these arts equally the fulfilment of such laws is only a means to an end. That end is the distinctively human satisfaction derived from elaborating forms in excess of that which is demanded in order to meet the exigencies of material utility, elaborating them simply because they are felt to be attractive and beautiful in themselves.—*Art in Theory*, VIII.

ARCHITECTURE, EXPRESSIVE OF CHARACTER (*see also* ARCHITECTURE REPRESENTATIVE, MORALITY AS INFLUENCED BY ARCHITECTURE, *and* SKYSCRAPERS).

Is it too much to say that subtle analysis may occasionally find reason to suspect that it is the lack of the good and the true in American manhood, that causes the lack of the beautiful in the American city street or college campus? Is it this lack in character that destroys the symmetry of adjoining buildings by throwing the cornice of the last comer just enough above that of its fellows to produce the effect—and for a similar reason—of the feather that stands straighter and higher than any surrounding it, in the head-gear of the uncivilized Indian? And then, besides the outlines, think for a moment of the inharmony of the colors!—sometimes of the paint, sometimes of the brick and stone, imported too, at great expense from distant

places, to afford another opportunity for the snob's exhibition of himself! The whole method of procedure is as fatal to the requirements of sound æsthetics as of neighborly courtesy.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XXIV.

ARCHITECTURE, FRAUD IN (*see also* ORNAMENT).

Is it not about time that mansard roofs and wooden cornices, which are no real roofs or cornices at all, with their various mouldings almost as light as if intentionally curled into shavings, should be committed to the flames, once and forever? This is said not merely because they are frauds, but because they are—what in art is worse—palpable frauds, frauds clearly seen to afford no legitimate conclusion whatever to a wall of stone,—donkey's ears protruding where they are clearly seen to have no connection with the body under them.—*Idem*.

A more radical and, for this reason, thorough way of correcting the error would be to avoid all deceit, and, in accordance with the method in art sometimes termed sincerity (*see* page 407), to arrange the materials in such ways that the apparent support would be the real support. In an age of iron, why should not the iron be shown, and allowed to reveal its genuine character? If a roof be really supported by steel girders, why should not the steel be visible? A ceiling of wood, revealing its natural colors and grainings, resting on beams of polished or nickel-plated steel, might be made to have effects, both as regards material and color, in the highest sense chaste and beautiful. The metal might even be ornamented and as legitimately too as if it were bronze.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XVIII.

ARCHITECTURE INFLUENCED BY A ONE-SIDED THEORY.

Fifteen years ago everybody in Boston was talking about "sincerity" in art. As applied to building a house, this meant that every respective bath-room, or closet, or staircase should be indicated on the exterior by a significantly constructed window, or blank space, or protuberance,—a thoroughly sound principle so far as it was applicable. But with the narrowness and the lack, in a distinctive sense, of *comprehension* characterizing the artistic notions of our country, the principle was applied to everything—to every exterior effect, for instance, without any regard to any requirements of proportion or harmony. There followed

those developments of the "Queen Anne" style, which even the unbalanced conceptions of American criticism had sense enough to nickname "Bloody Mary" and "Crazy Jane." Probably, however, even these were an advance upon the method pursued in the construction of the old Douglas Park University of Chicago, a huge Gothic building, the exterior of which is said to have been actually completed before any attempt had been made to decide upon the rooms or halls to be placed in the interior. Why should this not have been the case? In those days, when men wanted a meat market or a prison, they put up indiscriminately what was supposed to resemble either a Gothic cathedral or a Greek temple. There is no necessity of stopping to argue how far all buildings manifesting so partial a regard for the requirements of art rank below one in which the claims of both significance and form have been given due weight, whether it be a private house or a public hall, a villa on the Rhine or a cathedral at Cologne.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music; Introduction to Music as a Representative Art.*

The one thing which can enable an architect to produce that which, so long as it survives, may have a right to claim attention as, in its own style, a model, is this,—to bear in mind the double character of all artistic effects. Depending partly upon outward form, which mainly requires a practice of the method pursued in classic art, and partly upon the thought or design embodied in the form, which mainly requires a practice of the method pursued in romantic art, these artistic effects appeal partly to the outward senses and partly to the inward mind; and only when they appeal to both are the highest possibilities of any art realized.—*Art in Theory*, III.

ARCHITECTURE INFLUENCED BY FORMS IN NATURE.

The simple truth seems to be that the changes from the style of building determined by the use of the horizontal line, the circular arch, and the pointed arch, were not caused merely by the necessities of construction, . . . but also by the appearances of similar forms in nature. The exact effect given to the nave of a Gothic cathedral cannot be attributable merely to a development of methods of construction, nor to an imitation of cheaper buildings. It is of the same character as that which has been shown to

be true of any representation of natural objects when first attempted. We merely associate the nave with the natural appearances which it only suggests.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XXI.

One of the most charming features in connection with the castles on the Rhine, for instance, is their apparent correspondence—always in the nature and color of the building-material, and sometimes in outline—to the demands of the surrounding scenery. Art seems in them to have simply carried out the suggestions of nature. Indeed, had we time for it, it would be interesting to study the extent to which such suggestions have influenced those who have originated different styles of architecture. On the borders of the Nile, where the eye must see constantly the low and seldom undulating lines of the horizon giving way to the clean-cut limits of an almost cloudless sky, where man learns of uniformity mainly through the squarely shaped limbs of the cactus and the palm, the proudest achievement of Egyptian architecture seems to have been to chisel angular outlines like those of the pyramids, and to embody an ideal of symmetry in the stiff smile of the sphynx. But just across the sea, amid the same clearness of atmosphere, yet surrounded by a more generous guise of objects on the earth, that heave heavenward through grand hills and bend genially down amid the shadows of mysterious groves, have been reared the no less distinctly outlined but far more varied and symmetrical column and capital of the Grecian temple. Beyond this land again, amid the vapory climate of the north, where on either side the high horizon reaches up in outlines indistinct, that blend with mountains existing often only in the clouds, the child of storm and fog has drawn the hazy lines that sprout and branch out into pinnacle and spire above the spirit whose ideal of architecture seems complete alone when he is gazing upward toward his lofty Gothic arch and finial. To-day, in our own land, with the experience and the models of the past to guide us, we may take our choice of any of these styles; and we can learn much from the study of them. But while we study them with care let us be sure that we are paying equal heed to the promptings of nature without us and within us. Let us be sure that we are not sometimes producing forms that are foreign to our own surroundings and demands, and are thus untrue to one of the first principles of the art in fulfil-

ment of which they are supposed to be constructed.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, xxiv.

Not without reason, certain critics insist that in choosing the material for the construction of a building, preference should be given to that which is natural to the district in which the building is to stand. They say, for instance, that in red sandstone districts it should be built of red sandstone; in a gray granite district, of gray granite; or in forests intended to be left in a rustic state, of logs left in a rustic state. The idea is that a building thus constructed will appear to be a part of the surrounding landscape, harmonizing with it in color, and, upon a nearer inspection, in material also. There is undoubtedly much in this, as applied to a country residence. But, evidently, all the truth that is in it, is there because it involves one more way of making architecture represent nature.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, xxi.

ARCHITECTURE INFLUENCED BY FORMS OF ART.

When our race, with no models to direct them, first began to build houses and temples, the external forms of each were determined by the design for which it was constructed,—a design suggested, as reflection will show that it must have been, by the modes of attaining in nature ends like those of support, protection, and shelter. This being the case, the desire to attain these ends was evident to every one who saw the building; in other words, the building's effects were artistic in the sense of being genuinely representative of the design of the builder.

In process of time, however, after many such structures had been erected, and some of them had come to be especially admired for their appearance, a class of artists arose more intent to imitate this appearance than the methods in accordance with which the older architects had designed the buildings and caused them to appear as they did. As a consequence, there came to be no apparent connection between the outward form of a building and that for which it was designed;—in other words, architecture ceased to be representative, in the sense in which the word has been used in this chapter. But besides this, after the arts of painting and sculpture had been developed, architects began to manifest a tendency to imitate the methods, if not the

appearances, employed in these arts.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, xxvii.

Fergusson ascribes inferiority to modern architecture as contrasted with mediæval,—though he does not employ these words,—because of the prevailing tendency in this art to derive its methods from painting and sculpture rather than from the natural promptings and requirements of architecture itself. This tendency often causes the builder to be entirely satisfied with an “elevation” that merely makes a satisfactory picture when drawn on paper. But, as will be shown in the volume of this series entitled “Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color,” the requirements of perspective often prevent the parts of a building, which, when so drawn, seem to fulfil the principles of proportion from fulfilling them when put into the building itself. Besides this, the tendency leads to other forms of confusion between the kinds of conceptions appropriate for producing effects in this art and of conceptions that find legitimate expression in the other arts only. One element of successful architecture undoubtedly is the mere external appearance of a building. And yet, if this alone be regarded, is it not evident that the building, according as it is constructed with exclusive reference to its position or proportions, will be the embodiment of a motive less legitimate distinctively to architecture than to landscape-gardening, painting, or sculpture? And is it not because of this confusion of motives that we find in our modern buildings—in their cornices, roofs, windows, and walls—so much that is false, in other words, so much that is merely on the outside, put there to look well, not to fulfil or to give embodiment to any such significance as it is the peculiar function of architecture to represent? This is not to say that, in this art, the external form should violate the laws of proportion or harmony; but it is to say that these latter should be made subordinate to the general design, that they should cause the outlines to be so disposed as to indicate this design, and not, as is true in too many cases, to conceal it.—*Idem*, xxvii.

ARCHITECTURE, MODERN, CAN BE ORIGINAL (*see also ORIGINALITY IN ARCHITECTURE*).

It is often urged that, in our age and country, no new style of architecture can be originated. With reference

to this, something has been said already on page 95 of "Art in Theory," on pages 206 and 293 of "The Genesis of Art-Form," on pages 330 and 406 of "Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts," and on page 227 of the present volume. It may be said here that probably we can find no other ways of bridging openings made for doors and windows than those which have been in vogue for centuries, and which have already determined the chief characteristics of the Greek, Romanesque, and Gothic styles, namely, the horizontal lintel, the round arch, and the pointed arch, and that probably also the necessity of securing correspondence in architecture must continue to cause all other outlines in our buildings to resemble these. Yet while this is true, it must also be true that in every period in which there is progress, progress is possible in art.

Our own age has made an advance upon all preceding ones in two regards which should have, and already have had, some influence upon our architecture. These are the development of our mineral resources and of the facilities of transportation. The one has converted iron, together with various combinations and modifications of it, into a building material, and the other has lined our streets with structures of stone and brick exhibiting every variety of color. One can scarcely believe otherwise than that if one half of the thought expended on the Parthenon were expended upon incorporating the suggestions and possibilities derived from these two facts, we might originate an architectural style of our own which would become as classic and deserve to be as much admired as that of the Greeks. Iron used for the walls of buildings is inartistic. It looks like an imitation of stone produced by wood and paint, while it is standing; and it cracks, curls, melts, and ceases to stand as soon as a fire of any magnitude begins to heat it. But, used for roofs, it is more in place; and, where so used, the most economical and convenient shape that can be chosen for it is often the most beautiful. A correspondence between its arching forms and like forms in the stone- or brick-work underneath it, might give rise to a style equally novel and attractive.

See what is said on page 330 of "Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts," with reference to methods of letting iron be seen in ceilings. Besides this, iron can span immense spaces, and this fact renders the

columns characterizing the Gothic, and to some extent, the Greek structures as much out of the way architecturally in some of our modern buildings, as, with our modern uses, they are in the way optically. Large interiors, however, containing few or no columns, necessitate very artistic treatment of the wall-spaces. Otherwise, everything seems too airy and cold. Arrangements of mouldings and spaces can do something toward preventing such effects, but careful attention to the requirements of decorative art can do more. Nor in such cases should efforts be confined merely to painting. Decorative color, to be permanent, should be resident in the material used; and here, in treating both exterior and interior walls, architects might avail themselves of our modern facilities for transportation. Pictures have been made of mosaics, but few great buildings have been constructed on the principle of using differently colored bricks and stones and harmonizing them according to the principles of decorative painting.

Probably an architect who should undertake to erect such a building would be considered audacious; and, unless the materials and colors were judiciously chosen—not too brilliant or diversified—and were arranged in strict fulfilment of the principle that like classes of forms should be characterized by like classes of substances and hues, and were grouped in masses large enough to give dignity to the effect—probably the result would prove this opinion to be correct. Yet a great genius might produce something with a beauty as unique and successful as was the earliest Gothic church in its day, and surpassing the beauty of most of our buildings as much as the frescoed interiors of the present New York merchants' houses surpass the white-washed walls of their Knickerbocker ancestors. Color is certainly an element of beauty. Why should it not be recognized as such in architecture? Even the Greeks acknowledged the fact. It is known now that the marble of the Parthenon, unsurpassed as it is in its capabilities for receiving polish, was painted. But the painting has perished. Used on exteriors, it always does perish. Can no imperishable colors be used thus? They can. In a country where brick and stone of all possible compositions and colors can be collected from all quarters at comparatively slight expense, one can imagine churches, halls, streets, entire cities, wholly different in hue and general appearance

from any that have ever existed, built of material destined to remain unchanged as long as the pyramids, and, for a longer time, to continue to be models.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, xxv.

ARCHITECTURE, REPRESENTATIVE (*see mention of architecture under REPRESENTATION and REPRESENTATIVE*).

In the age in which the Greek temples were constructed, other artists believed—and why not the architect?—that a man should study upon a product, if he intended to have it remain a model for all the future. Is it not natural to suppose that in such an age the structural arrangements intended to counteract optical defects, or to produce optical illusions, or, as some think, to produce, in connection with these, effects of variety or of vagueness in line or outline, were largely the results of the individual experiments of individual builders? If not such results, why were they invariably different in different buildings? But if they were such, the predominating motive in the mind of the artist was not to imitate any particular form that he had seen before, so much as to represent its general effect. Thus, from the beginning of architecture in which we see the builder taking suggestions from primitive huts or from the trunks and branches of trees in nature, to the highest stage of its development, where we see him taking suggestions from the works of previous architects, we find him, in the degree in which he is a great artist, representing rather than imitating.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, vi.

ARCHITECTURE, REPRESENTATIVE OF THOUGHT.

A building, in just as true a sense as a poem, a symphony, a picture, or a statue, is the embodied expression of an idea. In architecture, this idea is a plan. It is sown, so to speak, in a particular locality; and there straightway it springs into walls, branches into wings, leaves into doors and windows, flowers into capstones and roofs, and sometimes filaments into spires.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, xxiv.

If the internal arrangements are to determine the external ones, as must evidently be the case in all logical construction, then, in the degree in which this principle is carried out artistically, *i. e.*, in such a way as to be made apparent in the form, that which is on the inside must be represented on the outside. In other words, a building to be made

expressive of the thought, which, in this case, would mean the design of the artist, must have an external appearance which manifests the internal plan.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XVIII.

Walls in which there are doors, windows, and projections such as pilasters, pillars, buttresses, or string-courses,—and the same is true of foundations, porches, and roofs,—awaken as much more interest than do blank walls, as bodies do when infused with a soul having the power to express thought and feeling than they do when they are merely corpses. Of course, too, the more clearly the architectural features reveal not only that there is thought and purpose behind them, but what this thought and purpose is, the more successful is the result.—*Idem*, XVIII.

A traveler, judging merely from appearances, may say with reference to the methods of construction, that some particular pillar, bracket, lintel, arch, was shaped and placed as it is in order to furnish just the support needed for some particular weight or arrangement of material which is over it. Or he may say that some particular foundation was laid as it is in order to suit some particularly rocky, sandy, or marshy soil; or that some particular roof was pitched as it is in order to fit a dry or a wet climate, to shed rain or snow. Or, judging from arrangements of doors or windows, he may say, with reference to the general uses of a building, that some particular part is an audience hall, a chapel, or a picture gallery. Even if he find nothing except foundations, he can often declare this to be a theatre, and that to be a temple, or a bath, or a private house; and not only so, but sometimes, as at Pompeii, he can tell the uses of each of the different rooms of the house.

Observe that, in all these ways, it is possible for a building to be representative; moreover, that just in the degree in which it is so, the interest awakened by it is enhanced. It then comes to have the same effect upon us that would be produced did its builder stand by us and tell us exactly what his thoughts were when designing the arrangement that we see. It is as if he were to say: "I had a conception that it would be a good idea in this position to have an arch projected so, or a ceiling supported by a bracket inserted so; or a foundation in soil like this laid so; or a roof in a climate like this shaped so; or a chapel for a sect like this planned so; or an audience hall for an assembly like

this arranged so." And the more one knows of architecture, the more innumerable will he recognize to be the thoughts, and, in the degree in which ornamentation is increased, the æsthetic feelings that it is possible for the architect to represent through these apparently lifeless forms of wood or brick or stone.—*Idem*, XVII.

ARCHITECTURE, ROMAN *vs.* GREEK (*see under* COMPARISON).

One or two other statements of Vitruvius may be of interest. But while reading them it is important to bear in mind that their significance lies not in the figures given but in the general principle which they exemplify. The figures are Roman, the principle is Greek. Greek architecture was original, and apparently, for reasons already indicated, what might be termed independent and individual. Roman architecture was imitative, and, as these quotations from Vitruvius show, traditional and mechanical. The principles that the Greeks sought to carry out in a spirit of freedom, the Romans sought to carry out in servility to the letter; and it is as true in art as in religion that "the letter killeth."—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, xv.

ARCHITECTURE *vs.* PAINTING AND SCULPTURE.

The painter and the sculptor observe nature for the purpose of reproducing its forms; the architect, for the purpose of producing a new and different form, for which, as a whole, nature furnishes no copy. In his work the contrast between the product and nature is often so complete that the one no longer, as in the case of painting, necessarily suggests the other. Although the shapes of the foundations, pillars, capitals, arches, roofs, chimneys, or towers of a building may suggest reminiscences of nature, they are constructed almost invariably as if the architect had forgotten what was the particular appearance of anything that had inspired his forms. He is influenced somewhat by nature, but much more by his own mind, which works with the least possible artistic regard for nature's dispositions of the forms that he uses. If these forms be beautiful, it is less because they are the same in detail as those found in nature, than because they are the same in principle, because they are controlled by the same general laws that underlie all appearances and combinations of them that are naturally pleasing.—*Art in Theory*, XIX.

ARCHITECTURE, WHY STYLES SHOULD NOT BE MIXED.

The world may improve in art as in other things. Yet, as every thinker knows, all improvements are in the nature of developments that are made in strict accordance with fixed laws. We have found that scientific classification, as well as artistic construction, demands that like be put with like. This demand is beyond the reach of any human power that may seek to change it. It exists in the constitution of the mind. No architect can disregard it, and produce a building satisfactory to men in general. No building has ever obtained and preserved a reputation as a work of art, in which this requirement has been neglected. . . . The true reason, therefore, for not introducing the forms of Greek, Romanesque, and Gothic architecture into the same building, is that, as a rule, such a course is fatal to unity of effect. These principal styles and some of the subordinate styles developed from them differ so essentially that to blend them is to cause confusion in the form where the mind demands intelligibility, which, so far as our present line of thought is applicable, means something in which many repetitions of similar appearances reveal that all are parts of the same whole. Buildings in which there are very few, if any, forms alike, are not, whatever else they may be, works of art.—*The Genesis of Art-Form*, XII.

So far as the appearance of forms alone is concerned, there is no reason why certain features of the Greek style should not accompany certain of the Gothic. To use them together would not violate in the least the fundamental principle of art, that like forms should be put together. At the same time, to do so would cause art to associate features that have come to be clearly dissociated in the mind. For this reason, it is possible that, as long as the world lasts, no artist can mix them extensively without suggesting to some an amount of incongruity wholly inconsistent with those effects of *unity* invariably present in arts of the highest character.—*Idem*, IX.

Under all the arts are certain principles that successful products need to exemplify. As applied to building, for instance, it is not because the Gothic artist did not mix horizontal with arched coverings for windows that it should not be done to-day. Our artists should be actuated by a higher motive than imitation. What they should avoid

is a violation of the principle exemplified by the Gothic builders, which principle is to put, wherever it is possible, like with like. It was pointed out in Chapter XVII of "The Genesis of Art-Form" that in strict accordance with this principle, as it is applied in all the other arts, there might be a legitimate style in which, from the lower storey up, the acuteness of the arches in each storey would be gradually increased; also, that in these days of easy and extensive methods of transportation, there might be a legitimate style, in which, through the use of stones or of other materials of different hues, the effects of contrast in coloring could be produced, even on exteriors.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XXI.

The use of color enters largely into effects in painting, and much imitation of natural forms characterizes both painting and sculpture. Neither fact is true of architecture. Its effects are often confined to those of forms alone. This makes these of supreme importance. Its forms, moreover, are originated by the artist. This makes it easy to have them such as interfere with what may be called the natural requirements of art. For both reasons, the architect needs to be exceedingly careful in his work. A painter has but to copy a tree as he sees it in nature, and every part of it will be consonant. The leaves or branches will differ in size and shape and, in the autumn, at least, differ sufficiently in color to suggest differences in combination and material. But, comparing leaf with leaf and branch with branch, the same principle of formation will so manifest itself in every part of the tree that no one who sees it can doubt that each belongs to the same organism. A building should appear to be as much a unity in this sense as a tree. Exact repetition of the same forms, as already explained, would always make it seem thus. But, in architecture, exact repetition is not always possible; nor even, if we wish to produce thoroughly natural effects, desirable. The method that is both possible and desirable is *consonance*. A moment's reflection will reveal, too, that there are certain very simple devices of arrangement which necessarily secure this effect. It ought to reveal, also, that the effect is important enough to make even a child notice the defects in cases in which it is neglected.—*The Genesis of Art-Form*, XV.

ART.

Nature made human, or nature re-made by the human mind, is, of course, a very broad definition of art—one that scarcely begins to suggest all that is needed for a full understanding of the subject. But it is one that all can accept, and therefore it will serve as a starting-point for what is to follow.—*Art in Theory*, 1.

ART, ÆSTHETIC (*see also* ÆSTHETICS, MEANING OF).

Æsthetic Art is the use of natural forms that seem beautiful for the expression of human thoughts and emotions; or, as we may say, it is natural beauty adapted to the formulation of human sentiment.—*Notes Taken in a Lecture*.

Æsthetic art, when possessed of the finest and highest qualities, from its first conception in the mind to its last constructive touch in the product, is a result of a man's imagination giving audible or visible embodiment to his thoughts or emotions by representing them in a form traceable to material or human nature, which form attracts him on account of its beauty, and is selected and elaborated by him into an artistic product in accordance with the imaginative exercise of comparison or of association, modified, when necessary, so as to meet the requirements of factors which can be compared or associated in only a partial degree.—*The Essentials of Æsthetics*, XVIII.

ART AND BEAUTY (*see also* NATURE, TRUTH TO).

Of course the word *art* may be broadly ascribed to anything that is made, especially by way of imitation; and, therefore, the term artistic may properly designate any product of this kind. But the word has also a more limited meaning,—the meaning that we all recognize when found in the terms *the fine arts*, or *les beaux arts*. When this is its meaning, the objects that art imitates must be, predominately at least, beautiful, and the product itself must introduce ugliness, or its concomitant, impurity, only subordinately;—by way, so to speak, of contrast, by way of shading that offsets brightness. A good deal that is true to life is not true to the beautiful in life; and, therefore, contrary to the opinion of these writers, is philosophically out of place in the highest art. Of course, this principle, if applied, would rule out of the highest rank a number of our modern plays—some of those by Ibsen, Sudermann, Hauptmann, and d'Annunzio. If so, they ought to be ruled out. The principle is one that no one who thinks

correctly can fail to accept; and, as proved by the survival of interest in Greek art, it is the only principle that all people, at all times, can be expected to accept.—*Essay on Art and Morals*,

In the preceding chapter an endeavor was made to show that art of the highest or finest quality involves three things: first, a reproduction of the phenomena of nature, especially of its sights and sounds; second, an expression of the thoughts and emotions of the artist; and, third, an embodiment of both these other features in an external product like a symphony, a poem, a painting, a statue, a building. The question now arises whether we should not make further limitations with reference to the sights or sounds of nature with which the highest art has to deal. . . . The question . . . suggests that when a man not for a useful but, . . . for an æsthetic end, reproduces these, he must do so mainly because something about them has instructed, attracted, and, as we say, charmed him. There is one word which we are accustomed to apply to any form, whether of sight or of sound that attracts and charms us. It is the word beautiful. . . . It seems to be conceded that arts of the highest class should reproduce mainly, at least, and some seem to think solely, such phenomena of nature as are beautiful.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, II.

It is only when an effect, whether appealing to the ear or eye, exerts a subtle charm upon the mind and spirit that it influences a man sufficiently to cause him to desire to reproduce it. But what is it that exerts this subtle charm upon the mind and spirit? It must be something, of course, connected with the appearance or form; for it is this, presumably, which is imitated. But charm exerted by appearance or form is due, as a rule, to that which men ordinarily associate with the term *beauty*. . . . "The beautiful arts," "the fine arts," "*the arts*," as we term them, are those in which a man gives expression to the excess within him of mental and spiritual, or, as we may say, intellectual and emotional vitality through a representation of effects exerting that subtle charm which, as a rule, is traceable only to appearances having what is called beauty.—*Art in Theory*, VIII.

Facts do not confirm any theory to the effect that all the features chosen for art should be beautiful. The most that can be said is that in the main they should be so;

and that those which are not so should be introduced only in order, by way of contrast, to enhance the beauty of others with which they are combined.—*Idem*, x.

Art, as a product of the imagination, always involves more or less use of imagery, as in the imitations of painting and sculpture, and the figures of speech in poetry, to say nothing of more subtle representings in music and architecture. This fact renders it possible often for the artist to introduce beauty into his treatment of subjects which, in themselves, are not beautiful. We see this illustrated often in the colors or carvings of pictures, statues, or buildings, and in the similes and metaphors of poems. Notice the following reference to hostile footsteps heard through the darkness of a midnight tempest in a jungle:

There seems human rhythm in this hell.
What hot pursuit is it comes burning through
These crackling branches?—*The Aztec God*.

And this description of the approach of a threatening storm:

It came like a boy who whistles first
To warn of his form that shall on us burst,
As if nature feared to jar the heart
By joys too suddenly made to start.

—*The Last Home Gathering*.

—*Notes Taken in a Lecture*.

Everybody admits that art is an embodiment of the ideal. Whoever heard of an ideal that was not characterized by beauty? Everybody admits, too, that art is of benefit to individuals or communities in the degree in which it cultivates in them ideality. How could it cultivate this, where it presented no ideal because no beauty? Of what use to humanity could art be, where all that could cause it to be of any use whatever was left out of it?—*Idem*.

ART AS MENTAL AND SPIRITUAL.

Art is a form produced by a man, and a man is not yet a spirit. He may have spiritual instincts tending, in a vague way, toward a recognition and production of the beautiful; but, as a man, with a human mind working in a consciously rational way, he knows nothing about form except as he may perceive it in the external world, of the appearances of which alone he is conscious. Nor can he produce form, except so far as he recombines those factors

of it which have already been created for him in this external world. One hears a man talk to himself, and he imitates the general form of the talk in a lyric. He hears men talk together, and he imitates the general effect in a drama. He hears them hum, and he imitates the general effect in a melody. He looks at scenery and a human figure, and he imitates the general effect in a painting or a statue. He notices the methods in nature of protection, support, and shelter, and he imitates the general effect in a building. So far as a man is an artist, *i. e.*, a being who works by intellection as well as by inspiration, it is always nature that furnishes his model. Especially is this true of that which, in art, is beautiful. There is no beauty without form. There is no form except in visible or audible nature. There is no beauty of form that is not suggested in connection with an observation of nature. This applies not only to the general outlines of art-form, but to the details of its elaboration—to rhythm, proportion, tone, color, and the harmony of tone and color. All these, in their perfected phases, are developments of certain great laws of appearance which have to do with the pleasurable or disagreeable effects produced upon the nervous organization of the eye or ear, or, through suggestion, of the mind itself. There are many physical and psychical elements which, in certain circumstances, enter into the requirements of beauty; but of all these a man knows with certainty only so far as he may study their effects in material nature. What then?—Is beauty merely an attribute of matter?—a superficial quality? Is Plato wholly wrong? Has the idea, the spiritual force which he supposes to be the cause of the expression, no influence? Just the contrary may be true. But so far as the idea appeals to the mind, it can become an object of conscious thought only when embodied in material nature . . . and any one who has faith in the Creative Spirit has faith to believe that the arrangements of nature are such that a thoughtful mind will not fail to find illustrated in them exactly those principles and laws which are suited for one's highest mental and spiritual requirements. Art in reproducing the appearances and methods of nature continues and develops their mental and spiritual effects. In the lyric, the play, the novel, the picture, the statue,—and always in the degree in which the imitation of nature is exact,—art widens the experience

of men with the same influence upon the mind that would be produced by actual experience, making them wiser, more sympathetic, more charitable; in short, more humane. . . .

Art is the expression of human thought and feeling in the terms of nature. This expression is never merely communicative, nor merely imitative. It is always both. It is representative. Art embodies truth, not dogmatically but imaginatively, and its influence is exerted not by way of dictation, but of suggestion. Therefore, art does not, cannot, and should not take the place—as Plato seems to suppose that it may—of either philosophy, ethics, or theology. All these together cannot produce upon conception or emotion the cultural effects of æsthetics. It is well, therefore, to let the latter do its own work, as also to acknowledge the value of this work when it is done well.—*Art in Theory*, Appendix II.

ART, BREADTH OF ITS RESOURCES.

Indeed, the resources that may be utilized in art are practically infinite. No man can observe so much as to see any facts outside the limits of its sphere. No man can reflect so much as to arrive at any conclusions beyond its powers of expression. No man can be so much as not to have mind and spirit lifted to greater heights through its inspiration.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XIII.

ART, EXPRESSING THOUGHT THROUGH IMITATION.

Are there any products which, however materially useful they may subsequently prove to be, are, at any rate, not planned, primarily, for the purpose of being useful? Of course, there is but one answer to this question. Such products are plentiful. Moreover, it is one invariable characteristic of all of them that in certain features, to a certain extent, their appearances are left in the condition in which they are found in nature. This is the case even with factors of a musical melody. The composer accepts the different elements of movement and pitch as they come to him, rendering them more useful not even by adding to them articulation. Much more is the same fact evident in poetry, the imitative, figurative, or descriptive language of which is recognized to be successful according to the degree of fidelity with which it recalls the sights of nature. So too with the products of painting, sculpture, and of the ornamental parts, at least, of architecture. Were forms

in these arts—and in principle the statement is applicable to the arts of sound also—shaped or combined, as are most implements and machines, into appearances wholly unnatural, they would necessarily suggest a material end intended to be accomplished by them. But this they do not suggest, for the very reason that their appearances are not changed from those that are presented in nature. Here then we come upon a clear point of agreement between the arts that are the most finely and distinctively *forms of nature*, and those that are the most finely and distinctively *human*. There is an indissoluble connection between employing in a product the appearances of nature and having it in a condition in which it will pre-eminently direct attention to the fact that it is used for the sole purpose of giving expression to thought or feeling. An artificially shaped machine or implement at once suggests the question, "What can it do?" But a drawing or carving never suggests this question, but rather, "What did the man who made this think about it, or of it, that he should have reproduced it?"—*Art in Theory*, VI.


ART FOR ART'S SAKE.

Whenever one uses a form either of sound or of sight in order through it to express thought or feeling, a natural tendency of mind causes him after a little to become interested in the form and to develop its possibilities for its own sake. It is this tendency that leads to all art; and the fact furnishes a degree of justification, though not to the extent that is sometimes urged, for the maxim that enjoins interest in "art for art's sake," even if by art, in this sense, be meant that merely which has to do with the representation of form. The truth of this statement is especially easy to recognize as applied to painting and sculpture, partly because in them it is so evidently essential to have the forms exactly imitative of those of nature, and partly because, before the imitation necessitated can be successful, it so evidently requires careful and scientific study. These considerations do not justify a lack of interest in the significance which a form may be made to express; but they do necessitate, on the part of all who wish to understand the subject, some knowledge, if not of a painter's technique, at least of his technical aims. Only in the degree in which men have this knowledge, can they estimate a painting from an artist's point of view, or have a right to

an opinion concerning its workmanship.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XVI.

“ART IN THEORY,” ANALYSIS OF THE BOOK.

(*Recapitulation.*) In the introductory volume, “Art in Theory,” an attempt was made to derive a true conception of the requirements of art from a study of certain facts and opinions concerning it acknowledged by all, or held by writers of authority. Guided by these criteria, nature was first distinguished from art, and then the lower arts from the higher. It was found that an essential characteristic of these latter is what is known as form, but in their cases a form producing always two apparently different effects, one derived from an imitation of external phenomena, and the other from a communication of thoughts and emotions. The first effect, tending to emphasize the form in itself, was said to be mainly, though by no means exclusively, characteristic of classic art, and the second effect, tending to emphasize the significance in the form, was said to be mainly characteristic of romantic art. It was also argued that the emphasizing of either of these tendencies, if carried so far as to involve a neglect of the other of them, is fatal to artistic excellence. In indicating, then, the conception of artistic aims best tending to preserve the equilibrium between the two tendencies, it was pointed out that art neither imitates nor communicates in the most practically effective ways. Because aiming to do both, its chief aim cannot be to do either the one or the other. Art represents natural phenomena, as one may say, as a means of representing thoughts and emotions. Or, to express this differently, art emphasizes representation, developing and elaborating the factors of it in nature, and the possibilities of it in the mind. But in doing this, art is using the same means and continuing the same modes of expression as those that are attributed by men to the creative and divine intelligence. The impulse to art, therefore, may be considered creative and divine. But as it neither imitates nor communicates in the most usefully effective way, we must trace it less to the useful than to the non-useful and so to what in elementary phases is called the play-impulse. This play-impulse, even in dogs and kittens, to say nothing of apes, tends to the imitation of that which seems interesting,



A Maori Festival, New Zealand

See pages 9, 10, 11, 73, 81-85, 88, 89, 91, 147, 148, 162, 227, 385

attractive, and charming in one's surroundings. The same impulse, when turned in the direction of art, inasmuch as this always involves the use of form, tends also to imitation. But an imitation of that which is interesting, attractive, and charming in form, especially in form communicating to mind and spirit the suggestions of a creative and divine impulse, is nothing more nor less than a reproduction of what men, when using the term in its highest sense, mean by beauty. What is there in beauty, however, that it should be used by the art-impulse when giving expression to the mental and spiritual? A review, which follows, of the history of opinion on the subject, reveals that the effects of beauty are well-nigh universally attributed—not always explicitly but certainly implicitly—in part to form, but in part also to significance suggested by the form. In other words, the charm exerted by beauty is exerted partly upon the senses, because the elements of the form harmonize with one another and with the physiological requirements of the ear or eye, and partly upon the mind, because the suggestions of these elements harmonize with psychological requirements. The consequent definition reached is, that "Beauty is a characteristic of any complex form of varied elements, producing apprehensible unity (*i. e.*, harmony or likeness) of effects (1) upon the motive organs of sensation in the ear or eye, or (2) upon the emotive sources of imagination in the mind, or (3) upon both the one and the other." There are the best of reasons, therefore, why a creative and divine impulse tending to imitation should reproduce beauty, the mere existence of which alone may involve that appeal to the mental and spiritual nature which is made by what we term significance. But we must not forget that in art the mind may do more than represent significance as a secondary consideration, which would be the case did it do so merely because, by way of accident, as it were, a certain significance was necessarily suggested by the form used. The mind often represents thoughts and emotions as a primary consideration,—that is, it decides upon them first, and, afterwards, selects the forms through which to communicate them. We are obliged, therefore, to know something about the ways in which the mind communicates or represents thoughts or emotions through any forms whatever, irrespective of their being characterized by beauty. The remainder of the book shows how, at

different stages of the influence exerted by precisely the same external phenomena, entirely different phases of conscious thoughts and emotions are aroused to activity. This activity is analyzed into that which primarily is instinctive or spontaneous, is reflective or responsive, or is a blending of both the others in what may be termed the instinctively reflective or the emotive. It is shown that for every phase of activity there is only one natural form of expression; and that it is this form and no other which, when artistically developed, *i. e.*, developed with reference to beauty, finds appropriate embodiment in one of the five arts of Music, Poetry, Painting, Sculpture, or Architecture.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, xxvi.

ART, ITS GENERAL EFFECTIVENESS.

Other products of men, products that are not distinctively works of arts, sometimes have marvellous effects. A machine, a galvanic battery, can electrify a body just bereft of life into movements for a moment almost deceiving the senses into surmising life's return. But what are such effects to those of art? men ask. What else but it can put such spirit into matter which never yet had life that the vitality can remain forever?—More than this, what else can reach outside the forms in which it is embodied, and electrify all beings that have souls? And when one yields to arts of this kind, the highest homage that can be bestowed upon the products of intelligence and skill, to himself, at least, he seems to do so, recognizing not alone that the finest and most distinctive qualities of mind have been expended on them; not alone that they have issued from an intellect exerting all its power, throned in the regal right of all its functions; not alone that they have involved activities of mind at the sources of the useful and of the ornamental arts combined. But he does so, because he feels that such activities, when exercised conjointly, adjusting thought to form and form to thought, necessitate, even aside from any other consideration, a quality of action that is not the same as that manifested by either of these activities, when not combined. Gunpowder and a match give neither of the two, nor both. No wonder then that mental possibilities, united as in art, suggest a force and brilliancy different in kind from that exhibited in any other sphere. "I tell you," said King Henry VIII. to a noble-

man who had brought him an accusation against the painter Holbein, "I tell you, of seven peasants I can make as many lords, but of seven lords I could not make one Holbein."—*Art in Theory*, VII.

ART, ITS HUMANIZING EFFECTS (*see under CULTURE*).

What a rebuke to the bigotry and the cruelty of the Middle Ages are the countless products of the arts of those periods, pleading constantly to the eye against the savage customs of the times for the sweet but little-practised virtues of justice and charity! Within our own century, too, notwithstanding the traditions of society, the state, and the church, which have often exerted all their powers to uphold and perpetuate slavery, aristocracy, and sectarianism, recall how the modern novel chiefly, but assisted largely by the modern picture, has not only changed the whole trend of the world's thought with reference to these systems, but has contributed, more, perhaps, than any other single cause, to the practical reorganization of them, in accordance with the dictates of enlightened intelligence.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XI.

ART, THE CONNECTING LINK BETWEEN SCIENCE AND RELIGION (*see ANALOGY IN ART, also under CULTURE*).

The moment that thought transcends the sphere possible to knowledge, it gets out of the sphere of science. But, when it gets out of this, what sphere, so long as it continues to advance rationally, does it enter? What sphere but that of religion? And think how large a part of human experience—experience which is not a result of what can strictly be termed knowledge—is contained in this sphere! Where but in it can we find the impulses of conscience, the dictates of duty, the cravings for sympathy, the aspirations for excellence, the pursuit of ideals, the sense of unworthiness, the desire for holiness, the feeling of dependence upon a higher power, and all these together, exercised in that which causes men to walk by faith, and not by knowledge? The sphere certainly exists. Granting the fact, let us ask what it is that can connect with this sphere of faith the sphere of knowledge? Has any method yet been found of conducting thought from the material to the spiritual according to any process strictly scientific? Most certainly not. There comes a place where there is a great gulf fixed between the two. Now notice that the one

who leads the conceptions of men across this gulf must, like the great Master, never speak to them without a parable—*i. e.*, a parallel, an analogy, a correspondence, a comparison. Did you ever think of the fact that, scientifically interpreted, it is not true that God is a father, or Christ a son of God, or an elder brother of Christians, or the latter children of Abraham? These are merely forms taken from earthly relationships, in order to image spiritual relationships, which, except in imagination, could not in any way become conceivable. This method of conceiving of conditions, which may be great realities in the mental, ideal, spiritual realm, through the representation of them in material form, is one of the very first conditions of a religious conception. But what is the method? It is the artistic method. Unless this could be used, science would stop at the brink of the material with no means of going farther, and religion begin at the brink of the spiritual with no means of finding any other starting-point. Art differs from both science and religion in cultivating imagination instead of knowledge, as does the one, and instead of conduct, as does the other. But notice, in addition to what has been said of its being an aid to science, what an aid to religion is the artistic habit of looking upon every form in this material world as full of analogies and correspondences, inspiring conceptions and ideals spiritual in their nature, which need only the impulse of conscience to direct them into the manifestation of the spiritual in conduct. This habit of mind is what art, when legitimately developed, always produces. It not only necessitates, as applied to mere form—and in this it differs from religion and resembles science—great accuracy in observation, but also, as applied to that which the form images—and in this it differs from science and resembles religion—it necessitates the most exact and minute fulfilment of the laws of analogy and correspondence. These laws, which, because difficult and sometimes impossible to detect, some imagine not to exist, nevertheless do exist; and they give, not only to general effects, but to every minutest different element of tone, cadence, line, and color, a different and definite meaning, though often greatly modified, of course, when an element is differently combined with other elements.—*Essay on Art and Education.*

Science has to do mainly with matter, religion with spirit, and art with both; for by matter we mean the external world

and its appearances, which art must represent, and by spirit we mean the internal world of thoughts and emotions, which also art must represent. The foundations of art, therefore, rest in the realms both of science and of religion; and its superstructure is the bridge between them. Nor can you get from the one to the other, or enjoy the whole of the territory in which humanity was made to live, without using the bridge. Matter and spirit are like water and steam. They are separate in reality: we join them in conception. So with science and religion, and the conception which brings both into harmonious union is a normal development of only art.—*Idem*.

A religious conception cannot become artistic until imagination has presented it in a form which manifests an observation of external appearances and an information with reference to them as accurate, in some regards, as are those of science. Nor can a scientific conception become artistic before imagination has haloed it about with suggestions as inspired, in some regards, as are those of religion.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, VI.

ART vs. NATURE.

In the degree in which significance is thus introduced into a painting, it necessarily calls attention to something that could not be suggested by the objects if depicted merely as they exist in nature. This *something* is an effect of rearrangement in accordance with a mental purpose. The objects as reproduced in art are thus made representative of the artist, of man; and, therefore, it is that, in a true sense, the result may be said to belong to the humanities. If we could imagine a picture in which the imitation was so accurate that no one could tell the difference between it and nature, we should have a result that, on the surface would not reveal itself to be the product of a man. The effect would be indistinguishable from that of nature. But art is different from nature; and, interesting and desirable as is success in imitation, clever deception is not synonymous with artistic skill. It must not be forgotten that, beyond imitation, and not at all interfering with it, something else needs to be superimposed before the art-product can be crowned with that which is indicative of its having a right to the highest rank.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XIV.

ARTISTIC BASED UPON NATURAL REQUIREMENTS.

It is not meant to be maintained here that all architects who first used the dome or pointed spire, or windows with round or pointed arches, did so because they had personally seen among savage tribes similar constructions, which they consciously imitated. The same cause that, among the savages, would operate to make those using cheap material build with a round or pointed arch, would operate also among those using costly material. All that it is intended to maintain, is, that these several forms are first adopted in order to meet certain requirements of nature; and afterwards are imitated and ornamentally developed in order to meet artistic requirements.—*Idem*, XX.

ARTISTIC CONCEPTIONS NECESSITATE FORM.

A scientific formulation—mathematic or geometric, for instance—usually indicates the interdependence of the conditions for which it stands without conveying the slightest conception of their appearances. In the ideality which characterizes art, this is not so; the imagination conforms the ideas to the outlines of certain known objects, events, or experiences. Artistic conceptions are therefore necessarily connected in thought with form, *i. e.*, with a visible or audible effect which is referred to, or is imitated, in order to express them, as, in such cases, they must be expressed, by way of *representation*.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XII.

ARTISTIC NATURES (*see also* SENTIMENT).

All men have emotion. All may be strongly moved, and, in such circumstances, the minds of all may be subject to that subconscious action which is one source of imagination. But when we try to answer the question,—To what extent may one as compared with another be subject to this? we find the differences between men almost world-wide. We must conclude, therefore, that large numbers are by nature excluded from the sphere of action of the artist. They are too cautious, too much under the control of consciousness, or, as we say, self-consciousness, to give themselves up to the abandon of subconscious mental activity. It is not only great orators who lose themselves in their subjects before they become eloquent. Sculptors, painters, and musicians have a similar experience. "If you think how you are to

write," said Mozart, "you will never write anything worth hearing. I write because I cannot help it." Viewed in this light, we may trace to the power that Shakespeare and Goethe had of objectifying and so of forgetting themselves, not only the effects but the causes also of their greatness. It might be almost said that faith in the results of that which is beyond the sphere of consciousness enables one to reach the æsthetic paradise no less than the heavenly. Especially in these intensely practical times of factories and furnaces, what but the ability to preserve one's relationship with something hidden, with some ideal that cannot be smelt or touched, with something real though in realms of mystery,—what but this can keep the soul in a region where results of art are possible? And if some by nature be excluded from the sphere of action of the artist, it must be equally true that some by nature are included in it. And, now and then, their products may evince this fact. From the realm of their nativity they can be banished wholly neither by the deadening effects of practical life, nor by the lack of the quickening influences of æsthetic education.—*Idem*, XIII.

ARTISTIC *vs.* SCIENTIFIC MENTAL ACTION (*see* TEMPERAMENT).

All children, because their brains are active, are artistic in their tendencies. The very essence of artistic imitation is mimicry; and what child is entirely destitute of this? Very nearly all the young pass through a dramatic age, in which they flower into poetry; and whether the blossoms soon fade or bloom perennially depends mainly upon the permanence within them of the characteristics thus manifested. When men arrive at maturity, the artistic mind, as distinguished from the scientific, continues to form theories before it reasons them out, and to imagine truth before it investigates. If one naturally of an artistic temperament ever can reach results that are scientific, this term "scientific" cannot be applied to the movements of his mind preparatory to these. Instead of advancing step by step toward his end, he first jumps to his conclusions, and then turns backward to discover the intervening steps. Very difficult, too, as a rule, is his task in bringing these to the light. Through the mist-hung marshes which the wings of his imagination have borne him across, he must flounder on foot, picking his pathway painfully until he reach his

starting-point. Yet if he do not do this, his own explanations of what he has accomplished will be more apt to entitle him to rank as a visionary among idealists than as a guide among practical thinkers. Notice, nevertheless, that the method of mental action just described is that which is most allied to the method which the world usually attributes to genius. A genius perceives a specific effect in nature, and surmises thence a truth or principle which is generic. Newton is said to have surmised the law of gravitation from the sight of a single apple falling from a tree; and almost every one who has invented any kind of a machine has conceived of it as a whole before he has tried to construct its separate parts. As everywhere else, therefore, the difference indicated here between the artistic and the scientific mind is one of degree and not of kind. The artist works almost exclusively according to the method just indicated; so the world supposes that he must be a genius necessarily. The scientific man has very much to do besides surmising and inventing; so the world confines the title genius to the few scientific minds pre-eminent in doing these latter.—*Idem*, XIII.

ARTISTS' LOVE FOR THEIR OWN PRODUCTS.

The story of Pygmalion who fell in love with his own statue of Galatea is merely an artistic embodiment of the conception of the naturally emotive susceptibility of the true artist. It is doubtful if one of these ever lived who lacked the tendency developed in the tale. It is doubtful if one without the capacity for falling thoroughly in love with his own product could ever be an artist. God made men, as we are told, in His own image, and the highest manliness results when His spirit becomes incarnated in them. So the artist forms art in his own image; his works reflect his thought or feeling; and the highest excellence follows only in the degree in which his soul has found complete embodiment in them.—*Idem*, XIII.

ARTISTS NEED BREADTH OF CULTURE.

The highest result, as art is, of human intelligence and skill, it cannot be produced when only part of the highest possibilities of manhood are engaged upon it. It needs all the resources that a man can command, as well as all the facility that he can acquire through the education that enables him to command them.—*Idem*, xv.

ARTISTS, SOME SUCH BY NATURE.

Every art is developed by making a study of methods natural to exceptional men who, because they take to them naturally, do not need to cultivate them.—*Essay on Art and Logical Form*.

ARTISTS, THEIR STUDY OF NATURE.

Who does not acknowledge that one characteristic of all great artists, especially of those who are leaders in their arts, is the faithful study that they give to nature. We may not admire the social customs of ancient Greece that allowed its sculptors frequent opportunities to observe the unclothed forms of both the sexes; we may shrink from believing the story of a Guido murdering his model in order to prepare for a picture of the crucifixion; or of a David coolly sketching the faces of his own friends when put to death amid the horrors of the French Revolution; yet, in all these cases, there is an artistic lesson accompanying the moral warning. It was not in vain that Morland's easel was constantly surrounded by representatives of the lower classes; that Hogarth always had his pencil with him on the streets and in the coffee-houses; or that, morning after morning, Corot's canvas caught its colors long before the eastern sky grew bright with sunlight. Or, if we turn to literature, it is not an insignificant fact that Shakespeare and his contemporaries, who gave form to the modern drama, as well as Goethe, who records in his *Wahrheit und Dichtung* the way in which he spent his youth in Frankfort and his age in Weimar, were for years the associates both of the audiences and actors in city theatres; or that Fielding, who gave form to the modern novel, was the justice of a police court. High art is distinctively a form of *nature*—a form that is this in the sense of being perceptible in nature, or at least directly suggested by it.—*Art in Theory*, II.

ARTISTS *vs.* ARTISANS.

It is wellnigh universally recognized that the poet is not a reporter, nor the painter a photographer, nor any artist at all entitled to the name, a mere copyist. For this reason it is felt that while, in the main, he is a careful observer of outward appearances, he, too, as well as the workman in so-called useful art, must have ability to penetrate in some way to something underlying these; that pathos in ballads,

passion in dramas, groupings on canvas, attitudes in marble, arches in cathedrals, cannot be produced so as to have anything approximating an artistic effect—be produced so as to cause forms to fulfil both physical and mental laws,—if their authors have either studied the sounds and sights of nature to the exclusion of its operations,—under which term may be included its effects upon thought and feeling as well as upon matter,—or have studied the latter to the exclusion of the former. Men name the producer of the highest æsthetic results an *artist*. By this term they distinguish him from one whose skill exhibits a more partial exercise of his various possibilities, whom they term, if his products repeat merely the appearances of nature, an *artisan*; if they repeat merely its operations, a *mechanic*. The highest æsthetic art must do both.—*Idem*, II.

ARTISTS *vs.* SEERS (*see also* RELIGION *vs.* ART).

In general, it may be said that most men's conception of a distinctively religious teacher, to say nothing of a prophet, excludes anything supposed to call particular attention to his own conscious intellection, or even to his own intellect. He may possess, and add to his influence by possessing, accuracy of observation, breadth of information, and brilliancy of style, but it is felt that the value of his work does not depend mainly upon them. He is supposed to be guided to his utterance by an agency above him, which can, occasionally, make the words of an ignorant fisherman or a weak child as enlightening and uplifting as those coming from the lips of the most learned scholar and skilful advocate.

Notice, however, that just the opposite is true in the case of art. For success in it, accuracy of observation is essential, because the artist derives from nature not only his suggestions, but the very form of the image which he must use in indicating them. So with reference to breadth of information. When the results of subconscious mental action must be represented through the results of conscious observation, information obtained through this latter is indispensable. Again, too, because supposed, in a degree not true of a religious leader, to work out his conceptions according to conscious mental methods, it is felt that the artist must have more than a usual amount of mental ability. In fact, it is felt that there is, and should be, an immense difference between the motive underlying the

effect produced by the preacher and by the actor. The actor we admire, as we do every artist, on account of a manifestation of acquired facility in holding the mirror of the subconscious as also of the conscious mind up to nature so that each mind shall work with apparent spontaneity as regards both impression and expression; and no matter how much he may reveal of the results of subconscious action, he is either supposed to have attained these results through lofty flights of his own self-impelled imagination, or else, if presumed to have received them precisely as prophets receive religious truth, to have rendered them effective through acquired skill, by means of which he has been enabled to give them form.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, VII.

ARTS, THE, ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO DIFFERENT EFFECTS UPON
THE MIND.

As related to the processes of representative art, the mind or the imagination, which is the faculty of the mind principally engaged in the work, acts, as it were, like a mirror. At different stages, as the trains of influence pass by, it flashes back that which necessarily takes a form analogous either to music, poetry (oratory), painting, sculpture, or architecture. We shall find, in short, that all these arts are elaborations of instinctive modes of expression which, in certain circumstances, the mind is forced to adopt, all representative art being, as Opie says of painting in the first of his "Lectures" upon that subject, "a language that must exist, in some greater or less degree, whenever the human intellect approaches a certain, and that by no means elevated, standard."—*Art in Theory*, XVI.

ARTS, THE, AS INFLUENCED BY BOTH NATURE AND MIND.

Let us represent the contents of the mind by the floating but, except for outside influence, stationary ice in some bay or inlet, and at the same time represent that which flows into the mind by the waves and currents entering this bay or inlet from an ocean. Let us observe what is the natural order of development of the relations sustained between the waters thus forced inward and the ice. Is it not something like this?—At the point nearest the ocean, the waves sweeping over the ice break off and bear up and down small portions of it, but with such force that the ice forms but an insignificant, perhaps an indistinguishable,

part of the effect of the waves as a whole. This is the condition corresponding to that of music. A little farther inward, the floating ice covers the waves. We see mainly the ice, but it is moving, and its movement indicates that of the water under it. This is the condition found in poetry. Still farther inward, the portions of broken ice, crowded together by the force of the waves, begin to offer manifest resistance. Up to this point one could hardly distinguish from a distance the ice from the waves. Here it becomes almost impossible to confound the two; for at one place the weight on the surface is seen crushing down the surf, and at another the surf is seen breaking through and above the surface. This is the state of things in painting and sculpture. Last of all, at places nearest the shore, the force of the waves seems to be crushed out completely, yet the effects produced by them are abundantly apparent in the great moveless heaps of ice resting against the water-line. This represents the condition in architecture. Let us now notice whether this order of development in the relations existing between the influence from without and the possessions within the mind has any basis in facts; first in physical facts, afterwards in mental facts. To begin with, are there any physical facts which justify us in comparing the action of outer effects upon the mind to that of waves upon something stationary; and if so, is there any reason why these waves, at their greatest, can be represented in music, and, at their least, in architecture? To both these questions we can give an affirmative answer. Physicists tell us that the acoustic nerve is surrounded by a fluid back of the drum of the ear; also that the optic nerve is surrounded by a corresponding humor back of the crystalline lens of the eye. They tell us that whenever sounds or sights reach intelligence, they are conveyed to it because, as a fact, these nerves are physically shaken through the influence of waves from without which strike the ear drum or the crystalline lens. So much for the first question; now for the second. Physicists tell us also that the waves vibrating to shake the acoustic nerve are so large that, at the least, about sixteen of them, and at the most, about forty thousand, can move in a second of time; but that, on the other hand, the waves shaking the retina are so minute that, at the least, about four hundred and eighty-three trillions, and, at the most, seven

hundred and twenty-seven trillions, can move in a second. These assertions indicate that the sensation of being most shaken, shaken by the largest waves, or when the influence has most force, can be represented or communicated better—and any nervous mother with half a dozen small boys will confirm the statement from her own experience—through sound than through sight. Whether we consider quantity or quality, there is more of sound represented in music than in poetry. By consequence, of the two arts, the former represents better the first effect of a motive *per se*; i. e., the most powerful, the least exhausted effect of any influence from without, considered merely as an influence. Oratory appeals to sight as well as to hearing. For this reason it represents a later effect than poetry. Of those arts which, because they appeal to sight alone, represent effects in sight still later than oratory, painting evidently comes first. It uses more brilliancy and variety of color, necessitating larger vibrations—the largest of all, for instance, producing extreme red—and also greater dependence upon everything conditioned directly by influence of this kind than does either sculpture or architecture.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, IX.

In its lack of the imitative element, and therefore in having forms that recall nature more by way of association than of comparison, architecture resembles music. Madame de Staël termed it “frozen music”; and with our present view of the subject, we may perceive the appropriateness of her metaphor. In music, the influence coming from without moves so rapidly and freely that, as contrasted with it, the mind is hardly conscious of its own ideas. In architecture, on the contrary, this influence seems so slight that of it the mind is hardly conscious. That which flows in the one art may be said to be congealed in the other, and the artistic representation of each state of consciousness evinces this. The medium of music moves; that of architecture stands. Because of the lack of balance in both arts between the consciousness of the influence from without and that of the ideas within, the connection between influence and ideas is not, in either art, always apparent. Many, in fact, fancy that music represents no ideas, and architecture no influences derived from the forms of nature. But the truth is that, without both arts, the representations of the different phases of consciousness, developing, one after

another, as has been shown, would be incomplete. The two arts are expressive respectively of the two extremes of this,—of those misty border lands of apprehension where external influence appears and where it disappears. Between these two extremes, the motive from without and the ideas within are more evenly balanced. The effect in the intellect (*inter* and *lego*), as jointly influenced by both, leads, when the consciousness of the influence from without exerted upon the emotions is the stronger, to comparison, tending, as in poetry and oratory, to identifying the two; and, when the consciousness of the ideas within, deliberately modifying by reflection the influence from without, is the stronger, to comparison also, but with more realization of a contrast between the two, as is the case in landscape gardening, painting, and sculpture. Taken together, the arts that have been mentioned represent every possible effect produced in the mind as emotions, intellect, and will successively receive and modify the influence that the audible or visible forms of nature exert upon it. The expressional series is complete all the way from where, in music, we heed the roaring of the waves of influence as they dash upon apprehension, to where, in architecture, we perceive the spray that congeals in fairy shapes above the place where their force has been spent.—*Art in Theory*, XIX.

In the moods represented in music and poetry, the influence from without is recognized in consciousness mainly because the thoughts move with it. This movement, therefore, is appropriately represented in musical tones and poetic words that follow one another in time. In the moods represented in painting, sculpture, and architecture, however, the mind is prompted to conceive of the influence as separate and different from the ideas; frequently, indeed, as offering a contrast to them. The influence from without is recognized in consciousness mainly because, as contrasted with the influence, the thoughts are relatively, though not absolutely, stationary. Consider now how these facts must be represented. If one wish to give expression to a consciousness of an external source of influence which is separate and different from the ideas within his mind, he can do this effectively only through using an external medium which alone is clearly separate and different from them. Again, a contrast is always revealed most clearly when objects are viewed not one at a time, but two or more at a time.

If one wish, therefore, to represent a consciousness of contrast, especially in connection with that of a continuation of a difference between the external world and his own ideas of it, he can best do this through using a medium that presents objects not in succession, like the words of a poem, but side by side in space like the forms on the canvas of a picture. And if he wish, again, to represent the fact that his own ideas, though affected by the influence, are not swept away or onward by it; but that whatever effects are produced are confined to suggestions prompted by the objects in nature that continue to stand immediately before him, he can best represent this fact too through using a medium that will stay thought like a scene rather than hurry it on like a story.—*Idem*, XIX.

ASSOCIATION, AS AN ART METHOD (*see also* COMPARISON).

Association and comparison, however, as has been pointed out in former essays of this series, are in all cases very closely allied, and sometimes are practically inseparable. Association is based upon suggested likeness in the underlying principle exemplified in two things which are apparently different. Comparison is based upon apparent likeness in the things themselves. Whether, as a fact, we connect them by way of association or of comparison, depends partly upon our point of view, and partly upon the degree of external similarity between them. Sometimes we *associate* things that are different in specific details, because they are connected with some identical general effect. Thus we associate the moon and the stars, because both are connected with the general effect of the night-time; or hens and turkeys, because both are connected with the general effect of a barn-yard. Yet while this is true, observe also that, in case we be thinking of the heavenly bodies, we can also *compare* the moon and stars, because, from that point of view, we can find many regards in which in specific details the two are alike, and so, in case we be thinking of fowls, we can compare hens and turkeys. Again, in case a Greek column supporting a heavy entablature be perceived to be like a Gothic column supporting a heavy arch, in one regard alone, namely, in being large in size, then we can say that the one column suggests the other by way of *association*. But in case the Greek column be perceived to be like another Greek column in most regards or in many

regards, then we can say that the one definitely recalls the other by way of *comparison*. Moreover, in case we have learned that the Greek column is large in order to hold up a heavy weight, then we can infer that the Gothic column is large in order to do the same thing; and we may say that the latter, by way of *association*, represents the same general idea, or conception, of strength in support which we have originally derived from the former. But if the latter column as well as the former be Greek, that is, if both columns manifest the same details of appearance, then we may say that the latter not only represents the same idea or conception of strength in support as does the former, but that it does this by way of *comparison* as well as of association.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, I.

BALUSTRADE, REPRESENTING A FLAT ROOF.

What does a balustrade as thus indicated represent? What is it for? What but to keep people from falling over? But if they need to be kept from this, they must be expected to walk on the roof behind the balustrade. But how could they walk on a roof unless it were flat? A few questions like this will lead to the inference that a balustrade necessarily represents a flat roof. Now, if we compare with this inference, the fact that this sort of ornamentation is recognized by almost everybody as, on the whole, the most satisfactory for a wall supporting a flat roof, we shall have obtained at least one proof that when by conscious design or unconscious accident the architect faithfully represents actual conditions, he does exactly what will fulfil the artistic conceptions of the majority of people.—*Idem*, XIX.

BEAUTIFUL, THE, *vs.* THE ARTISTIC (*see* ART AND BEAUTY).

The artistic may result from any isolated proof of craftsmanship. Not so with the beautiful. It is general in its effects, and these transcend those of the craftsman. The light that it possesses is like that of a halo. It illumines everything of which it forms a part, its influence on the mind extending to the whole mental environment, giving suggestions to imagination, stimulus to aspiration, and filling every allied department and recess of energy with that subtle force which men attribute to inspiration. It is merely in accordance with a law of nature, therefore, that, as a fact, all such statues, pictures, poems, buildings of past ages as are universally considered to be great conform to

the laws of ethics almost as fully as to the laws of æsthetics,—in other words, that one test of greatness in art has always been its influence upon morals.—*Essay on Art and Morals*.

BEAUTIFUL, THE, *vs.* THE USEFUL IN ARTS.

The question, as applied to sights or sounds, suggests at once that when a man, not for a useful but, . . . for an æsthetic end, reproduces these, he must do so mainly because something about them has interested, attracted, and, as we say, charmed him. There is one word that we are accustomed to apply to any form, whether of sight or of sound, that attracts and charms us. It is the word *beautiful* . . . To-day, everywhere, it seems to be conceded that arts of the highest class should reproduce mainly, at least, and some seem to think solely, such phenomena of nature as are beautiful. . . . For a sufficient reason then did the Abbé Du Bos in 1719, in his "Reflexions critique sur la Poésie et la Peinture," first apply to the arts the term "Les Beaux Arts."—*The Essentials of Æsthetics*, II.

BEAUTIFUL *vs.* POPULAR STYLE.

And people call, and most of them think, the prevailing style beautiful, merely because it happens to be current and popular. They are so constituted that, consciously or unconsciously, they are unable to resist the tide that, apparently, is bearing along every one else. When the same tendencies appear in art it strikes me that the critic who is of value to the world is the man who, in case public opinion be setting in the wrong direction, is able to resist it, is able to look beneath the surface, analyze the effects, detect the errors, put together his conclusions, and have independence enough to express them. When the current theory is riding straight toward the brink, he is the man who foresees the danger, screws down the brakes, and turns the steeds the other way—not the sentimentalist irresponsibly swept into folly by the fury of the crowd, or the demagog whooping its shibboleth to the echo, because, forsooth, he must be popular.—*Essay on Art and Education*.

BEAUTY AND ANALOGY IN ART (*see also* ANALOGY).

Our standards of beauty, concerning which the reader may consult Chapters X. to XIV. of "Art in Theory," are derived primarily from certain forms of nature, which, because attractive and charming in themselves, cause men to like to look at them and to think about them. Accordingly,

if a man wish to produce forms of art which men will like to look at and to think about, it is merely a dictate of policy, and, if he be an artist, it is generally a dictate of preference, for him to select these forms for his models; and in the degree in which he reproduces them, or any effects analogous to theirs, his product will have beauty. What is to prevent his selecting them because, viewed in one aspect, they are beautiful; and yet also selecting them because, viewed in another aspect, they, as well as all other natural forms, are analogical? Certainly there is no conflict between the conception that beauty is of paramount æsthetic importance, and the conception that the effects obtained through the use of beauty should be analogical.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XII.

BEAUTY, ATTRIBUTED TO BOTH FORM AND SIGNIFICANCE.

Let us recall a woman, in prominent position, of great beauty of form and excellence of character, a woman with the reputation, say, of Queen Louise of Prussia, the mother of the first Emperor William. Here was one whose form and face were of such a nature that, owing solely to their effects upon the organs of sight, they would cause almost any observer of ordinary taste, however ignorant of whom or of what she was, to declare her to be beautiful. But, behind and above the attractions of her mere appearance, she had such a character, such mental and sympathetic traits, that none of her own family, intimately acquainted with these, would have been willing to admit that she was beautiful to others in as deep and spiritual a sense as to themselves. But to what would their unwillingness to admit this be owing, except to a subtle belief in a phase of beauty dependent upon effects exerted not upon physical organs, but upon mind and soul? At the same time, had one of their number been blind, all the others would have regretted the impossibility of this one's recognizing her beauty as they did. But to what would this feeling be owing, except to an inward conviction that beauty is a result of effects coming from form as well as from character; and, not only this, but also from both of them when combined.—*Art in Theory*, XII.

This combination of mental effects with those of form can be recognized more clearly in connection with poetry. In this art, besides the beauty which is due to phraseology,

as manifested in the choice and sequence of words, and in various developments of assonance, alliteration, rhythm, and rhyme, everybody acknowledges that there is also a beauty dependent upon the thought, the proof of which is that this beauty is frequently as great in prose as in poetry. But from what does this beauty spring? Clearly and unmistakably from a combination of the effects of recollection, association, and suggestion, assuming concrete form in the imagination; in other words, from the harmonious effects of many different forms, some coming from without and some from within the mind, some perceptible to sight or recalled by memory as once perceptible to sight, and some, according to the laws of the mind, merely conjured by fancy. As a rule, too, the wider apart the spheres are from which these effects are derived, introducing that which is unexpected and surprising, the more striking is the beauty resulting from their combination, as where those that are extremely material are united to those that are extremely mental, *e. g.*,

Still as a slave before his lord,
The ocean hath no blast;
His great bright eye most silently
Up to the moon is cast.

The Ancient Mariner: Coleridge.

—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, II.

If men think with the classicists of the extreme type that the chief end of art is imitation, either of classic models or of nature, is it not because, consciously or unconsciously, they hold to a belief that beauty is conditioned mainly upon form? And if, on the contrary, they think with the romanticists that the chief end of art is the expression of ideas, is it not because they believe that beauty is a result of thought or feeling either of the human mind as in art, or of the creative mind, as, according to the Platonists, in nature? The inference, therefore, from what has been said hitherto, is that there must be some who attribute beauty to form; and some who attribute it to the thought or feeling expressed in the form, with a probability also of the existence of some who attribute it partly to the one source and partly to the other.—*Art in Theory*, x.

BEAUTY ATTRIBUTED TO HARMONY OF COMPLEX EFFECTS.

The phase of unity appealing to scientific apprehension is usually the basis of conscious or unconscious classifica-

tion as it is termed; that appealing to philosophic comprehension is usually the basis of what, if distinguished at all from classification, is termed systemization; and that appealing to æsthetic appreciation can be defined by no better term, perhaps, than harmony, as the word is used not in a technical but in a general sense. As we shall find presently, it is the phase of unity that we have in harmony, which, as manifested in connection with a variety of complex effects, produces the result that is termed beauty.—*Art in Theory*, XII.

The highest beauty, in all its different phases, results, as is the case in other departments of excellence, from harmony in effects. Analyzing the elements of these effects, carries with it the additional conclusion that, so far as beauty is physical, it results when sounds, shapes, or colors harmonize together and in such ways that their combinations harmonize with the natural requirements of the physical senses—ears or eyes—that are addressed; that, so far as beauty is psychical, it results when the thoughts and feelings suggested or expressed through forms harmonize together, and also with the natural requirements of the mind addressed; and that, so far as beauty is both physical and psychical, it results when all the elements entering into both physical and psychical effects harmonize together, and also with the combined requirements of both the senses and the mind. In this latter case, it will be observed that the complete beauty which results necessitates something more than that which is either formal or expressional. It can be obtained in the degree only in which a form beautiful in itself fits a beautiful ideal conjured in the mind by the imagination as a result of a harmonious combination of thoughts and feelings. To express all this in language as concise as possible, we may say that beauty is a characteristic of any complex form of varied elements producing apprehensible unity (*i. e.*, harmony or likeness) of effects upon the motive organs of sensation in the ear or eye, or upon the emotive sources of imagination in the mind; or upon both the one and the other.—*Idem*, XIV.

The essential element of beauty is harmony resulting from complexity of effects, and the greater the number of the effects upon the mind that can be added to effects upon the senses, the greater, at times, is the amount of the

beauty. A single tone gains in beauty, as has been said, when compounded of several different partial tones; but it is usually more beautiful when heard in connection with a melody or chord or series of chords that multiply the complexity many scores of times. The tone is still more beautiful when, in addition to this, it resembles, so as clearly to represent, some natural or conventional method of expression, and therefore some effect of emotion, and in connection with this a combination of the effects of many different emotions. So with poems, pictures, statues, and buildings; they are all made more beautiful, the more their harmony results from effects of apparent complexity in the form, and more beautiful still, the more, in addition to this, it results from the mental effects of images recalled in memory or conjured by imagination, as well as of infinite ranges and spheres of these. In fact, this increase of beauty always continues up to the point where confusion begins. This is true even of the blending of effects from different arts, as where to those of melody are added those first of harmony, then of poetry, then of acting, then of dancing, then of painting, then of sculpture, then of architecture, till, finally, we have all the components of a Wagnerian opera. In all such cases, up to the point where confusion begins—but it must be confessed that with some, perhaps with most people, it begins long before the list is completed—there is an apprehensible increase of the distinctly æsthetic influence.—*Idem*, XIII.

BEAUTY, HUMAN, ATTRIBUTABLE TO BOTH FORM AND SIGNIFICANCE (*see also* TASTE, DISCREPANCIES IN).

As related to the human form, one must always bear in mind that its proportions are expressive of significance. All the members, whether connected with forehead, eyes, ears, nose, mouth, chin, neck, shoulders, arms, hands, waist, hips, legs, calves, ankles, feet, are adapted to some purpose; in our minds they are associated with this purpose; and seem beautiful or ugly, on account, partly, of the way in which they fulfil it, and partly, of the deficiency or superabundance of the characteristics supposed to be represented by them, in case they are relatively smaller or larger than is usual. This is true as applied to combinations, the beauty of which is ordinarily judged to be dependent upon form solely. For instance, take those

outlines of the countenance composing what are ordinarily described as regular features. When, as in these, after drawing vertical and horizontal lines across the face, the corresponding parts of eyebrows, eyes, nostrils, on the opposite sides of the face, appear to be in exact balance, inasmuch as the whole is outlined by a framework that is exactly square or rectangular, the external arrangement is satisfactory because it seems representative of something internal that is satisfactory; in other words, because we associate these physical conditions with correlated ones that are mental and moral. Because the face is square, we judge that the character is square. For instance, Mephistopheles as represented on the stage is always painted with the arch of the eyebrows not in line with the horizontal, but beginning high up on the temples and running downward toward the bridge of the nose. This is the way, too, in which even a handsome man looks when contracting his brows under the influence of arrogance, pride, contempt, hatred, and, most of all, of malice. With a similar general effect of irregularity, a simpleton on the stage is painted with nostrils and lips which exaggerate the expression of the smile by running too far up the sides; and a scold, with the sides of the same features exaggerating the expression of the sneer and frown, by running too far down. Or if we consider combinations which almost every one admires, of a comparatively small ankle and large calf, or of a small wrist and large forearm, or of a small waist and broad shoulders, or, in a woman, broad hips; certainly one way of explaining the effects of combinations of this kind is to attribute them to significance. Clumsy joints at the places where the body must bend suggest a lack of flexibility, deftness, and grace; and slender muscles at the places where the body must exert itself suggest a lack of stability, strength, and persistence. Therefore, though the curve connecting the ankle with the calf, or the wrist with the forearm, or the waist with the breast or hips, is beautiful, as will be shown by-and-by, because it fulfils a requirement connecting together with ease two outlines in vision, it is beautiful also because it fulfils a requirement connecting together with satisfaction two facts in thought. After all that can be claimed, therefore, for the effects of mere outlines, there remain certain other requisites of beauty for which these never can ac-

count. They can be attributed to significance alone, under which general term we may include, for reasons given in Chapter XV. of "Art in Theory," all such suggestions as are contained in conceptions like those of adaptability, fitness, association, symbolism, sympathy, and personality.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, VII.

BEAUTY, IN BOTH PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EFFECTS.

There are certain combinations of colors or sounds, say a flag like that of Italy, or a tune like the "Austrian National Hymn," the effects of which, in every land, without something to interfere with the normal action of the eye or ear, are recognized to be beautiful. Yet it is possible that, owing to certain associations of ideas, or to certain suggestions excited by their effects upon the mind, the indisputable beauty both of the flag and of the tune may fail to appeal to some. Did the Italian flag seem beautiful at the time of the unification of Italy to the adherents of the Pope? or the Austrian hymn seem so to the Italians when Austria was their oppressor? On the contrary, for exactly opposite reasons, the sound of a Scotch bagpipe or the sight of a Scotch plaid, though neither may fulfil æsthetic laws in its effects upon the physical organs of perception, excite in the Scottish head and heart that which, with his hand on the Bible and fear of eternal punishment in store for perjury, the Scotchman would be willing to declare an effect of beauty. Yet even he might be willing to admit, too, that certain other things could be more beautiful,—an admission which, logically carried out, would lead to the acknowledgment that complete or ideal beauty is attained only by effects, if there be any, recognized to be beautiful not only by the senses irrespective of the quality of their appeal to the mind, and by the mind irrespective of the quality of their appeal to the senses, but also by both the senses and the mind; in other words, when the effects upon the senses seem to fit those upon the mind in such ways that both together seem to fit the whole duplex nature of the man to whom they are addressed.—*Art in Theory*, XII.

In the first place, there are forms made up of complex effects containing every element of beauty, so far as concerns their appeal to the eye or ear, and yet which, on account of the character of their appeal to the mind, no

delicately organized æsthetic, to say nothing of moral, nature could declare to be, in anything like a satisfactory or complete degree, beautiful. Instead of this, their beauty in any degree might be denied. Take a scene of debauchery—a mingling of vice and nakedness—could any amount of faultless music or physique make this seem to a pure mind other than disgusting and revolting? And could the effects of beauty be fully experienced, or consciously experienced at all, in connection with either feeling? Notwithstanding every argument or example of immoral art, there is but one answer to this question. Certainly they could not, and why not? Because the effects which act together harmoniously, so far as concerns their influence upon the ear or eye, are accompanied by other effects produced through the agency of the imagination calling up forms from the realms of recollection, association, and suggestion; and with these latter effects those from without are discordant.—*Idem*, XIII.

Every physiologist admits that the nerves may be affected not only from the sense-side, but also from the mind-side. A man suffers in spirits and health not only because of influence exerted upon his body from without, but also because of influence coming from his own thoughts and emotions. It is a simple physiological fact, therefore, that, even though the nerves may be agreeably affected by a form, nevertheless if, owing to a lack of adaptability or fitness, or to a failure to meet the mind's requirements of association, symbolism, sympathy, or personality, certain suggestions of the form jar upon one's sense of congruity or propriety, or, as we say, shock one's sensibilities, then even the physiological condition which is the subjective realization of the presence of beauty will not ensue.

The author is aware that to take this ground is to meet with the accusation, on account of the one subject to which the principle is most frequently applied, that he is confounding the æsthetical with the ethical. But this is not so. It seems so because the dictates of conscience are more apt to be the same in all men than those of any other part of one's nature, and because, therefore, that which violates these dictates is that which is most likely to appear distasteful to the largest number. But the principle involved applies to a vast range of subjects which have nothing to do with ethics. A picture untrue to the

requirements of history also, or to the scenes of a locality, might have a correspondingly distasteful effect upon the mind of an historian or a traveller; might so jar upon his sensibilities as to counterbalance entirely any possible degree of excellence in form considered merely as form.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, vii.

BEAUTY IN EXPRESSION.

We sometimes find, as in the pictures of early Christian art, a degree of beauty which cannot be attributed to any fulfilment of the laws of line or color, such as meet the physiological requirements of the eye. Yet often these pictures are acknowledged to possess great charm, owing to what is termed, notwithstanding the implication of some that it does not exist, beauty of expression. What is meant by this? Careful analysis will show that it means that there are evidences in them of a blending of separate and very widely different effects, only a few of which are attributable to form as form. The rest are attributable to traits of character, which certain of the depicted faces and figures are supposed to manifest. But is not every one of these traits of character conjured by the imagination of the spectator and assigned to the forms only so far as they have effects upon recollections of some like form, or upon associations with it, or else as they in some other way suggest a significance which can have its origin in no place except his own mind?—*Art in Theory*, xiii.

There are forms the inharmonious effects of which upon the senses render them incapable of appearing beautiful, considered merely as forms; and yet, on account of other accompanying effects exerted upon the mind, these same forms often manifest, not a little, but a great degree of beauty. Recall, for instance, many a tone expressive of joy, admiration, wonder, surprise, as it is uttered upon the stage, not only in dramas that are spoken, but in operas that are sung; and yet such tones, having all the scientific qualities of noise and not of music, have precisely the thrilling and inspiring effects upon thought and emotion that are ascribed to beauty. It is the same with lines. The rigid straightness and sharp irregularity allowed in art because they alone are expressive of passion, either rightly or wrongly impelled, do not in themselves considered, whether used in dramatic representation or in pictures or statues, contain any har-

monious elements such as must appeal to the eye before a form can produce upon it the physical effect of beauty. So with colors. In connection with certain scenes or figures the effects which the mind attributes to beauty may often be received from forms depicted in hues that to the eye alone appear to be only dingy, mixed, and sometimes positively inharmonious.—*Idem*, XIII.

BEAUTY IN FORM.

To men generally, a fabric of a single hue hanging in a shop-window, two or three of different hues thrown accidentally together, and certain figures, even rooms, on account, sometimes of their colors, sometimes of their proportions, sometimes of both, are termed, and properly termed, *beautiful*. When so used, the word does not refer necessarily to any human thought or feeling that men recognize as being suggested through them or by them. All that is meant is, that certain colors and spaces have been so presented as to fulfil requirements of physical laws that make them attractive or agreeable to the sense of sight. Women are not wrong in principle, only in their application of the effect to a lower sense, when they apply the same word to soups and pies agreeable to taste.—*Idem*, x.

BEAUTY IN SIGNIFICANCE.

Ordinary language recognizes a phase of beauty in mere significance, despite the form. Let one come upon a woman with a deformed figure and homely countenance, dressed in most inharmonious colors, and in a most illy proportioned room; yet if she be engaged in the utterance of some noble sentiment, or in the performance of some sublime act of charity or of self-sacrifice, the expression of the motive in her face and frame, together with her surroundings, may be so accordant with the demands of his soul as to transfigure the mere forms, and prepare him to swear before a court of justice that he has seen what is beautiful.—*Idem*, x.

BEAUTY IN SOUND.

When is a sound beautiful? Few would think of answering this except by saying, when it is a blending together, in accordance with the laws of harmony, of several sounds, as in melodies or chords, or series of these,—in other words, when the sound is not simple but complex. But let us be accurate in this matter. Is it not true that a single sound, like the solitary, unvaried note of a bird or of a prima donna,

is sometimes beautiful? Certainly it is. But when is it beautiful? Of course, when it is musical. But when is it musical? As all physicists know, in the degree in which it is complex; and complex under such conditions that all its component effects work together in ways causing them to fulfil the same laws of harmony that are fulfilled in chords or series of them. . . . For instance, when a string like that of a bass viol is struck, its note, if musical, is not single or simple: it is compound. Suppose that it produces the tone of the bass C—representing a sound-wave caused by the whole length of the string. This C is the main, or, as it is termed, the *prime* tone that we hear. But, at the same time, this same string usually divides at the middle, producing what is called a *partial* tone of the C above the bass, representing a sound-wave caused by one half the string's length. It often produces, too, *partial* tones of the G above this, of the C above this, and of the E above the last C, representing sound-waves caused, respectively, by one third, one fourth, and one fifth of the string's length.

—*Idem*, XII.

BEAUTY IN THINGS SEEN.

When is a line beautiful? Who, if asked this, would not answer, when it outlines a figure? And when does it outline a figure?—When it is a combination of many lines of different directions; and, therefore, when its effects are *complex*. But here again it may be asked, is a single line never beautiful? And again we may answer, “certainly.” But, if so, the line is never perfectly straight; it is never a line having the simple effect of only one direction. The line of beauty is a curve; in other words, it has a complex effect. Nor is it really beautiful even then, except when its different sections are conditioned and related so as to produce effects which, for reasons that cannot be given here, are recognized to be harmonious. The same is true of colors also. It is with the harmony or contrast occasioned by the presence of many of these used together that we ordinarily associate the idea of beauty. But yet a single color may be beautiful. At the same time, when this is so, it is owing either to the contrast between it and everything surrounding it, or else to harmonious effects of light and shade, as they apparently play upon the surfaces of a hue, and also subtly underlie it in those exact subdivisions of the elements of light and of its absence, which determine what it is.—*Idem*, XII.

BEAUTY, ITS APPEAL TO THE SYMPATHIES.

On the whole, however, this fact that men attribute beauty to that which makes an appeal to the sympathies has not been sufficiently emphasized. Yet nine people out of ten, especially among those not educated in particular schools of art, whose minds therefore act according to first principles rather than according to derived ones, in reading poetry, in looking at pictures, or in entering houses, judge of their beauty precisely as the poet Coleridge said that he did of the inspiration of the Bible—namely, by the feeling that it *found* him. In this fact with reference to the influence of art, lies the degree of truth that there is, when not made universally applicable, in the theory of “association.” We all take delight in songs and choruses like those of which we have pleasant reminiscences; in passages of poetry that express thoughts or feelings like those to which we have been led by our own experiences; in landscapes like those by which we have been surrounded in hours of pleasure; in figures like those which we have loved or should wish to love could we only find them; in buildings like those which we have possessed or should like to possess as homes. In all these cases, with a possibility of a breadth of applicability in other directions not possible to the theory of *association*, as held exclusively, the principle of ascribing beauty to the influence of like effects exerted by the forms from without and by those conjured by the imagination within, covers all the facts. But notice, too, that among these like effects, in cases where beauty emanates from a work of art, are included not merely effects traceable to the thought, feelings, will, in short the whole character of the artist, all of which have been manifested by him in his art-form, but also those conjured by the imagination from the thought, feelings, will, in short the whole character, of the one to whom the beauty appeals.—*Idem*, xv.

BEAUTY OCCASIONED FROM WITHOUT AND FROM WITHIN.

Going back to what was said of the play-impulse or the art-impulse, which is distinctively manifested, as explained there, in an excess of psychical or spiritual life, let us observe more carefully than was then done the sources of the manifestations of this excess, which, of course, will be the same thing as to trace the sources of beauty; for it is in beauty that the manifestations culminate. Where, then, are the

sources of this? Are they wholly in the mind, the soul, the spiritual being of the subject of it? If so, why does the impulse characteristically express itself, as shown on page 73, in imitation? It certainly would not do this were it not under the influence of natural appearances that could be imitated. Yet again, would any number of natural appearances that could be imitated account for the excess of vitality carrying on the imitation? Must not this vitality come from within? It certainly seems so. Yet if it be so indeed, we have clearly indicated effects both from without and from within.—*Idem*, xv.

BEAUTY PSYCHOLOGICALLY CONSIDERED (*see* HARMONY).

[*Comments on the æsthetic theory that "the sense of beauty is an emotional state arising from progressive psycho-physical accommodation to mental objects."*] In nature, opposing effects, like differently produced waves on a pool, can often be seen to assimilate; and we have a certain interest in watching the result. So with the sense of accommodation, the one to the other, and, by consequence, of progressive identity of the different stages of logical processes. But notice that in these it is necessary only that two or more very nearly connected conceptions should assimilate, whereas in beauty—as will be recognized upon recalling the conditions underlying rhythm, versification, musical harmony, proportion, collected outlines of columns, arches, windows, roofs, even the tones of a single scale or the colors of a single painting,—it is necessary that whole series and accumulations of effects should assimilate; that, so far as possible, everything presented should seem to be the result of putting like effects (not necessarily like forms—see page 153) with like. This requirement of beauty appears to be met by saying that, in it, the amount of assimilation is increased,—that it results in the degree in which the processes to which attention ministers all tend together to give this sense of accommodation. But even this statement seems insufficient. In the degree in which pleasure of any kind whatever predominates, the consciousness of opposing effects must be subordinated to that of assimilation. Distinctly æsthetic pleasures differ from those afforded by logical connection, or by mere sensational ease or assimilation not only in the relative amount of likeness in them, but also in the relative comprehensiveness of this. There may be

physical pleasure in which there is little or no complexity and therefore no assimilation between effects from sources essentially different, such, for instance, as those that appeal to the senses and those that appeal to the mind; and the same is true of mental pleasure; and in both forms of pleasure, because of greater narrowness of excitation, there may be more intensity—more, that is, which induces to thrill and rapture, tears and laughter—than in æsthetic pleasure. A person is more apt to become hilarious when being tickled or when hearing good news from the stock market, than when reading Shakespeare. But the peculiarity of æsthetic pleasures is that while they lose in intensity they gain, as a rule, in breadth. The latter effect follows not only from the relative amount of likeness in them; but still more from the range and different qualities of the sources of this. In their most complete phases, as has been shown, æsthetic pleasures blend the results of that which is most important in both physical and mental stimulus, widening one's outlook and sympathies especially in the direction—for this is distinctive in them—of enabling imagination to perceive subtle correspondences between things material and spiritual which otherwise might not reveal their essential unity. The fact is, as pointed out on page 160, that the effects of beauty are satisfactory in the degree in which they are felt to accord with every possible influence exerted at the time when they are experienced. It is not too much to say that so far as they result from vibrations, or in connection with vibrations, some of these are beyond the circumference of conscious experience; but all of them, nevertheless, like the minutest and most distant waves upon a pool, moved as in our first illustration, seem at the time to be proportional parts of a universal rhythm. Often, in fact, they seem to be, and possibly, to an extent, they always are, parts of that larger rhythm which, coming down through life and death, winter and summer, waking and sleeping, inhalation and exhalation, pulse-throb and stillness, extend back through the alternating effects of metre and proportion, tone and hue, to others of a nature almost infinitely subtle, but which are just as necessary to the life of the spirit as the beat of the heart to that of the body. To this conception of beauty the idea of sensational ease or assimilation is necessary as an accompanying effect; but it is a question whether, considered even as a point of departure

for development, it is inclusive of all that is in the germ, or of that part of it which most clearly reveals the originating cause. One could not be conscious of the thrills of pleasure connected with doing a deed of disinterested kindness, were it not for unimpeded processes in the circulatory systems of his physical organism. But these do not account for all the effects entering into such an experience or possible to it, even if, as at times in the presence of beauty, it awaken a sense of nothing not distinctly physical. A cause to be satisfying must be capable of accounting for all the facts. Can this be affirmed of the processes that have been mentioned? Are they not rather effects accompanying others which, in connection with these, are attributable to something deeper in essence and more comprehensive in applicability?—*Art in Theory, Appendix 1.*

BEAUTY RECOGNIZED BY ITS EFFECTS ON THE MIND.

So far as can be ascertained, the æsthetic quality of a single tone or color, as also the concord caused by the blending of it with others, is recognized to be what it is by the physical senses irrespective of the conscious action of the mind. Only the analysis of science has been able to detect the way in which, in such cases, the effects are made to harmonize. But can the same be affirmed of all the effects of beauty? Can it even be affirmed of all of them that are indisputably connected with form as form? How is it with the beauty of effects undoubtedly imparted through rhythm and proportion? These, certainly, though apprehended through the physical senses, are recognized only in connection with the conscious action of the mind. It is because we can consciously count the beats and accents in music and poetry, as well as compute the distances between straight lines and curves in painting and architecture, that we detect those results in them of exact measurements in time or space which make them what they are. But if it be true that certain characteristics of art which are determined only by form demand action on the part both of the senses irrespective of the mind and of the mind also, how much more true must this appear when we consider that in all cases, as shown in Chapter VI., this form is, in some sense at least, a form of expression; and therefore a form of something that in any circumstances must, in some way, appeal to the mind.—*Art in Theory, XII.*

The very complexity and unity that have been shown to be essential to beauty of form can be recognized by only the exercise of distinctively mental analysis. Indeed, the range of the appreciation of beauty is invariably limited by the ability of the mind to make this analysis. If musical tones be made to follow one another too rapidly for the mind to distinguish the differences between them, the result is not rhythm or melody, but noise; or if a round disk with harmonious colors near its rim be made to revolve too rapidly for the mind to distinguish them, the whole produces only the effect of a mixed color usually of a dingy and thoroughly non-beautiful white. A similar result is produced in poetry by metaphors or similes, the different effects of which are so complicated as to appear mixed, as well as by hues, outlines, or carvings of a similarly confused nature in pictures, statues, or buildings.


—*The Essentials of Æsthetics*, II.

Now the question comes, Are all the effects entering harmoniously into that complex result which constitutes beauty traceable to such as influence merely the physical organs of the ear or eye? In answer to this it may be stated, first, that it has been discovered that not only do the nerves of the ear and eye vibrate as affected by sound and sight, and communicate to the brain intelligence of particular degrees of pitch and hue as determined by the rates and sizes of the vibratory waves, but that in addition to these the nerves, as well, that constitute the substance of the brain vibrate and thus give rise to thoughts and feelings; and, not only so, but that the vibrations of the nerves in particular parts of the brain give rise to thoughts and feelings of a particular character; such, for instance, as those connected with particular exercises of memory in recalling general events or specific terms. These facts have been ascertained through various observations and experiments in connection with the loss or removal of certain parts of the brains of men or of animals, or with the application of electricity to certain systems of nerves accidentally or artificially exposed or else naturally accessible. Of course, such discoveries tend to the inference that all conscious mental experience whatsoever, precisely as in the case of sensations excited in the organs of the ear and eye, are effects of vibrations produced in the nerves of the brain. If this inference be justified,



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See pages 10, 11, 38, 73, 81-85, 88, 147, 148, 162, 208, 227, 326



the line of thought that we have been pursuing apparently justifies the additional inference that all conscious mental experiences of the beautiful are effects of harmonious vibrations produced in the nerves of the brain.—*Idem*, II.

BEAUTY THE EMBODIMENT OF CREATIVE THOUGHT.

The aspiration and the aim of art
That will not bide contented till the law
Of thought shall supersede the law of things,
And that which in the midnight of this world
Is but a dream shall be fulfilled in days
Where there is no more matter, only mind,
And beauty, born of free imagination,
Shall wait but on the sovereignty of spirit.

—*West Mountain*, from "*The Mountains about Williams-town*."

BEAUTY WHEN COMPLETE.

It does not seem to be true, therefore, that beauty can be referred merely to form, or merely to significance, or merely to both together. To cover all the facts indicated by, at least, the ordinary use of the term, we must acknowledge that all these theories contain some truth; and, at the same time, that beauty is complete alone in the degree in which beauty of form and of significance are combined.

—*Art in Theory*, x.

BRILLIANT WRITTEN STYLES, BRIGHT AND CLEAR.

This is a method of writing not uncommon in our day, and it is called brilliant. But no style is really brilliant the figures and ideas of which do not stand out in bright light and clear relief; and few writers of the first class, notwithstanding the example of Carlyle, and, to some extent, of Emerson, obscure their thought by an endeavor to render it poetically representative. We have found how true this is as applied to the poetry of the best writers; it is equally true as applied to their prose. The fact is that a man who knows best what poetry is, knows best what poetry is not; and when he tries to write prose he gives men the benefit of his knowledge. Nothing, indeed, can be more simple and direct than the prose of Shakespeare, Coleridge, Goethe, Wordsworth, and Byron. A man judging from it might suppose that these writers, as compared with men like Professor Wilson, Hartley Coleridge, and Carlyle, had but little representative ability.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, xxv.

CHARACTER (*see mention of it under* ARCHITECTURE, PERSONALITY, REPRESENTATION, *and* REPRESENTATIVE).

CLASSIC *vs.* ROMANTIC.

Centuries ago, people who spoke one of the two languages, Greek or Latin, the degrees of proficiency in which even in our own colleges indicate the *class* to which a student belongs, and which everywhere since the revival of learning have been termed, because the literature composed in them is supposed to belong to the highest class, the classic languages, —these people produced certain works of art, noticeably in poetry, sculpture, and architecture, that are still considered to equal, if not to excel, anything produced in modern times. For almost a thousand years, during the Middle Ages, this art was scarcely known, little appreciated, and seldom imitated. In the meantime, however, an artistic development manifested itself among the different Romanesque or Romantic nations, as they are termed, *i. e.*, nations both Latin and Gothic, formed from the fragments of the former Roman Empire. In architecture this development culminated in the style termed Gothic. In sculpture, years before the revival of learning, it produced statues and busts like those in Wells and Lincoln cathedrals, which in form are wellnigh perfect. In music and poetry it brought forth the songs of the troubadours and the minnesingers, and also the early rhyming chronicles and ballads. It gave rise, too, to the “mystery plays” and the “moralities,” and was the mainspring of the English drama.

About the fifteenth century, however, owing partly to the wars in the Orient and the attendant renewal of commercial intercourse with the East, partly to the fall of Constantinople and the consequent dispersion of Greek scholars through Europe, and partly to that general revival of interest in intellectual pursuits that soon afterward led to the Reformation, the older classic languages and art began to attract attention. The matured results, as they were, of a matured civilization, they could not but have a moulding influence upon the theory and practice of Western art with which they were now brought into contact.

Whatever increases intelligence tends to increase intellectual power, and the influence of schoolmen learned in the classics was at first only beneficial. Nearly all modern literature in every country of Europe dates from the Renaissance. Painting and sculpture attained, at that time,

an almost unprecedented degree of excellence; and the style of building originated by Brunelleschi, Bramante, and Alberti in Italy was based upon principles that still underlie the most successful street architecture for large cities, and which, artistically developed, might have led then, and might still lead, to results equalling anything termed Grecian or Gothic.

But increased intelligence tends to increase not only intellectual activity but also pedantry. The artistic expression of pedantry is imitation. As soon as that which was classic became fashionable, artists began to forget to embody their thoughts and feelings in what they produced. They paid attention to forms alone; even then to forms as they could be found, not in nature, but in celebrated works of art. With these for their models, and being artisans rather than artists, they attained the highest object of their ambition in the degree in which they attained success in copying. Their copying, moreover, necessarily extended, after a little, beyond the forms to the ideas expressed in them. The subjects of art came to be not modern nor even Christian, but ancient and mythologic. For these reasons, the production of something that imitates a previously existing form or subject is now one of the recognized meanings of the term classic. When the word was used first, Greece and Rome supplied the only classic products. Now any works of any nation are so called as soon as they have become admired sufficiently to be used as models. . . .

The classic tendency being that which inclines the artist to imitate forms and subjects of the past, the romantic has come to mean just the opposite,—namely, that which allows the form to be determined solely by the exigencies of expression and the expression solely by the exigencies of the period. In fact, it is hardly right to say that this latter tendency has *come* to mean this,—it has always meant this. The mediæval pictures were poorly drawn. Their forms, as forms, were exceedingly defective. Yet they were fully successful in expressing exactly the religious ideas of the time. Similar conditions underlay also, as first developed, mediæval music, poetry, and sculpture.

This being so, it is evident that romanticism, if manifested to the total exclusion of classicism, cannot lead to the best results. The same fact is still more evident when

we consider that the forms and themes of all art of the highest character, whenever and wherever it appears, are developed upon lines of previously developed excellence; and that to model after others, even in a slight degree, is to manifest something of the classic tendency.—*Art in Theory*, III.

"The Independent" first refers to the "astounding misapprehension" of this view, and then goes on to say,— "We cannot at all admit that . . . 'the production of something that imitates a previously existing form or subject is now one of the recognized meanings of the term classic.'" Why can he not admit this? Can it be that he is unaware that, at the present day, which is what is meant by the word *now*, men, when they speak of a modern artist as producing a classic face, or temple, or drama, or allusion in a drama, invariably suggest a likeness in it either to a Greek face, or temple, or drama, or allusion containing Greek mythological references? or else, if not, at least a likeness to some form which, as a form, is sufficiently old to have a recognized character? And does he not know that the reason for this suggestion is that "one of the recognized meanings"—not the only meaning mentioned in "*Art in Theory*," but one mentioned in its historic connections—"of the term classic is the production of something that imitates a previously existing form or subject"? One would think that everybody ought to know this. "*Les classiques*," says a French criticism lying before me now, "*les classiques c'est-à-dire ceux qui perpétuent une manière*." But this reviewer does not know it. However, he probably fancies himself in good company—for America. An earlier critic in "*The Nation*," quoting from "*Art in Theory*" the statement that "the germ of classicism is the conception that art should chiefly emphasize the form," and of romanticism that "the ideas expressed in the form should be chiefly emphasized," had exclaimed: "Sound not sense was certainly never a motto of classical literature." And who had said that it was? Does the carefully worded phrase "chiefly emphasize" mean "exclusively emphasize"? Or does the term "sound" include all that is meant by "form"? When we speak of dramatic "form" do we often even suggest the idea of "sound"? What we mean then is the general method of unfolding the plot as a whole. This attempted refutation reveals,

once more, that lack of philosophic discrimination to which reference has been made. But connected with it, there is a still greater lack of historic knowledge. Who has never heard of the famous theatrical contest between the classicists and romanticists in Paris, which once almost made a Bedlam of the whole city, because Victor Hugo, the idol of romanticism, did not model his dramas upon those of his predecessors, which, in turn, were modelled upon those of the Greeks? What was Hugo contending for? For the right to emphasize chiefly the ideas behind the form—to speak out naturally upon a modern subject, with a style to fit it, whether it assumed a conventional form, or one that nobody before had ever attempted. But no, says one of these critics: "Classicism and Romanticism are tempers of mind." "They owe their origin," says the other, "to a difference in mental constitutions." Of course, there is a truth in this. By nature men are inclined toward the one or the other. But one might say the same of almost any different phases of mental action. He might say it of the tendencies to intemperance or gambling. But would his saying this explain what either of these is? Certainly not; for only when the tendencies come to the surface and reveal themselves in a form of action, do they exist in such a way that they can be differentiated. The same is true of classicism and romanticism. They cannot be differentiated till developed into a form of expression. The questions before us are, what is this form, and what is there in it, as a form, that makes it what it is? To speak of differences in "tempers of mind" or of "mental constitution," is to mention something influential in causing a difference to be. But it is no more influential than is the spirit of the age, or the conditions of taste, or environment, or education; and it fails to suggest, as even some of these latter do, why it is that, in certain periods, all authors and artists incline to classicism, and in other periods all of them incline to romanticism; while, now and then, the same man seems almost equally inclined to both. Goethe's "*Leiden des jungen Werther's*," for instance, and his "*Goetz von Berlichingen*" are specimens of distinctively romantic literature; whereas his "*Iphigenie auf Tauris*" is, perhaps, the most successful modern example of classic literature. At what period between writing the first two and the latter of these was his "temper of mind," his

"mental constitution" changed? Is it not a little more rational to say that what was changed was his artistic method?—possibly, his theory of this?—that in the first two he "chiefly emphasized" the "significance," and in the last, "the form," causing it to be—what he did not take pains to cause the others to be—"something imitating a previously existing" Greek "form" not only, but, in this case, a Greek "subject" also?

On the contrary, says one of these critics, elaborating his theory about "tempers of mind," "classicism is reasonable, logical, and constructive, while romanticism is emotional and sensuous"; and the other echoes his sentiments with something about "the eternal distinction between the intellectual and the emotional." And so one is to believe that the distinguishing feature of classic Greek sculpture—like a "Venus," a "Faun," or a "Group of the Niobe,"—or of a classic Greek drama, like the "Antigone," is, that it is not sensuous or emotional; and that the distinguishing feature of the plays of Shakespeare or Hugo, or of a Gothic cathedral, is that they are not reasonable or logical or constructive! Of course, there is a cause underlying the distinctions that these critics are trying to make. It is suggested too in "Art in Theory." On page 25, the statement is made that one characteristic of romantic art is that in it the form is "determined solely by the exigencies of expression," and on page 17, at the beginning of the chapter in which this statement occurs, as well as in scores of other places in the book, it is explained that by the term expression is meant a communication of thought and feeling combined. Without any explanation indeed, this meaning would be a necessary inference from the fundamental conception of the book, which is that all art is emotional in its sources, and that art-ideas are the manifestations of emotion in consciousness (Chapters V., XVIII., and XIX.). It follows from all these facts together that emotion—but not without its accompanying thought, which, sometimes, as with Browning, throws the emotion entirely into the shade—has a more unrestricted expression in romantic art than in classic art. In the latter the form is "chiefly emphasized," and therefore there is a more conscious, as well as apparent exercise of rational intelligence engaged in constructing a form for it, and in confining the expression to the limits of this form. But we must not confound the effects of this

difference with that which causes them. This is the method of the artist when producing his art-work, a method influenced by the relative attention which he gives, either consciously or unconsciously, to the requirements of significance or of form. It is important to recognize this fact, too, because, otherwise, we should not recognize that he is the master of his methods, and, if he choose, can produce in both styles, though, of course, not with equal pleasure, because he must have his preferences; nor with equal facility, because it is a matter of a lifetime to produce successfully in either. To suppose that his methods master him, is to show a lack of insight, with reference to the practice of art, still greater than that just indicated with reference to the theory of it. Goethe could write "Iphigenie auf Tauris" or the "Leiden des jungen Werther's." So, too, the same painter can "chiefly emphasize" form in his figures by using the distinct "classic" line, as it is termed; or, if he have been educated in another school, often merely if he choose, he can suggest the form with the vague outlines of the romantic impressionists; and the same architect also can plan a classic Girard college, or a romantic seaside cottage. To imagine otherwise, is to parallel the notion of a schoolboy that the poet tears his hair, rolls his eyes, raves in the lines of a lyric rather than of a drama, and makes a general fool of himself by a complete lack of self-control whenever he is composing at all, simply because he is "born and not made."

That this inference with reference to the error as to artistic methods is justified, is proved by the inability of critics of this class to recognize the necessity of making any distinction whatever between significance in form—not outside of form—and form as developed for its own sake, concerning which the reader may notice what is said in the Introduction to "Music as a Representative Art."—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music, Preface.*

CLASSIFICATION, AS THE SOURCE OF ART-COMPOSITION.

Men generally—and possibly we may find the same true of artists—before they can master the materials about them, must do what is expressed in the old saying, "Classify and conquer." When the child first observes the world, everything is a maze; but, anon, out of this maze, objects emerge which he contrasts with other objects and distin-

guishes from them. After a little, he sees that two or three of these objects, thus distinguished, are alike; and pursuing a process of comparison he is able, by himself or with the help of others, to unite and to classify them, and to give to each class a name. . . . All his knowledge, and not only this, but his understanding and application of the laws of botany, mineralogy, psychology, or theology will depend on the degree in which he learns to separate from others, and thus to unite and classify and name certain plants, rocks, mental activities, or religious dogmas. Why should not the same principle apply in the arts? It undoubtedly does. . . . The factors classified and the results attained in science, philosophy, and art are different; but in essential regards, the method is the same. It is so because it is the same human mind that applies it.—*The Genesis of Art-Form*, I.

Just as the physicist classifies effects conditioned upon laws operating underneath phenomena of a physical nature, and the psychologist classifies effects conditioned upon laws operating underneath phenomena of a psychical nature, so the artist classifies effects conditioned upon laws operating underneath phenomena of an artistic nature. . . .

So far as classification results from the conditions of *mind*, its function is to simplify the work of forming concepts, and its end is attained in the degree in which it enables one to conceive of many different things—birds or beasts, larks or geese, dogs or sheep, as the case may be—as one. Classification is, therefore, an effort in the direction of *unity*. It is hardly necessary to add that the same is true of art-composition. Its object is to unite many different features in a single form. Unity being the aim of classification, it is evident that the most natural way of attaining this aim is that of putting, so far as possible, *like with like*; and that doing this necessitates a process of *comparison*. Applying this principle to art-composition, and looking, first, at music, we find that the chief characteristic of its form is a series of phrases of like lengths, divided into like numbers of measures, all sounded in like time, through the use of notes that move upward or downward in the scale at like intervals, with like recurrences of melody and harmony. So with poetry. The chief characteristics of its form are lines of like lengths, divided into like numbers of feet, each uttered in like time, to which are sometimes added alliteration,

assonance, and rhyme, produced by the recurrence of like sounds in either consonants, vowels, or both. In painting, sculpture, and architecture, no matter of what "style," the same is true. The most superficial inspection of any product of these arts, if it be of established reputation, will convince one that it is composed in the main by putting together forms that are alike in such things as color, shape, size, posture, and proportion. . . .

But classification is traceable not only to the conditions of *mind* but also of *nature*. It is in the latter that the mind is confronted by that which classification is intended to overcome, by that which is the opposite of unity—namely, *variety*. If there were none of this in nature, all things would appear to be alike, and classification would be unnecessary. As a fact, however, no two things are alike in all regards; and the mind must content itself with putting together those that are alike in some regards. This is the same as to say that classification involves, occasionally, *putting the like with the unlike* and necessitates *contrast* as well as comparison. . . . A similar fact is observable in products of art. One of the most charming effects in music and poetry is that produced when more or less unlikeness is blended with the likeness in rhythm, tone, and movement which, a moment ago, was said to constitute the chief element of artistic form. In painting and sculpture one of the most invariable characteristics of that which is inartistic is a lack of sufficient diversity, colors too similar, outlines too uniform. So, too, with architecture. Notice the conventional fronts of the buildings on many of the streets of our cities. Their accumulations of doors and windows and cornices, all of like sizes and shapes, are certainly not in the highest sense interesting. When we have seen a few of them, we have seen all of them. In order to continue to attract our attention, forms must, now and then, present features that have not been seen before. In "The Genesis of Art-Form" (see the chart on page 89 of this volume), the suggestions derived from a line of thought similar to that just pursued, are developed into various methods used in art-composition.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, XIV.

CLASSIFICATION, NECESSITATED BY IMITATION.

At first thought, classification, and anything resembling imitation appear to necessitate different processes. But,

possibly, they do not. Suppose that the forms of nature themselves were found to manifest effects like those of classification? In that case, to imitate them would involve imitating this; and to add to them, as is usually done in art, and to add to them in such a way as to make the added features seem analogous to the imitated ones, and thus to cause the forms as wholes to continue to seem natural, would involve continuing the process of classification. Now, if, with this thought in mind, we recall the appearances of nature, we shall recognize that the condition, which has been supposed to exist there, really does exist. A man, when classifying rocks, puts together mentally those that are alike. So does nature, grouping them in the same mountain ranges, or at the bottoms of the same streams. He puts together leaves, and feathers, and hairs that are alike. So does nature, making them grow on the same trees, or birds, or animals. He puts together human beings that are alike. So does nature, giving birth to them in the same families, races, climates, countries. In fact, a man's mind is a part of nature; and when it works naturally, it works as nature does. He combines elements as a result of classification, in accordance with methods analogous to those in which nature, or, "the mind in nature," combines them. Indeed, he would never have thought of classification at all, unless in nature itself he had first perceived the beginning of it. He would never have conceived of forming a group of animals and calling them horses, nor have been able to conceive of this unless nature had first made horses alike. To put together the factors of an art-product, therefore, in accordance with the methods of classification, does not involve any process inconsistent with representing accurately the forms that appear in the world. These forms themselves are made up of factors apparently put together in the same way, though not to the same extent.—*The Genesis of Art-Form*, I.

COLOR (*see* HARMONY OF COLOR, DECORATIVE *vs.* PICTORIAL, *and* REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS OF COLOR).

COLOR, AS PERCEIVED BY THE EYE.

Where (*i. e.*, through the bacillar layer) the optic nerve enters the retina, the eye is blind. This seems to prove that the bacillary layer is necessary to sight. But this layer contains the rods and cones. These are said in Foster's "Physiology" to be transparent, refractive, doubly refrac-

tive, and very sensitive to light, changing in size in different degrees of it. Possibly they may act in some way analogously to prisms. But however they may act, Fig. 131 shows that the rods because smaller should be more sensitive to slight vibratory effects than the cones; and Fig. 128 shows that the central spot, which sees outlines and colors the most distinctly, contains only cones. Are the rods, therefore, affected, according to what was said on page 379, by light in general, and the cones by local color in particular objects? Again, each rod and cone possesses two apparently separated limbs, the larger of which is nearer the main body of the nerves than the smaller. If a wave of white light affect each limb similarly, this wave divided and changed in form, as when color is produced, must affect each differently. In this case is one cone-limb affected by the principal color-wave, and the smaller, with reflecting rods near it, by the twin complementary color-wave? All around the rods and cones, and inside the former, a purplish-blue liquid is constantly advancing and receding. It has been supposed that the sole purpose of this is to record different degrees of light and shade. But, while recording these, it may do very much more. Most of us must have noticed, when the power is turned from an electric light, that the one platinum wire vibrating at different rates produces all the warm colors—white-yellow, yellow, orange, and red; and it is a fact easily shown that these colors respectively, when shining through blue glass, produce all the cold colors,—blue, green olive-green, and purple. The attributing of articulative sounds to different rates and forms of vibrations when affecting the same ossicles in the ear suggested to Professor Bell that apparatus for converting the vibrations in an electric wire into sounds which made the telephone a success. Why is it not reasonable to suppose that the same rods or cones, when vibrating differently, shaded or not by blue, can produce all the colors, so that the mind can see them as well as the outlines in the picture impressed upon the retina. Another thought: vibrations of particles of matter against one another or the air usually generate heat. Heat thus generated usually generates chemical action. Different rates of vibration—and this is why, as has been proved, it is true of different colors—generate different degrees of heat and of chemical action. Chemical action, so scientists tell us, manifested in the pulling down and building up of tissue,

is the method through which the nerves communicate sensations. What then? The author is aware that he has suggested an explanation of the way in which sound-waves or sight-waves may affect the organs of the ear or eye, and through them the nerves and the mind back of them, which is not in the books. But can any explanation be found in them as plausible, or as free from objections, as is this one? Certainly it is not any explanation ascribing the recognition of any pitch or color to a separate organ fitted to respond sympathetically to it and to it alone. So far, at least, as concerns the organism, as represented in Figs. 130 and 131, there is no reason to suppose otherwise than that all the rods and cones may be equally fitted to respond to the waves of light of any color, and yet with different degrees of susceptibility, some—possibly the rods—representing only atmospheric light and color, and some—possibly the cones—that color which appears in particular objects.

The explanation thus suggested not only refers to a similar cause the subjective effects both in the ear and the eye . . . but it seems to explain also the most important difference between the effects of successive¹ and of simultaneous² contrast. This is that the time of the continuance and the brilliancy of a color in successive contrast depend upon the length and strength of the vibratory condition preceding it, whereas, in simultaneous contrast, such effects depend neither upon the length of time during which one looks at a color, nor even upon its comparative fulness. This difference is exactly what, according to our hypothesis, we should expect. According to it, the continuance and character of the oscillations occasioning successive contrast will, of course, be determined by the quantity and quality of their previous excitation. On the contrary, the complementary color produced in simultaneous contrast depends upon the presence by its side of the local color, and it is neither increased nor lessened in intensity by its continued presence. Moreover, in every place where this complementary hue can become visible, there is already some other shade or tint with which its hue must blend, and . . . produce a mixed, and therefore never, save in very exceptional cases, a brilliant effect.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, XXII.

¹ Color contrasting with that of an object removed from sight.

² Color contrasting with that of an object which it surrounds.

COLOR AS PRODUCED BY HAVING HUES MIX IN THE EYE.

Within the last half-century, the art of painting . . . has been almost revolutionized; and here again we have to attribute the result to a change in the method of producing effects in color. The older painters, as a rule, mixed their hues before placing them on the canvas, and put them there exactly as they wished to have them appear when seen from a distance. But, according to the most modern method (suggested first by Velasquez), colors, so far as feasible, are brought into proximity on the canvas in such ways that, although not mixed there, they shall, when seen from a distance, mix in the eye. This is the way in which the color effects of nature are usually produced; and, as applied in many cases renders the art-product much more satisfactory, suggesting that the elements entering into a scene, like those of leaves and grasses, are separated from one another, and thus conveying impressions of transparency and atmosphere which were impossible according to the older method. The general effect . . . with the attendant impressions of transparency . . . and of infinity of gradations seems to be accepted as a crucial test of excellence in modern painting.

It is safe to say that the Fontainebleau-Barbizon and the Spanish Roman schools, which have been chiefly instrumental in introducing these new methods, have changed the whole character of much of the contemporary art in other countries, and of about all of the best painting in our own.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, XVII.

COLOR, IN PAINTING VS. DECORATION.

There are two methods of using color, one having to do with imitating it so as to represent it as we find it in certain agreeable or beautiful appearances of nature; the other with applying or arranging it, irrespective of anything but the general principles in accordance with which it appears to be agreeable or beautiful. As painting gives us pictures of the forms of nature, and architecture does not, it is natural to suppose that the first of these methods is, or should be, used mainly in the former art, and the second mainly in the latter, *i. e.*, in the decoration of the interiors or exteriors of buildings. This natural supposition it would be well if some of our modern painters would ponder. When they imagine that they can use color merely "for its

own sake" they are on ground almost, though not quite, as dangerous—owing to the far more subtle requirements of color when used in any circumstances whatever—as are poets who imagine that they can use rhyme, or any other element of sound, merely "for its own sake." The primary object of both painting and poetry is to represent certain effects that are, or that may be supposed to be, in nature; and the moment that this primary object is forgotten the artist or author has crossed the boundaries of his own art, and must compete with the decorators or musicians, in circumstances where imitative limitations by which they are not hampered will materially interfere with his success.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, xvii.

Just as arrangements of sound in verse are satisfactory in the degree in which they fulfil such laws of harmony as apply to music, so arrangements of colors in pictures are satisfactory in the degree in which they fulfil such laws of harmony as apply to decoration. Although the painter of pictures does not use color merely for its own sake, he ought nevertheless to use it in such a way as to cause it, for its own sake, to be a source of interest and pleasure.—*Idem*, xxiii.

In music, it is absolutely essential that all the tones sounded simultaneously as in chords, or in immediate succession, should fulfil certain physical and physiological requirements. If they do not, all the other art-methods, however scrupulously applied, cannot secure harmony. That the same is true with reference to the colors used side by side or one after another in the order of space is a fact which, even if not confirmed by our own observation, the investigations of science have placed beyond dispute.—*Idem*, xxii.

COLOR-PERCEPTION INFLUENCED BY CULTIVATION.

A spectrum, which, when thrown upon green pigment, shows only a green color, if thrown upon the green of foliage shows tints both of red and yellow. Or if the trees be examined through a red glass, it has been observed that in the degree in which the glass transmits only the red rays the leaves are red, although the blue sky above them, as also green fabrics and pigments about them, appear black. The conclusion is inevitable that the coloring matter of foliage, which is called chlorophyl, contains, besides green, other and warmer colors. Of course, for one who knows this, the

suggestion of the tints of red and yellow, in the green about him, will greatly augment his interest in natural scenery. Nor does it require more than a slight degree of effort to enable him actually to perceive these. In coloring, as in everything, men come to see what they try to see. What but persistence in scrutinizing and criticising their neighbors' attire makes the color-sense in women so much stronger than in men? As shown in Chapters XII. to XIV. of "Art in Theory," beauty, even as recognized by the senses, depends largely upon effects produced upon the mind. The truth underlying such injunctions as "Seek ye first the kingdom," "The kingdom is within you," and "Except a man be born from above he cannot see the kingdom," is of universal applicability. Those who strive to enter into the realm of coloring will find capabilities within themselves which, if properly used, will introduce into their field of vision an infinite variety of tints and shades which, so far as concerns the effect upon the senses, transcend in beauty those which the ordinary man perceives, in a degree akin to that in which the new earth pictured in the Apocalypse transcends the old earth of ordinary experience. It is only the man, too, who is able to perceive these colors in nature, by whom they can be fully recognized as representing truth when they are placed upon the canvas of the painter. Yet here they are essential. That indescribable effect of vitality which characterizes the grasses and grains of some landscapes is owing largely to the presence in them of these red and yellow tints. It is these that make of the dead green a "living green," just as surely as the same tints, were they used, would give to the picture of a corpse the glow and warmth of life.—*Idem*, XVIII.

COMPARISON AND ASSOCIATION IN ART-COMPOSITION (*see also* ASSOCIATION, *and* IMAGINATION AND COMPARISON).

Certain audible or visible effects traceable to material or to human nature have, either by way of comparison, as in imitation, or of association, as in conventional usage, a recognized meaning. This meaning enables the mind to employ them in representing its conceptions. But what has been said applies to the use of these effects so far only as they exist in the condition in which they manifest themselves in nature. Art-composition involves an elaboration and often an extensive combination of them. How can they be

elaborated and combined in such a way as to cause them to continue to represent the same conceptions that they represented before art had begun its work upon them? Evidently this result can be attained in the degree alone in which all that is added to the natural sound or sight representing the original conception continues to repeat the same representative effect. In other words, the imagination, which, by way of comparison or of association, connected together the original mental conception and the form representing it, must continue, in the same way to connect together this form and all the forms added to it by way of elaboration or combination. Other methods of expression—religious or scientific—may use imagination in only its initial work of formulating words or other symbols, but art must use it to the very end. It matters not whether its first conception be an image of a whole, as of an entire poem or palace, or whether it be an image of a part, as of a certain form of metre or of arch, the imagination, in dividing the image of the whole into parts, or in building up the whole from its parts, must always, in successful art, continue to carry on its work by way of comparison or association.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, XIV.

COMPARISON APPLICABLE TO MENTAL CONCEPTIONS.

The degree of importance that should be attached to the representation of like conceptions in the forms that are grouped together, is difficult for some to recognize. Yet if, as was said on page 344, the difference between the effects of harmony and of discord be the difference between experiencing in the nerves an unimpeded, free, regularly recurrent vibratory thrill or glow, and experiencing an impeded, constrained, irregularly recurrent series of shocks or jars, then an application of the simplest physiological principles ought to show us that the artistic effects of which we have spoken can be produced in part by the representation of like conceptions. It is universally admitted that the nerves, merely as nerves, may be affected from the thought-side as well as from the sense-side. Whatever, therefore, owing to *incongruity* between thought and form or between different thoughts as represented by different forms, shocks one's conceptions or, as we say, one's sense of the proprieties, may so contribute to the general nervous result that, even though he may find the combinations of color thoroughly pleasing,

it is physiologically impossible that he should experience the effects of beauty in its totality. On this subject the reader may consult Chapter XIII. of "Art and Theory."—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, XXI.

COMPARISON AS THE FOREMOST ART-METHOD (see also COMPOSITION, IMAGINATION, LIKE WITH LIKE, and PAGE 89).

Every one knows that comparison is the very first result of any exercise of the imagination. And he knows also that imagination is the source of all art-production. When a man begins to find in one feature the image of another, and, because the two are alike, to put them together by way of comparison, then, and then only, does he begin to construct an art-product. And not only so, but only then does he continue his work in a way to make it continue to be a medium of expression. The forms which he elaborates are naturally representative of certain phases of thought or feeling, and the significance of the completed product depends upon its continuing to represent these phases. But it can continue to do this only when that which is added in the process of elaboration is essentially like that with which the process starts. It is a striking illustration of the rationality which characterizes the action of the mind when working naturally and instinctively though without knowledge of reasons, that the forms of all the arts, as developed in primitive ages, should fulfil this rational requirement. . . . Looking at poetry, we find the chief characteristic of its form to be lines of like lengths, divided into like numbers of feet, each uttered in like time, to which are sometimes added alliteration, assonance, and rhyme, produced by the recurrence of like sounds in either consonants, vowels, or both. So with music. The chief characteristic of its form is a series of phrases of like lengths, divided into like numbers of measures, all sounded in like time, through the use of notes that move upward or downward in the scale at like intervals, with like recurrences of melody and harmony. In painting, sculpture, and architecture, no matter of what "style," the same is true. The most superficial inspection of any product of these arts, if it be of established reputation, will convince one that it is composed in the main by putting together forms that are alike in such things as color, shape, size, posture, and proportion. . . . It is an equally striking illustration of the irrationality and departure from

nature into which too much self-conscious ratiocination may plunge the same mind, that, in our own more enlightened age, art-forms should not only be tolerated but praised—in poems and buildings for instance—in which the principle of putting like with like has been utterly disregarded.—*The Genesis of Art Form*, II.

Ancient artists, with only their sensations to guide them, constructed those harmonic systems of tone and of color, of which modern science alone has discovered the causes. These causes, as will be shown presently, are the same as those that underlie all the developments of form in art, being all traceable to the satisfaction which, for reasons unfolded in "*The Genesis of Art-Form*," the mind derives from being able, amid the *variety* and *complexity* of nature, to form a conception of *unity*, and, through the general method of *comparison* to embody this conception in a product.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music*, VII.

In these volumes, the effects of form in art have been traced to a single principle, and to the same principle have been traced the effects of whatever significance also may be expressed in each form. All art, in any of its manifestations, has been shown to be an emphasizing, through a method of elaboration, of factors taken from one's surroundings, which are used not only in art, but in every attempt at expression, for the purpose of representing, by way of association or comparison, sometimes these surroundings themselves, and sometimes the thoughts and emotions that are communicated through them. Moreover, whether we wish to emphasize the factors themselves, or the purpose for which the mind uses them, each end is best attained by putting, so far as possible, like with like in the sense of grouping features having either corresponding effects upon the mind, *i. e.*, like significance; or corresponding effects upon the senses, *i. e.*, like forms; or, as is frequently the case, corresponding effects upon both the mind and the senses. Stated thus, the principle may seem very simple and insignificant. But any one who has read the volumes of this series, and observed the applicability of the principle to all possible effects of form in all the arts, together with the way in which analogous effects in different arts have been correlated to one another; and who has observed also the applicability of the principle to the mental effects of art, whether produced by the grandest generalizations that can broaden

thought, and the profoundest passions that can excite emotion, or only by the smallest specific accent of a syllable, the measuring of a tone, the shading of a line, or the turning of a little finger,—any one who has observed these facts, and is at all appreciative of the vastness and complexity of the subject, or is acquainted with the chaotic conditions in which the histories of opinions have left men's common conceptions of it, or is merely aware of that which, in general, is the distinctive aim of all philosophical analysis,—any such man will recognize the degree in which, when the elements investigated are made to seem single and simple, the comprehensiveness and importance of the discussion are enhanced.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, xxvi.

The reader needs to be reminded that the developments resulting from putting like with like according to the methods indicated in the chart on the opposite page, are manifested not only in rhythm and proportion but also in harmony, whether of sound or sight, the difference between the first two and the latter being that in the former we are conscious of the elements that are put together, and in the latter we are not conscious of them, and can only become aware of them as a result of scientific demonstration. At the same time, there are both sounds and sights which are in the border-land, as we may term it, between these two conditions. For instance, in a low tone of the organ we can distinguish vibrations allying its effects to those of rhythm almost as clearly as we can distinguish pitch allying them to those of harmony. So in the case of this particular curve, a reason for the use of which is indicated here in accordance with the principles of proportion,—this explanation will not prevent another, and perhaps a better one, which will be given on page 292, and which ascribes it to the principles underlying harmony of outline.—*Idem*, v.

COMPARISON IN ARCHITECTURE (*see mention of it under*
ARCHITECTURE, PERSPECTIVE, *and* PROPORTION).

Study will show that at the time of the Gothic and the Renaissance revivals, the manifestation in buildings of the principle of putting large numbers of like dimensions with like, again came to be considered necessary. It is considered so in all great architecture.

In case our own builders ignore this fact, we can expect but little from them. They may turn out of their planing

mills or stone quarries, pillars that look like those of Greek temples, or arches that look like those of Gothic cathedrals; they may discard these older models altogether, and try as hard as savages to be original by bringing together discordant mixtures of shapes, sizes, styles, and colors, and doom to eternal infamy the names of Queens Anne and Elizabeth by calling their hotch-potch after them; but no great architecture or school of architecture can be produced in this way. Great architecture is founded upon principles that are in the constitution of nature and of mind, the applicability of which all men recognize. Nor can they be ignored or neglected in any product of art without lessening the force of its appeal to human interest.—*Idem*, XIII.

Every list of figures that we have found proves . . . that the Greek builder was careful to preserve the appearance of putting like dimensions with like. This principle applied to all the parts of a structure would determine its proportions as a whole. If, in time, laws like those mentioned by Vitruvius arose, it is more than likely that most of these in the forms in which they have been preserved, were afterthoughts, derived from what, at a period when architecture was no longer in its prime, was discovered by measuring the buildings of the fathers. Why it should ever have passed its prime and begun to decline is easy to perceive. When any form of art is young, men are never tired of going back to first principles and experimenting with their designs, not only in painting and sculpture but in architecture too, just as often as effects seem unsatisfactory. After the earlier, creative periods of the art, however, men begin to think that the whole subject, and all its methods, have been mastered. They imagine that no more practical experiments are needed. They are first contented with what has been achieved by their ancestors, and then they begin to have a traditional veneration for it. That which should stimulate them to thought, stirs them only to reverence, and, like many of the critics and architects of our own day, they come to teach in their schools, and to believe in their hearts, that to be a successful imitator is to embody the only praiseworthy artistic ideal. Undoubtedly this was the fate that, after a time, overtook the architects of Greece. They became imitators. Because their copies stood before them, they ceased to experiment. Because they did not need to conceive their own designs they ceased to think

about them; and when they ceased to do this they necessarily ceased to cause them to develop, and began to cause them to deteriorate. Before long, they began to regard as ends those methods which the great architects had used as means. They reproduced the subordinate features in the older temples, but overlooked the principal ones. Finally all the measurements that they used grew discordant, and it was beyond the power of any rules like those of Vitruvius to make them otherwise. Columns, entablatures, and tympanums, bore a general resemblance to those upon the Acropolis, but contained not one element that, in the estimation of the merest tyro of the art, could entitle them to be considered architectural models. . . . The Greek temples emphasize results, which the others do not, attained by putting like with like. All the best Greek buildings show similar effects, and why? Because the Greek lived near to nature. His buildings emphasized corresponding measurements for the same reason as do the card houses of a child. The Greek carried out the instinctive promptings and prescriptions of the mind. It was in the endeavor to do this that he originated those scientific adjustments to accommodate actual proportions to optical requirements, which will be considered in the following chapters. Only much later did this end absorb the whole interest of builders, as it has that of modern students who have examined their works, and thus divert attention from more important matters on account of which alone these optical requirements were at first studied. The result was on a par with that of the exclusive attention paid to the secondary details of poetic form in the time of Queen Anne, leading to the pompous prosaic jingle that during most of the last century passed in England for the only permissible poetic phraseology.—*Idem*, XIII.

COMPARISON, PUTTING LIKE WITH LIKE 'N POETRY.

The illustrations used are sufficient . . . to suggest to what an extent the meanings of words, whether primary or secondary, are developed according to the very closely allied methods of association and comparison. Isolated words, however, do not constitute language. Before they can become this, they must be put into phrases and sentences. But what are these phrases and sentences, again, except words uttered consecutively in such a way that the

order of their utterance or dependence upon one another shall compare with the order, *i. e.*, the direction or tendency, of the different phases of the mental motive which prompts to them? Through the whole extent of language, therefore, which furnishes the material or medium for the expression of poetry, we find in constant operation this process of comparison. The same thing is true, but need not be argued, with reference to metaphors, similes, and representations of characters and events, which all acknowledge to be necessary to the further development of poetic language and thought.—*Art in Theory*, XVIII.

We cannot, without some important modification, frame any rule to the effect that the uttering in succession of like sounds is invariably euphonious. But should we, therefore, draw the inference, as some do, that the opposite is true; in other words, that in poetry the repetition of similar sounds is not euphonious, and that here is a case in which the principle of putting like effects with like does not apply? Before drawing this conclusion, let us, at least, look farther into the subject. . . . The vocal organs are so formed that their positions and actions in an accented and in an unaccented utterance are different. . . .

Moreover, the nature of the organs is such that ease of utterance requires that both forms should be present, and used in alternation. One cannot apply to consecutive syllables without restriction, therefore, this principle of comparison. Unaccented syllables must *contrast* with the accented ones, and in such a way too as to *complement* them (see page 89). But if this requirement be regarded, like sounds repeated only on accented or only on unaccented syllables, except in the sense in which all forms of repetition may become monotonous and tiresome, are not open to the objection urged. They do not render utterance more difficult, as suggested above, but, on the contrary, decidedly more easy.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music*, VII.

COMPLEMENT (see CHART ON PAGE 89, CONTRAST, and HARMONY OF COLOR).

Two things are complements when they contrast, and yet, as they appear together, complete the one thing to which they equally belong. They must be regarded, too, in classification, because every department of nature is full

of them. Certain kinds of metals and ores, leaves and branches, males and females, alike in some regards, unlike in others, are always found together, and are both necessary to the realization of the type. So in the arts. In those of sound, high and low tones contrast; and yet, if we are to have rhythm, melody, or harmony, both are necessary. In the arts of sight, light and shade contrast; and yet, if we are to represent the effects of forms as they appear in sunlight, both are necessary. In colors, again, certain hues, like red and blue-green, contrast; and yet as both, when blended together, make white, both may be said to be necessary to the completeness of light. In all these cases the contrasting factors are termed complements. The principle which underlies their use is closely related, both in reality and in ordinary conception, to the developments of it in *counteraction* and *balance*.—*The Genesis of Art-Form*, II.

Complement produces unity in a natural way from things different. *Counteraction* applies the principle underlying complement to things that are not complementary by nature, and produces, as we have seen, effects that are essential to the very existence of form. *Balance*, going still farther, applies the same principle to things that are neither complementary nor counteractive, in such a way as to give a more satisfactory appearance to the form by adding to it the effect of equilibrium. A still later development of the same principle, preceding which, however, there need to be some intervening stages, results in symmetry.—*Idem*, III.

COMPLEXITY (see BEAUTY ATTRIBUTED TO HARMONY).

COMPOSITION IN ART, METHOD OF (see CHART ON PAGE 89, and mention of it under CLASSIFICATION and COMPARISON).

How is a song or a symphony that is expressive of any given feeling composed? Always thus: A certain duration, force, pitch, or quality of voice, varied two or three times, is recognized to be a natural form of expression for a certain state of mind,—satisfaction, grief, ecstasy, fright, as the case may be. A musician takes this form of sound, and adds to it other forms that in rhythm or in modulation, or in both, can be compared or associated with it, varying it in only such subordinate ways as constantly to suggest it; and thus he elaborates a song expressive of satisfaction, grief, ecstasy, or fright. Or if it be a symphony, the method is the same. The whole, intricate as it may appear, is developed by recur-

rences of the same or very similar effects, varied almost infinitely but in such ways as constantly to suggest a few notes or chords which form the theme or themes. A similar fact is true with reference to poetic elaboration. What are the following but series of comparisons,—reiterations of the same particular or general idea in different phraseology or figures? . . .

What do we have in the poetic treatment of a subject considered as a whole, as in an epic or a drama? Nothing but repeated delineations of the same general conceptions or characters as manifested or developed amid different surroundings of time or of place. So with the forms of painting, sculpture, and architecture. Every one knows that, as a rule, certain like lines, arches, or angles are repeated in the columns, cornices, doors, windows, and roofs of buildings. Few, perhaps, without instruction, recognize that the same principle is true as applied to both the outlines and colors through which art delineates the scenery of land or water or the limbs of living creatures. But one thing almost all recognize: This is that, in the highest works of art, every special effect repeats, as a rule, the general effect. In the picture of a storm, for instance, every cloud, wave, leaf, bough, repeats, as a rule, the storm's effect; in the statue of a sufferer, every muscle in the face or form repeats, as a rule, the suffering's effect; in the architecture of a building,—if of a single style,—every window, door, and dome repeats, as a rule, the style's effect.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, XIV.

COMPOSITION IN ART, METHODS OF (*see* CHART ON PAGE 89).

Art-composition is influenced first by *mental* and then by *material* considerations. He (the artist) begins with a conception which, in his mind, is associated with certain forms or series of forms. To represent this conception is his primary object. But he cannot attain it, unless the forms, or series of forms, added by him in the process of elaboration, continue to have the same general effect as those with which he starts. About the latter therefore, as a nucleus, he arranges other like forms according to the general method of *comparison*. Controlled at first chiefly by a desire to have them manifest this, in order to express a like thought, or to be alike by way of *congruity*; afterwards descending to details, he is careful to make them alike by way of *repetition* and *consonance*. While thus securing

METHODS OF ART-COMPOSITION.

Mainly Conditioned upon the Requirements of the Mind.

[illegible]

See pages 24-26, 73, 86-88, 90, 231, 246, 267-271, 278, 279, 286, 292, 294, 383-385, 391.

unity of effect, however, he is confronted by the *variety* and *complexity* of the natural forms from which he is obliged to construct his art-work. But he soon finds that these can be adapted to his purposes through the methods of *contrast* and *complement*; and, when it comes to *grouping*, he is able still to suggest *unity* by fulfilling the requirements of *order*, in spite of *confusion*, through *counteraction* and the arrangement of factors in accordance with methods of *principality*, *subordination*, *balance*, and *organic form*.—*The Genesis of Art-Form*, IX.

It is the combined result of the application of all of these methods that produces the general effect termed harmony. —*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, XXIV.

COMPREHENSIVENESS AS AN ART-METHOD (see CHART ON PAGE 89).

Who that has heard the earlier composed overture of Wagner's "Tannhäuser"—and the same question would apply to the whole opera which this overture represented and epitomized—can fail to recognize either how themes thus contrasted may add to the interest, or how, by the way in which they complement each other, they may augment the *comprehensiveness* of the result? In this overture, a slow choral, representative of the religious element, is at first entirely interrupted by wild contrasting movements, representing the surgings of the passions; then, after a little, it reappears again, gains strength, and finally by main force seems to crush the others down, and in the final strain entirely to dominate them. Here, in the blending of the most intensely spiritual and material of motives, is *incongruity*, and with it a *comprehensiveness* including the widest extremes. Yet how artistically the like features are grouped with like, and each phase of expression made to *complement* the other; and when the two clash, how *principality* gets the better of what would else be *insubordinate*, and reduces all to *order*! *Incongruity* in such cases really adds to the general effect of *congruity*, because it suggests, as nothing else could, the overwhelming power of that tendency to produce a single effect upon thought, which finally blends the whole into a *unity*.—*The Genesis of Art-Form*, IX.

CONGRUITY IN ART (see CHART ON PAGE 89).

Connecting objects because of like effects produced upon the *mind* by way of association or suggestion may be

termed *congruity* (from *con*, together, and *gruo*, to grow). It means that two things are conceived of as naturally growing or going together; and it may cause them to be connected when in reality they are as unlike as the sounds of a church bell and of an organ, or as the crape of a widow's garb and a white face.—*Idem*, VII.

Congruity might cause the artist to associate in a product things as different essentially as rouge on a cheek and blondined hair, or a hunting song and the sound of a horn; *repetition*, on the contrary, would demand as much likeness as in the allied factors of a piece of fringe, or of a picket-fence, while *consonance*, half-way between the two, would be satisfied were he to unite sounds as different in some regards as those of the flute, the trumpet, the violin, and, the drum, or shapes as different in some regards as a chimney and a tower, or a window and a porch. In architecture, a porch or a bay-window on one side of a building, and a wing or hot-house on the other side of it, might be alike by way of *congruity*. Windows and doors of the same sizes and shapes would be alike by way of *repetition*; but merely a similar pitch of angles over windows and doors and in the gables of a roof above them, would be enough to make all alike by way of *consonance*.—*Idem*, VII.

CONSERVATISM IMPORTANT IN ART.

It is a question whether the most enduring work of even the most original artist is that in which he manifests to the full his tendency to forsake the methods of his predecessors. Wagner, for instance, will probably be remembered chiefly not for the extended passages in his "Siegfried" or "Tristan und Isolde," in which he carried his theories to excess; but for the passages mainly in the operas of his middle period in which his themes were developed more in accordance with the requirements of form as established by his predecessors. That he neglected these requirements is more evident, perhaps, in the works of his imitators than in his own.—*Idem*, III.

CONTRAST, AS AN ART-METHOD (see mention of it under COMPARISON, COMPLEMENT, COMPOSITION, HARMONY OF COLOR, IMAGINATION AND COMPARISON, and PAINTING vs. POETRY).

When the modern artist, like the Greek, selects for representation a certain part of nature, he does so because he has contrasted it, and wishes others to contrast it, with the whole of nature. When, again, in certain parts of his

picture, he wishes to bring some objects into the foreground and to keep others in the background, his attempt is successful in the degree in which light and shade and color are arranged, according to scientific principles controlling contrasts, so that the objects, as they appear side by side, shall be not only separated with the distinctness found in nature, but shall also produce other distinctively complementary effects such as art seems to require. Moreover, it is worth noticing as according with this principle, that the excellence of subjects as manifestations of ideality is measured by the degree in which they admit of originality in the arrangement of contrasts. Hence a fruit-piece, in which the forms and colors admit of little variation, ranks below a landscape; a landscape, for the same reason, below one representing human figures; which latter, in the details both of line and color in posture, countenance, and dress, admits of variations almost infinite.—*Art in Theory*, XIX.

CONTRAST, REPRESENTING IMAGINATION (*see* IMAGINATION).

It is the effort of what we term the imagination—the effort to find in one phenomenon the image of another, or to find one like another—that leads the mind to compare, and then, if it cannot do this, to contrast the two. In such cases, therefore, the imagination is the underlying faculty of mind called into exercise, comparison the primary method in which it exercises itself, and contrast the secondary. As applied to art, the primary position of comparison is still further augmented by the fact that art-products always spring from efforts to connect motives and ideas, and to embody both in a single form. The result is that while the phases of consciousness represented in the arts of sound begin, as it were, with comparison, the forms that are produced in these arts, including, as they necessarily do, many things that are not alike, involve also a consciousness and a representation of contrast. The converse is also true, that while the phases of consciousness represented in the arts of sight begin with contrast, the production of a form which shall be true to the appearances, or, as in architecture, to the formative principles of nature, necessarily involves, also the consciousness and representation of comparison. Only in the exercise of comparison and contrast together is the work of imagination, which is the faculty underlying all the developments of art, complete.—*Idem*, xx.

CONVENTIONAL FORM IN ART.

Just as everybody in Italy, before the time of Dante, supposed that literature could be written in only Latin, though unintelligible to the common people, so everybody in these ages of decline had come to expect, in art, forms that were not natural, and so far, for the reasons just given, not intelligible; and all were disappointed if they saw anything else.—*Essay on Art and Education*.

CORRESPONDENCES OF REPRESENTATIVE FEATURES OF SOUND AND OF SIGHT (*see also* REPRESENTATION BY ASSOCIATION).

Sounds may differ not merely in duration or the quantity of time that they fill; but in force, or the stress with which they are produced, making them loud or soft, abrupt or smooth, etc.; also in quality, making them sharp or round, full or thin, aspirate or pure, etc.; and in pitch, making them high or low, or rising or falling in the musical scale. Sights, too, may differ in analogous ways; *i. e.*, not merely in extension or the quantity of space that they fill, which is the same thing as size; but in contour, which is the same thing as shape, and is shown by the appearance of forcible or weak lines of light and shade; also in quality of color, which has to do with their tints and shades and mixtures; and in pitch of color, which is determined by the hue.

In addition to merely stating these facts, it may be well to enlarge upon one or two of them. Notice, for instance, how true it is that *force* which gives emphasis to sounds, rendering them more distinct from one another than would be the case without it, corresponds to *light and shade*, which emphasize and render more distinct the contour through which one portion of space having a certain shape is clearly separated from another. Notice, also, that accented and unaccented syllables or notes, as they alternate in time, perform exactly analogous functions to those of light and shade, as they alternate in space. The impression of form, for instance, which, so far as it results from metre, is conveyed by varying force and lack of force in connection with divisions made in time, is the exact equivalent of that impression of form which, so far as this results from shape, is conveyed by varying light and shade in connection with divisions made in space. Notice, again, that *quality* and *pitch* are terms almost as much used in painting as in music, quality in colors depending, in a way analogous to quality

in sounds, on the mixture of hues entering into the general effect; and pitch in colors depending on the subdivision of light and its vibratory effects. Undoubtedly, too, it is owing partly to a subtle recognition of the correspondences just indicated that to certain effects in the arts both of sound and of sight the more general terms, *tone* and *color*, have come to be applied interchangeably. In connection with the various divisions and subdivisions under which will be treated the different phases of form to be considered it is sufficient to say that *duration*, limited by pauses in connection with force, as applied to the accents of syllables or notes, gives rise to *rhythm*; that *extension*, limited by outlines in connection with light and shade, as applied to contour or shape, gives rise to *proportion*; that *quality* and *pitch* of tone taken together furnish the possibility of developing the laws of the *harmony of sound*; and that *quality* and *pitch* of color furnish the same possibility with reference to the laws of the *harmony of color*. It is important to notice, too, that *force* or *accent*, while having to do mainly with rhythm, has a certain influence also upon tone—in poetry upon the tunes of verse, and in music upon the melodic suggestions of different degrees of animation; also that, in the same way, *light and shade*, while having to do mainly with outline and proportion, have a certain influence also upon color. They change it in order to interpret the meaning which a colored surface is intended to convey, as, for instance, whether it is to represent what is flat or round. They suggest, too, the vitality characterizing nature. Correspondingly, also, it is important to notice that quality and pitch of sound are often necessary for the full effects of force as applied to *rhythm*; and that the same elements of color are often necessary for the full effects of light and shade as applied to *proportion*. In fact, when used in the same art, the different special effects that enter into the general effects of proportion and harmony which are now to be considered are none of them produced exclusively according to one method or to one combination of methods, but more or less according to all of them when operating conjointly.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, 1.

COUNTENANCE (see also IRREGULARITY).

The expression of mere individuality alone necessitates having no two forms or faces in the world exactly alike. Yet

thousands of them may be equally beautiful; and tens of thousands, though not equally beautiful, may be equally attractive; while, to the student of humanity, none can fail to be interesting.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, VI.

COUNTENANCES MAY BE REGULAR WHEN NOT GRECIAN
(see also REGULARITY).

It must not be supposed, however, that countenances, in order to meet the requirements of regularity, need to be similar. In its way, a dog's face may be as regular as a man's; and there is no reason why one human face should not be as regular as another, though both differ almost radically. Of course, this could not be the case, if by regularity were meant conformity to a certain Greek type, which, as must be confessed, is the generally accepted supposition. Regularity, however, need not mean this; but only a condition in which the general outlines sustain analogous relations to lines or spaces of like directions or measurements. And there may be many different forms of which this can be affirmed, all corresponding in principle though not in the method of applying it. For this reason, when, as is probable nine tenths of all Americans tell us that they consider these faces more beautiful than any conforming to the Greek type, they may be justified. According to the laws of form, properly interpreted, such faces fulfil the principles of proportion. But, besides this, according to the laws of significance, as derived from our association with faces of the ordinary American type, from our deductions with reference to the characteristics manifested by them, and from our sympathy with the persons possessing such characteristics, it is perfectly in accordance with æsthetic principles to say that, while as beautiful in form as are the Greek faces, their beauty, to one of the race and country to which they belong, is enhanced on account of its significance.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, VI.

CREATIVE ART.

It was said that the arts cannot create. But it was not said that they cannot be creative. If by the creative we mean the power which seems to represent divine intelligence through the sights and sounds of nature, what can more resemble this than can the power of him who makes a further

use of these same sights and sounds for the purpose, through them, of representing his own thoughts and feelings? Is it strange that he should take delight and pride in work like this, and in connection with it feel the sources of the deepest inspiration stir within him? Who is there that could not draw delight and pride and inspiration from the consciousness of being in the least degree a follower, an imitator, a child of Him who created the heavens and the earth?—*Art in Theory*, v.

CRITIC, THE DESTRUCTIVE.

One is tempted by it toward the easy task of a destructive critic in general, and to the easier task of destroying their reputations in particular. But a man who becomes a destructive critic, except when intellectual slaughter is justified in order to prevent the slaughter of the truth which he represents, is one who has turned from the discussion of principles and is willing to imperil the acceptance of them for the empty, often merely malicious satisfaction of doing personal harm to those whom he should wish to help. In the long run, to live and to let live is the wisest way of serving the truth, whether of mind or of heart.—*The Genesis of Art-Form*, xv.


CRITICISM (see HISTORIC, STANDARDS, and TASTE).

CRITICISM, DESTRUCTIVE.

The only valid arguments that can be urged against any form of criticism must be connected in some way with a proof that it is destructive and not constructive; or that, if it be the latter, it becomes so by pointing to imitation and not to invention; or, if to invention, only to methods of it which necessitate a departure from the first principles of the art rather than a development of them.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XXI.


CRITICISM, EFFECTS OF, ON THE ARTIST (see also STANDARDS OF).

Criticism cannot produce personality, but can guide it to successful performance. It can prevent that total waste of ability which is invariably expended upon worthless products, where either imitation or eccentricity has led taste away from a recognition of standards which are as enduring as the ages, because rationally deduced from principles deeply seated in humanity and in nature. Rules of art cannot create artistic ability; but they can cultivate it. They cannot make a man a genius; but, if he have genius,



Type of an Assyrian Square

See pages 9, 73, 81, 82, 88, 147, 148, 162



they can enable him to give it vent in such ways that it will exert its due influence; and, if he live, as every man does, where he must accommodate his productions to the demands of those about him, the study of æsthetics can elevate conceptions and tastes so as to give a higher aim to the efforts which are directed to the satisfying of them. The born artist may be a ruler of humanity by divine right; but it is art, the requirements of which can be taught and learned, that alone can give him his government, army, palace, throne, crown, and sceptre, and not only these, but the subjects, too, who on account of their appreciation of the significance of these will acknowledge his authority.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, xxvi.

CRITICISM, SCIENTIFIC, NOT DETRIMENTAL TO ART.

There is less danger, therefore, than is sometimes supposed, that scientific pursuits will diminish the facility of one's imagination. There is always a possibility, of course, that a single mode of thinking, if pursued exclusively, will predominate in the mind; but if two modes be pursued together, and especially if one be pursued for the direct purpose of giving efficiency to the other, this aim will cause both to be kept in use, and counterbalance the possibility. As a fact, we find few instances in history in which a liberal education, properly subordinated, has proved an injury to the æsthetic nature. Milton wrote little poetry until he had finished his political work. Goethe and Schiller both profited much from the discriminating scientific criticism to which, as appears in their correspondence, they were accustomed to submit their productions; at all events, they achieved their greatest successes subsequent to it. And with criticism playing all about his horizon, like lightnings from every quarter of the heavens, who shall calculate how much of the splendor of Shakespeare is attributable to this by-play among the circle of dramatists by whom he was surrounded? With new forms rising still like other Venuses above the miasmas of the old Campagna, who shall estimate how much the excellence of the Italian artists has been owing to the opportunities afforded in historic Rome for critical study?—*The Representative Significance of Form*, xiii.

CULTURE, AS INFLUENCED BY ART.

Art, in all its phases, is merely a compend of lifelong studies in nature and in human conditions, reported by those

with exceptional powers of perception, insight, and inference. If men are to become wise, they must have experience. If they cannot travel and become personally acquainted with different parts of the world, and its inhabitants, they must derive their experience from those who can do so. There is no more efficient way of deriving this than from the pictures, poems, dramas, and novels of great artists. But the effects of art are so subtle, they depend upon so many complex causes, that one can derive comparatively little from it, until he has learned to do so. And when he has learned this, the result is so connected with everything in his whole complex constitution, with both mind and soul, that not only his intellectual but his spiritual experience is enlarged almost beyond measure.—*Essay on Teaching in Drawing*.

CULTURE, AS RELATED TO SCIENCE *vs.* ART.

A scientific specialist with any amount of learning, if it be merely learning, may not give any suggestion of what is meant by culture. A man may study science all his life, and never do it—which fact is the one irrefutable argument against an entirely scientific course in our universities. But it is impossible for one to be a student of art—a dabbler is not meant now, but a student—and not begin to have some culture, and this for the simple reason that he is obliged—a statement which cannot be made so absolutely with reference to any other department of study—to experience some of the results of *practice*. It will be found, too, that the degree of his culture will often depend upon the degree of the thoroughness with which he has studied some art in some of its phases.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, xv.

CULTURE, AS RELATED TO TASTE (*see also* TASTE).

The age is scientific, and the country's aims are directed toward material progress. Both facts cause us to emphasize the real rather than the ideal, the substance rather than the suggestion, that which is held in the hand rather than that which is conceived in the brain. In such conditions, the phase of the play-impulse that prompts to art cannot tend to give expression to its highest possibilities. A cowboy of the West could take little pleasure in the Seventh Symphony, the "Excursion," the "Sistine Madonna," the "Dying Gladiator," or Roslyn Chapel; and, for this reason, no artist of the Western plains would be stimulated to produce

its like. But taste in appreciation or production can be cultivated; and, in the degree in which it is cultivated, a new realm of thought will open for a man, and with it a recognition, hitherto not experienced, of those almost infinite correspondences between spiritual and material relationships which every great product of art manifests. Thus gradually the mind will enter a region of thought in which the play-impulse, which, at first, is satisfied to expend its energies upon the merely apparent and superficial, will care for more than a fife and drum, a jingle of rhyme, a dash of color, a trick of chiselling, or an incongruous pile of stone and mortar. The mind will not be satisfied unless, at times and often, music, poetry, painting, sculpture, and architecture suggest the profound and the sublime; in fact, unless the humanities have had their perfect work, and art has become humanizing in all of its relations. To open such a region to the mind, has been the object of the work of which these volumes contain the records.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, xxvi.

CULTURE, WHAT IT IS.

What, according to the conceptions of men in general, is a man of culture? Does not the following describe him? He is one who has been educated in the sense of having been trained; who has not only a brain but a working brain; who is prepared therefore to deal not only with information but with suggestion; a man whose aims in study—to express his condition in terms to accord with the general thought presented in this volume—have regarded duly both the conscious and the subconscious powers of mind; a man whose memory is able to recall from his own experience and that of others, from history current and past, from books and life, the scores and hundreds of associated facts and fancies teeming about, and through, and beyond the immediate object of consideration; a man whose sphere of thought belongs, therefore, not to the small but to the great, not to the single but to the universal; a man whose whole nature is open to the currents of tendency moving in upon him from all directions, and is prepared both to apprehend and to comprehend, to appreciate and to appropriate whatever truth may loom from any quarter.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, xv.

DECLINE IN ART.

It is a fact overlooked by many how rapidly art, owing to its other necessarily imitative methods, when it once begins to decline, continues to do so. The sense of proportion in the human face and form was entirely lost once, and recovered again, during the period of the art of ancient Egypt. It was lost in Europe all the time between the third and thirteenth centuries. It has been lost many times in China and Japan. In architecture, as developed in Greece, the same sense was lost before Rome was in its prime. It continued lost till the rise of Gothic architecture. It is lost again in our own time. The simplest principles of proportional perspective, which the Greek applied to buildings precisely as we do to pictures, are not merely misapprehended, but are not considered possible either of apprehension or of application by our foremost architects.—*Essay on Art and Education*.

DECLINE, NATIONAL, ATTRIBUTED TO ART.

It has been seriously maintained by certain writers that the development of art in a nation is contemporaneous with its intellectual and political, but especially with its social and moral, decline. At first thought, too, this theory has seemed well founded. Though not true of poetry, the fine arts never reveal their full possibilities in any land, until many individuals have come to have sufficient wealth and leisure to enable them to become patrons or producers of that which is ornamental as well as useful. Nor does decline come to a nation until exactly the same conditions of wealth and leisure have caused many to care more for luxury than for right living. There is, therefore, a certain connection between artistic development and national decline. The connection, however, is not that of cause and effect, but merely of coincidence. Indeed, considered in this light only, a more careful study of history will reveal that the connection is by no means as close or inevitable as is sometimes represented. As a fact, centuries elapsed between the age of Pericles and the intellectual and political decline of ancient Greece. Rome survived by almost as long a time her most flourishing period of architecture and sculpture. Other agencies than those of art could be shown to underlie the partial decline of Italy and Spain between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries; and there is no indis-

putable proof of any deterioration whatever in any of the other nations of Europe as a consequence of their artistic activity during the last three centuries.—*Essay on Art and Morals*.

DECORATIVE vs. PICTORIAL ART (*see also* PAINTING).

Decorative differs from pictorial art, primarily, in the motive. In a picture, color is used in order to reproduce an appearance of nature. In decoration it is used for its own sake. While in the former, therefore, all possible shades and tints may be introduced, so long as, in some way, they can be made to harmonize; in the latter, those only ought to be introduced which of themselves harmonize naturally. Connected with this difference in motive, is the same difference that was noticed on page 175 of "Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music" between sounds in speech and in music. In the one, every possible degree of pitch may be used; in the other, only certain degrees separated from one another by decided intervals. Of course, the method of gradation is exemplified both in pictures and decoration; but in decoration the colors used are, as a rule, separated from one another by more decided intervals, such as are indicated in the color-chart on page 334; and they are more apt to be full hues, than light or dark modifications of these such as are generally found in painting. These hues are placed, sometimes, side by side; but they produce better effects when separated by black, white, gold, or silver lines, which lessen the influence of the adjoining colors on one another. Moreover, while painting deals largely with the greens, light blues, and grays predominating in the world about us, decoration shows a large use of the reds, oranges, yellows, and dark blues, as if one design of it were to produce contrasts to the colors seen in nature. Again, as imitation of form or outline in decoration is often of little importance, almost the entire effect depending upon the selection and arrangement of colors, it is still more necessary than in painting that these should be grouped so as to fulfil strictly scientific principles.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, xxv.

DEGENERATION IN ART.

Does this comment seem to involve treating evident absurdities too seriously? Does any one feel prompted to excuse them because they are merely manifestations of a

species of play? So, as shown in Chapter VII. of "Art in Theory," is all art. The point to be observed is that the manner of the play reveals the matter of the art-conception. Besides this, it is important to observe, too, that, owing to the necessarily imitative action of the mind in connection with all art-development, nothing can degenerate quite so rapidly, when allowed once to start in the wrong direction, as art can. If any one doubts that we are getting ready, at short notice, to take a stride all the way back to the artistic conditions of the middle ages, it might be well for him to ponder the facts just mentioned. Why are they facts? There can be only one of two reasons,—either because too few inventive brains are left among our artists to give us products representative both of mind and of nature; or else because too few æsthetic brains are left among our patrons of art to make demands upon the artists which will necessitate their finding out exactly what art is.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XII.

DESIGN, WHAT IT IMPLIES.

A cousin of mine went to a ball. He came back raving about a young miss fresh from the country who had fascinated him there. A few days later, he was told that she was an experienced coquette who had long been out of her teens. Then he began to talk of her *arts*, he began to recognize in her a creature of *design*. And we shall find that universally when we speak of art, whether of its lowest or highest manifestations,—all the way from sighs to symphonies or canes to cathedrals,—we mean something which is a manifestation of *design*.—*Art in Theory*, I.

DETAILS, COPIED MAINLY IN LATE DEVELOPMENTS OF IMITATIVE WORK.

Now, with this thought in mind, turning again to the other arts, notice that an increase in the imitation of the details of natural appearances has a tendency to increase the same in the treatment determining the general outlines also. As a rule the general plot, *i. e.*, the general outline, of a ballad has to do mainly with mere events; the plot of an epic, which comes later, with details concerning the persons engaged in these events; the plot of a drama, which comes still later, with additional details representing the characters of these persons; and the plot of a descriptive—as distinguished from a narrative—poem, which comes yet

more late, with added details representing one's natural surroundings. So in music. Only in later compositions, as in the oratorios of Haydn, or the operas of Wagner, is the plot unfolded by so analogous or imitative a use of harmony that the melody is reduced to *recitative*. So too in painting and sculpture. A reproduction of the general outlines of form, as by the painters of the middle ages, was once considered all that was necessary. Now there are schools of criticism whose sole applied test of excellence seems to be accuracy in the delineation of the minutiae of appearance.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XXI.

In accordance, now, with everything that has been said in this volume, let us notice the order of the development of the representation of appearances in architecture as fulfilling the principles of correspondence by way, first, of association or suggestion; and, later, of comparison or imitation. On page 8 it was said that in association things are connected that have a like *general* effect, though they may not seem alike in their details; whereas in comparison things are connected that in their details as well as in their general effects seem alike. In strict conformity with this order of representative development, notice that in poetry, music, painting, and sculpture, the first effect which the primitive artist tries to reproduce is a *general outline* of something, either of a story, or of a method of intonation, as in a rude ballad or chant; or of a figure of a man or a beast, as in a rude sketch by pencil or chisel. Notice, too, that even when the desire for ornamentation is quite strong, he is satisfied, at first, merely by emphasizing the factors of outline as in measures and verses, or in colors and shadings. The early poet does not usually give that careful attention to minutiae, which in more civilized times causes a distinctively poetic style, and he never has what is termed a flowery style, by which, as usually interpreted, is meant a style excessively full of comparisons. Nor does the earlier musician make any attempt at the significant accompaniments and florid variations which come later; nor does the earlier painter or sculptor imitate in color or line the less obvious appearances of surfaces and textures. So with architects. . . . long after pillars were given capitals and care was taken with the arrangements of entablatures and pediments, no ornamentation appeared except in the way of giving additional em-

phasis to their necessary characteristics. But just as the straight onward flow of poetic style begins, after it passes the ballad period, to be filled up with allusions, mainly associative and suggestive, and after that with minute descriptions of flowers, plants, streams, mountains, and the various men and living creatures that can be seen surrounding one, so the straight onward lines of architectural style, when it gets beyond the archaic period, begin to be filled up with, first, associative suggestions, and after that with careful imitations of the appearances of nature. . . . Yet, at first, the imitation is only partial. That is, parts of certain natural forms are copied, but they are not put together as in nature. . . . Later than these partially imitated figures, though now, of course, often found in the same buildings with them, come those that are fully imitated,—the method of dealing with forms, which we find in the later decorated Gothic.—*Idem*, xx.

DISCORD IN ART (*see also* BEAUTY ATTRIBUTED TO HARMONY, *and* HARMONY).

It is difficult to conceive how a man who has never studied the subject at all can fail to detect the blunders in some of the discords above. Certainly few children playing with building blocks would make mistakes analogous to them. The outline of the toy houses that they construct are usually consonant at least. Why is this not the case with those planned by architects? For the same reason, probably, that many in other arts—musicians, elocutionists, painters—owing to false methods of studying or of applying rules, seem to be unable to sing, speak, or color in a natural way. Certain methods of studying or applying the laws of architecture seem to have a corresponding effect. Those who should be conversant with them neglect to exemplify requirements that are the most instinctive of which we know.—*The Genesis of Art-Form*, xv.

DRAMATIC ART (*see also* EPIC).

Like marriage and religion, dramatic art is one of those human activities to which, as things are, no one can put an end; and, at certain periods—as, for instance, at the time of the morality plays—its influence has been just the contrary of debasing. What is needed is an endeavor not to abolish but to correct; and, so far as the nature of art has been misunderstood, a first step in doing this must be taken by

giving people more accurate conceptions with reference to what art really requires.—*Essay on Art and Morals.*

DRAMATIC ART DEALING WITH HISTORY.

Just as a magnifying glass modifies all the points of interest in an object to which it is applied, so it seems permissible at times for imaginative art to do—in case, like the glass, it does not change the relative proportions of the parts to one another and to the whole. A poet, like a painter, has a right to increase the interest and beauty of the life that furnishes his model by means of the medium—the modern medium too—through which he is supposed to contemplate it. Otherwise, the subject with which he deals could not be treated from a present and poetic view-point, and his works would not be worth the ink expended on them. All the consideration for truth which it seems reasonable to expect of the historic dramatist is that, in a medium, the component parts of which are necessarily made up of the language and methods of thought natural to his own time, he should represent, in their relative proportions, the particular motives and feelings as well as the general atmosphere of thought natural to the conditions existing at the time of the events forming the basis of his plot.—*Introduction to "The Aztec God."*

DRAMATIC ART, IN A CLASS BY ITSELF.

Take the dramatic art—a better term, by the way, than histrionic, though perhaps, because liable to be confounded with dramatic literature, not so distinctive a term as *dramatics*—take this art. In important particulars, it certainly stands at the centre of the higher æsthetic system, containing in itself, as it does, the germs of all its artistic possibilities. It may use not alone the sustained intonations of the voice that are developed into melody and music, but also the unsustained articulations that are developed into language and poetry; and besides these, too, it may use the posturing in connection with surrounding scenes and persons and stage settings that are developed into painting, sculpture, and architecture. Why then is it not usually included in the same class with music, poetry, painting, sculpture, and architecture? Is not this the reason?—Because its effects result mainly from the use of means of expression that are connected with the artist's own body, whereas the other arts necessitate the use and consequent

production of a medium of expression that is external to him. There is little doubt that externality in this sense is important in order to give completeness to the conception of a product of art as a thing that is *made*.—*Art in Theory*, ix.

DRAWING, INFLUENCE OF INSTRUCTION IN.

As we sit in our homes and examine our surroundings, we discover in them artistic appearances infinitely beyond the number of those which any one man, looking at the world about him, could suppose that this could in any way suggest. These appearances are everywhere, whether we look at the carpet, wall-paper, table-service, bric-à-brac, or furniture. As manifested in all these places, they indicate the exact degree of the taste of those who have made or have purchased them. Much of this taste, too, as well as the ability to express it in production, has been cultivated in children when learning to draw and color. But this is not all. Dependent primarily on the same taste and ability, are the house itself, the garden surrounding it, the town in which it stands, with its business blocks and churches, the country with its roads and parks, and the whole country with its harbors, canals, and railways, with all the century's various methods of development and transportation. All these necessitate, on the part of promoters or inventors, the drawing of plans, plots, charts, maps, and designs. If so, it may be doubted whether, after reading, writing, and arithmetic, any branch of instruction begins the knowledge of that which is destined to prove more generally useful in life, than does instruction in drawing.—*Essay on Teaching in Drawing*.

DRILL IN EDUCATION (*see also* INSPIRED, PRACTICE, and SKILL).

We need to have impressed upon our minds the fact that drill and discipline are not merely a subordinate function,—they are the chief function of education up to the period of adolescence. Studies intended merely to inform or explain, instead of being crowded down, as now, into periods earlier than this, should be crowded up and out,—not because they have no importance, but because, at this period, other mental requirements that it is impossible to cultivate later in life have greater importance. Exactly the same method pursued in making a scholar in music should be pursued in making any scholar. You want the man when grown to be well informed. Very well, then, you must sharpen his memory when young, so that the information that he gets

when older will stick. You want the man, when grown, to be a thinker. Very well, then, when young you must keep his mind awake by quizzing—tickling it, even in the sense of playing with it. Such questioning will accustom him to search for what is inside his mind, to dive into the depths of consciousness and to bring every link in the chain of thought to the light. Hypnotize him, and you will find that, however hidden, what you want is inside of him. He has not forgotten or lost any fact or principle that ever was his. He merely fails to be able to recall or use it. If you train him properly, he can do both.—*Essay on Music as Related to Other Arts*.

EARLIER ART PRODUCTS (*see also* HOMER).

Who has not asked himself why it is that to-day we find so many of the best models of art in all its branches among the earlier products of the kind? And what is the answer? Is not one reason to be found in the fact that, in the absence of specimens of the sister arts which crowd around and confuse the aims of the modern workman, the ancient one was in a better condition to confine himself to the legitimate promptings of the phase of consciousness natural to his own art?—*The Representative Significance of Form*, xxv.

EDUCATION INVOLVES HARD WORK.

One theory of our modern educational quacks—who seem to have forgotten the experiences of their youth because only imagination, which they have not, is able to recall them—is that education should not be made either hard or disciplinary; on the theory that it cannot thus be made entertaining,—as if it could not be, at one and the same time, both,—as if the mind, like the body, did not enjoy exertion, and the triumph of overcoming, in the very degree of the difficulty involved! The idea of recommending a game to a growing boy on the ground of its being easy! In the olden times, some of the most pleasant hours of almost every childhood were spent when all the school were assembled together, in order to be drilled. Of course, such a method of teaching, to be interesting, requires an interesting instructor; but so does any successful method of teaching.—*Essay on Music as Related to Other Arts*.

EFFECTIVENESS OF WORKS OF ART.

There is a sense, too, in which this art is often able to repeat the most effective even of nature's operations in the

most effective way. What is it in nature that operates the most powerfully? Not the wind or fire or earthquake, but rather the still small voice, sighing for us in the silence of our reveries. So in the works of man, not in the railway or the telegraph, in the rattle or the flash of material forces that deafen or dazzle us, do we apprehend the presence of the most resistless power. Just as frequently, more frequently, perhaps, we recognize it in connection with those products of art which, though they seemingly may influence activity as slightly as the ministering angels of a dream, yet, like them too, come often summoning souls to high companionship, and everything that this can signify, with all that is most true and good and beautiful.—*Art in Theory*, II.

ELLIPSIS, AS USED IN POETRY (*see also* OBSCURITY).

There is a significant connection between these effects and the use of the rhetorical hiatus and ellipsis which are so general in poetry, and so generally regarded as legitimate. These figures of speech seem invariably to suggest that the thoughts of the writer are moving forward in time, and that he must not try to elaborate them. He must hurry on to something else. In the majority of cases, too, hiatus follows a reference to something that is aside from the main line of thought, something that the writer conceives of as existing side by side with that with which he is dealing, something involving, therefore, an appeal that is suggestive to the imagination. One secret of Robert Browning's power lay in this use of ellipsis. But he sometimes carried the figure too far.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XXII.

Omission or *ellipsis* is an exaggeration of terseness in style, which is often a great excellence. In all kinds of writing, but especially in that appealing to the imagination, it is a fault to express too much. Those to whom poetry is naturally addressed derive their main satisfaction, and therefore interest, from that which influences them in the way of suggestion, leaving their fancies free to range where and as they will.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, XIV.

ELLIPTIC-LANCEOLATE SHAPE AS USED IN ART.

Dr. M. Foster says in his "Text-Book of Physiology," sec. ii., on Binocular Vision—that "when we use both eyes a large part of the visual field of each eye overlaps that of the other; but that, nevertheless, at the same time, a

certain part of each visual field does not so overlap any part of the other. The dimensions of the field of sight for one eye will, . . . be approximately circular." But, so far as this is true, notice that the whole field of sight—not for one eye, but for both eyes when acting conjointly—is represented neither by the single circle . . . nor by . . . two separated circles; but rather by the space enclosed between . . . two circumferences of the circles where they overlap, . . . This space has the shape termed by botanists elliptic lanceolate,—an ellipse pointed; and of all outlines wholly curved, those of an upright ellipse fit into it most nearly.

The bearing of this upon our present subject is found in the fact that the whole of a form facing us can be recognized with ease, *i. e.*, in a single glance, or, at least, a single conscious glance, in the degree in which it is conformed to vertical elliptic-lanceolate outlines. Indeed, this fact thus theoretically unfolded, can be confirmed by practical experiments. If we describe at the nearest point at which it is possible to perceive all its outlines, an ellipse longer vertically than horizontally, and about it a circle of the same diameter as the vertical length of the ellipse, there will be not a few who will find it slightly more easy at a single glance, or without consciously changing the axis of the eye, to perceive all the outlines of the former than of the latter. If we describe about the circle and ellipse a square of the same diameter as the circle, no one can see all its outlines without consciously changing the axis of the eye, as when glancing from corner to corner; and if we describe about the square a rectangle of the same vertical but twice the horizontal dimensions, we cannot see all its outlines without changing the axis still more consciously.

In the use of the eyes, the difference between movement and no movement, or *no conscious* movement, is the difference between activity, work, or effort, and rest, play, or enjoyment. But this is the same difference as in Chapter III. of this book is said to separate that which is done with a utilitarian aim and an æsthetic. If a form of outline naturally fitting into the shape of an upright elliptical figure, be the one which requires, to recognize it, the least visual activity, work, or effort, then this form must be the one most conformed to the physiological requirements of the eye. In other words, it is the form most in *harmony* with

these requirements; therefore the most agreeable, the most pleasurable, the most "fitted to be perceived," which is the exact etymological meaning of the word *æsthetic*. This fact furnishes the best possible justification for calling the curve—particularly, as we shall notice presently, the one found in the ellipse—the line of beauty.

What has been thus found to be true with reference to the elliptical contour, renders significant many whole classes of facts with which few of us can fail to be familiar. Recall, for instance, the extensive use in art of this elliptical shape. If we go into the shops where they sell implements for drawing, whatever else they may not keep, assortments of models for different sizes of ellipses are sure to meet our eyes. The one ornamental object, avowedly not modelled after an appearance in nature, which the arts of all lands and races have united in producing, is the vase; and this is almost invariably conformed to vertical elliptic-lanceolate outlines. Again, in architecture, the form that general usage has shown to be the most satisfactory is one which, whether we consider it as exemplified in the cupola or the dome, is . . . described within the space enclosed between circles . . . and even if the building be wide, the form preferred for this is one containing at least a central part which . . . it is possible to enclose in such a space. Notice, too, how the human form as a whole fits into the same elliptic-lanceolate shape.—*The Essentials of Æsthetics*, XVI.

ELOCUTION A GUIDE TO RHETORIC.

A man who knows just where to pause and emphasize in order to produce the best elocutionary effects, will know also how to arrange his words the most effectively when writing. Still greater will be the influence of the same fact upon his oratorical rhetoric. He will instinctively come to present his thoughts not only rhythmically but emphatically. His good elocution will secure him an audience when he speaks, and often, too, when what he speaks is put into print.—*Essay on Elocution in the Theological Seminary*.

ELOCUTION, AS INTERPRETING THE ART PRINCIPLE.

The form to which the elocutionist must apply the result of technique is a part of himself. Therefore, he, of all artists, is least liable, in his own conceptions, to divorce the form of expression from the significance of expression. Take any

elocutionary system and you will see the truth of this,—that of Delsarte, for instance. What does it suggest? To half of us the importance and possibility of accurately representing significance in the form. But to the other half, it suggests gymnastic technique—the importance and possibility of adapting the form to every possible requirement of grace. At the same time, to all of us it suggests something of both conceptions. Such a result is not so inevitable in any other art. Nor is it an unimportant mission of elocution, as I conceive, to make it inevitable in all the arts. But, while doing this, and because doing it, our branch of instruction has a broader mission still. What, as well as it, can enable a man to realize that he has a soul of which his body is merely an instrument, an instrument that can be made to signal any purpose, or to trumpet any call? And the man who recognizes that the human form can be transfigured by the influence of soul,—is not he the one most likely to recognize that, by way of association or suggestion, all forms can be thus transfigured?—*Essay on the Function of Technique.*

ELOCUTION, AS RELATED TO ALL EXPRESSION.

The man who has learned how to arrange tones and pauses in reading is the man who can best arrange what can be easily read by others. Where elocution is properly taught, not once in a score of times, will you find a prize writer in an upper class who has not started by being a prize speaker in a lower class. When Wendell Phillips made a special study of elocution at Harvard, by his side studied Motley, the historian. But, beyond its influence upon literary excellence, the kind of practice necessitated in elocution, and its very apparent effects, are a revelation to large numbers of students of the true method through which thought and feeling can make subservient to themselves the agencies of expression in any department whatever that necessitates the acquirement of skill; indeed, a revelation of how, if at all, the mind can master the whole body or any of its bodily surroundings.—*Idem.*

ELOCUTION, AS RELATED TO OTHER ARTS.

It is not only an art, but also, in an important sense, the art of arts, the centre and fountain of the whole æsthetic system. When the fountain plays, there is melody and rhythm in the rush of its spray and the ripple of its overflow;

there is color and line in the sunlit bow crowning its brow and in the ghost-like shadow shrinking from the touch of moonlight or the frost. But there would be nothing to hear or to see, except for the fountain itself. Nor would there be anything of the whole art-system except for elocution. Make that which can echo a man's intonations, symbolize his articulations, imitate his postures and the hues and outlines that surround him, and you have the possibilities of music, poetry, painting, sculpture, and architecture. Whatever more these latter arts include, they gain all their uses and meanings from the previous use which an immaterial soul has made of its material body. Art is human sentiment made incarnate in the forms of nature; and it first touches nature in the human form, as in elocution.—*Idem.*

ELOCUTION, ITS INFLUENCE ON LITERARY STYLE.

"In reading without utterance aloud," says Alexander Bain, in his "Rhetoric," "we have a sense of the articulate flow of the voice as it appeals to the ear." If this be so, the deduction is unavoidable that the man who, himself, knows how to read with ease will be the most likely to know how to select and to arrange words so that they can be read with ease by others. He will be the most likely to know just where to introduce the accents causing natural rhythm, the pauses enabling one to breathe without effort, and the important words emphasizing the sense; to know where to hasten the movement by short sentences and syllables that one can pronounce quickly, and where to retard it by long sentences and syllables that have to be uttered slowly; to know how to balance the sound-effects of epithets and phrases, when ideas are to be contrasted, or to parallel them when they are to be compared; to know how to let the suggestions of proof, if decisive, unwind like a cracking whiplash at the end of a periodic sentence or climax, or, if indecisive, unravel into shreds at the end of a loose sentence or an anticlimax; to know how to charge his batteries of breath with consonants and clauses that hiss, whine, roar, or rattle, and give thought the victory over form, through rhyme that is loaded with reason, and rhythm that repeats the thought-waves pulsing in the brain, or only to waste his energies in cataloguing names for things that never waken realization of what they cannot picture, that never rouse imagination save as they first lull to dreams, and that never stir one

vivid feeling except of gratitude when their dull details are at an end.—*Essay on the Literary Artist and Elocution.*

ELOCUTION, PROFESSORSHIP OF (*see also* TEACHER).

The inexperienced conception of a professorship like ours is more likely to be that of a man spending all his time in enlarging the range of Demosthenes and Shakespeare by his own contributions, blowing their dead phrases to a glow with the breath of his own inflections, and starring their every climax with the rays of his own gestures; above all, exhibiting his familiarity with the very gods themselves, by pointing the end of every criticism with a rocket bursting into a temporary rivalry of Venus, Jupiter, and Saturn and the whole galaxy of the empyrean.

As a fact, however, no boy was ever more cramped and smothered, while playing dumb orator, than some of us have been, spending so much of our lives, as we have, almost literally kneeling behind those who, but for us, would have had little more influence in the world than the dumb and the halt—and with what result? Not infrequently a comic result; for this is a world of incongruities. The born genius to whom we have been conscious of offering a few hardly-needed suggestions, may thankfully attribute all his success to our efforts. But the man whom we have literally created from the diaphragm up, sending into certain parts of his lungs for the very first time the real breath of life, is not seldom inclined to resent the impious insinuation that to any influence less than that of divinity could be attributed what he has become.—*Essay on the Function of Technique.*

ELOCUTION TEACHERS, ARTIFICIALITY OF (*see also* TEACHER).

Occasionally, one meets candidates for such positions who articulate with such pedantic precision that he feels like shaking them to see if teeth and tongue, which appear to have cut connection with head and heart, cannot actually drop out. There are others who emphasize with so much artificiality that the chief impression conveyed comes from the dexterity with which subordinate words and clauses are kept dancing up and down, as if intent to assume an importance that will keep the main sense in the background.—*Essay on Elocution in the Theological Seminary.*

ELOCUTION, WHEN TOO PICTURESQUE.

A word, too, might be added with reference to the fault of making elocution too picturesque; of confounding re-

presentation in action with painting. As we all know, in connection with expression in language, only a moderate degree of action is natural. To overstep the boundary of moderation in this regard is to transgress those limits where the dignity of appropriate characterization passes into the ludicrousness of incongruous caricature,—a result that we may laugh with in comedy, but can only laugh at in a serious performance. — *The Representative Significance of Form*, XXVI.

ELOCUTIONARY vs. MUSICAL MOTIVE (see ORATORY vs. CONVERSATION).

In correct elocutionary delivery, every sound represents a definite thought. In music, not every sound but every series of sounds represents, and, even then, it does not represent a definite thought but an indefinite emotive tendency of thought. The musical motive is manifested in elocution, when the speaker begins to be influenced by the general drift of the words rather than by the particular thought behind each word. He is more apt to be influenced thus when he is reading from a manuscript than when he is speaking without one. When the eye is attending to phrases instead of individual words the mind is apt to be thinking of the phrase. As a consequence, there begin to be regularly recurring series of slow or rapid upward and downward utterances, irrespective of the emphasis appropriate for particular words, which, when a man is thinking of them, he always gives. This makes the result of elocution resemble that of music. Music either puts our thinking powers to sleep, as if the rhythm had a sort of hypnotic influence, or else it sets us to thinking not of anything in particular but of many things in general, the drift only of which need be in analogy with that which is being heard. And this is just what is done by a sermon delivered with the musical motive, no matter how sweet the voice or correct the enunciation. It either puts people to sleep, or makes them think of something having nothing to do with the discourse. Indeed, however they may try to follow the line of its thought they have hard work in doing so, the legitimate effect of the delivery being to incline them away from it. One's feet might almost as well attempt, without slipping off, to follow a line of cracks along the side of a steep roof covered with ice. — *Idem*, xxvi.

EMOTION, AS INFLUENCING ART-EXPRESSION.

The works of the lesser or occasional artists are produced amid excitement which at intervals avails in all to paralyze the logical powers and to stimulate the analogical. But when, as in the greater artists, such phases of emotion are the rule and not the exception; when they are constant, when the man by nature is subjected to them and habitually views things in an artistic light, and that, too, although not greatly influenced by external causes, then the experience must be attributed mainly to *temperament*.—*Idem*, xiii.

Thought in its very essence is comparison. The artistic state in which the tendency to use comparisons is in the intensest exercise, may be the state in which there is the intensest exercise of thought. What though this thought may be impelled by an excited rather than by a quiescent condition of emotion? Does this change its essential character? As a fact, do artists show less thought in what they furnish us than do scientists? Are not the spirits of the great artists, as of the prophets, notwithstanding all their quickness and intuitiveness of perception and expression, subject to their rational minds? Dante and Raphael, —were their works inspired by an absence of intellection? Leonardo and Goethe,—were they not wellnigh as accurate in their regard for the laws of science as of art?—*Idem*, xiii.

The emotion possessed by the artist, it was said, moves his thought with so much speed that he is unconscious of the different phases through which it passes before reaching its conclusions. With little emotion, with all the thoughts advancing at slow pace, the scientist is conscious of almost every step. But when circumstances so affect one that, owing to some limit in his means or time for consideration, he must arrive at his conclusions in haste—circumstances realized in the cases of all the members of a savage and uncultivated race, and of children and of older persons in the presence of exciting causes—then apprehension overbalances comprehension, and the mind expresses what it would according to the dictates of intuitive judgment rather than of logical reasoning. These are the conditions, as we have found, which give birth to art.—*Idem*, xiii.

EMOTIONS, AS THE SOURCE OF ART.

It is because of emotions succeeding one another too rapidly to permit one's perceptions or expressions to flow

wholly in the channels of conscious thought that the artist's mind works imaginatively with reference to the forms of nature, and causes the minds of others to work similarly with reference to the forms of art which are made similar to those of nature. In other words, the imaginative ideality embodied in art is due to thought as prompted by emotion. But this is exactly what Lord Kames in his "Elements of Criticism" says that sentiment is.—*Idem*, xv.

EMOTION, OR SOUL, AS RELATED TO INSTINCT AND REFLECTION
(see REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS IN EXTENSION).

Instinctive processes on the part of men are those which are conducted according to unconscious methods, and are analogous, for this reason, to the results of the promptings of instinct in the lower animals. Applying this test to music and poetry, we can perceive in what sense they may be attributed to the instinctive tendency. The best melodies and verses sing themselves into existence. The musician or poet hardly knows how or whence they come. In producing paintings, statues, and buildings, however, the mind is more successful when it works reflectively, by which is meant according to the conscious and calculating methods of reason. A statue and a building are produced slowly and with a clear conception of design. At the same time it is important to remember that neither the instinctive nor the reflective tendency alone is sufficient to bring all that there is in a man to bear upon his product. . . . it is when the results of reflection are added to those of instinct, or of instinct to those of reflection; when, therefore, neither one of these elements alone is present, but both together,—it is then that we have in the product an illustration of what, in distinction from either *instinctive* or *reflective*, we may term an *emotive* influence. A man, for instance, may eat and sleep like an animal, instinctively, or he may think and talk reflectively, without giving any expression to what we mean by emotion. But as soon as he thinks and talks in connection with eating and sleeping, as is the case with a caterer or upholsterer, an hotel keeper or a house-wife; or as soon as his instincts prompt and accentuate his thinking and talking, as is the case with an actor or a good story-teller, then, as a result of instinct made thoughtful, or of thought made instinctive, he begins to manifest his emotive nature; and the character of his emotion is represented by the degree in

which the one or the other of the two tendencies—instinct or thought—is in excess. It may be interesting to point out also that, according to ordinary conceptions, the power which blends or balances the instinctive or physical and the reflective or mental, is the soul, holding body and mind together, influencing and influenced by both; and also that, according to ordinary conceptions, it is the same thing to put *emotion* into expressions and to put *soul* into them. Neither can be manifested in them unless they represent a blended result both of nerve and of thought, of instinct and of reflection. In accordance with this, it is evident that music and poetry, which are naturally instinctive, come to manifest soul in the degree in which they embody also, kept of course in due subordination, something of the reflective; and that the naturally reflective products of the other arts acquire the same effect in the degree in which, in the same way, they embody something of the instinctive.—*Art in Theory*, xx.

EPIC, REALISTIC, AND DRAMATIC MOTIVES.

Suppose that one be moved to tell a story. That which first prompts him to do so is some thought, usually a general impression, which strikes him in connection with certain transactions that he has witnessed or heard; and because the impression remains, he tells the story in such a way as to convey to his hearers an impression similar to his own. His whole object in the recital, though he may not be conscious of it, is to make clear the impression, or, as we sometimes say, the *moral*, the *point* that has interested him, and so long as he does this he cares little about accuracy in all the details. Now this is the condition requisite to the epic form of art, and, as all of us will probably recognize, this is the condition of the method most naturally adopted by those who gain the reputation of being good story-tellers. Therefore it seems appropriate that the Greeks, taking their term from a word meaning story, should have named this form, *par excellence*, the *epic*, or story-style.

But there is another way in which one may recall the same transactions. After reflecting upon them a little, he may begin to analyze the different deeds or words of the person implicated, and to ask himself, Why did this one do this or say that? These reflections will lead him to think more particularly of the details of the transactions and

sayings, and of each of them in the order of its occurrence. When, after such a consideration, he comes to tell the story, although possibly he may not neglect to bring out that which at first seemed to him to be its "point," nevertheless this will appear subordinate to the accuracy with which he relates the details themselves and their interaction. In other words, his desire to be true to the facts in their order of sequence—*i. e.*, to the scientific-artistic tendency—will realize the condition requisite to what has been termed *realistic* art; and, with reference to this, it is evident that while such a mode of recital may render a story far less interesting as a mere story, it will render it far more satisfactory to a consideration purely intellectual and analytic.

Once more, there is a third way of telling the story. After analyzing the different words and deeds of the persons engaged in the transactions, a man may become conscious of forming definite conclusions with reference to the motives and characters of these persons, and, as a result of his conclusions, he may be joyous or otherwise, according to the degree in which the events have pleased or grieved him. At this stage, he will be prompted to express his pleasure or grief; *i. e.*, his emotions, and, while doing so, in order to manifest his reasons and enforce their reasonableness on others, he will be led instinctively to imitate the expressions or appearances of the characters to whom he is referring. This gives us the condition requisite to *dramatic* art—from the word *dramare*, to act. In this form, the story is told, not with supreme reference to the *point* or *moral*, as in the *epic*, or to the *details* or *facts*, as in the *realistic*, but to the *effects* produced upon thought or feeling, and to the way in which they can be represented in *action*.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, XI.

EPIC, REALISTIC AND DRAMATIC OUTLINES (*see* REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS IN NATURAL OUTLINES).

Now add to this observation with reference to the expression of outlines in material nature, another with reference to the expression of thoughts or emotions in the human form. Whenever these find vent under the predominating influence of a subjective or instinctive prompting, corresponding to the *epic*; in other words, whenever, wholly from within, a man is inspired to rapture, enthusiasm, and eloquence, either of a joyous or serious character, then his

gait, postures, gestures, and all the movements of his body, in the degree in which his sentiment is able to find unimpeded expression in his physical frame, will take the form of free, large, graceful curves. But whenever his thoughts or emotions find vent under a predominating influence of a relative or reflective prompting corresponding to the *realistic*—in other words, whenever he is actuated by a desire, conscientious, self-conscious, and therefore more or less constrained, to accommodate expression exactly to that which it is to express, then his form will be erect, and his gestures straight and stiff, and, so far as is necessary in order to make them straight, angular. And once more, whenever he is under a predominating influence of objective or emotive promptings, corresponding to the *dramatic*—in other words, whenever his chief impulse is to emphasize in the forms of expression that which in view of outward circumstances or consequences has stirred him profoundly, then the excitement or passion either joyous or grievous, in the degree in which it is effectively manifested, will double up his form, throw out his chin, bend violently his elbows, knees, and wrists, and make all his body a human representation of the same sort of varied irregularity already described in the forms of nature which have been said to represent the same tendency.

There are reasons, therefore, founded both upon the principle of association and upon methods of expression pertaining to the very nature of our body, why the three tendencies of form should find expression as has here been indicated. —*The Representative Significance of Form*, XXI.

EXPLANATIONS OF ART-WORK (*see also* INFORMATION and LITERARY).

To a work of art an explanation is much what canes are to walking. Well used, they may increase the gracefulness of impression conveyed by a man's gait. But this cannot be graceful at all, unless he is able to walk without them. So a picture cannot be all that a work of art should be, unless, without one's knowing what the explanation is designed to impart, the drawing and coloring can, in some degree, at least, attract and satisfy æsthetic interest. Neither can a musical composition, unless it too, without the aid of explanations, through the mere unfolding of musical motives in a distinctively musical way, can afford,

at least, some degree of æsthetic delight. So far as an explanation is intended to be used as a crutch instead of a cane, the opponents of program music are justified. But on the other hand, so long as a composer refrains from conditioning upon his printed description such effects as are not legitimate to it, there seems to be no good reason why he should not share his confidences with his audiences, and let them know what visible phenomena seemed represented by his product when he was preparing it. In pursuing this course, why is he not acting as strictly in accordance with the principles of his art, as is the composer of an opera when he indicates to his stage managers how to represent the movements of his music through visible changes in scenery and action?—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music: Music as a Representative Art*, VII.

EXPRESSION, ARTISTIC *vs.* ORDINARY (see ART FOR ART'S SAKE).

A man hums and talks, fulfilling an instinctive prompting of his nature, in order to give vent to certain inward moods. It is when something about the form in which he hums—the movement, the tune—attracts his attention, and he begins to experiment or play with it for its own sake, that he begins to develop the possibilities of the musician. In the same way, it is when something about the forms in which a man talks—the metaphors, similes, sounds of the words—attracts his attention and he begins to experiment with them that he begins to develop the possibilities of the poet. So with drawing, carving, and building. A man does more or less of all of these, owing to an instinctive prompting within him; but when something about the outlines, colors, and materials that represent the conditions or relationships of nature attracts his attention, so that he begins to experiment with them—it is then that he begins to develop the possibilities of the painter, the sculptor, or the architect.—*The Genesis of Art-Form*, I.

EXPRESSION DEVELOPED FROM POSTURES AND GESTURES (see REPRESENTATION A CHARACTERISTIC OF ART).

How does a man express to sight what is passing in his mind? Undoubtedly by his postures and the gestures of his hands, feet, head, and countenance, and by these as we see him when standing alone not only, but when surrounded

by other persons and things. Postures and gestures, though never as definitely intelligible as the sounds of the voice, are, nevertheless, in as true a sense natural forms of communicating thought and feeling; and may be developed into the subordinate art of pantomime, just as natural forms of utterance in sound may be developed into the art of speech. But pantomime is no more painting or sculpture than speech is poetry. It is when a man becomes so attracted and charmed by the methods through which he naturally expresses thought in pantomime that he begins to make an external product, embodying thought through like methods,—it is then that he begins to work in the sphere of the higher arts. Moreover, when he does this, he does not pose with his own figure, as in dramatic representation, but he makes other figures pose—that is to say, he draws, colors, shapes, and combines the different parts of the figures of other men, either alone, or in connection with their fellows or with objects of nature animate or inanimate. Besides this, too, very often without making use of any human figures, he draws, colors, shapes, or combines other animate or inanimate objects. It is for these reasons and in these circumstances that he produces a work of painting or of sculpture. In other words, instead of conveying a thought or feeling through a posture of his own body, he conveys it through representing a posture in a pictured man's body. Or if his idea involve nothing that needs to be represented by human figures; if it be something that could be conveyed by his pointing to animate or inanimate objects, were they present in a certain location, then he leaves the human figure out of his picture, and reproduces merely these objects. . . . Paintings and statues are thus *external products* that are embodiments of distinctively human methods of expression. But, besides this, notice how true it is that they are not directed primarily toward ends of material utility. The infinite pains taken with the lines, shadings, hues, and modelings, that alone make them works of art, cannot be explained on any other supposition than that they are owing to the satisfaction which a man takes in developing the forms for the sake of their own intrinsic beauty, wholly aside from any desire to make them convey clear intelligence of that which they express. This could usually be conveyed equally well by the rude outlines of hieroglyphics.—*Art in Theory*, VIII.

EXPRESSION FOR EXPRESSION'S SAKE (*see also* ART FOR ART'S SAKE, *and* PERSONALITY AS REPRESENTED).

All expression, in order to be what it is, in order to convey audible and visible information of inaudible and invisible thought and feeling, necessitates a use of the sights and sounds furnished by nature. Only art emphasizes this use of them. Notice that, in doing so, art does not emphasize the thought and feeling in themselves. . . . What art emphasizes is the use that by way of development is made of the factors of expression. What music emphasizes, for instance, grows out of the possibilities of rhythm, melody, and harmony in sound; what poetry emphasizes, grows out of the possibilities of rhythm, figurative language, description, and characterization; what painting and sculpture emphasize, grows out of the possibilities of outline, color, pose, and situation; what architecture emphasizes, grows out of the possibilities of support, shelter, strength, and elevation. . . . But what interest has the artist in manifesting, or the world in knowing, that certain forms of nature are factors used for the purpose of expression by a mind behind them? What interest has a man in manifesting, or the world in knowing, that behind any appearances of nature there is a mind? He who can answer this, will find a reason for the interest that men take in art, either as producers or as patrons. . . .

But are there any problems of life of interest so profound as those which have to do with the relations of mind to matter? Is it not enough to say that mortals conscious of a spirit in them struggling for expression, feel that they are doing what becomes them when they give this spirit vent, and with care for every detail, elaborate the forms in which they give it this? What are men doing when thus moved but objectifying their inward processes of mind; but organizing with something of their own intelligence, but animating with something of their own soul, the scattered and lifeless forms that are about them, and infusing into their product something of the same spirit that is the source of all that they most highly prize within their own material bodies.—*Idem*, v.

Art, while traceable to that which, in one sphere, is a play-motive, and while produced with an aim irrespective of any consideration of material utility, nevertheless often springs from mental and spiritual activity of the most dis-

tinctive kind, and results in the greatest possible benefit to the race. What though a product does exist for expression's sake alone? A being with a mind and spirit perpetually evolving thought and feeling possesses that which, for its own sake, ought to be expressed. Beyond his material surroundings and interests, there exists for him a realm in which excess of mental and spiritual force may be directed toward the production of veritable *works* of art; and the effects of these upon mental and spiritual development may be infinitely more important than all possible energy that could expend itself in seeking "what shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewithal shall we be clothed."—*Idem*, VII.

If in the world that we call real, our spirits be in prison, then in the world ideal of art in which the spirit freely conjures forms at will, there may be an actual and not a fancied exercise of that which men in general, not knowing why, but following, as so often, an unerring instinct, have agreed to call "the faculty divine." At least, with all the possibilities suggested, if not indicated, by the facts that are beyond dispute, we certainly have no necessity for asking why the aim of art should be to represent, though only for the sake of representing, these reciprocal effects of nature upon the mind and of the mind upon nature, with which we have found it to be occupied.—*Idem*, v.

EXPRESSION, ITS MEANING.

No one thinks of objecting to applying to the higher arts, as is so frequently done, the phrase "arts of expression," which term *expression*, as will be recognized, indicates always the general result when a man's invisible or inaudible thoughts or emotions are represented visibly or audibly in deeds or tones. As thus understood, expression involves effects produced both by the mind, which is the source of the conception embodied, and by the body—the voice, hands, whatever they may be, that constitute the agencies through which the conception is made to pass into form.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XIII.

EXPRESSION, ITS PRINCIPLES.

The principles of expression which we teach,—what are they but those which best interpret that which is most important in humanity, and not in it alone, but in all the audible and visible forms of the universe, from which it is

possible for humanity to derive wisdom and guidance?—*Essay on the Function of Technique.*

EXPRESSION, ITS TRUTHFULNESS DEPENDENT ON ITS FORM.

It is common with the English to fancy that if one have only something to express, he need not trouble himself about the form of expression. So, when they wish to express heartiness of welcome, they imitate the actions of men shaking hands with ladies holding up heavy trains on their arms,—actions necessarily suggestive of a pretence of having artificial habits acquired at court, and, by consequence, just as necessarily incapable, in the remotest degree, of suggesting anything even of the nature of heartiness.—*Idem.*

EXPRESSION, TEACHERS OF.

The majority of the great teachers, whose names have come down to us from antiquity, like Aristotle, Gamaliel, Quintilian, were teachers of expression, some of them, like the last-named, distinctively teachers of elocution.—*Idem.*

FADS IN ART.

Let any one glance at the illustrations in the new¹ English magazine, "The Yellow Book"; and then in humiliation read over the names of hitherto reputable authors who have been beguiled into allowing their writings to be printed between the covers of a periodical started for the purpose of making such illustrations popular. We are told that these are specimens of a new style of art. In reality, they are specimens of a style of no art whatever, if by the term we mean that which is art in the highest sense; and this for the very evident reason, which those who have followed the lines of thought in this so-called unpractical series of essays, will at once recognize, namely, that it is not their aim to represent either mental conceptions or natural appearances. The fad which they exemplify furnishes merely one more of many inane manifestations of Anglo-Saxon affectation, the same trait, exhibiting the same inability to perceive the essentially ethic as well as æsthetic connection between a thing to be expressed and a representative method of expressing it which, for years, has made two whole nations speak inarticulately and spell irregularly, and, to-day, is making so many wear monocles, carry canes dirt-end up-

¹ This was first printed in 1895.

ward, and shake hands as if, forsooth, they could not get over habits acquired in clasping the fingers of court ladies holding on their arms heavy trains at the queen's receptions. There is no more art in what the draftsmen of this "Yellow Book" suppose to indicate it than there is heart in what so many of their patrons now suppose to indicate a hearty welcome.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XII.

FAMILIAR, ART AS RELATED TO THE.

The mere fact that the discoveries of science are treated like familiar subjects is not an argument against the artistic quality of the work containing them. Nevertheless, as this quality can be recognized by those alone to whom such subjects are really familiar, the fact may be an argument, and a strong one, against the expediency of introducing them at the expense of necessarily limiting the number of those to whom the work will prove artistically interesting.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, VIII.

FASHION PREVAILING, DISREGARDED IN ART.

Nor is the taste of any age, however it may stimulate ability or aspiration to produce, above the sway of fashions, good and bad, that, in proportion as they keep truth fettered, render excellence impossible. In order to attain this, the leader in art, as in religion, must break away from them, in fact from all the shackles of conventional traditionalism—one might almost say of historic criticism, broadly beneficial as this has been in many a direction,—and, searching back of them, must find within himself and in the world about him those first principles that underlie the nature of both thoughts and things.—*The Genesis of Art Form*, Preface.

FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE, WHEN APPROPRIATE (see ILLUSTRATIONS, LANGUAGE PLAIN AND FIGURATIVE, POETRY—ITS LANGUAGE vs. PROSE, and REPRESENTATION IN SENTENCES).

He (the poet) will be impelled to use figures whenever, for any reason, he feels that plain language will not serve his purpose. Two circumstances, inclusive, in a broad way, of many others, will justify him, as we can see, in having this feeling: first, one in which the impression to be conveyed is very great or complex in its nature. Very often, in these circumstances, plain *direct* representation might not only fail to do justice to the subject, but might positively misrepresent it. Milton wished to convey an impression

of the size and power of Satan. It would scarcely have been possible for him to do this adequately without making his representation *illustrative*. . . . The second circumstance that justifies a writer in feeling that he must not use *direct* representation is this:—not the fact that the impression to be conveyed is too great or complex to be represented truthfully in this manner, but just the opposite:—the fact that it is too small and simple to be represented adequately in this manner. When the scene to be described is one that in itself is fitted to awaken the deepest and grandest feelings and thoughts, then, as in the concluding paragraph of “Paradise Lost,” given a few pages back, direct representation is all that is needed. Wherever, in fact, the ideas to be presented are sublime or pathetic in themselves, the one thing necessary is that the reader should realize them as they are; and any indirectness in the style rather hinders than furthers this. . . . Indeed, the main reason for the large preponderance of direct over illustrative representation in the works of Homer and of the Greek tragedians, is undoubtedly this,—that most of the persons and actions of which they treated were heroic in their nature. They needed only to be represented as they were, in order to awaken admiration. It is the boast of our modern times, however, that we have learned to take an interest in common men and actions. The poet feels that he misses that which perhaps is noblest in his mission if he fails to help the humblest of his fellows, physically, mentally, socially, morally, and spiritually, by doing his best to lead them into better conditions.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, XXIII.

FORM AND SIGNIFICANCE IN ART (*see also* ART AS MENTAL, ART EXPRESSING THOUGHT, SIGNIFICANCE *and* TECHNIQUE).

The term *form*, derived from the Latin word *forma*, meaning an *appearance*, refers, primarily, to anything that can be perceived by the senses, and, in the higher arts, for reasons given on page 8, by one of two senses,—that of hearing or of seeing. But, besides this, the term has a secondary and metaphorical meaning; it refers to any conception the whole and the parts of which appeal to the imagination—*i. e.*, the imagining power of the mind—in a clearly articulated, distinctly outlined, or graphic way, so that one may liken the conception to a thing that the senses can perceive. This is the use of


the word which justifies one in speaking of the *form* of an oration or a drama, or of a storm-scene or a battle-scene, which latter he may have only in mind without any intention of ever actually putting it into the form of a picture.

The term *significance* refers to that which is supposed to be indicated to the mind through the form. Sometimes the form indicates this on account of what it is in itself, as when the picture of a man looking intently at an object makes us think that he is studying it. But sometimes the form in itself has nothing to do with the significance, which it only suggests by way of association. For instance, in certain circumstances, by hanging out a national flag, or by wearing the national colors, we may manifest our patriotism. The flags and colors are the *forms* through which, because men can see them, we indicate the patriotism which men cannot see. The flags and colours are the signals, the patriotism is the thing signified, or the *significance*. This illustration will indicate what is meant in art by *form* and by the *significance* expressed through the form. Very many forms which an artist can use inevitably suggest—on account of what they are in themselves, or of their associations—one conception and no other. Therefore, in reproducing them, the artist must treat them not as mere forms, but as forms which, by way of nature or of ordinary use, have a definite meaning. If, for instance, we ask a sculptor who has tried to represent a certain character, why a hand has been moulded so as to produce a gesture with the palm up instead of down, he cannot give a satisfactory answer by saying that he has moulded it thus for the sake merely of the *form*, in case he mean to use this word as indicating an *appearance*. One gesture, if well made, may *appear* as well as another. The difference between the two is wholly a difference of meaning, of *significance*.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, v.

This fact is exemplified in all the arts; and it is that which makes an art-product, as distinguished from a scientific, a combined effect of both form and significance—of form, inasmuch as it fulfils certain physical laws of harmony or proportion, which make the effect agreeable or attractive to the physical eyes or ears; and of significance, inasmuch as it fulfils certain psychical laws, as of association or adaptability, which cause it to symbolize some particular thought or emotion.—*Art in Theory, Introduction*.

Goethe once said that his poetry had been a continual confession. Suppose that it had been merely a confession. Would this alone have made him the greatest poet of his time? To become such, did he not need, besides thinking of the significance of that which he was to say, to think also of the form in which he was to say it? And was not the significance one thing, and the form—the versification, or the unity of the plot—another thing? And might he not have paid attention to the one, and not to the other? Most certainly he might. But if he had he would never have ranked where he does—with Dante and Shakespeare. So in painting and sculpture. The figures of Benjamin West and Julius Schnorr are arranged more effectively than many a most spectacularly significant climax in a drama; those of Balthasar Denner and Florent Willems manifest the most scrupulous regard for the requirements of line and color. Yet because exclusive attention to either significance or form led all of them to neglect one of the two, they never can rank with artists of which this was not true—Raphael, Titian, and Rubens.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, v.

Do those who hold that the subject of art can be “anything,” continue to hold on to their belief in the necessity of a strictly artistic treatment of this?—or do their followers? It may be a new suggestion, but the plain truth is that usually they do not, and this because they cannot. If it be a law, as is maintained in “Art in Theory,” that an artist, to be successful in his work, must always keep his thought upon two things,—form in itself, and significance in the form,—then he cannot think of only one of these without doing injury to both. He is like a man in a circus, riding two horses. The moment that he neglects one of them, it shies off from him; and, when he leans to recover his control of this, he finds himself balanced away from the other. Very soon, unless he wish to keep up a jumping exhibition, for which his audience have not paid, he will either ride no horse at all, or only one, and this is as likely as otherwise to be the very one that he at first neglected. So in art: unless a man preserve the equilibrium between the requirements of form and of significance, no one can tell which of the two will finally appeal to him more strongly. Significance of some sort,



Poutou Temple, Ningpo, China

See pages 9, 12, 73, 81-85, 89, 91, 147, 148, 162, 223-225, 301, 385

for instance, to apply this to the case before us, is eternally present in art, no matter what one's theory may be concerning it. For this reason, when men have begun to think that the subject of art may be "anything," so long as the form is artistic, some of them, as just noticed, will soon begin to think that it may be "anything but what it should be." Before long, too, they will come to suppose—just as people come to admire most the disagreeable eccentricities of those whom they accept as leaders—that the art is all the better for having as a subject "anything but what it should be." Does this result appear improbable? Recall the almost universal comment of the art-editors in our country upon the rejection of the nude male figure prepared for the medal of the Columbian exhibition. The comment—probably true enough in itself—was that the authorities at Washington did not "understand" or "appreciate art." But think of any one's imagining that this fact was proved by this particular action?—as if the statues of our statesmen in the old Hall of Representatives in the Capitol could not be specimens of art unless all their pantaloons were chiselled off!—as if appropriateness of subject and of treatment had nothing to do with art in them or in this medal!—as if by reproducing, however successfully, a form representative of Greek life, we could atone, in a distinctively American medal, for misrepresenting American life!—as if, in short, there were not a large number of other considerations far more important as proving the possession of æsthetic appreciation than the acceptance of a subject which, when exhibited in an advertisement, would inevitably be deemed by hundreds of thousands of our countrymen "anything but what it should be!" How long would it take a condition of art-appreciation, of which such a criterion were the test, to fill our public parks with imitated Venuses and Apollos, meaningless to our people except as reminders of the reigning beauties of else forgotten "living pictures"? What would be the effect upon our growing youth, were the thoughts excited by such productions to be substituted for the nobler and purer inspiration of works like St. Gaudens' "Farragut," or McMonnies' recently erected "Nathan Hale"?

The influence upon sculpture of this supposition that a subject of art may be "anything," has not yet, fortunately,

in our country, been fully revealed. But the same cannot be said with reference to poetry. There are plenty of people among us, neither vicious nor morbid in their tastes, who, nevertheless, are inclined to fancy that, considered æsthetically, a shady theme is not only excusable but desirable, when furnishing a background from which to project into relief a brilliancy of treatment. Therefore, for his brilliancy, they accepted Swinburne when he first appeared; and to-day, though far less brilliant, they have taken up with Ibsen. How would it be, accustomed as they are now to these morbid themes, were another Ibsen to appear, an Ibsen so far as concerned his subjects, but without the present Ibsen's dramatizing skill? Would he, too, though destitute of the elements of form which once their school considered the essential test of art,—would he, too, be accepted as a foremost poet or dramatist? Strange as it may seem, he certainly would. Most of the service of praise to Whitman in the Madison Square Theatre in New York, some ten years ago, was piped by our little metropolitan singers, whose highest ideal of a poet had been Swinburne, and whose most vehement artistic energy had hitherto expended itself almost entirely upon dainty turns of melody in rondeaus and villanelles. The result merely verified an old well-known principle. Extremes meet. The apotheosis of form, when the smoke of the incense clears away, reveals, enthroned on high, a Whitman; and not in any of Whitman's works is there even a suggestion of that kind of excellence in form, which once his worshippers supposed to furnish the only standard of poetic merit.

Precisely the same principle is exemplified in painting, too. When an artist starts out with an idea that the subject of art may be "anything," of course he begins to develop the form for its own sake. He has nothing else to do. But form may mean many different things. With some, it means the imitation of natural outlines or colors. With some, it hardly means imitation at all. It means the development of color according to the laws of harmony. Even where the subject of art is a person, even in portraiture, there are critics who tell us that the result should not be judged by its likeness to the person depicted. It is not a photograph, forsooth. It is a painting, to be judged by the paint, they say, and mean, apparently, by the color, irre-

spective of its appearance in the face portrayed. Of course, this supposition will be deemed by some unwarranted. Few would second it, made thus baldly. But we must judge of beliefs by practices; and scarcely an art-exhibition in New York fails to show some portraits on the walls—nor the ones least praised—in which those slight variations of hue which every careful observer recognizes to be essential to the effects of life in the human countenance, are so exaggerated for the sake of mere effects of color that faces in robust health are made to look exactly as if breaking out with the measles; or, not infrequently, as if the victim had had the disease, and died of it. Thus in painting as in poetry, and the same fact might be exemplified in all the arts, exclusive attention to form,—the conception that art is the application of its laws to “anything”—may lead in the end, and very swiftly too, to the destruction not only of all in art that is inspiring to the soul, but even of that which is pleasing to the senses. A law of art-form is worth nothing except as it is applied to forms that have worth; and that which gives them worth is not by any means synonymous with that which makes them “anything.”—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music, Preface.*

This fact, that certain characteristics of art are wellnigh entirely dependent upon form considered as significant, while certain others are equally dependent on form considered merely in itself, makes the tasks both of the art producer and of the art-critic peculiarly difficult. To neglect the requirements of significance is to disregard the soul of art, that which is the very substance of its life; and to neglect the requirements of form is to disregard its body, that which is essential to its artistic effectiveness.—*Idem: Introduction to Music as a Representative Art.*

Do I mean to say, therefore, that every artist, when composing, must consciously think of significance and also of form? Not necessarily. Many a child unconsciously gestures in a form exactly indicative of his meaning. But often, owing to acquired inflexibility or unnaturalness, the same person, when grown, unconsciously gestures in a form not indicative of his meaning. What then? If he wish to be an actor, he must study the art of gesture, and for a time, at least, must produce the right gestures consciously. And besides this, whether he produce them consciously or

unconsciously, in the degree in which he is an artist in the best sense, he will know what form he is using, and why he is using it. The fact is that the human mind is incapable of taking in any form without being informed of something by it; and it is the business of intelligent, not to say honest, art to see to it that the information conveyed is not false, that the thing made corresponds to the thing meant. —*Essay on Art and Education.*

It might be inferred from what has been said that the requirements of form and of significance are essentially different. Indeed, many artists and critics, apparently, imagine that, in order to do justice to one of the two, they must subordinate the other or neglect it altogether. This supposition has led to two schools of art, the one grounding it, primarily, upon imitation, the other upon the communication of thought and emotion. But why should there be these two schools? A man usually imitates a form because he has had some thought or feeling in connection with its appearance,—in other words, because it has suggested something to him, because it has had for him some significance. The very existence of art-form, therefore, involves the existence of significance. Again, a man communicates thought and emotion through a form because these, in the condition in which they exist in the mind, cannot be heard or seen by others. They must be expressed audibly or visibly; that is to say, in a form. The existence of significance, therefore, if one would make it known, involves the use of a form.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, v.

FORM AND SPIRIT.

To determine aright the relations that should exist between form and spirit is to solve the most important, perhaps, of human problems. Ideally, of course, the one should be a perfect expression of the other; but, in this world, nothing is ideal or perfect; and in nothing is the fact more clearly exemplified than in the frequent failure of a form to represent that which, apparently, it exists for the sole purpose of representing. To recognize, and, so far as possible, to remedy this condition, are primal obligations of intelligence; and this fact justifies the extensive treatment of the subject which has characterized the literature of all periods.—*Introduction to "Cecil the Seer."*

FORM, ARTISTIC AS DEVELOPED FROM NATURAL.

Unless a man could and did hum in this apparently useless way, it is not likely that any conception of musical art could ever be suggested to him. At any rate, it is true as a fact that it is never until something in connection with the form in which he hums—the movement, the tune—attracts his attention, charms him, seems beautiful to him, and he begins to experiment or play with it for its own sake, irrespective of any aim having to do with material utility, that he begins to develop the possibilities of the musician. In a precisely similar way, talking to oneself may be said to be the underlying condition of poetry. When a man, because interested in some ulterior object, is talking to others, he has neither the time nor the inclination to think of the form that he is using. It is only when something in connection with the form—the metaphors, similes, sounds of the syllables, or words—attracts his attention, charms him, seems beautiful to him, and he begins to experiment or play with it for its own sake—it is only then that he begins to develop the possibilities of the poet.

A rude outline can convey all that is essential to suggest to oneself or to others the idea of a horse. When a man, simply to give vent to the excess of energy in his expressional nature, delays over the outline, adding to what would be necessary in hieroglyphic writing, for instance, limnings and colors that make the representation more complete or ornate, he is moved by the art-impulse. When again, merely to give vent to this energy, besides shaping, he shapes carefully, or ornaments clothing, knives, forks, or other implements; and, still more, when he does all this in connection with busts and statues, which, from their very nature by imaging human forms and faces, are peculiarly adapted for the expression of human thought and feeling, then again he is moved by this impulse. Once more, when in constructing by way of combination any object, but especially a house with which we always associate a human presence, he adds to it, above what is necessary, pillars, porches, window-caps, cornices, cupolas, and always in the degree in which these are distinctly expressive of human sentiment—as in a church, for instance,—then, too, he is influenced by the art-impulse. It is almost superfluous to point out that, in these three cases, respectively, we find the conditions

leading to painting, sculpture, and architecture.—*Art in Theory*, VIII.

FORM, HUMAN (*see* ARTISTIC CONCEPTIONS, BEAUTY HUMAN, PROPORTION IN HUMAN FORMS, REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS IN GESTURES, *and* TASTE DISCREPANCIES).

FORM IN AN ART-WORK CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE.

When we have any conception to communicate to others, we instinctively associate it with some sight or sound in the external world. Otherwise, as thought itself is invisible and inaudible, we might not be able to make them acquainted with it. For instance, this term *expression*, just used, means a pressing out,—an operation that can be affirmed literally only of a material substance which is forcibly expelled from another material substance; but, because we recognize a possibility of comparison between this operation and the way in which immaterial thought is made to leave the immaterial mind, we use the term as we do. So with thousands of terms like *understanding*, *uprightness*, *clearness*, *muddled*, etc. Carrying out the same principle, the ancients represented whole sentences through the use of hieroglyphics; and geometricians and scientists, even of our own times, represent whole arguments—the logical relations of abstract ideas and the physical relations of intangible forces—through the use of lines and figures. In a similar way and with a similar justification, we can apply the principle to the expression of thought in a subject considered as a whole. . . . Not merely, as judged by separate illustrations, but by general arrangement, that oration or poem is the most successful which presents the thought in this depicted or graphic way,—a way that causes the hearer or reader to seem to see all the lines of the argument mapped out before him, the entire framework of the ideas built up and standing in front of him. But before a speaker or writer can produce such an effect, he himself must be able to see his subject lying before him, or rising in front of him; in other words, he must be able to conceive of it as comparable to some external object whose shape or movement can be perceived.—*Essay on Art and Logical Form*.

Almost all critics of all ages have felt it to be appropriate to take an animal or a man, the highest type of an organized being, as an ideal natural form from which to derive suggestions with reference to the essential characteristics of

an ideal art-form. Plato, for instance, named head, trunk, and feet as the three essential features in every work of art; and Aristotle, recalling the fact that all products do not appeal to the eye, and cannot seem to have visible bodies, tried to state a principle more general in its reach by declaring that they must all have beginning, middle, and end. But both statements are virtually the same, and together are inclusive of all possible artistic applications of the subject. The first applies literally to forms that appear in space, the second to those that appear in time. Both mean that there should be such an order in the arrangement of the parts constituting the form as to cause all the parts to seem to be organically connected with one whole, and this whole to seem to possess all the parts necessary to render it complete.—*The Genesis of Art-Form*, VI.

In arranging a number of objects or individuals to be represented in the same picture, an artist will almost invariably place the larger or more prominent in the centre or at the top, thus giving the group a head; and the others on either side or below, thus giving it a trunk and feet; while he will dispose of all the members in such ways that the contour of the group, as outlined by all their forms together, shall seem to have some shape—that suggesting a circle, an arch, or a pyramid, as the case may be.

In architecture, the foundation corresponds to the foot, the wall to the trunk, and the roof to the head. All these features taken together may present effects of grouping similar to those in painting and sculpture. The various projections, gables, pediments, chimneys, domes, spires, whatever they may be, that make up the wings and roofs, may be arranged so that, taken together, they can be inscribed in a low or a high arch, rounded or sharpened like a pyramid. As a rule, the greater the appearance of the exercise of design in the organic arrangement of these features, the more satisfactory are they to the eye that looks to find in them the results of art.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, XIV.

FORM IN ART NOT ALWAYS DETERMINED BY THE FORM IN NATURE.

Our first conception would be that the sight or sound perceived in nature would of itself indicate the forms in which the thoughts or feelings awakened in connection with

it should be reproduced in art. Such is sometimes the case. It would always be the case, if art were a mere imitation. But, whether imitative or not, art is also an expression of thought and emotion, and, because it is so, the form used must, at times, be subordinated to the requirements of that which is to be expressed. To illustrate this, suppose a man to have listened to the story of a battle. It might be presumed that a representation of what he has heard would also assume the form of a story, and therefore be artistically expressed in a poem. But often the effect of the story upon his imagination, as also of his imagination upon it, is such that what is experienced can be represented truthfully only through a picture. Again, it happens sometimes that the forms through which the effects have been exerted, have lingered so long in his mind, and experienced so many modifications there that, though critical analysis may detect, as in architecture and music, that the effects produced have been suggested by forms in nature, the artist himself is unconscious of what these forms were.—*Idem*, IX.

FORM, STUDY OF, NEGLECTED BY ANGLO-SAXONS (*see* TECHNIQUE).

Misunderstanding of the relations to expression of technique and consequent suspicion of it, is common in our own country. I sometimes think that it is constitutional with us. Certainly no race manifests such possibilities of error in this direction as does the Anglo-Saxon. Many of us have apparently become so accustomed to see a form used to express a mental condition diametrically the opposite of that which it should express, that we have ceased to recognize any necessity of having the one correlated to the other. Is there any other race among whom an ideal hero is a man like Rochester in "Jane Eyre," Bertie in "The Henrietta," or the "Disagreeable Man" in "Ships that Pass in the Night"—a man whose exterior exactly misrepresents his interior? Is it a wonder, either, that this nonconformity of the ideal to the real in actual life should influence conceptions of art? An Italian or a Frenchman with a voice naturally melodious, a frame naturally graceful, and both naturally flexible, seems to believe instinctively that the form of expression should be, and can be, conformed to that which is behind it; and he seldom thinks of appearing in public

until he has studied sufficiently to secure this result. But an Englishman or an American who, as a rule, has by nature either an inarticulate drawl or a nasal twang, and an awkwardness not only unthinking but unthinkable, he, forsooth, must hold a theory that any study of elocutionary technique is unnecessary!—*Essay on the Function of Technique*.

FORM *vs* SIGNIFICANCE IN ART (*see* SIGNIFICANCE *vs*. FORM).

Go to critics of literature who believe that art is "the application to anything" of the laws of art-form—which, for reasons given on page 235, is a strictly just way of shortening what is meant by the exceedingly loose use of the term *proportion* in the above definition—and ask them who is the first English poet of the age. They will probably answer—and few would differ from them—Swinburne. Now ask them what is the influence upon life of the thought presented in his poetry, what is the particular phase of inspiration to be derived from it; and they will probably answer that to them as critics this is immaterial; that not the thoughts of the poet, not his subjects give him his rank, but his manner of presenting them, his style, the rhythm of his verse, and its harmony as produced by alliteration, assonance, or rhyme. Again, ask a critic of painting of the same school to show you the best picture in a gallery. He is as likely as not to point you to the figure of a woman, too lightly clothed, posing not too unconsciously near some water; or, too heavily clothed, sitting in front of a mirror. You ask him what is the peculiar phase of thought expressed in this picture, the particular inspiration for life to be derived from it; and he will look at you and laugh. Nothing to-day, in our country, is supposed to show more ignorance about art, than the conception that interest in a picture has anything to do with a subject, or with its suggesting a story, whether inspiring or otherwise. We must judge of the picture, we are told, entirely by the form, the style, the use in it of light and shade and color.

But, you say, there certainly was a time when theories of art were different. Dante, Milton, Wordsworth, yes, and Shakespeare, Goethe, and Schiller too,—all these had style or form, yet what one thinks of chiefly, when he reads them, is not this, but the thought that is behind it. Then there is Raphael. On a Sunday, one could sit for

an hour before the Sistine Madonna, and feel more benefited than in most of the churches. But Raphael's is not a name, you find, with which to charm the modern critic. You are told that you are behind the age. This statement gives you a new suggestion, and you proceed to apply it. You ask yourself if you are also behind the age in your conceptions of literary art. You take up the nearest periodical and read the poetry in it, and its criticisms upon poetry. What are the new poets doing? What is it in their work that excites praise? The thought?—its breadth of conception? its completeness of development? its power of expressing truth fitted to uplift spiritually? How often do we see, in an American criticism, anything like an analysis of a new American poem? How often do we see an effort to bring to light the subtle character of the philosophy of which it is the expression? And there is the kindest of reasons why these are not seen. A suggestion of logical arrangement, as in Dante or Milton, a hint of ethical maxims, though set as brilliantly as in Shakespeare or Schiller, would give a poet of our own day, were he commended for these particularly, a hard tramp up the road to recognition. What our people want is style, form. "Yes," say the critics, "but imaginative form. You can't object to that." Certainly one can—to imagination used for mere form's sake. Imaginative form has value only when it images a truth; and this is that which our modern critics have forgotten. Any comparison, however odious, will do for them, if it be only a comparison, and almost any style if it only ring, even if as hollow as some of the French forms of verse that our magazines admire so much. Not, of course, that the style must always be as dainty as in these. Some of us prefer to take it—as the English do their cheese—strong, with plenty of light and shade, and if the former be leprous and the latter smutty, so long as the effects are anything but weak, our critics, especially of our religious journals, are apt to like it all the better. The truth is that the moment that, through an overbalancing regard for form, people come to think that it alone has value, and that the subject in art is immaterial, they are in a fair way to become realists in that very worst sense in which it means believers in the portrayal in art of any amount of ugliness or nastiness so long as it be only that which they term "true to nature." This is the belief which, at present, is uppermost in France,

brought about in that country by the predominating influence, through more than one century, of a materialistic art-philosophy. . . . And this French attitude of mind toward art,—art which some believe to be the handmaid of civilization and religion, and the most powerfully elevating of any purely human influence;—this attitude of mind and this direction toward high achievement in art, is that to which almost all those potent in criticism in our country, to-day, are doing their utmost to point our own people.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music, Preface.*

FORM *vs.* SIGNIFICANCE IN MUSIC.

And so with music. The difference between a melody of Offenbach and the least successful *recitative*-work of Wagner is the difference between treating musical form as if it were wholly a matter of form, and as if it were wholly a matter of significance. The difference between both and the best music of Wagner, and of Mozart, Beethoven, and Sullivan, too, is that in this latter the equilibrium between the two tendencies in art is maintained.—*Idem, Introduction to Music as a Representative Art.*

FORM, WHY ART ORIGINATES IT.

Art is a development of the earliest endeavor of men to give form to thought for which they have no form at their command. It is not at the command of the savage or of the child, simply because no form appropriate has come, as yet, within the very limited range of his experience or information. It is not always at the command of the cultivated man, because, often, all forms with which he is acquainted seem to be inadequate. Accordingly the uncultivated and the cultivated alike are impelled to originate expressions for themselves. In doing this, they are obliged to interpret nature in a certain way. They must think about that which they have observed, and before they have had time to examine it critically, through the exercise of their conscious powers, they must judge of it instinctively through the exercise of their unconscious promptings. This principle applies, not only to their use, for purposes of expression, of imaginative words and imitative drawings, but to their whole methods of conceiving of the material world. The boy hears of a sailor or of a general, and for the very reason that he has had no experience of the life led by either, he imagines it, and the man in the same condition surmises

what might be the experience of a fairy or of a saint.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, III.

FORMS, IMPORTANCE OF INTERPRETING THEM IN ART AND NATURE.

It is hoped that a few examples which, possibly, on second thought, the author might explain, or the reader apprehend differently, will not deter any from a serious consideration of the principles themselves, the acceptance of which cannot fail to have an important influence upon all one's views either of art or of life. For, if true, they show that the poems, symphonies, paintings, statues, and buildings produced by the artist differ from the elementary forms of these produced before his appearance, mainly in the greater degree in which he has learned to read through forms, whether human or not, that which is in the soul of man and of all things. For one who practises art or enjoys it, or takes any interest in it whatever, though not beyond a perception that it is about him and has come to stay; and not only for such an one, but for all who live in a world surrounded by appearances which could awaken infinitely more interest, were it believed that every slightest feature of them might be recognized to be definitely significant and suggestive and, therefore, instructive and inspiring,—this, certainly, is a conception of art and of life and of the relations between them, which is worth holding.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, Preface.

FORMS, THINKING THROUGH USE OF.

Most of us are not aware of the extent to which we think through this use of forms. We fancy that we think through the use of words. So we do, but only so far as words have been made arbitrarily to take the place of forms. We think in dreams, do we not? In these, what are we doing except thinking? Yet how many words do we seem to hear in our dreams? The vast bulk of our experience then appears to pass before consciousness in visible pictures. The same may be affirmed of what occurs during our reveries, though we seldom analyze these sufficiently to discover the fact.—*Essay on Teaching in Drawing*.

FORMULATION, NEEDED IN ALL INVENTION.

A principle or law which has never been applied in invention can have no existence until it has been given a form; and it cannot be given a form until the image of it has been

conceived in the mind. Therefore, in order to be able to invent, a mind must, first of all, be able to think in images. This is the same as to say that an original product, before it can become real, must be ideal,—in other words, that the main difference between the action of the mind in physical construction and in metaphysical, is in the order of time in which the one or the other appears. After the preliminary work in the imagination, the arts separate. That which the mind seems to see, the poet records in words, the painter in pigments, the architect in brick and mortar, the machinist in wood and iron.—*Idem*.

FORMULATION, THE CHIEF FUNCTION OF SYSTEMIZING.

A scientist, philosopher, or statesman is often successful in the degree alone in which he is able to visualize the material effects of a collection of facts, principles, or motives, in such a way as to substitute for the chaos in which they ordinarily appear, what we term a well-outlined system. There is no radical difference in mental action between planning a military campaign executed by guns through the agency of bullets, and a political campaign executed by words through the agency of ballots.—*Idem*.

GENERAL AND DISTANT *vs.* SPECIFIC AND NEAR ART-EFFECTS (*see also* PERSPECTIVE, *and* PROPORTION DEPENDENT ON APPARENT NOT ACTUAL MEASUREMENTS).

One not acquainted with the methods of reproducing in color the effects of nature might suppose that it would be necessary merely to go into the fields, and examine near at hand the colors, appearing, say, on a rose or a bush, match them exactly with his pigments, and then use, on his canvas, these pigments thus determined. But every one of experience knows that much more is necessary; and this for the simple reason that colors, when blended and seen from a distance under the influence of light and shade, are very different in appearance than when seen near at hand. A certain fresco in Paris, when examined closely, shows the flesh of a human figure to be painted in green. Owing to the influence of surrounding colors, no other color, at a distance, could be made to have the effect of flesh. Contours are impressed upon the retina in connection with the same processes as those that impress colors upon it. These latter indeed frequently seem to compose the whole image, outlines being merely effects pro-

duced where one color changes to another. Why should it not be recognized that to imitate the appearance of outlines necessitates the reproduction of general effects, in the same sense that it does to imitate colors? But is this recognized? Undoubtedly—in painting and sculpture; but not, in our times, in architecture. Yet it is as rational for a man to suppose that he can produce satisfactory effects of outline through causing a building to measure just as many inches across the top as across the bottom, or through causing a cornice to be exactly straight, or causing columns to be exactly the same distance apart, as it would be for him to suppose that he could produce satisfactory effects of color by exactly matching with his pigments the apparent hues of a rose or a bush, when examined close at hand. —*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, XIV.

Whatever benefit we may derive, therefore, and it may be much, from the accurate measurements of the buildings of the Greeks, we can never find out, in this way alone, those elements of proportion which they esteemed of most importance. . . . To understand what these elements were we must examine their buildings, as intimated on page 35, not near at hand, but from a distance. The same holds good in principle as applied to the processes through which we come to understand any works of art. If we wish to study Raphael, we do not start by trying to detect the way in which he put the paint upon his canvas. We sit before a finished work of his where we can gaze, unconscious of the paint, at what seems flesh and blood infused with thought and grace and beauty. We feel his composition in our souls before we touch it with our fingers. If we wish to study Shakespere, we do not start by testing how his lines will parse and scan. We read, or we hear read, an act or a scene. We listen to the music of his sentences. We heed the accents of the living men of his drama. We note the play of fancy that passes between them, their bursts of passion and the friction of their thoughts as they flame out so that heaven and hell both brighten to reveal their secrets. We move with ordinary men and women, but cast in a heroic mould. We live in history that was dead but has found a resurrection. We revel in the bliss of a new world that the poet's genius has created. These are facts that pedants never seem to realize. They teach

the spelling-book and mathematics, and think that out of these the works of art develop. But works of art are germed in seed that drops down from above. Like Minerva from the brain of Jove, they spring to life full-armed; and soar through air before they tread the earth; and when, through using spelling-books and mathematics, men make the art-forms fit intelligence, these forms have no artistic value save to those who know enough to search beneath them for the principle that formed them, a principle manifested in results that cannot be perceptible except to larger and more comprehensive views in which the parts appear related to the wholes, and the wholes related to the parts. So, to judge of these Greek buildings, we must see them from a distance where such views are possible. Indeed, the very conception that the Greek had of proportion indicates as much. How could he study what he considered the *intermeasurement* between the parts, except from a point where all, or at least a majority of all, the parts were visible? Again, in order to find what the Greek considered desirable in architectural proportion, we should draw our conclusions from examining as many temples as we can.—*Idem*, XI.

“GENESIS OF ART-FORM, THE.” ANALYSIS OF THE BOOK.

Form, as related to art in general, was treated in the volume entitled “The Genesis of Art-Form.” Taking up the thread of thought where dropped in the previous volume, this opens by examining the very beginnings of form when representing significance. The necessity is pointed out of having inaudible and invisible thoughts or emotions, when they are to be imparted to another, communicated to him through some audible and visible medium. Then it is pointed out that the particular method in which they may be thus communicated in art is only one of many similar ways in which the mind is obliged to use material surroundings. It is recalled that all knowledge, and not only this, but all understanding and application of the laws of botany, mineralogy, psychology, or theology, depend upon the degree in which a man learns to separate certain plants, rocks, mental activities, or religious dogmas from others, and to unite and classify and name them; and that it is classification which enables him to have knowledge and understanding of the materials which nature furnishes, and

to make an efficient use of them. It is maintained that, while science classifies facts, and philosophy theories, art classifies forms or appearances; and it is stated also that the general process in all cases is the same,—a process which involves an application of the same principles of association and comparison which are mentioned on page 426 as being at the basis of all earliest attempts at expression. This process in its elementary stages is a putting of like with like. If the factors be not actually alike in form the process involves gathering them into groups according to the principle of mental association; or, if they be alike in form, of doing the same according to the principle of comparison. The essay maintains, in short, that it is the endeavor to produce unity of impression out of the variety and complexity everywhere apparent in nature, as one is influenced sometimes by the requirements of the mind, sometimes by those of nature, and sometimes by both, that leads to the different methods adopted in art-construction, the whole of which methods, arranged in the order of their logical development, are indicated in a chart.¹—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color, Recapitulation in*, XXVI.

GENIUS (*see* ARTISTIC *vs.* SCIENTIFIC, INDIVIDUALITY IN ART, INSPIRED, PERSONALITY AND UNIVERSALITY, and SUBCONSCIOUS MENTAL ACTION).

What is genius? The term is derived—through the Latin word *genus*, meaning something characterized by the source of its begetting or production, therefore a *family*, *race*, or, in this sense, *kind*—from the word *genere*, meaning *to beget* or *produce*. The word *genus* seems to combine, therefore, the ideas both of *kind* and of *production*. It means *the kind that is produced*. The termination *ius* means *belonging to*. Therefore, *genius* means something *belonging to the kind that is produced*. All recognize that by the *genius* of an age or a race, as when we say “the genius of the American people,” is meant the kind of production in thought, word, deed, invention, or composition, that belongs to the age or race. And what is a *genius* but primarily a man who is the source of this kind of production?—a man whose feelings, aims, opinions, deeds, or words are true representatives of kinds that belong to his age or race?

¹ See page 89 of this volume.

Was not this true of Homer, Pheidias, Raphael, Milton, Mozart, Goethe, and Beethoven? Could their works have appeared except when and where they were produced? And if we want to find out what was *the genius* of the age of each, do we not examine what was done by these men and by others who were typical of their age? And is not this one reason why we term these men *geniuses*? But, of course, there is also another reason, yet it is connected with this. As indicated on pages 223 to 227, a man is considered to be a genius in the degree in which he is able to give unimpeded outward expression to results coming from the hidden sphere of mind. But this sphere is occultly connected with the whole hidden or spiritual sphere of nature. The genius, therefore, is a man whose temperament makes him one of his kind, and therefore makes his products reflect the fact, in the sense of inclining him to be influenced as are other human beings, and as are also all the animate or inanimate developments of life that is not human. The word *genius* is sometimes used for the word *spirit*. Why is this except because genius tends like spirit to make the mind work in harmony with what may be termed the Mind in nature, and hence, according to the principle brought out on page 94, with the Spirit, or, if we choose to be polytheistic, the spirits in nature, of which Milton sings when he says?—

And as I wake, sweet music breathe
Above, about, or underneath,
Sent by some Spirit to mortals good,
Or th' unseen Genius of the wood.

Il Penseroso.

The genius's interpretations of nature commend themselves, therefore, both because nature makes the same appeal to him as to others through its visible forms, and also because it causes a unity of action between the sub-conscious processes of his mind and its own invisible processes. This unity of action results in expression which is artistic inasmuch as it is characteristic of the individual artist, and yet is also natural inasmuch as it is characteristic of what is experienced by men in general, the representations of art, notwithstanding the intervention of human skill, appearing to spring up and flow forth to influence as instinctively as fountains issue into streams and buds burst into blossoms. As a result, the art of any age is the blooming and fruitage of the influences of nature and humanity

that have been at work on every side throughout long centuries.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XIV.

The same conception of the province of genius is involved also in the use that we make of another word,—the adjective *genial*, meaning that which is *kindly* stimulating because coming from one of one's *kind* or *kin*. We all recognize this meaning as applied in ordinary language to the productive influence of one natural object upon another,—that of the April sun, for instance, on the meadow. A similar influence, natural and life-stimulating, on the part of works of art upon the human mind, is similarly termed. But a writer or composer of any product of art who is really *genial* or *congenial* is, so far, a *genius*. Thus not alone these words, but the ideas expressed in them, appear related.—*Idem*, XIV.

GENIUS AND LEARNING (*see* IMAGINATION and INFORMATION).

Let it not be thought, then, that education, experience, and learning unfit one for those pursuits which are usually supposed to necessitate genius. Milton wrote little poetry until he had ended his argumentative and political work. Goethe and Schiller both profited much from the discriminating scientific criticism to which, as appears in their correspondence, they were accustomed to submit their productions; at all events, they achieved their greatest successes subsequent to it. And with criticism playing all about his horizon, like lightnings from every quarter of the heavens, who can calculate how much of the splendor of Shakespeare is attributable to this by-play among the circle of dramatists by whom he was surrounded? With new forms rising still like other Venuses above the miasmas of the old Campagna, who can estimate how much the excellence of the Italian artists has been owing to the opportunities afforded in historic Rome for critical study?—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, IV.

GESTURE (*see* REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS IN GESTURES).

GOthic ARCHITECTURE (*see* ARCHITECTURE, EXPRESSION IN, ARCHITECTURE, WHY, and REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS IN NATURAL OUTLINES).

One peculiarity of this style is that it can be varied almost infinitely. A number of buildings can be constructed either with towers or without them, and yet, when grouped together, produce an effect of unity. . . . Another peculiarity

of the style is that it admits of equal variety in expense. The stone is generally uncut, but any amount of carving is admissible in the elaboration of details. . . . As a result, a dormitory, costing only fifty thousand dollars, may stand at the side of a chapel costing five hundred thousand, and yet both buildings contribute equally to the harmony of the whole series of buildings.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XIX.

GRADATION IN OUTLINE.

As we look at the successive arches of a bridge, or of an aqueduct, we see them gradually becoming smaller and smaller. If we look at a row of trees that is sufficiently long, we see it pass gradually into a narrow stretch of green. Two parallel outlines, if we continue to trace them when carried up toward the zenith, or toward the horizon, appear gradually to converge. Sometimes, if they ascend a hill, though themselves perfectly straight, they seem gradually to pass into curves. A similar fact is still more evident in the outlines of forms not so influenced by the laws of perspective. Think of the innumerable curves and angles and straight lines that make up the contour of every mountain, tree, bush, fruit, flower, bird, beast, and man; yet often, not even with a microscope, can one tell just where one form of line ceases and another begins.—*The Genesis of Art-Form*, XVI.

GRADATION IN SOUND AND COLOR (see HARMONY OF).

In listening to a bird singing, to a wind whistling, or to a surf breaking, we usually notice a gradual increase and decrease in the blended sounds. It is the same when observing color. Any ordinary lawn reveals an almost infinite number of shades of green, and the most of these coalesce, but show scarcely a trace of when and where they do it. A clear sky at dawn or sunset exhibits between the horizon and the zenith every color of the spectrum from red to purple, yet few boundary lines between any two colors. Among the maple trees in spring, when just beginning to show their leaves, one can clearly see hues as different as red, yellow, and green, yet it is well-nigh impossible to find in any given cluster just where one color stops and another starts. It is the same with a majority of the hues of nature, whether seen in the flowers beneath us or in the clouds above us. In fact, it is one of the most common

laws of sight, that when different colors or different shades of the same color come together, the line of demarkation between them is indistinct.—*Idem*, XVI.

In music, graduated differences of effect take place in time, as when the movement passes from one key to another. In painting, there is no reason why they should not take place in space, and, if they do, though the vibrations in one part of the retina may not coalesce with those in another part, the eye, for reasons indicated on page 350, may be hardly conscious of the difference. At the same time, as a whole scene is usually visible to a single glance, or to many glances constantly moving from one to another part of the scene, it is doubtful whether, in case the changes are from one decided hue to another, the best effects of harmony can be secured by gradation without the aid of such arrangements of color as have been described under the heads of *balance*, *symmetry*, and *interchange*.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, XXIV.

GREEN COLOR IN PAINTING.

Between violet, purple, and red there are differences in degree by no means matched by the differences between their complementaries, yellowish-green and bluish-green. This fact makes the difficulty of using green with its proper contrasts very great; and this difficulty becomes still greater in view of the position of green on the dividing line between the warm and cold colors, concerning the entirely different uses of which in sunshine and shadow mention was made on page 320. We see one reason, therefore, why a decisive test of a good landscape painter is the way in which he manages his greens, as well too, perhaps, as why decorators in all times have made but a limited use of them.—*Idem*, XIX.

HARMONY (*study also* BEAUTY, COMPARISON, and VIBRATORY).

We must begin by ascertaining exactly what harmony is, and this not in its general but in its technical sense. An answer to the question can be found in no better way than by recalling the discoveries of the scientists as a result of analyzing harmony as it appears in music, the art to the effects of which the term was first applied technically. In this art, through the use, among other methods, of resonators, so constructed as to enable one to detect the presence in a tone of any particular pitch, it has been found that notes which are harmonious are such as con-

tain the same elements of pitch, or—what is the same thing—are notes in which effects of *like* pitch are repeated. For instance, when a string like that of a bass viol is struck, its note, if musical, is not single or simple: it is compound. Suppose that it produces the tone of the bass C—representing a sound-wave caused by the whole length of the string. This C is the main, or, as it is termed, the *prime* tone that we hear. But, at the same time, this same string usually divides at the middle, producing what is called a *partial* tone of the C above the base, representing a sound-wave caused by one half the string's length. It often produces, too, partial tones of the G above this, of the C above this, and of the E above the last C (etc.). . . . This C, G, C, and E of the major chord are in harmony with the lower bass C, because they are made up of effects that already enter into its composition. The chord as a whole, therefore, or any analogous development of it, is a result of putting *like effects with like*.—*Art in Theory*, XII.

Glancing at the above, suppose that we were to sound the note C, and then to sound, either after or with it,—for the laws of harmony have to do with the methods of using notes both consecutively and conjointly,—notes whose partial tones connect them most closely with C,—what notes should we sound? We should sound F,—should we not?—of which C is the third partial, and G, which itself is the third partial of C. This would give us C—F—G—C. But these are the very tones accredited to the “lyre of Orpheus,” which represented the earliest of the Greek scales.

Let us add to these notes those whose partial tones are the next nearly connected with C, F, or G. They are D the third partial of G, E the fifth partial of C, A the fifth of F, and B the fifth of G. This gives us C—D—E—F—G—A—B—C, which is our own major scale, the main one that we use to-day; and is similar to one used by the Greeks after theirs had been expanded to seven notes.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, XVII.

Why is it necessary that tones should chord? Why does the mind or the ear demand concordance in the sounds used in music?—In answer to this we might begin by inferring a psychological reason. Sounds result from vibrations that cause oscillations in the air, and through it in the liquid

within the inner labyrinth of the ear. There is a sense in which it may be said that the mind is conscious of these vibrations, for when it hears a certain number of them, per second, it invariably hears a sound of a certain pitch. Now if the vibrations causing two notes start together every second, third, fourth, fifth, or sixth time that they are made, as they do in the notes composing the musical concords, it is easy for the mind—on the supposition, of course, that in some subtle way it takes cognizance of vibrations—to perceive a unity in the result, because it can analyze the vibrations and perceive that they all form exact subdivisions of certain definite wholes. But if the vibrations causing the tones start together at only long and irregular intervals, then any analysis or classification of the different constituent effects is impossible. Of course such a result cannot be else than confusing and unsatisfactory.

This explanation, which is the one given by Euler, has much to recommend it. We know how it is in the case of musical rhythm. Certain measures, to all of which an equal time is given, are filled with notes and rests that represent exact subdivisions of this time—the whole of it or a half, a quarter, an eighth, or more, as the case may be. When the musician composes or sings in rhythm, he beats time, mentally if not physically, and puts into each measure just the number of notes that will fill it. Why are we not justified in surmising that the principle which the mind applies consciously when it counts the beats that determine the relations of a note to rhythm, it applies unconsciously when it counts the beats or vibrations that determine the relations of tone to pitch? The fundamental bass note of the chord represents a certain number of vibrations per second. These constitute, so to speak, the chord-measure, and only those notes can be used in the chord which represent the partial tones produced by exact subdivisions of this measure. In fact, there is ground enough for holding the theory that music is no more than an artistic adaptation of the laws of rhythm, of a part of which, as related to duration, the mind is conscious; but of another part of which, as related to pitch—*i. e.*, to the rhythm resulting from tone-vibrations,—it is unconscious.

But it has not yet been shown here that the mind actually does count or compare vibrations. It may do this, but is there any proof of it? We may best begin an answer to

this question by going back of the action of the mind to that of the ear that occasions it, and ask, is there any proof of a physical requirement in the ear underlying an operation analogous to comparison as made in the realm of consciousness?

There is proof of such a requirement. If we sound at the same time two very low notes of an organ separated from each other on the scale by only half a tone,—C and C# for instance,—we shall hear, not a consecutive tone, but a succession of throbs or beats. Knowing that all sounds are caused by vibrations, and that a difference in pitch is caused by a difference in the time of vibrations, it is easy to understand how these beats are produced. Suppose that one of the notes is a result of fifty vibrations in a second, and the other of fifty-one. At the end of the twenty-fifth vibration in the first of the tones, there will have been, in the second, twenty-five and one half vibrations. But as each vibration necessitates a movement in one direction half the time, and in a contrary direction the other half the time, the vibrations in the first tone will move from the twenty-fifth to the fiftieth in an opposite direction from those in the second tone. For this reason the vibrations causing the two tones will tend to suppress and to still one another, just as is the case where two waves of nearly equal size but contrary motions come together at the mouth of a river. However, at the fiftieth vibration in the first tone, and at the fifty-first in the second, the vibrations in the two will again move in the same direction, and tend to reinforce one another. A difference between two notes, therefore, corresponding to one vibration in a second, will cause one suppressed period and one reinforced period of sound,—or one beat in a second; a difference of two vibrations, two beats in a second, and so on. In a difference of this kind between low notes caused by a limited number of vibrations in a second, these beats are perceptible, as has been said, and are easily counted; but this is not the case when produced by high notes. Then one of two results follows. The beats either become so numerous as to form vibrations causing an entirely new tone, or else they continue to exist as beats which the ear cannot distinguish, but feels to be disagreeable.

Why does the ear find these beats disagreeable? For this reason. They are interruptions in the continuity or

regularity of the vibrations. On page 194 attention was directed to the fact that a musical sound, and therefore all the pleasure derivable from it as such, is due to the rapid periodic, or—what means the same—the regularly recurring motion of the sonorous body; and a noise to its non-periodic, or irregularly recurring motion.

When beats occur that interfere with harmony, therefore, there is noise instead of music. But noise in music not only violates the artistic principle which requires that like amid varied effects be put with like, but it communicates to the auditory nerves a series of shocks, conveying an intermittent, irregular, disordered excitation; whereas it is natural to suppose that, in all agreeable excitations of the nerves, the thrill and glow that are pleasurable are characterized by the elasticity and freedom accompanying non-interference. We may infer this from the fact that in nature all movements are regular and rhythmical. The leaves and limbs of a twig, for instance, vibrate, when struck by a blow, as regularly as does a pendulum. The same must be true of the oscillations in . . . the auditorium of the ear. At any rate, we know that only regularly recurring vibrations can produce the sensations in the auditory nerves which render music enjoyable. . . .

In conclusion, we may blend the physiological and psychological reasons for the effects of music, thus: The ear has become habituated through long experience to search for unity of effect in sounds. When it hears musical chords, it recognizes, after a few vibrations, that all the sounds are exact subdivisions of some one note,—in other words, that what is heard results from a succession of like amid varied effects. At other times, when the mind cannot recognize that this is the case, it is natural to suppose that there is an endeavor to recognize the fact, and, owing to this endeavor, that there is a positive effort on the part of the organs of sensation in the ear to adjust themselves to the new conditions and to discover elements of unity and likeness that do not exist. That the ear is sometimes successful in doing this, is proved by its acceptance of the slight variations from true harmony that are found in the temperate scale. In decided discords, however, nothing can make the sounds seem to compare, and the nerves and muscles are wearied by the effort of trying to do it, just as they would be, were they listening intently for sounds or

footsteps which they failed to hear. Of course, the nerves of hearing, strained, and on the alert, but without success, give the ear pain, not pleasure. Pleasure in connection with sound, æsthetic satisfaction in connection with tone, is experienced by mind or ear in the degree only in which the result is perceived to be a *unity obtained from the apparent variety of unlike complex wholes by putting together those that have like partial effects.*—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music*, xvi.

The reader will not fail to notice that the effects of harmony as thus described are, in important regards, analogous to those of rhythm, and yet of a rhythm so finely grained that it is impossible that the mind should be conscious of its constituent elements. . . . It is sometimes said that, as the mind consciously counts the beats in determining rhythm, so, in some subtle way, it unconsciously counts the vibrations in determining harmony. But is it necessary to suppose this? When influenced by tones that seem consonant we are certainly not conscious of counting. Are we conscious of doing it even when influenced by the effects of rhythm? Are we conscious of anything except of certain accentuations of tone that are equally subdivided into other accentuations—all of which, in some way, are so related that they exactly fit, the smaller into the larger and all into the largest? And if we need not count the accents in rhythm, why should we do it in harmony? Why need we do more than experience certain throbs or thrills of sound equally subdivided into other thrills, all of which are so related that they exactly fit, the smaller into the larger and all into the largest? As a result of experiencing these, every part of the auditory organism, under any influence of sound, is under the same influence,—as much so as is every part of a still pool when we have thrown a single stone into it, infinitely varied as may be the sizes of different waves that in remote places circle into ripples. The result, inasmuch as all the sound-waves represent a single impulse, is an unimpeded, free, regularly recurrent vibratory glow of the whole auditory apparatus. But if, on the contrary, the effect resemble that upon the waters of a pool when more than one stone is thrown into it, *i. e.*, if the sound-waves do not coalesce, if the smaller do not fit into the larger, and all together into the largest, then

nothing ensues but a broken, impeded, constrained, irregular series of jolts or jars. The difference in the ear between the sensation of harmony and of a lack of it, is the physical difference between thrilling or glowing and jolting or jarring. Notice, too, that this illustration applies to notes when sounding not only, as in one chord, simultaneously, but, as in different chords, successively. Two things related to the same thing cannot fail, in some way, to be related to each other; and two chords, each containing sets of vibrations for which there is a common multiple, and both containing one set of vibrations (*i. e.*, one tone) which is the same, must both be entirely composed of vibrations for which there is some common multiple. This common multiple, moreover, for the vibrations of a first and second chord may be different from that of the vibrations of the second and third chord. It is possible, therefore, for a series of chords, each in part repeating the same tones as the last sounded, and in part introducing new tones, to change, very soon, the whole character of the general vibratory effect; and yet if this be done with sufficient gradualness, the auditory apparatus will experience no jolt or jar, while, at the same time, it will be conscious of a constant progress and so of relief from anything resembling monotony.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, xx.

Of course, the early musicians could not have explained exactly why they selected certain notes and put them into a musical scale, and from these began to develop that which has now come to be our elaborated system of melody and harmony. Those artists followed merely the instincts of their æsthetic nature. This prompted them, in constructing forms, to select sounds that would naturally go together; and to use these and these only. But what connection is there, it may be asked, between sounds that naturally go together, and those that go together because certain of their effects are alike? None, perhaps, so far as the first musicians were aware. They judged merely by the results that they heard, and had only a limited knowledge of the causes of these. Nevertheless, as will be shown presently from an examination of the discoveries of modern science, their ears guided them aright. All the notes of the scale and all the methods of musical harmony owe their origin to a literal fulfilment of the art-principle declared in "The

Genesis of Art-Form" to be of universal applicability. This principle is that, in order to receive an impression of unity, the mind *groups complex wholes by putting those together that produce like partial effects.*—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music*, XII.

Harmony, like rhythm and proportion, often involves very intricate arrangements and developments, but through them all can be detected the presence of this one underlying principle. The following, for instance, represents a common way of accomplishing the result which is termed "making the circuit" of all the major keys. Those unacquainted with music will understand sufficiently what is meant when it is said that the chords of one key are often discordant with those of another key unless, in some such way as is indicated in this music, an artificial connection has been made between the two.—*The Essentials of Æsthetics*, XVII.

The main result . . . is secured through using such methods as those of interchange, gradation, and transition, which, nevertheless, cause all the divergent parts of a composition to *assimilate*. Because, too, all the methods in the chart (see page 89 of this volume) are, more or less, connected, music, at times, reveals traces of the influence of every one of these.—*Idem*.

HARMONY OF COLOR (*see also different paragraphs under BEAUTY, COMPARISON, and VIBRATORY*).

Like tone-harmony, this was developed, at first, by artists of exceptional taste, knowing little and caring less about the scientific reasons underlying their choice of combinations. But, after art has developed to a certain extent, scientists always make a study of its effects. That which they discover increases not only the knowledge and the appreciation of art on the part of the general public, but also adds not a little to the resources of the artist and to his ability to make further progress.

Nor must it be supposed that color-harmony, so far as it has been developed from the contributions of science, has been based upon the relations between vibrations in the eye in the same way in which tone-harmony has been based upon the relations between vibrations in the ear. The numbers of the latter vibrations can be and have been definitely determined. The numbers of vibrations causing

the colors have not been determined except approximately. For this reason, and very wisely, the principles of color-harmony have been developed from facts which, though related to those of vibration, have, unlike them, been definitely ascertained. The different stages of development have been somewhat as follows:

The discoveries with reference to the complementary colors,¹ as described on page 370, led to the natural supposition that the eye takes pleasure in seeing these two together; and as, in all cases, the two were found to make white, it led to the supposition that any two or more colors making white would cause harmony. Not long after, too, it led to the supposition that these colors must be introduced into a painting in just such *proportions* as to make white. . . . A law of this kind, however, though it might be applied to decoration, would evidently interfere with one of the first requisites of the art of painting, namely, that it should represent nature. In how many landscapes can we find the blue of the sky, or the green of the foliage, or the bluish gray of a lowery day, exactly mingled in such proportions with the warmer and lighter yellows, reds, or browns?

On the face of it, therefore, this theory did not seem tenable. Modern artists universally reject it. They tell us that the slightest spot of crimson against the green of a forest, or of yellow against the blue of the sky, is all that is needed in order to bring out the brilliancy of the complementary coloring. . . . But when it is added that these effects are owing to merely a suggestion given to the mind, one must demur. Those who say it have forgotten a very important principle in æsthetics. That is, that psychological effects (see Chapter II.) must harmonize with physiological, and, as the latter come first in the order of time, it is not logical either to overlook them or to fail to consider them first.

The influence in a painting of very slight quantities of complementary coloring seems to suggest the importance of the method of interpretation indicated on pages 375 to 378. If we may suppose that a color associated with its complementary produces in the eye an agreeable effect

¹ The complementary colors are usually said to be red and bluish-green, orange and turquoise-blue, yellow and ultramarine-blue, yellowish-green and violet, and green and purple.

because, for the vibrations causing both colors, there is a common multiple, then we may also suppose that these colors influence, at the same time, the organs of the same retina without producing any sensation of jolting or jarring. All the vibrations are variations of the same *unity* in that they are partial effects of the same single impulse or set of impulses, resulting in a free, unrestrained vibratory thrill or glow. The quantity of color, therefore, makes no difference with the harmony of the effect. All that is necessary is that the form of vibration causing the one color, be it much or little, should exactly coalesce with the form of vibration causing the other color. It could coalesce in this way, of course, in several different circumstances. First of all, it could do so when there was one predominating color. . . . Thus, in a scene representing moonlight or twilight, or even a storm, especially if at sea, there would necessarily be one pervading color, in some cases banishing almost the suggestion of other colors. . . . Such paintings are said to be characterized by *tone*, and, as this quality is usually understood, it is difficult to perceive why it does not fulfil a different law of harmony from that which is fulfilled through a use of great variety in coloring. Indeed, it is often represented that it does; as if the theory that harmony of coloring is produced by uniformity of coloring were antagonistic to the theory that it is produced by variety. . . . But why cannot an identical law be perceived to be operative in both cases? Differences in tints and shades of the same hue, while they involve differences in the intensity of the sight-waves, do not necessarily involve differences in their rates or shapes. Therefore uniformity of coloring is fitted to cause all the vibrations of the same retina to coalesce, *i. e.*, to cause all to be exact subdivisions of some common multiple. But the same effect is produced by the use of one predominating color with its various tints and shades, enlivened . . . by an occasional introduction of some tint or shade of its complementary color; and it is produced also when both complementary colors are used in almost equal proportions. In fact, color-harmony may result from the use of any colors whatsoever, if only they can be made in some way to produce in the organs of color-apprehension an effect of unity. This effect follows whenever all the vibrations of the retina that are near together are multiples of some common

unit, as is the case when adjoining tints and shades in a painting are of the same hue, or of hues that form complementaries, or for some reason allied to this, as indicated on pages 370 to 374, are fitted to go together. If, in connection with these hues, others must be used requiring what may be termed conflicting forms of vibration, these others must, in the painting, be remote from the first, and be connected with them in accordance with methods of securing partial consonance like those of interchange, gradation, and transition. . . . Why this should be the case, may be surmised by recalling that a single vibration is to the whole retina about what a single wave is to an ocean. On an ocean, divergent forms of waves would not be recognized to be conflicting were they widely separated, or were they changed from one form into another with great graduality; and were thus made—to apply the term of physiological psychology—to *assimilate*. . . . Color-harmony, to be successful, must be a result of an application of the same endeavor after unity of effect which, starting with the principle of putting like with like wherever possible, leads to a careful study and embodiment of all such requirements as those of variety, complement, principality, subordination, balance, parallelism, repetition, alternation, symmetry, massing, interchange, continuity, consonance, gradation, transition, and progress.¹ This fact is developed in the author's "Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color in Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture."—*The Essentials of Æsthetics*, XVIII.

The third method of arriving at the principles underlying the joining of colors is advocated by those who hold that as in music the ratios between the numbers of vibrations per second producing the different notes determine which should go together, so, in painting, the ratios between the numbers of vibrations per second producing the different colors should determine this. As a rule, physicists have had little respect for any advocate of this theory, because he has usually started out with the hypothesis that there is some absolute and necessary connection between the seven colors of the spectrum and the seven notes of the musical scale. As was shown, however, in Chapter XIV. of "Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music," these seven notes happen

¹ See the Chart in "An Art-Philosopher's Cabinet," on page 89.

to be used merely as a matter of convenience. There have been scales extensively used of four and six notes, and possibly our own might be improved by the addition of two more. As it is, it contains not seven but twelve distinct intervals. There is a principle, however, underlying the formation of all musical scales, as well as of all melody and harmony, which depends upon the relative numbers of vibrations. One cannot refrain from feeling, therefore, that it is logical to suppose that this same principle should be exemplified in that which causes colors to harmonize.

It does not allay this feeling, to remind one that between, say, the 400 trillions of vibrations causing extreme red and the 750 causing extreme violet, the differences in vibration are not sufficient for those of a single octave. . . . As it is, we have in the colors all the range of intervals corresponding to those of one octave if containing no note belonging to another. Moreover, the possibility of producing variations in a single color is much greater than that of doing the same in a single sound. Indeed, when we consider the innumerable shades and tints not merely of one color but of all other colors in connection with which this one may produce mixed effects, we are forced to recognize that the range both of single colors and of those that are exactly complementary to these is practically infinite, and thus far more than sufficient to make up for the absence in the color-scale of more than one octave.


So much for the theory; now for the facts confirming it. Let us take the ratios of the numbers of vibrations producing the sounds, not of all the scale, but of those that harmonize, and apply these ratios to the numbers of vibrations producing the different colors, and notice what colors they cause to go together. As the numbers of vibrations producing the colors are exceedingly great, and the difficulty in the spectrum of determining just where one color leaves off and another begins is also great, we must content ourselves with approximate measurements, but even with these we can attain our object.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, XXIII.

HARMONY OF COLOR AS PRODUCED BY VIBRATIONS.

Sound-waves are comparatively large. . . . Color-waves are exceedingly small. . . . According to Le Conte in his

"Sight," there are in the center of the retina, in a space not larger than one tenth of an inch square, no less than a million cones that a wave can influence. . . . As is known, too, all these are so connected with their surroundings, as Foster says, by a "basket-work" or "sponge-work," that they are apparently capable of vibratory motion. If their minute vibrations, as affected by movements in the ether, may be supposed to influence the whole retina in any degree, how can they do so except as one set of waves may be supposed to influence the whole surface of a sea? On the same sea there may be breezes causing waves differing, as these vibrations do, in intensity, in rate, and in shape. But, in case these differences were far apart, and produced by very gradual changes from one form to another, there might be, to an eye capable of perceiving the whole surface at once, no appearance whatever of inharmonious action. It needs to be added, however, that, within the narrow limits of a picture, it is impossible for any colors to be very widely separated, and, not only so, but that, even if they could be, the eye, in shifting attention from one point to another while examining them, would constantly be bringing them into still closer proximity, in fact necessitating often the perception of all the colors on the canvas by exactly the same part of the retina.

These latter conditions, taken in connection with those mentioned on page 349, will show us that, in considering the harmony of color, there are two main questions to be discussed: first, the selection and arrangement of colors with reference to their general effects in a painting considered as a whole, corresponding to the selection in music of a key-note, involving that of the particular scale and chords that go with it; and, second, the selection and arrangement of colors with reference to their special effects when placed side by side, together with the ways of sufficiently separating and yet connecting them in cases in which placing them side by side would produce discord. This phase of harmony corresponds to what in music is termed modulation or transition from one key to another. The first of these questions will naturally be discussed while considering the methods in the chart (see page 89 of "An Art-Philosopher's Cabinet") preceding *consonance*, and the second while considering *consonance* and the methods following it.—*Idem*, xx.



Taj Mahal, India

See pages 9, 19, 73, 81-85, 88, 89, 91, 223-225

HARMONY OF POETRY.

Some may suppose that, in poetry, there are no effects corresponding to those of musical harmony. But this is not so. Inasmuch as poetry uses words, the articulation of these renders them more clearly distinguishable from one another than are musical notes; and there is not the same necessity, as in the latter, for merely tonal distinctions of quality and pitch. But science has ascertained that in addition to the pitch on which a vowel or a consonant is apparently sounded, it has, at least, one partial tone peculiar to itself, which tone is always at the same pitch. For this reason, alliteration, assonance, and rhyme all involve the use of like pitch; consecutive syllables produce different consecutive degrees of pitch, *i. e.*, melodies, or what are termed tunes of verse; and every syllable containing a vowel and a consonant, like *an*, for instance, contains two tones that may or may not harmonize. For these reasons, the words of poetry, though in a very subtle, but, at the same time, suggestive way, fulfil the same methods as those of musical harmony. See the author's "Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music," Chapters V. to XII.—*The Essentials of Æsthetics*, xvii.

It is not true, therefore, that, in arranging words, all that is necessary is to put them together grammatically, and in such a way as to indicate their sense. To produce satisfactory poetic effects either upon the mind or ear, they must be arranged so that their sounds shall occur in a certain order.¹—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music*, vii.

HARMONY OF TONE AND OUTLINE AS PRODUCED INDIRECTLY.

In artistic speech, as in poetry, the harmonic ratios that underlie musical pitch are often exactly though subtly reproduced. At the same time, the poet who reproduces them successfully, does not do so directly, *i. e.*, by thinking of the pitch of his tones while he is composing. He does so indirectly, *i. e.*, while thinking merely of accommodating the sounds to the physiological requirements of the ear; so that, as the tones pass, the one into the other, they shall produce a satisfactory, agreeable, and artistic effect; in other words, so that the transitions shall seem not sharp and abrupt, but smooth, euphonious, and natural. In order to attain this end, poets use such methods as in the repeated,

¹ See page 89 of "An Art-Philosopher's Cabinet."

or regularly recurring sounds in alliteration, assonance, and rhyme, or in the very easily coalescing sounds in phonetic syzygy and gradation. . . . When we are using a phrase like "Many men of many minds," though the unaccented syllables differ, the fact that the organs, being once arranged for the *m*-sound in the accented syllables, regularly, when these recur, return to this same position, makes the utterance easy. . . . So in the arts of outline. What the artist successful in these thinks of, is the method of accommodating their appearance to the physiological requirements of the eye so that they shall have satisfactory, agreeable, and artistic effects. . . . Again, outlines, or those parts of them nearest to one another, may be said to be arranged according to the requirement just indicated, when they are adjusted in such ways that straight lines are made to pass into curves, or curves of one kind into those of another kind, by regular degrees of change. . . . According to this method, though there may be conscious changes in axis, focus, or lens, as the eyes look from one line or part of a line to another, the changes are as slight as possible, and occur by regular degrees—in these regards evidently producing effects corresponding to those of verse which are most nearly connected with phonetic *gradation*.¹
—Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color, XIV.

HARMONY, SIMILARLY PRODUCED IN ALL THE ARTS (*see also* CORRESPONDENCES).

Thus far, we have found that poetry and music are alike in that both contain melody and harmony. But when we attempt to go beyond this, and to inquire in what ways melody and harmony are manifested in each, we find great differences. This discovery is important, not only on its own account, but, as we shall find in another place, on account of the light that it throws on the correspondences which we should expect to exist between harmony of sound and of color. That which connects the arts is the unity of method underlying them. In each of them this method is applied to a different germ. By keeping this fact in mind we shall be able to recognize, as would otherwise be impossible, in what sense the effects of harmony in all the arts are secured in ways essentially the same.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music, XII.*

¹ See page 89 of "An Art-Philosopher's Cabinet."

HISTORIC, NOT THE HIGHEST FORM OF ART-CRITICISM.

The claim of the historian that all art is of interest and deserving of study is not true as applied to the artist as an artist. To him only such art is of interest as has attained a certain high level of excellence, which it is the object of criticism to discover, and which excellence, as we know, has appeared only at certain favored periods. It is worth while to notice, too, as just suggested above, that these periods are not necessarily identical with those that are under the influence of the historic spirit. The tendency of this, unless counterbalanced, is to direct attention to forms as forms, not to these as expressions of spirit; or, if so, only of the spirit of the past. The practical results of such a tendency are, in the first place, as already intimated, imitation, and, in the second place, degeneracy. The nature of the mind is such that it must vary somewhat that which it imitates; and if its variations be not wrought in accordance with the principles underlying the first production of the imitated form, the original proportions of the different parts of this as related to one another are not preserved, and the whole is distorted. For this reason, it is fully as important—to say no more—for the artist to continue to work in accordance with the methods of the great masters as to continue to produce the exact kind of work that they did. And if we inquire into these methods, we shall find that, in art as in religion, philosophy, and science, the one fact which distinguishes not only such characters as Socrates, Aristotle, Confucius, Gautama, Paul, Copernicus, and Newton, but also Raphael, Angelo, Titian, Shakespeare, Goethe, Beethoven, and Wagner, is that they have resisted the influences of traditionalism sufficiently, at least, to be moved as much from within as from without; as much by their own feeling and thinking as by those of others who have preceded them, and whose works surround them; as much, therefore, by that which results from a psychologic method—for we must not forget that there is always a necessary connection between one's method of studying art and of practising it—as by that which follows an historic. In an age when the influence of the latter is so potent that not one in ten seems to be able to detect, even in his own conceptions, the essential differences that separate archeology from art, it is well to have emphasized again, as is done in every period when pro-

duction is at its best, the importance of the former method.
—*Art in Theory, Preface.*

HOMER, WHY HIS METHODS DESERVE STUDY (*see EARLIER*).

These poems of Homer have stood the tests of centuries, and there are reasons why they have survived them. The consideration which should interest us most in the present connection is the fact that the poems were produced by a man who spoke directly from the first promptings of nature; a man upon whom the methods of representation in other arts, and of presentation as used in science and philosophy, had had the least possible influence. In his works, therefore, better than in any others with which, in our day, we can become acquainted, we can study the tendencies of poetry in its most spontaneous and unadulterated form.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, XXII.

HUMANITIES.

“The humanities”. . . are the arts through which a man can cause forms, otherwise often merely material in their influence, to thrill and glow with emotion and meaning; through which he can show himself able to breathe, as it were, something of that sympathetic and intellectual life which has already given life and humanity to his own material frame.—*Art in Theory*, IX.

HUMANITIES, SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TERM AS APPLIED TO ART.

Instead of considering particular works of art, as they appeal to individuals, take them collectively, as they appeal to men in general. What do men call them? One term, almost universally used, is “the humanities.” Would this term have been used by way of distinction unless it had been thought possible to embody in the art-work all the highest possibilities of humanity? Certainly not. But is there any highest possibility of humanity which is not connected with the human mind? Certainly not, again. But what is the mind? What but a reservoir of thought and emotion ever on the alert to detect significance in everything that is seen, and to express this in everything that is handled? And what is a human mind? A mind in a body, not so? And this body is a combination of nerves and muscles, sensitive to every phase of apparent form, and capable of being trained to an almost limitless extent in the direction of reproducing it. The arts, therefore, which are distinctively the humanities, must involve both the expression

of significance and the reproduction of form.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XIII.

HUMANIZING OF NATURE BY ART.

Art humanizes nature according to the thoughts and feelings of one man, yet succeeds in making it human for all because the thoughts and feelings of this man accord in general with those of all men. The artist is a mediator between the actual truth of nature and the possibility in the race of recognizing actual truth. He is in fact the priest of nature, in his rank inferior only to the priest of revelation. He, too, lifts the veil that hangs about God's earthly tabernacle. He, too, steps within the holy place, bows before the light which shines from the Shekinah, and comes back to the masses bearing them a message from that which always dwells behind the symbol.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XIV.

IDEAL, AN, WHAT IT IS.

An ideal is an idea represented to the imagination in the outlines, greatly beautified often, of some known object, event, or experience. This is always the condition when a conception becomes artistic. No matter how much in it may be derived from the vague intimations of subconscious intellection, it is fitted for art in the degree alone in which, for the time being, it has been made to assume exactly what a religious conception may not even suggest, namely, a definite form.—*Idem*, IX.

IDEALS, WHY ORIGINATED.

Science is concerned with knowledge; and one cannot have knowledge without some comprehension of preceding material conditions. But art is concerned with ideals; and ideals, however much or little one may know of a preceding condition, are not material. They are mental. Circumstances and our very nature prevent all of us from learning about more than a few objects and from experiencing more than a few phases of life. Nevertheless, we all desire to possess the results that would ensue, provided such were not the case. Therefore the boy who cannot have the experience surmises what might be the experience of a sailor or a general; and the man in the same condition surmises what might be the experience of a fairy or a saint.—*Idem*, X.

ILLUSTRATIONS, WHY EFFECTIVE IN DISCOURSE.

We all know that the man who makes a large use of illustrations and figures, the imaginative man, or the man sufficiently imaginative to give a graphic as well as logical form to his thought, is, as a rule, a more successful orator than the man who does not. Why? It is because he is addressing his audience according to methods of the mind's nature which operate in a different and deeper way than is exemplified in plain language. He is communicating his thought not merely as it has assumed shape when formulated on the lips, but as it emerges into consciousness, when conceived in the mind. So far as possible, without the intervention or interference of audible forms between his conceptions and his hearers' conceptions, or between what he apprehends and what he desires to have them apprehend, he is bringing that which is in the depths of his own spirit into direct contact with the depths of their spirits. In this way, he is often making them do more than merely understand. He is leading them, step by step, through all the processes of his own mind, starting with these processes at the very springs of psychic action. He is influencing them as if they were expressing their own thought. In making them visualize this, he is making them, for themselves, vitalize it—making them feel and realize it in a way impossible according to any other method. *Essay on Teaching in Drawing.*

IMAGINATION AND COMPARISON AS USED IN ART (*see*
COMPARISON *and* CONTRAST).

What is the faculty of mind from which springs the kind of repetition developed in art when elaborated in accordance with the principle of representation. What is it but the imagination, the faculty which has to do with the imaging of one thing in or by another? In an art-product, forms are grouped together because imagination perceives that they are alike or allied, in other words that they compare, either exactly or very nearly. If, for the sake of variety, a few subordinate features are introduced of which this is not true, even then the clearest possible consciousness that comparison is the process and that these features are exceptional, is manifested by the fact that they are acknowledged to be introduced artistically in the degree in which they exactly contrast with the other features. But

no one can originate or recognize a contrast,—which is an effect caused by agreement in many features but disagreement in, at least, one feature,—except as a result of comparison, which itself is merely the mode of procedure of imagination.—*Art in Theory*, v.

IMAGINATION, AS AFFECTED BY REPRESENTATION AND IMITATION (*see* REPRESENTATION *vs.* IMITATION).

It is precisely for this reason, too, because art does and can represent, and does not and need not literally imitate, that the faculty through which it exerts its chief influence upon the mind, as has been so often observed but seldom explained, is the *imagination*. A literal imitation, leaving nothing for the imagination to do, does not stimulate its action. Whistles or bells in music; commonplace phrases or actions in poetry; and indiscriminate particularities of detail in the work of pencil, brush, or chisel, usually produce disenchanting effects entirely aside from those that we feel to be legitimate to art. This is largely because the artist, in using them, has forgotten that his aim is not to imitate but to represent. It is well to observe here, too, that an effect, appealing primarily to the imagination, necessarily passes through it into all the faculties of mind; and therefore that the distinctive interest awakened in them all by works of art is really due to that which affects first the imagination.—*Art in Theory*, iv.

IMAGINATION, AS AIDING SCIENCE (*see* SCIENCE AIDED BY ART).

The mind that can make discoveries of great truths and principles is, as a rule, the mind that, when it can advance no longer, step by step, can wing itself into these unexplored regions. How can it do this? Through imagination. How can imagination, when doing it, detect the truth? According to a law of being which makes the mind of man work in harmony with the mind in nature, which makes an imaginative surmisal with reference to material things a legitimate product of an intelligent understanding of them. This is the law of correspondence or analogy, which can often sweep a man's thoughts entirely beyond that which is a justifiable scientific continuation of the impression received from nature. Only in art is the mind necessitated and habituated to recognize this law, which fact may not only suggest a reason why so many successful inventors have started in life, like Fulton, Morse, and Bell, by making

a study of some form of art; but it may almost justify a general statement that no great discovery is possible to one whose mind is not able to go beyond that which is ordinarily done in science.—*Essay on Art and Education*.

Imagination is a forerunner of investigation; and investigation furnishes an impetus to imagination. For this reason a great thinker, whether a poet or a philosopher, although he will incline to the one method or to the other, according to the bent of his genius, must not be wholly deficient in the qualities that go to make up either. Nor, so far as education can atone for deficiency, will his education be complete until he has cultivated the powers that go to make up both. Goethe was a student of science; and his poetry owes much to his scientific studies. Dante and Milton were scientific in their poetry, and Plato and Spinoza were poetic in their philosophies. As Sir Wm. Hamilton says, in the thirty-third of his "Lectures on Metaphysics": "A vigorous power of representation is as indispensable a condition of success in the abstract sciences as in the poetical and plastic arts; and it may accordingly be reasonably doubted whether Aristotle or Homer were possessed of the more powerful imagination."—*The Representative Significance of Form*, VIII.

IMAGINATION, AS INFLUENCED BY MUSIC *vs.* POETRY.

Literature belongs to the department of art. This fact necessitates its appealing, not—as science does—to the understanding through direct statements with reference to ideas or emotions, but to the imagination through forms representative of these. In other words, the imagination thinks of that which art presents, by perceiving images which appear in the mind. But in different arts these images are awakened in different ways. The inarticulated sounds heard in music start within one a general emotive tendency—active or restful, triumphant or desponding, gay or sad, as the case may be—and this tendency influences the general direction of thought; but exactly what the form of the thought—or the image—shall be, the mind is left free to determine for itself. If a reciter forget to appeal to imagination according to the methods of sound, he ceases to have that drift which is necessary in order to draw into the channel of his thought, and sweep onward, as music does, the emotions of his audience. If he forget to

appeal to imagination according to the methods of sight, *i. e.*, to remember to what an extent his words, and each word in its place, must cause his audience to think in pictures, then his motive, being merely musical, begins to have the effect legitimate to music. It either lulls people to sleep or, if not, at least leaves their minds free to determine for themselves what shall be the substance of their thought.—*Essay on the Literary Artist and Elocution.*

IMAGINATION, THE SOURCE OF ART.

Art is distinctively a product of imagination, of that faculty of the mind which has to do with perceiving images, —the image of one thing in the form of another. While science, therefore, may find a single form interesting in itself, art, at its best, never does. It looks for another form with which the first may be compared. While science may be satisfied with a single fact, art, at its best, never is. It demands a parallel fact or fancy, of which the first furnishes a suggestion.—*Essay on Art and Education.*

IMITATION AND EXPRESSION NOT ANTAGONISTIC.

Why cannot and why should not a work of art be equally successful in imitation and in expression, in execution and in purpose?—there is no reason except that the most of us are narrow in our aims and sympathies, and prefer to have our art as contracted and one-sided as ourselves. But this is not the spirit that will ever lead to the development of great art. It may foster the mechanical school, where everything runs to line, and the impressionist, where everything runs to color, but it will not always blend both lines and colors sufficiently to produce even satisfactory form, and it will never make this form an inspiring presence by infusing into it the vitality of that thought and feeling which alone can entitle it to be a work of the humanities.—*Art in Theory*, III.

IMITATION, ARTISTIC, DUE TO EXCESS OF LIFE-FORCE.

Imitation without reference to that which underlies the method, or has to do with the end which it is desired to attain, always arises from a condition in which the tendency to activity on the part of the imitator is in excess of that which needs to be expended, or which, in the circumstances, can be expended, upon gaining what is really necessary for the supply of material wants. The young cannot realize the need of expending it upon these, nor do

they know how and where to expend it thus. Therefore they play, and the form of their play is imitative. Their elders, on the contrary, realize that they must work; and they have learned how and where to do it. Therefore they seldom play, having neither the time nor the inclination for it. But that which causes indulgence in play in any case is *excess of life-force* which, if it cannot be expended in obtaining that which is needful for the supply of material wants, must be expended in other directions.—*Idem*, VII.

IMITATION, ARTISTIC, INCLUDES GENERALIZATION.

Imagine a gardener classifying his roses—as he must do instinctively the moment that he has to deal with any large number of them—and obtaining thus a general conception of the flower. Then imagine him trying in some artificial way to produce a single rose embodying this conception. This rose will very likely resemble some one rose particularly present to his mind while forming it; yet, probably, because, before starting with his work, he has obtained a conception of roses in general, his product will manifest some rose-like qualities not possessed by the specimen before him, but suggested by others. That is to say, because of his general conception derived from classifying, he does more than imitate—he represents in that which is a copy of one rose ideas derived from many roses. The same principle applies to all works of art. Let a man write a story or paint a picture. In nine cases out of ten in the exact degree in which he has observed and classified many like events or scenes, he will add to his product the results of his own thinking or generalizing. In fact, it is a question whether the chief charm of such works is not imparted by the introduction into them, in legitimate ways, of these kinds of generalizations having their sources not in the particular things described, but in the brains of the describers, who have already been made familiar with many other things somewhat similar. Shakespeare certainly did not get the most attractive features of his historical plays from history, nor Turner those of his pictures from nature. So, as a rule, even in the most imitative of works, the really great artist, consciously or unconsciously, gives form to conceptions that he has derived from an acquaintance with many other objects of the same class as those imitated.—*The Genesis of Art-Form*, I.

IMITATION IN ART, ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPTION OF.

The general result of emphasizing unduly the imitative side of æsthetics is to lead men to consider art merely a reproduction of reality as manifested in form, and not to consider it, in any important sense, a representation of ideality, or an expression of human thought and feeling. Is there anything in Aristotle's conception of art as *imitation* to justify a deduction that he did not consider it to be an expression of human thought and feeling?—Strange as it may appear to some, nothing whatever. His own explanation of what he meant by *imitation* or *mimicry* (μίμησις) includes all that most idealists would desire to have included in the conception of that which art should do. "Homer," says Aristotle (Chap. 2), "imitates better men than exist," and again, in Chap. 25, "the poet," he says, "being an imitator, like the painter or any other artist, must, of necessity, always imitate one of three things,—either such as they were or are; or such as they are said to be or appear to be; or such as they ought to be" (Thomas Taylor's translation). . . . In art, *imitation* or *imaging* is a means not an end,—a means of representing through accurate imitations or images of external objects that which is, or appears to be, or ought to be. This seems to be the only fair interpretation to be put upon Aristotle's word; and this interpretation reveals at once the depth and the comprehensiveness of his æsthetic insight.—*Art in Theory, Appendix III.*

IMITATION OF THE ART-WORK OF OTHERS.

It is hard enough to produce a work of art which is natural, when one models directly from nature. It is well-nigh impossible to do so, when one models merely or mainly from that which another man, however accurate his eye, has seen in nature. The work of the imitator will be as much inferior to the work of art after which he models, as the latter is to nature's original.—*Art in Theory, III.*

IMITATION, SOLELY, NOT THE AIM OF HIGH ART (*see mention of it under* COMPARISON COMPOSITION, REPRESENTATION).

The aim of high art is never mere imitation; and the truth of the statement is nowhere exemplified more clearly than when applied to the use of color. Merely because blue in the natural spectrum stands between green and

purple, is no proof, as we shall find by-and-by, that a blue object should be represented in a painting as standing next to one that is green or violet. In the natural spectrum, as in a natural scene, bounded by only the horizon, there are other counteracting, balancing, or complementary influences of color, which may render an effect entirely different from that which alone is possible where a few colors are introduced into the narrow limits of a picture. Besides this, the mere association of certain hues in nature does not make the arrangement beautiful; and, if not, art has no business to reproduce it. For both reasons, it must always be borne in mind that art deals with selected colors, just as poetry and music deal with selected tones; and harmony in all these arts, though discovered from a study of principles in nature, is distinctively a human invention.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, xvii.

Art is the work of a man possessing more than merely physical senses. The reason why he desires at all to construct an art-form is because natural forms have produced an effect upon his mind. And it is this effect that he wishes to reproduce. If he can do it by mere imitation, well and good; but there are many cases in which he cannot do it thus. Yet even then, even in poetry, in which . . . the imitative element is often very slight, who can fail to perceive that, as in the "Voices of the Night" of Longfellow, or the tragedies of Shakespeare, *the effects of nature upon the mind* may be reproduced; that the reader or hearer feels sad or joyous, weeps or laughs, precisely as he would, were he, in natural life, to experience the actual moods or perceive the actual events imaginatively presented to his contemplation? A similar principle evidently applies also to the products of painting, sculpture, and architecture.—*Art in Theory*, iv.

IMITATION *vs.* REPRESENTATION IN ART (*see also*
REPRESENTATION IN ART *vs.* IMITATION).

So with the general line of thought in a poem. An imitation so exact apparently that we should think it written down within hearing, of the ravings of a mad king, or of lamentations at the loss of a friend, would not appeal to us like what we know to be merely *representations* of these in the blank verse of Shakespeare's "King Lear," or in the rhyming verse of Tennyson's "In Memo-

riam." The talk of the phonograph will never be an acceptable substitute for the soliloquy or dialogue of the artistic drama or novel. A like fact is true of the photograph. For the very reason that it is an imitation, in the sense of being a literal presentation, of every outline on which the light at the time when it was taken happened to fall, it does not awaken in us the kind or degree of imaginative interest or of sympathy that we feel in paintings or statues. In contrast to the impression received from a photograph, in gazing at these, we feel that we are looking through an artist's eye, seeing only what he saw or thought fit for us to see, and that everything in them is traceable to the skill displayed by him when transferring what in nature is presented in one medium into another medium, as when delineating flesh and foliage through the use of color and when turning veins and lace into marble.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, VI.

It is mainly owing to a lack of all appeal to the imagination or the sympathies, that accurate imitations of the sounds that come from birds, beasts, winds, and waters fail to affect us as do notes which are recognized to be produced by wind and stringed instruments in the passages descriptive of the influence of a forest, in Wagner's opera of "Siegfried," or in the "Pastoral Symphonies" of Handel and Beethoven. Nor do any number of tones imitating exactly the expressions of love, grief, or fright compare, in their influence upon us, with the representations of the same in the combined vocal and instrumental melodies and harmonies of love songs, dirges, and tragic operas. The truth of this may be more readily conceded in an art, like music, perhaps, than in some of the other arts; for in it the imitative elements are acknowledged to be at a minimum. To such an extent is this the case, in fact, that some have declared it to be *presentative* rather than *representative*, not recognizing that a use of the elements of *duration*, *force*, *pitch*, and *quality*, such as enables us to distinguish between a love-song, a dirge, and a tragic passage, would altogether fail to convey their meaning, unless there were something in the effects to *represent* ideas or emotions which we were accustomed to associate with similar effects as they are *presented* in nature, especially as they are presented in natural speech.—*Art in Theory*, IV.

IMITATION, ITS USE IN MUSIC AND POETRY.

It is evident that the analogies between the general order of series of sounds and the order of particular phases of nature that they are intended to suggest, can be rendered much more distinctly apprehensible by adding to what is only generally representative by way of analogy that which is specifically so by way of *imitation*. It would need but a few imitative strokes of a drum, for instance, to make that which might suggest either a storm or a battle, suggest one of these rather than the other. In this regard, musical forms correspond exactly to poetic forms. Some words are representative because they suggest a similarity in underlying causes—like the word *expressive*, derived as it is from analogies between pressing one material substance out of another material substance, and doing something similar with a purely mental substance. Other words are representative because they suggest a similarity in apparent effects—like the imitative words “buzz” or “crackle.” The same is true, too, of phrases and sentences. Some are artistic because they recall an analogous series of relationships, and some because they also recall an analogous series of sounds.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music: Music as a Representative Art*, VIII.

IMITATION, WHY LITTLE, IN MUSIC AND ARCHITECTURE.

A symphony is constructed from a single significant series of tones; and precisely in the same way a building is constructed from a single significant series of outlines, as in a rounded or pointed arch. In both arts, however, there is an occasional return to nature for the purpose of incorporating, if not imitating, in the product some new expression of significance. But as both arts are developed, as will be shown in the first chapter following, from a sustained and subjective method of giving expression to a first suggestion, a return to nature is much less frequent in them than in the other arts. Poetry, being developed from the unsustained and responsive methods of expression underlying language, manifests a constant tendency to *talk back* and, therefore, to mention and describe what has interrupted the flow of thought and presented new thought. Painting and sculpture, being developed from the same methods of expression, when underlying vision, manifest a constant tendency to *look back* and, therefore, to imitate and depict what has

interrupted the contemplation of one object of sight and presented another.—*Idem, Introduction to Music as a Representative Art.*

IMPRESSIONISM AS RELATED TO MUSIC.

Only since there has come to be a scientific study of the philosophic reasons underlying the laws of musical harmony and composition—such a study as is exemplified in the great work of Helmholtz on “The Sensations of Tone”—has there been a study of the effects of color-harmony and composition of such a nature and with such a purpose as is manifested in the painting of the modern impressionists.—*Essay on Music as Related to Other Arts.*

IMPRESSIONISM, INFLUENCE OF, ON DRAWING.

An age of the paintings of impressionists, in which mere patches of color would be considered all that was requisite in order to enable the imagination to construct its own contours for objects, would be an age in which drawing would become a lost art. Here, as elsewhere, the truth seems to lie between the extremes. And does not the salvation of art as of life depend upon its fidelity to truth?—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XVI.

IMPRESSIONIST PAINTING (*see* POETRY AS PICTORIAL).

The endeavor appears to be to influence the eye by means of color aside from shapes in a way analogous to that in which, in music, the ear is acknowledged to be influenced by sounds aside from words. Is it possible to suppose that such effects would ever have been attempted, if it had not been for suggestions derived from music? It is interesting to notice, too, that, when carried to excess, impressionism, which may be described as painting influenced by decorative motives, is apt to prove unsatisfactory owing to neglect of the natural requirements of picturing in outline, in exactly the same way in which, as was pointed out a moment ago, poetry, influenced by the musical motive, is apt to prove unsatisfactory owing to its neglect of the requirements of picturing in words. One can no more make a thoroughly successful painting without lines that, at least, suggest to the mind a very definite form than he can make a thoroughly successful poem without words and phrases that do the same. Nevertheless, just as the influence of music on verse has been, in part, beneficial, so too has been

its influence, so far as exerted, in the directions of which I have been speaking, upon the use of pigments. The conceptions which underlie modern impressionism will probably never cease to manifest themselves, and in ways, too, perfectly legitimate to the art of painting.—*Essay on Music as Related to Other Arts.*

INDIVIDUALITY, DISTINGUISHING THE PROSAIC FROM THE POETIC.

One difference between the prosaic and the poetic, as respectively illustrated in these passages, lies in the fact that the former is devoid of any formative influence upon the details mentioned produced by the intervening human mind through which it has come to us, whereas of the latter the contrary is true. The same should be true of all products purporting to be those of art. No men are great painters merely because they accurately reproduce the shapes or hues of nature; or great sculptors, merely because they remould some ancient masterpiece, or merely imitate in marble some modern living model. It is the individuality of the effect characterizing the new product that gives it artistic soul and life. In what consists the difference between the artists living in Rome to-day and the artisans who do their chiselling for them? Is it not in this?—that the artists give form to their own conceptions, while the artisans give form to the conceptions of their employers?—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XIV.

INDIVIDUALITY IN ART (*see also* GENIUS *and* PERSONALITY).

The truth of art is surmised and embodied according to the methods of imagination and expression peculiar to the temperament of one man; and it becomes the property of all mainly on account of the individual influence of this man whose intuitive impressions have been so accurate as to recommend themselves to the æsthetic apprehensions, and to enlist the sympathies, of those about him.—*Idem.*

INDIVIDUALITY MANIFESTED UNCONSCIOUSLY.

A moment's thought will enable us to recognize that that which constitutes one's individuality often lies in traits of which he is unaware. Or, if through a study of himself or of the opinion of the community he have become aware of them, they are even then expressed, as a rule, involuntarily. A man is never more thoroughly himself

than when so interested in something else as to forget himself. The Christ said that "he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it." Wherefore should not art affirm the same?—*Idem*.

INFORMATION INCREASING ENJOYMENT OF ART (*see also* EXPLANATIONS *and* LITERARY).

An art-product appeals to a man as distinguished from an animal. If so, the appeal must be made to that which distinguishes him from the animal. This, of course, is his intellect, together with the character and amount of intelligence ascribable to it. But if this be so, an increase of intelligence must increase his capacity for recognizing the appeal of art. As applied to a particular art-product, an increase of his intelligence with reference to either its form or subject, must increase his capacity for enjoying it. Nor need it make any essential difference whether this intelligence be the result of his general information, or of special information with reference to the object immediately before him, such as he can derive from a guide book. A man with a knowledge of history, however derived, will certainly take more interest in a painting like Raphael's "School of Athens". . . than will one ignorant of history; and a student of the Bible will take more interest than will one ignorant of it in a painting like "The Death of Ananias.". . . The degree of beauty is often increased in the degree in which the number of effects entering into its generally complex nature is increased. This is true even though some of these effects, as in the case of forms conjured before the imagination by a verbal description, may come from a source which, considered in itself, is not æsthetic. It must not be overlooked, however, that all beauty whatever is a characteristic of form; and that intellectual effects, like these explanations, to have an æsthetic influence, must always be presented to apprehension in connection with an external form with which they can be clearly associated. For this reason, though they may add to the æsthetic interest, where it already exists, they cannot, of themselves, make up for a lack of it. . . . A picture cannot be all that a work of art should be, unless, without one's knowing what the explanation is designed to impart, the drawing and coloring can, in some degree, at least, attract and satisfy æsthetic interest. . . .

But the knowledge that we may get with reference to the subject of a picture, enlarging, as this must do, its associations and suggestions, can add immensely to our distinctively æsthetic enjoyment. In what consists the worth of art except in the effects that it arouses in the emotions and, through them, conjures in the imagination? But by what is the reach of imagination determined, except by the amount of information present in the mind with reference to that by which the emotions have been influenced?—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, xv.

INSPIRATION AND OBSERVATION, BOTH NEEDED IN ART.

The transcendentalists of New England who, fifty years ago, were exercising the most pronounced of any effect upon the art and literature of our country were constantly confounding artistic inspiration with religious inspiration. The tendency of this mistake was not only to minimize in religion the importance of the spiritual, because this was conceived to be the same in kind as the distinctively human in art; but to minimize in art also the importance of the material,—*i. e.*, of the material product as given form through skill in technique,—because the whole desired effect was conceived to be attained, as in religion, by merely giving adequate and accurate expression to the results of inspiration. Emerson himself, not only in his practice but in his theory, almost always goes astray when he approaches this subject of art-form. On the other hand, the followers of the French, who, during the last twenty-five years, have occupied in our country the position formerly occupied by the transcendentalists, are constantly confounding artistic observation with scientific observation; and the tendency of their influence is not only to minimize in science the importance of imaginative hypothesis as a prerequisite for the discovery of great underlying principles, because they conceive that science has the same interest in the mere appearances of nature that art has; but to minimize in art also the importance of imaginative construction embodying the great truths of analogy; because they suppose the end to be attained in art, as in science, by an accurate study of the facts of nature as they are, poems or paintings being ranked according to the literal fidelity with which they recall or imitate the details of that which

has been observed.—*The Representative Significance of Form, Preface.*

INSPIRATION, ARTISTIC.

Just here, in fact, we come upon a philosophic, if not scientific, warrant for that common opinion, so often held without reasoning and expressed without discrimination, that the products of art are to be ascribed to what is termed *inspiration*. When we have traced them to this overflow at the very springs of mental vitality, no one who thinks can fail to feel that, if human life anywhere can come into contact with the divine life, it must be here. There are reservoirs behind the springs of the mountain-streams. Are there none behind those of thought? And if there be, what are they? The answer to this question must depend, of course, upon the general character of one's theologic or philosophic conceptions. He may attribute that which he calls inspiration directly and immediately to the divine source of life. Or, recognizing the erroneous nature of the forms in which truth, even when most unmistakably inspired, is often presented, he may suppose that there are gradations of intelligences beyond one's ken through which, even before undergoing subjection to human limitations, the brightness of the divine light, in order to become attuned to the requirements of earthly conditions, loses not only its brilliancy but with this much of its defining power. Or he may suppose that the soul itself comes into the world stored with forces directly created for it, or else indirectly acquired in a previous existence of which not only every otherwise unaccountable intuition but every impulse is a consequence,—a previous existence, which, if not human and personal, may, at least, have existed as a psychic force developing in the lower orders of life according to the laws of psychic evolution through successive physical forms, themselves developing according to the laws of physical evolution. Or, finally, he may suppose that this reservoir is in a man's own subconscious nature; and this, again, he may suppose to be either psychical or physical. With those whose tendencies are toward idealism, he may deem the reservoir to be the receptacle of experiences in his present state of existence, stored in the inner mind with all their attendant associations and suggestions, and, in accordance with some law, surging upward in order to control thought and expression whenever, as in dreams

or reveries, or abnormal states of trance or excitation, or merely of poetic enthusiasm, the conscious will, for any reason, is subordinated to the impulse coming from within. Or, with those whose tendencies are more materialistic, he may consider this subconscious nature to be the accumulated result merely of that which, through physical sensation, has come to be stored up in the nerve-cells and, in circumstances similar to those just mentioned, aroused to conscious vitality as a consequence either of intense external stimulation, or of unusual activity in the nervous centres. Whether a man incline to the acceptance of one of these theories, or of a combination of them; however he may account for what lies in the realm of mystery beyond the art-impulse, it is evident that the theory just presented of it can accord with every possible view. That, back of all conscious intelligence, there is an unconscious intelligence of some kind, in which the powers of memory and of deduction are well-nigh, if not absolutely, perfect, the phenomena of accident, disease, and hypnotism seem to have established beyond all question. How, otherwise, could men with memories naturally weak recall, as at times they do, in abnormal conditions, whole conversations in a foreign tongue with not one word of which they are consciously acquainted? Or how could those of the very slightest powers of imagination or of logic, argue for hours, when in such states, with superlative brilliancy and conclusiveness? Whatever be the final explanation of these facts, in themselves—as will be brought out clearly in the volume of this series treating of the nature of the thought that can be represented in art—they cannot now be doubted. Behind conscious mental life, sources exist of intellectual energy. They find expression in many ways—in the words and deeds of ordinary people, as well as in the extraordinary moods and methods of prophets and reformers. But there is only one department of activity which humanity appears to have developed for the special purpose of giving expression—if we may so say, of consciously giving material embodiment—to that which has its source in these subconscious regions of the mind; and this department of activity is art.—*Art in Theory*, VII.

INSPIRATION, INFLUENCED BY ARTISTS' SURROUNDINGS.

In every age, of course, men of genius are prompted instinctively, entirely aside from any knowledge that they

may have of æsthetic laws, to recognize and embody æsthetic effects. But where are such men who fail to find themselves surrounded by the products of their inferiors? and who is able wholly to resist the influence of these? If it be true that art, like religion, is fountained in inspiration, it is true also that different sources of this differ in quality; and that the stream which flows from the high region of the masters has a purity not characterizing that which rises in the low plane of their imitators.—*The Genesis of Art-Form, Preface.*

INSPIRED, THE, AND THE ARTISTIC (*see* GENIUS).

When Mozart was three years old, he was giving concerts attended by the first musicians. When he was eight, he had composed a symphony containing parts for a complete orchestra. We ascribe such precocious results to genius. But suppose that . . . after practising (like Beethoven) five or six hours a day for ten or fifteen years, he had produced the same, or approximately the same, quality of music. In this case, we should have said that his genius had been rendered able to express itself as a result of his having acquired skill. . . . We should recognize, too, that he never could have become able to do this, unless that which he had studied and practised had, after a time, passed from a region—so to speak—in which it needed to be consciously overlooked, to a region where it could be overlooked unconsciously. No man ever acquired the skill of an artist until he could—automatically, as it were—read printed notes, finger them, and harmonize them, while reserving all his conscious energies for the expression of the general thought and emotion. . . . When a man's mind has naturally a tendency to act in this way, we term him a genius; but this tendency may be greatly developed by the study of art. In fact, it may be developed in some cases in which it is only latent. Many find the strongest indication of the genius of Henry Ward Beecher in his marvelous illustrative ability, in his imaginative facility in arguments from analogy. He himself, in his "Yale Lectures," says that, while in later life it was as easy for him to illustrate as to breathe, he did not have this power to any such extent in early manhood, but cultivated it. Now, notice the inference from what has just been said. If the subconscious powers of

mind that every man possesses operate like an automatic machine, producing approximately perfect results of recollection, imitation, illustration, and—as developed from the premise submitted—of logic, then the problem of education is how to cultivate the conscious powers of the mind so that they shall be more and more pliant to the touch of subconscious influence, and thus be enabled to manifest outwardly that which is within one. The problem of expressional art is how to cultivate the conscious agencies of expression so that they shall respond automatically to the promptings of the subconscious agencies. The musician has always practically solved this problem when he is pouring his whole soul into his music, unconscious of anything but the emotional effect that he desires to produce upon the souls of his hearers. The sculptor and the painter have always solved it, when they are projecting into line and color, unconscious of being hampered by any thought of technique, that picture which keen observation of the outer world has impressed upon their conceptions. The poet has always solved it, when he has lost himself in his theme, unconscious of anything except that to which Milton referred in "Paradise Lost," when he said that it

"Dictates to me slumbering or inspires
Easy my unpremeditated verse."

As intimated here, this state in which thoughts and emotions, *i. e.*, mental forms, pass from the inner mind into external material forms, through methods, of the details of which, at the time of its action, the mind is unconscious, is the result of what we sometimes term inspiration. But notice, too, that it is often, even in cases of the most indisputable genius, a result, in part at least, of acquired skill. Therefore, the inspirational and the artistic are frequently exactly the same in effect.—*Essay on the Literary Artist and Elocution.*

INTONATIONS *vs.* ARTICULATIONS IN LANGUAGE.

Whatever may be true of words used separately, it is a fact that, even aside from the conventional meanings ordinarily attached to them, intonations, such as can be given only in the movements of consecutive speech, have a significance. When Bridget, according to a familiar story, was sent to the neighbors to inquire how old Mrs. Jones was, she

emphasized the *old*, and paused after it, and so gave irreparable offence. Her tones represented an idea which the mere words of the message confided to her had not been intended to convey.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, I.

IRREGULARITY IN THE HUMAN COUNTENANCE (*see also*
COUNTENANCE *and* REGULARITY).

This statement suggests an important principle of art which needs to be noted here. It is that, sometimes, certain requirements of form have to be waived for the sake of significance. We all are acquainted with this fact as applied to paintings or statues containing two or more figures. We often see one of these made positively irregular and ugly, in order to offset, and thus enhance, the regularity and beauty of the others. . . . The same principle is applicable not only to groups of faces or figures, but, in each of them, to groups of features. Irregularities in certain of these, if not too pronounced, though they may be altogether too decided to render possible any method of supposing them to be regular, may add at times not only to the interest, but even to the charm of the form in which they appear. Like the stronger shading of a line or color that changes the apparent condition of a factor for the purpose of emphasizing it, or of taking emphasis from some other adjacent factor, they may thrust upon attention that which thus interprets the meaning of the whole, and renders it in the highest sense representative. The expression of mere individuality alone necessitates having no two forms or faces in the world exactly alike. Yet thousands of them may be equally beautiful; and tens of thousands, though not equally beautiful, may be equally attractive; while, to the student of humanity, none can fail to be interesting.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, VI.

LABOR, NEEDED FOR ART-EXCELLENCE.

The results of art have not disproved that universal principle according to which the degree of labor, mediate or immediate, generally measures the degree of worth. A bountiful exuberance of imagination usually accompanies abounding information. The analogies of the poet are usually most natural to the mind that has made the most scrupulous study of nature. Truth, comprehensiveness, and greatness, manifested in artistic products, are usually crystallizations of the accuracy, breadth, and largeness of

the formative thought occasioning them.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, IV.

LANDSCAPE GARDENING, ARTIFICIAL AND NATURAL
EFFECTS OF.

Where human intellect is supposed to have graded the hillocks and cultivated the lawns, neither of these can appropriately present too great an appearance of ruggedness or unculture. Lakes that are acknowledged to be the results of contrivance should not seem swamps, nor should streams that are made to flow into them seem sluggish. Trees that have been transplanted should not appear illy selected as to sizes, nor illy arranged as to groups or rows. Walks that every one knows to have been planned, however adroitly they may be adjusted to the conformations of the land, should never violate the mathematical laws controlling the formation of curves; nor should flowers that have been placed in beds be disposed otherwise as to sizes and colors than in a manner suited to produce effects that are æsthetic.

On the other hand, the artist, while striving to avoid the tendency just mentioned, can scarcely be too cautious in his endeavor to guard against infidelity to such effects as may be supposed to have developed naturally. It is possible to grade the land so that the outlines and positions of mounds, lawns, and lakes shall seem too much the products of design. The trees may be too nearly of a size, and arranged with too great regularity. If in addition, as in some French gardens, they be clipped in order to seem uniform, or be made to imitate tents, spires, or what-not that a man may fancy, or if they be ranged like fence-poles about walks suggesting nothing but a square and compasses, or stuck into the edges of flower-beds, wherein all the colors are as carefully matched as in the mats of a French parlor, then, while artifice has had its perfect work, nature may seem to have been so painfully distorted and misrepresented that the result has been the death of her.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XXIV.

Applying these ideas to landscape-gardening, it is simply a fact recognized by all, that any given plot may be so graded and laid out that hills and valleys, lawns and lakes, avenues and flower-beds, shall appear to be the results of nature as much as of artifice. In the degree in which such is the case, landscape-gardens may be said to suggest effects

in time. And yet if, in connection with these, there be no evidences that the results perceived were contrived and constructed through an exercise of ingenuity and skill; if, in other words, there be no evidences of a human mind which, accepting certain natural features of landscape as developed in time, has given unity to the whole in space, and this as a result of thinking,—then manifestly the landscape will not appear artistic.—*Idem*.

LANDSCAPE GARDENING, AS INFLUENCED BY OTHER ARTS.

What but a subtle tendency to imitate the effects of drawing or of painting could lead to the mathematical straightness or stiffness apparent often in the arrangements of walks and plants, and of outlines in artificial ponds, and even of forms and colors in flower-beds? Or what but a confounding of this art with sculpture or architecture could result in that which so offends good taste in many gardens,—the crowding together of plaster statues, waterless fountains, riverless bridges, and arbors whereon the sun never shines, clipped out and bent out of trees that would have seemed beautiful if only left in their natural condition? No wonder that they appear artificial!—*Idem*, xxvii.

LANGUAGE, ARTISTIC, NEEDS CULTIVATING.

At a recent centennial celebration of one of our colleges, a professorial friend of mine was seated next to a scientist. They were listening to a brilliant speech from a prominent clergyman. The scientist was to follow. Before he did so, he made a disparaging remark, indicating that he felt that he should be commended because he could not, and would not, attempt anything resembling what had immediately preceded. My friend in repeating his remark indicated that he also agreed with the scientist in this self-commendation. Neither, apparently, was able to perceive his own limitations sufficiently even to regret them. . . . Is it necessary to argue that when such sentiments prevail and are expressed by those who desire to make themselves popular, no great efforts will be expended upon the methods of presenting thought; and if so, that no high standards will be reached in the spheres peculiar to literature, whether of prose or of poetry? You cannot expect art to be manifested in the use of language in any college or country where there is general disparagement of endeavors to make language artistic.—*Essay on Fundamentals in Education*.

LANGUAGE, AS FORMED INSTINCTIVELY AND REFLECTIVELY.

The earliest sounds made by a babe are *instinctive*, by which is meant, that they are allied in nature to expressions of instinct, due, even in a rational being, to the operation less of conscious rationality than of natural forces vitalizing all sentient existence. These instinctive sounds seem to be accepted as words in fulfilment, mainly, of the principle of *association*. The child cries and crows while the mother hums and chuckles, and both understand each other. They communicate through what may be termed *ejaculations* or interjections. This kind of language is little above the level of that of the brutes; in fact, it is of the same nature as theirs. The sounds seem to have a purely muscular or nervous origin; and for this reason may be supposed to have no necessary connection with any particular thought or psychic state intended to be expressed by them. Nevertheless, we all understand the meanings of them when produced by the lower animals, as well as when made by man. Everywhere, certain ejaculations are recognized to be expressive of the general tenor of certain feelings, as of pleasure and pain desire and aversion, surprise and fright. This fact shows that there is a true sense in which these utterances are representative.

The principle of association in connection with the use of natural exclamations accounts probably for the origin not only of actual interjections, but of other sounds also, like the sibilants, aspirates, and gutturals, giving their peculiar qualities to the meanings of syllables like those in *shoo*, *hist*, and *kick*. Some, too, think that it accounts for the origin of words like *is*, *me*, and *that*, cognate with the Sanskrit, *as*, *ma*, and *ta*; the first meaning to breathe, and indicating the act of breathing; the second closing the lips to shut off outside influence, and thus to refer to self; and the third opening the lips to refer to others. In the same way, too, because the organs of speech are so formed that the earliest articulated sound made by a babe is usually either *mama* or *papa*, and the earliest persons to whom each is addressed are the mother and father, people of many different races have come to associate *mama*, which, as a rule, is uttered first, with an appeal to the mother, and *papa* with an appeal to the father.

In order, however, that utterances springing from exclamations may be used in language, it is evident that men must

begin to imitate them, which they can do as a result only of *comparison*. This principle, therefore, as well as that of association, must have been closely connected with the formation of the earliest words. Ejaculations, as has been said, are instinctive. As such, they come first in the order of time. The imitations of them with the purpose of making them accepted as words do not appear till the *reflective* nature begins to assert itself and then they soon extend to the reproduction of other sounds besides ejaculations—sounds that are representative of natural effects external to man, and that become accepted as words as a still more immediate result of *comparison*. These latter sounds are first heard when the child is led to notice external objects. Then, unlike the animal which can only ejaculate, but just like his reputed father Adam, the first who had a reflective nature, he begins to give names to these objects, or to have names given to them for him by others. These names, according to the methods controlling the formation of nursery language, are always based upon the principle of imitation. Certain noises emanating from the objects designated, the *chick-chick* of the fowl, the *tick-tick* of the watch, the *cuckoo* of the bird over the clock, the *bow-wow* of the dog, and, later, the *clatter* of the *rattle*, or the *rustle* of the silk or satin, are imitated in the names applied to them; and this imitative element enables the child to recognize what the object is to which each name refers. The existence of hundreds of terms in all languages, the sounds of which are significant of their sense, like *buzz*, *hiss*, *crash*, *slam*, *bang*, *whine*, *howl*, *roar*, *bellow*, *whistle*, *prattle*, *twitter*, *gabble*, and *gurgle* (many of which are of comparatively recent origin), is a proof that the principle of imitation is an important factor in the formation of words.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, 1.

LANGUAGE, ITS EARLIEST FORM.

This theory, that the very earliest words were ejaculatory and imitative, seems to accord with the commonly accepted view, that language is a gift from God, recognizing it to be so in the sense that, whereas beasts and birds are endowed with the power of representing only a few sensations through a few almost unvarying sounds, man can represent any number of thoughts and emotions through articulating organs capable of producing almost

infinite combinations and variations. Place two human beings, thus constituted, in a state like that of Eden, and in a month's time, by using ejaculatory and imitative utterances, and mutually agreeing, as they necessarily would do, to associate certain ideas with certain of these, they would form a primitive language, which both could understand; and a number of their words, too, would probably not be wholly dissimilar in either sound or sense to some that we use to-day.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, I.

LANGUAGE, PLAIN AND FIGURATIVE (*see* POETRY, ITS LANGUAGE, REPRESENTATION IN POETRY, *and* WORDS).

Plain language, as we have traced it, is a development of the instinctive methods of expression used in natural ejaculations. These, by being *associated* with the circumstances in which they are uttered, come to be used as words; and, in a broad way of generalizing, there is a sense in which all words, no matter how originated, whenever they come to mean what they do on account of this principle, can be put into this class. But now, if we think a little, we shall recognize that, from the moment of the utterance of the first ejaculation to the use of the latest sound which means what it does merely because conventionally *associated* with an idea to which it stands in the relation of an arbitrary symbol, the tendency exemplified is a desire to *present* rather than to *represent* the thought or feeling.

Just the contrary, however, is true of *figurative* language. We have traced it to a development of the reflective methods of expression which arise when one hears and imitates for a purpose the sounds about him. The same tendency is carried out when he puts these sounds together, after they have become conventional words, so as to represent the relations between the sights about him, as in the terms *express*, *understand*; in fact, it is carried out in every case in which there is a use of imaginative or figurative language. This latter language, then, from its earliest source to its utmost development, exemplifies a tendency to *represent* rather than merely to *present* the thought or feeling.

But we have not yet reached the whole truth with reference to the matter. It must be remembered that thus far we have been dealing mainly with single words, or with a

few of them arranged in single sentences. Each of these words or sentences may be supposed to express some single phase or process of the mind's experiences. But to express a series of these processes, as words usually do when used at all, we need a series of words and sentences. Now it is conceivable that, though each factor of the series when taken by itself should merely *present* some single phase, all the factors when taken together should *represent* a series of these phases; and it is equally conceivable that though each factor of the series when taken by itself should *represent* a mental phase, all the factors when taken together should merely *present* a series of these phases. In other words, it is conceivable that owing to the artistic use, not of single words but of series of them, plain language should *represent* the thought and feeling (as in "Home they brought her Warrior" in Tennyson's "Princess"), and therefore be poetic; and it is equally conceivable that figurative language (as in oratory) should *present*, and therefore be prosaic; prose, so far as it is determined by the mode of communicating thought, being the *presentative* form of that of which poetry is the *representative*.

These conditions which we have considered conceivable, we shall find to be true in fact; and for this reason poetic methods of treating a subject considered as a whole must be judged, precisely as was said in another place of poetic sounds, by the degree in which they *represent* the thought or feeling to which they give expression. Now what, in the last analysis must determine the method of the communication?—what but the method in which the thought itself is conceived in the mind of the writer? If he think in pictures, his words, whether or not picturesque or figurative in themselves, will describe pictures. Otherwise they will not. Moreover, if we reflect a moment, we shall recognize that there are many times when he can think *in* pictures, even when he is not thinking *of* pictures; as, for instance, when he is impressing a truth upon the mind through using a story, a parable, or an illustration, as we call it. In this case, his method, if it accurately convey to us that which is passing before his own mind, must be *representative*, and not merely *presentative*.

Accordingly we find, when we get to the bottom of our subject, that the figurative or the representative element in poetry may exist in the conception as well as in the

phraseology. If it exist in only the conception, we have representation in *plain* language, or *direct* representation; if in the phraseology, by which is meant now the words or expressions illustrating the main thought, we have representation in *figurative* language, or *illustrative* representation. If all the significance expressed in a passage be *represented*, the form of the representation will in this work be termed *pure*; if a part of the thought be merely presented, the representation will be termed *alloyed*; and in the degree in which this is the case, it will be shown by and by that the whole is prosaic.

Pure representation is pictorial in character, as we should expect from the pictorial tendency of which we have found it to be an outgrowth, and its methods are not wholly unlike those of painting. When composing in accordance with them, the poet indicates his thought by using words referring to things that can be perceived; and in this way he causes the imaginations of those whom he addresses to perceive pictures. Alloyed representation, while following in the main the methods of that which is pure, always contains more or less of something which cannot be supposed to have been perceived, at least not in connection with circumstances like those that are being detailed. For this reason, that which is added to the representation is like alloy, interfering with the pureness and clearness of the pictures presented to the imaginations of those addressed. It appeals to them not according to the methods of poetry, but of science or philosophy, or of any kind of thought addressed merely to the logical understanding.

The distinction between pure and alloyed representation lies at the basis of all right appreciation of poetic effects.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, XIX.

The object of language is to cause others to share our mental processes, to communicate to them the substance of our ideas and their associated feelings. In doing this, it represents both what a man has observed in the external world and what he has experienced in his own mind—not in either the one or the other, but invariably in both of them. If a man, for instance, show us a photograph of something that he has seen, he holds before our eyes precisely what has been before his own eyes; but if he describe the scene in words, he holds before our mind only those parts of it that

have attracted his attention; and not only so, but added to these parts many ideas and emotions of his own that were not in the scene but occurred to him when viewing it.

A similar added element from the man's mind accompanies every endeavor of his to tell what he has heard, or even, at some other time, thought or felt. From these facts, it follows that the aim of language, so far as this can be determined by what it actually and necessarily does, is to cause the same effects to be produced in the hearer's mind that are experienced in the speaker's mind. Now if one, when talking, conceive that this is an easy aim to attain; that what he has heard or seen or thought or felt, needs only to be told in clear, intelligible phraseology, in order to produce in another the same effects as in himself, then he will be content with conventional modes of expression; he will use in the main plain language.

On the other hand, if a man conceive that the end at which he is aiming is difficult to attain; that what he has heard, or seen, or thought, or felt, either on account of its own nature, or of the nature of those whom he is addressing, is hard for them to realize in its full force, and with all its attendant circumstances, then, as his object is to convey not merely an apprehension but a comprehension, both complete and profound, of that of which he has to speak, he will dwell upon it; he will repeat his descriptions of it; he will tell not only what it is, but what it is like; in other words, he will try to produce the desired effect, by putting extra force into his language, and, in order to do this, inasmuch as the force of language is increased by becoming representative, he will augment the representation by multiplying his comparisons; his language will become figurative. It will be so for the same reason that the language of a savage or a child, even when giving utterance to less occult ideas, is figurative,—because he feels that the words at his command are inadequate to express or impress his meaning completely.—*Idem*, XVIII.

LAW, ART AS SUBJECT TO (*see also* MUSIC AS RELATED TO
LAW).

In the degree in which the conclusions reached are accurate, and appeal as such to the reader's judgment, it will make evident that the effects for which the artist seeks are due to laws that operate far more inflexibly than sometimes

is supposed; it will suggest that originality, while wider in its scope than those imagine who confound the methods of the master-artists with their manner, has too its limits; and it will reveal beyond a doubt why many works of so-called art produced to-day, because devoid of almost every element of art, can never be of permanent interest, as well as why, for reasons just the opposite, so many of those that are now the classics of the past have charms that never can be lost.—*The Genesis of Art-Form, Preface.*

LIKE WITH LIKE (*see also* COMPARISON).


Imagination is the source of all art-production. When a man begins to find in one feature the image of another, and, because the two are alike, to put them together by way of comparison, then, and then only, does he begin to construct an art-product. And not only so, but only then does he continue his work in a way to make it continue to be a medium of expression. The forms which he elaborates are naturally representative of certain phases of thought or feeling, and the significance of the completed product depends upon its continuing to represent these phases. But it can continue to do this only when that which is added in the process of elaboration is essentially like that with which the process starts. . . . As a fact, however, no two things are alike in all regards; and the mind must content itself with putting together those that are alike in some regards.—*The Genesis of Art-Form, II.*

LITERARY, A TERM APPLIED TO PICTURES (*see also* EXPLANATIONS and INFORMATION).

Suppose that, for the reason which Lessing gave when he said that it should present only that which could be perceived at one time, or for any other reason, the picture is not able to interpret itself. Then it needs an explanation. Such an explanation is necessarily made in words, and, often, in printed words. Words, whether printed or not, are the substance of literature. A painting which cannot be of interest until one is made acquainted with the literature of the subject, until one has read or heard the words of a story which it is supposed to illustrate—what is this?—What, but a painting which may be said to owe its interest to literature; and in this sense a painting that is "literary." . . . The term "literary," as one of disparagement, is rightly applied to pictures that need to be



Church of St. Mark, Venice



Old Picture of St. Sophia, Constantinople

See pages 9, 10, 15, 19, 73, 81-85, 89, 91, 223-225, 316, 385

interpreted by a verbal story; in other words to pictures that do not represent their own story. But is this what is meant by those who, in our own time, most use the term? No; but often the opposite. The term is applied to pictures that do represent their own story; and because they do this. Thus a deduction from Lessing's principle is made in order to disparage the very kind of pictures that he would have commended. Nor is it the first time that inability to interpret the spirit of a law beneath the letter of it has caused the disciples of a master to suppose themselves to be following his lead, when they are going in diametrically the opposite direction.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XIII.

Human minds, as a rule, have so narrow an outlook that they can be depended upon to snatch a half-truth, if possible, and use it as a weapon against the whole truth. Whatever may have been the case in the past, an artist at the present time cannot compose upon the theory that significance is essential to the highest excellence in art without being stigmatized by certain critics as "literary"; nor can he compose upon the theory that imitative skill is essential to the highest excellence without being stigmatized by certain other critics as being "a mere technicist."

Of course, in some cases the use of these designations is appropriate; and, in all cases, it is easy to trace their genesis, and find some justification for them. To inveigh against the literary tendency in this art is a perfectly natural reaction against an attempt on the part of certain English and German artists of the early part of the last century, like West and Overbeck, not only to revive religious symbolic and allegoric painting, but to do this, apparently, upon the supposition that a subject capable of being made impressive by an elaborate explanation, or story indicating its intention, can compensate for an indifferent style, an idea subsequently developed by the English Pre-Raphaelites and in the *genre* pictures of the followers of Von Schadow at Dusseldorf. On the other hand, to inveigh against exclusive attention to technique is an equally natural reaction against the exceedingly tame and unimaginative effects produced by mere imitation, such as we find in many of the French pictures. No amount of care expended upon the portrayal of tint or texture in foliage, clothing, or flesh can satisfy the artistic ideals

of certain minds. They refuse to admit that great art can ever result from any possible elaboration of small subjects.—*Idem*, XII.

LITERARY STYLE IN ART-CRITICISM.

That which was undertaken in these volumes did not seem to permit of a method that might have proved far more pleasurable both for author and for reader. How can one get down to the roots of anything, so long as he persists in making his chief aim the enjoyment of its flowers? Our libraries are full of treatises upon art appealing to the imagination. The series of volumes which this concludes has been intended to appeal to the understanding. We may exercise imagination and go astray, in case we fail to exercise the understanding also. But so long as we are really using the latter, whether as artists or critics, we are much less likely to go astray, however imaginative. To understand a subject completely, one must be led to analyze it, and to perceive its minutest details. Details that are minute require minuteness in presentation. Your small matter may be as effectually lost in generalities of style as a needle in a dust-heap. Or, as applied to considerations of a broader character, one cannot manifest the coolness needed in a philosophic presentation, through a manner aglow with the heat of fancy; nor accurately balance principles in the scale of argument, when allowing either side of it to be borne up or down by a bias of sentiment.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, xxvi.

LITERATURE AND SERIOUS THOUGHT.

"From time to time," says Oscar Wilde, "the world cries out against some charming, artistic poet, because, to use its hackneyed and silly phrase, he has 'nothing to say.' It is just because he has no new message that he can do beautiful work." Think of the literary prospects of a country or of the world; of the possibility of its receiving any inspiring impulses from its poets at a period when new authors, writing with the acknowledged motives of Dante, Milton, or Wordsworth, would, for this and for no other reason, fail to commend themselves to the leaders of literary opinion!—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, v.

LYRIC (*see also* DRAMATIC, EPIC, REALISTIC).

A lyric represents a movement imparted to the thoughts, but, unlike the condition in a melody, the thoughts of the

lyric appear in definite form. It is these thoughts that, according to their order of sequence, reveal the tendency which impels them.—*Art in Theory*, xvii.

LYRIC CRY.

The term *lyric cry* is often used by critics. What does this indicate except a recognition that, in this form of poetry, the soul, as in the case of one crying out in excitement, is over-mastered by the impulse from within. Yet there is little suggestion that the thought or emotion, as in the epic condition, is absolutely too great to be adequately expressed. There is often a suggestion of the opposite. Judging of the persons who cry loudest, and of the circumstances in which they do so, it might be argued that this form of expression, as a rule, exaggerates the amount and quality of the experience; and this is the condition in dramatic art.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, xix.

LYRIC POETRY (see VERSE AN ELEMENT).

Just as, through a few outlines, a good draughtsman gives us a conception of a whole form, so the lyric poet, through a few words, gives us a conception of a whole series of scenes or events. But in the lyric these few words do more than represent, as in realistic art, what exists or may be supposed to exist. They create something that without them would not exist. They give apprehensible form to impressions made upon thought and feeling. . . . The æsthetic interest awakened by the following is an interest not in any great idea illustrated nor in successive events accurately detailed, but in the *form* which the writer has constructed in order, through it, to represent the particular character of the emotional *effects* which, owing to his own poetic sensibilities, he himself has, or may be supposed to have, experienced.—*Idem*.

MODELS, HUMAN, AND THEORIES OF PROPORTION (see also OBSERVATION vs. THEORY, and SCULPTURE, GREEK).

It is impossible to find rules for guidance which, as used in particular cases, do not constantly need to be authenticated and modified by the facts that can be learned from studying models. All art is the representation of nature. The art that portrays human nature represents that which is, presumably, the highest embodiment of creative intelligence. A man who tries, after no matter how faithful a study of the human form in general, to create such a form

de novo, is in danger of representing his own conceptions to the detriment both of nature and of that creative intelligence which gives human nature its highest significance. As indicated on page 89, a knowledge of proportion can do little more than enable an artist, in the presence of models, to select for portrayal features that are beautiful, and, where these are combined with such as are not, to avoid copying the latter, or, if he must regard them, then, as a result of observation and experience, to correct their defects. To do this last satisfactorily, however, or even to choose a model wisely, requires that an artist's judgment should be regulated by some correct general theory. . . . Such a theory may afford equal aid, too, when one is called upon to form practical or theoretical judgments with reference to mere posture. . . . There is no doubt that, when limbs are arranged so that their combined outlines suggest these like curves, the effect of beauty is enhanced on account largely of their influence in producing effects not only of harmony of outline, but of proportion.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, VIII.

MORALITY, AS INFLUENCED BY ANY ART.

The novel, the drama, the painting, the statue,—all report, with more or less interpretative additions, that which keen observers have been able to perceive, and to reproduce. The legitimate effect of their work is to enlarge the experience of others who have not had the same opportunity, or the same ability to avail themselves of it, that they themselves have had. Whoever enlarges another's experience imparts not only information, but, with it, something of that wisdom which expresses itself in intelligent action. Of course much depends, as has already been intimated, upon the artist through whose mediumship the wider experience has been imparted. He is like a showman who may throw upon a screen whatever sort of picture he may select. At the same time, in making his selection, he can scarcely fail to be influenced by another fact. It is this,—that only in the degree in which men conceive that his thought when assuming form in art is in harmony with thought when assuming form in nature, do they conceive him to be influenced by the spirit in nature to such an extent as to term him inspired. Is there any great artist who does not wish to have his work considered to be of this character?

Or, if an artist be not great, does he not try, at least, to imitate those who are so, and prefer to be considered of their class? If both these questions can be answered in the affirmative, then it must be true that, practically, in the majority of cases, the forces that are working in nature, as most of us believe, for the enlightenment and uplifting of man will continue to be influential in directing toward the same ends the developments of art.—*Essay on Art and Morals*.

Nothing influences the general conceptions of a community more than the specific conceptions suggested by what seems true of its art. This cannot manifest disregard of law without cultivating more or less disregard of the same in life, whether individual, social, political, or religious. There is a connection between thinking that anybody, without any guidance of rules, can write a successful poem, or build a successful house, and fancying that a promoter on Wall Street can disregard the financial laws of the street, and not do something toward bringing on a financial panic; or that a lady of the "Four Hundred" can turn her back upon her poor relations, violating thus the laws of both humanity and hospitality, and not do something toward making them turn their backs upon her, even to the extent, possibly, of causing them to enlist for a socialistic revolution; or that a statesman, trusting to his own personal popularity or eloquence, can ignore the laws of diplomacy and the enactments of his predecessors, and not do something to endanger the peace and prosperity of his country; or that a leader in the Church, under the impression that all that religion needs can be developed from his own unaided self-consciousness, can break away from the laws of form or purpose embodying the historic results of the spiritual life of the past, and not do something to develop from himself the very evils that religion and its methods are intended to prevent.—*Essay on Music as Related to Other Arts*.

Art is one thing, and morality is another thing. A statue, a picture, a drama, or a dance, may be immoral in its influence, and yet artistic. But, in this case, it is seldom artistic in every one of its features. If it were, people would not speak of it, as some invariably do, when referring to products of this character, as "lacking in good taste."—*Essay on Art and Morals*.

MORALITY, AS INFLUENCED BY ARCHITECTURE *see also* ARCHITECTURE, EXPRESSIVE OF CHARACTER *and* SKYSCRAPERS).

Are there any ethical relations of architecture: and if so, are moral principles exemplified in it? Both questions can be answered in the affirmative. Consider, for instance, the modern skyscraper,—the apartment house, hotel, or office building containing twenty or thirty stories. Sociologists point out how objectionable it is morally, as used in residence districts, either for irrepressible children who need more companions out of doors, or for disaffected parents who need fewer of them indoors; and how objectionable physically, as used in business districts, because depriving thousands of sunlight and fresh air, and increasing the nervous strain of life by crowding streets and street-cars, and adding to the labors of business, the greater labor of trying to get in safety, comfort, and health, despite lungs almost suffocated, to and from one's home. But, long before the sociologist had thought of these results, the artist had realized the beauty of a uniform skyline, as in the streets of Paris and the Court of Honor at the Chicago Exposition; and had recognized as well the inexcusable lessening in value, because of depreciation in effectiveness, of every building that another adjoining it is allowed to over-top. So one might go on and give to the principle thus illustrated almost universal applicability.—*Essay on Art and Morals*.

MORALITY, AS INFLUENCED BY DRAMAS (*see* PLAY, DRAMATIC).

As for the other criterion, namely, that art should point a moral, this is accurate so far as it goes; and yet a t, imitative art, must do more than point a moral. Its nature is that of representation, not reasoning; it presents a picture to be perceived, not a problem to be solved; and the representation, the picture, not the reasoning or the solution, is that in it which is of supreme importance.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, xv.

MORALITY, AS INFLUENCED BY POETRY.

Very often passages like this merely add to the impressiveness of the picture conjured before the imagination, and are distinctly within the limits of an appeal to sentiment. For this reason, though having much to do both with influencing conduct and imparting information, they are legitimate to art, because subordinated to its aims.

This is a fact important to recognize. Indeed, the failure to recognize it is one of the artistic mistakes of our own age; and is doing more than any other, perhaps, to prevent art from attaining the rank due to it, as a great instrumentality for the betterment of humanity. In the criticisms in our papers—often, owing to an affectation of æsthetic knowledge, in our religious papers,—one finds an almost universal tendency to discount, and for this reason solely, poetry, painting, and statuary that give any marked evidence of being the product of an earnest, ethical, or religious nature. One reason—though, of course, not by any means the sole reason—why certain of our greater as well as minor pessimistic poets, whose influence is anything but inspiring, are so lavishly praised, is because they give so few indications of having such a nature; and it is certain that many critics of the drama would think twice before imperiling their reputation by objecting to a really artistically constructed play merely because of its immoral tendency. Yet what can be more thoroughly unphilosophical than to gauge artistic ability and taste by an absence of those traits which, in ordinary life, give a man not only character but common sense?—*Idem.*

MORALITY, AS INFLUENCING ART.

We respect a moral man who is a boor; but when there is enough of æsthetics in him to make him also a gentleman, we admire him, and strive to imitate him. We tolerate earnest reformers who, in rowdy mobs, boisterously insult all who differ from them; but most of us connect ourselves with such leaders only as do their work “decently and in order,” in places where they have more or less of refinement in their surroundings. Why cannot this rule be reversed, and art be bettered by its moral quality?—*Essay on Art and Morals.*

Wherever there is anything human, there, too, exists the possibility of immorality. Art is intensely human. But just as the best type of humanity is distinctly moral, so it is with the best type of art. To this rule, dramatic art furnishes no exception. Nor, for a similar reason, does that of the romance or the novel.—*Idem.*

Art, as a pleasurable result, may appeal in a pleasurable way to a man's whole nature; and nothing can do this that,

in any degree, shocks and repels him because recognizing it to have an impure and harmful influence upon thought, feeling, or conduct.—*Idem*.

MUSIC, AND ITS TEACHER.

There are certain principles essential to the very existence of every other higher art, as at present developed, which are traceable to music alone; and no æsthetic influence tends so decidedly as that which it exerts to keep alive, in any department of culture, either a realization in theory or an actualizing in experience of such effects as those of law, thoroughness, accuracy, practise, drill, pleasure in work, or personality in presentation. If what has been said be true, then the music-teacher stands in the very front ranks of those who are leading the armies of culture. Without what he, and he alone, is fitted to contribute, no department of that army can be fully equipped, and all the departments together may fail of their purpose.—*Essay on Music as Related to Other Arts*.

MUSIC, AS AFFECTING POSTURE.

Not until, at least, the rhythm of music—to say nothing of its tune—began to affect the human nerves, did the man begin to dance, and not until he began to dance, did his arrested attitudes begin to emphasize those effects of grace which, perhaps, most clearly differentiate the portrait from the snap-shot photograph and the *genre* painting from the portrait. It is not too much to say, therefore, that some lessons learned from the influence of music upon the human form are illustrated in almost all pictures and statues, whether considered as ends in themselves, or as ornamenting architecture.—*Idem*.

The underlying significance of all straight lines, angles, and curves, whenever or wherever seen, is subtly connected with the expressional uses of the same in the poses assumed by the various limbs of the human body. Man is so limited in outlook, so self-centered in insight, that he is obliged to interpret not only God but all nature and its manifestations in accordance with his own experience and actions. So, indirectly, the same strains of music that cause dancing, and thus tend to the exhibition of gracefulness in the human form, have an influence on the artistic qualities of other of the visible forms that become subjects of art-production.—*Idem*.

MUSIC AS RELATED TO LAW.

The mightiest master of melody and harmony who, as he composes, seems to lose all consciousness of restraint and to give vent to absolutely untrammelled promptings of inspiration, is not one who has risen above the control of rules. He is one who has studied and practised in accordance with them so assiduously that not one cell in his brain can forget them, or break from the habit of fulfilling them. Every musical non-conductor has been, by repeated effort, expelled not only from his conscious but from his unconscious mind. Every nerve in his being vibrates to the touch of harmony, and vibrates according to law.—*Idem*.

MUSIC, CHARACTER OF ITS INFLUENCE.

Music furnishes perhaps the best possible illustration of a fact noticed to be true universally whenever, rising above purely physical conditions, we come to consider forces fitted to affect the mind and soul,—the fact, that it is of more importance to influence the substance of thought than the form of thoughts; of more importance to aim for something giving direction to sentiment than definiteness to statement; in short, that the most profound and lasting effect upon experience is exerted in connection with that which, at the same time, allows the greatest freedom to expression. This principle is illustrated more or less in all the arts. Otherwise they would not merely represent what they have to express; in direct form they would present it. But the principle is especially noticeable in music; and for this reason, probably, the production of it is mentioned so often in the Bible in order to describe symbolically the employment of heaven. Other arts, by words, shapes, or colors, confine thought to some extent; indicating, as they do in no unmistakable way, that of which one should think. Not so with music. It may hold the feelings of a multitude in absolute control; yet, at the same time, it may leave each individual absolutely free to think the thought and to do the deed that is prompted by his individual instincts.—*Art in Theory*, XVIII.

The most powerful mental agency perhaps is music. To those who can appreciate it, it can bring joy or sadness, smiles or tears, long after every other influence has ceased to affect the feelings. Yet music is the most intangible

and spiritual of all the arts. There is nothing to see as in sculpture, no movement to animate as in oratory, no words to inspire as in poetry. One hears sounds only; and these vague sounds are so powerful that a man may be thrilled through and through with . . . whatever thoughts of joy or of sadness may be nearest to the heart of the man who is under its control. The same strains may affect differently the experience of every one who listens to them. It may make a child think of his play, a youth of his school, a merchant of his business.—*Suggestions for the Spiritual Life*, II.

Yet, with all this, it would be an error to think that the mental influence of the art is slight. The story of the men hired to assassinate Stradella, who, after listening to his oratorio in Rome, dropped their weapons and became the saviours of his life, is only one story of a thousand evincing men's belief to the contrary.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, VII.

MUSIC, DRAMATIC.

His (Wagner's) method was first to associate a motive with some person, object, action, or event; and afterward, whenever that with which it was associated appeared upon the stage or was suggested by the language, thought, feelings, or situations, the motive itself was introduced into either the melody of the voice or the harmony of the instrumentation. Not only so, but a certain correspondence was musically indicated between the way in which this was introduced and the relations of the person, object, action, or event to the circumstances attendant upon its introduction.

This method, to those who have familiarized themselves with the motives, causes an opera of Wagner to have a double effect: first, the ordinary musical effect which is due to the development of the melodies and harmonies for their own sakes; and, second, the intellectual effect which is due to connecting each of these motives with that which it suggests, and noticing the way in which it blends with other motives or opposes them. This action on an extended scale, of motive upon motive, is what Wagner meant by dramatic music, and it is in the development of this that he chiefly manifested his originality. It is owing to it, too, that he has obtained such a hold upon his admirers. His method of adapting music to the require-

ments of intellect necessarily adds to it an intellectual interest. In fact, after making all due allowance for those who applaud and apparently enjoy his music for the same reason that they applaud and apparently enjoy anything which is understood to be fashionable, there are certainly many people formerly unable to appreciate anything musical, who have learned to perceive in his works that which they can appreciate, and who, by first coming to take delight in music as developed by him, have come to take an otherwise, for them, impossible interest in all its legitimate forms. Through effects thus exerted Wagner greatly dignified the art to which he devoted himself, as well as extended the sphere of its influence.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music: Music as a Representative Art*, VIII.

MUSIC, HOW REPRESENTATIVE (*see paragraphs concerning music under REPRESENTATION and REPRESENTATIVE*).

Startled by circumstances, the child of nature utters inarticulate cries. These are instinctive in their origin; but are always alike when the mind is influenced by like motives. Therefore men associate them with these motives, for which reason they may be said to be in a true sense representative of them. Availing himself of this fact the artist endeavors to portray in music the effect not of a single feeling, but of an entire current of feelings as set in motion by outside influences. Notice too that all the developments of the art continue as it begins. Notwithstanding the very limited amount of imitation and, in this sense, of comparison that we find in music, nevertheless, a great composer, through introducing only a few imitative notes, may force the mind to connect two things as radically different as, say, a symphony and a landscape. That he may accomplish this end, two conditions are necessary: he must have observed the particular character of the sounds through which the child of nature, and, in some cases, through which the irrational creature, represents particular feelings; and again, he must have been conscious within himself of feelings similarly excited—similar in kind, that is, not in degree—and hence capable of being represented similarly. The two conditions go together. Unless he has observed the forms of expression in natural life, the forms at his command, to be used in his art-product,

will be few in number. Unless he himself has experienced feelings that naturally lead to such expressions, the few forms that he does use will not be used appropriately. They will have little meaning. They will not speak to the universal human heart with the authority of a veritable language of the emotions. In short, we notice what is in exact analogy with the line of thought in the chapters preceding this, namely, that the same conditions which make music representative of human nature or of natural feeling render it representative also of the artist or of the artist's feeling; in other words that to be truly representative of nature, this art must be representative of man also.—*Art in Theory*, XVIII.

MUSIC, ITS GENESIS (*see also* ART FOR ART'S SAKE, POETRY
vs. MUSIC, ETC.).

Music has been traced to humming. But only a slight development of this latter is needed in order to turn it into a song; and a song is not merely the beginning of music, but music. Cannot a man sing without constructing a product external to himself? Certainly he can, and so can a bird; and, if a man could do no more, he could do nothing entitling music to be placed in a class different from that to which, for example, dramatic representation belongs. A melody, in itself considered, is not necessarily, in the finest and most distinctive sense, a natural form made human. Yet it may be this. It is so in the degree in which it is unmistakably a product of the *art* of music. What is such a product? A composition that consists not merely of unstudied subjective expressions in sounds. It is objective. It is a result of labor and practice. Even aside from its usually involving an external writing in musical notation, it is a development of a complicated system of producing notes and scales and chords, not only with the human voice, but with numerous instruments, invented, primarily, so as to imitate every possibility of the human voice, all these working together in accordance with subtle laws of melody and harmony which, as a result of years of experiment, men have discovered and learned to apply. Indeed, almost the slightest musical composing suggests an external product. Simple humming is not only a method of expression for its own sake, but it is a form of nature, of nature as manifested in a man. A symphony

is a development not only of the possibilities of this expression, but of its peculiar form; and it involves, therefore, especially in connection with the necessity for a written score and for manufactured instruments, the existence and elaboration of form such as is possible only to an external product. Notice, too, that to the last detail of this elaboration, there is nothing whatever in the art that is not attributable to the satisfaction which the mind takes in developing the form not for the purpose of attaining an end of material utility, but for the sake of its own intrinsic beauty.—*Art in Theory*, VIII.

MUSIC, ITS LANGUAGE FOR THE MIND.

There is a natural, inarticulated language of the emotions employed by all of us. What reason is there in nature to suppose otherwise than that all its elements might be comprehended and tabulated with sufficient definiteness in a few score of carefully related forms of sound? As it is, even now, every really great composer recognizes the existence of this language and unconsciously applies its principles. Why should they not be formulated so that all men could know them? Why should not the psychological correspondences of music be unfolded with as much definiteness as those of elocution to which in their elements they are analogous? Or, if the formulation of the principles involved would necessitate, as it might, artistic difficulties and dangers impossible to overcome, why, at least, might there not be developed among men such a concurrence of opinion with reference to the principles themselves that the composer would feel constrained, more often than at present, to regard them? And then, in the degree in which they were carried out persistently and accurately, would not the musical world be made familiar with them, and even the unmusical be made, at any rate, to recognize their existence? Were this done we should have no more writers upon æsthetics with outer and inner senses—ears and minds—so dull of perception as to declare that music does not appeal, as do the other arts, to intelligence, or that it is presentative and not representative. It has been abundantly shown here that this view is erroneous; but it would be an advantage to have the recognized conditions of the art clearly reveal the fact. It would be an advantage to have music seen by all in its true position, standing side by side

with poetry, painting, sculpture, and architecture, and representing in just as legitimate a sense as they, its own appropriate phase of the influence which nature exerts not merely upon the auditory nerves—which alone would not account for its spiritual effects—but also upon the mind.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music : Music as a Representative Art*, VIII.

MUSIC, SPIRITUAL EFFECTS OF.

If the mind can ever be affected by color in exactly the same way as by sound, then coloring, like music, may become an art setting in motion the general drift of thought and feeling, but leaving imagination free to formulate what evolves from the drift. Because exerting this kind of influence upon the sources rather than the results of thinking, music never, even when used in worship, tends to dogmatism and bigotry as do, sometimes, the words of hymns, or to idolatry and superstition as do, sometimes, pictures and statues. Its tendencies to a greater extent than those of any of the other arts except, perhaps, architecture, are spiritual and religious. It would be strange if the play of electric light on the stage of the comic opera and the ballet should lead, some day, to a new art—probably of decoration, though possibly of performance—which philosophers would have a right to associate with the distinctively spiritual and religious. But it would not be the first time that the world has had experience of such results. Most of us have heard the same kind of music that summons the wild Indian tribes to a war-dance used to collect the throngs of the Salvation Army; and, if we live long enough, we may hear, in many a Sunday-school, the melody of the “Merry Widow Waltz” inciting to all the virtues. If the teachings of history have not been misinterpreted, we might have had none of the harmony that renders possible the great anthems or masses of the present, had it not been for the Bacchanalian street-airs brought together in rounds, which so distressed the serious minded Plato; or introduced, to relieve, by way of variation, the unisonance of solemn cathedral chants, in disregard of consternation in the souls of the mediæval priests.—*Essay on Music as Related to Other Arts*.

MUSIC vs. POETRY (see also POETRY vs. MUSIC).

It follows from what has been said that, as distinguished from poetry, music should be representative of only such

indefinite and emotive mental effects as can be expressed in unarticulated sounds. This inference suggests, at once, a reason for certain well-known facts with reference to the effects of this art. It shows us, for instance, why the music invariably conceded to rank highest is instrumental; . . . and again, it shows us why it is that all men, well-nigh with unanimity, recognize a superlative sweetness in the midnight serenade. In both cases there is experienced a distinctive effect of sound, and of this only. In connection with the former, there is no distraction from words; in connection with the latter, none from sights.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XXVI.

NATURAL EFFECTS RATHER THAN APPEARANCES REPRODUCED
IN ART (*see also* ART AS MENTAL, *and* REPRESENTATION IN ART *vs.* IMITATION).

But again, are the effects that come from nature traceable to the forms in themselves, or to causes behind the forms? Hardly to the forms in themselves, because, practically considered, as has been shown, neither music, poetry, painting, sculpture, nor architecture involves an exact imitation of forms. At best, art merely reproduces, as will be brought out in Chapter XVI., their effects; and again, because, theoretically considered, in reproducing effects, a stream cannot rise higher than its source. How can powerful influences such as, presumably, stir thought or feeling in the presence of beauty, owe their origin to forms that have no force of any kind—at any rate, no mental or spiritual force behind them?—*Art in Theory*, xv.

The mind itself is a source of thoughts and feelings. These are constantly at work, and the influence of them may often change completely the specific form in which an effect has come from nature. This is a fact, a discussion of which would have greatly enhanced the value of Lessing's celebrated criticism upon the "Laocoön." What is involved in the fact may be made clear by an illustration. Suppose a man to have listened to the story of a battle. It might be presumed that a representation of what he has heard would also assume the form of a story, and therefore be artistically expressed in a poem. But often the effect of the story upon his imagination, as also of his imagination upon it, is such that what is experienced can be represented truthfully only through a picture. Again, it happens

sometimes that the forms through which the effects have been exerted, have lingered so long in his mind, and experienced so many modifications there that, though critical analysis may detect, as in architecture and music, that the effects produced have been suggested by forms in nature, the artist himself is unconscious of what these forms were.—*Idem*, XVI.

NATURAL EFFECTS REPRODUCED IN ART (*see* ART AS MENTAL).

In poems and dramas, the characters represented, although Homeric gods or Miltonic angels, speak and act in ways showing that the artist's ideas concerning them have been modeled upon forms natural to men and women of the earth. Even in music and architecture, the principle holds good, though in a more subtle sense. There would be no melodies if it were not for the natural songs of men and birds or for what are called "the voices of nature"; nor would there be buildings were there not in nature rocks and trees furnishing walls and columns and water-sheds, to say nothing of the innumerable forms suggested by the trunks, branches, leaves, flowers, and other natural figures which architectural details unmistakably imitate. In a word—to repeat what was said before—the effects of art are not what they are because they are *unnatural*. On the contrary, they all do no more than *remake, reproduce, reshape, rearrange, reapply, recombine, represent* appearances that nature first supplies.—*Art in Theory*, I.

The first condition of art is an audible or visible form; and this form is always a reproduction, at least partially, of something perceived in nature, which term is to be understood as including not only non-human but human nature, as manifested in a man's actions and utterances. It follows, therefore, that, in some way, one must always associate with nature whatever thoughts and emotions he puts into artistic form. Otherwise, he could not attribute to nature any possibility of representing these; he could not suppose that, by using natural forms as he does, he could suggest his thoughts and emotions to others.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, I.

Whenever we term a product of art "natural," and argue that, because it is so, it is artistically effective, we include in the term "natural" a conception both of form and of conditions which precede and determine form. For in-

stance, we all recognize that the events portrayed in a drama or a novel are effective in the degree in which they are natural to the conditions that lead up to them, *i. e.*, to the causes occasioning them.—*Idem*, XII.

NATURAL FORMS AS THE AGENTS OF EXPRESSION.

At every stage of intellection, a man is forced to use the forms of the material world in order to represent his mental processes. Otherwise they could not be perceived clearly nor understood intelligently even by himself, and much less by others to whom he wishes to communicate them. Take any one of the more important of the emotions that actuate us and we shall recognize this fact. Take that experience in some of the manifestations of which religious people believe that a man most resembles the Unseen One. Think how love, which is begotten often in a single glance, and is matured in a single thrill, gives vent to its invisible intensity. How infinite in range and in variety are those material forms of earth and air and fire and water which are used by a man as figures through which to represent the emotion within him! What extended though sweet tales, what endless repetitions of comparisons from hills and valleys, streams and oceans, flowers and clouds, are made to revolve about that soul which, through the use of them endeavors to picture in poetry spiritual conditions and relations which would remain unrevealed but for the possibility of being thus indirectly symbolized! Nor is it man alone who is obliged to use the forms of material nature in order to reveal the workings of his spirit. He himself does this only, as it were, by way of imitation; only because he partakes of the nature and therefore must follow the methods of the Creative Spirit to which all men and all material nature owe their origin. If what has been said be true of the expression of human love, why should not the Great Heart whose calm beating works the pulses of the universe express divine love through similar processes evolving infinitely and eternally into forms not ideal and verbal, but real and tangible—in fact, into forms which we term those of nature?

Do we not all, subtly, at least, believe in the two statements just made? Do we not believe that material nature furnishes the representative implements through which a man creates language, and that it furnishes also the actual implements through which the Creative Spirit produces

a language speaking, though in a less articulate and distinct way, to our thoughts and emotions?—*Psychology of Inspiration*, VI.

This is the question with which, wittingly or unwittingly, poetry and poetic faith always have confronted and always must confront merely natural science and scientific skepticism.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, XXVIII.

NATURE, REPRESENTATION OF, ESSENTIAL TO ART.

Forms of natural expression—intonation, speech, drawing, coloring, constructing—just at the point where most satisfactory as means of communicating thought and feeling, lack something that art needs. What is this? It is not difficult to tell. . . . They lack that which can be given, in connection with expression, by the reproduction of the effects of nature. Penmanship and hieroglyphics lack the appearances of nature that are copied in painting and sculpture. Prose lacks the figures of speech and descriptions that in poetry are constantly pointing attention to the same appearances; and, as shown in the last chapter, even the elements subsequently developed into music and architecture lack traces of a very keen observation and extensive use of effects in nature which would not need to be observed or used at all, were the end in view attainable by the mere communication of thought or feeling. Were communication the aim of any art, the elaboration of the forms of nature would cease at the point where it became sufficient for this purpose.—*Art in Theory*, v.

NATURE, REVELATION OF ITS LAWS BY POETS AND ARTISTS.

A philosophical botanist—to say nothing of a poet like Wordsworth—will have scores of thoughts suggested to him by a scene in nature, which would never occur to most of us. Now these scenes in nature,—what are they? They are visible representations of the life and methods at the source of nature. They are illustrations, through the appearances and operations of nature, of what we mean when we speak of divine laws, principles, and truths. I think that everyone admits that one of the chief missions to the world of great poetic and artistic minds, like those of Dante, Angelo, Shakespeare, Raphael, and Goethe, is that they interpret rightly these laws, principles, and truths.—*Essay on Teaching in Drawing*.

NATURE, TRUTH TO, NOT ALL THAT ART NEEDS.

We are constantly hearing it asserted that, if anything portrayed in art be "true to nature," this fact is a sufficient warrant for its reproduction—in plays or pictures, for instance—and, sometimes, a trustworthy test of its excellence. In connection with this assertion, those who—mainly, as is supposed, for moral reasons—object to some of the practical results of applying the theory involved in it are usually represented to be victims of ignorance or bias which they would not manifest had they been sufficiently cultivated æsthetically. According to the conclusions reached in this volume, nothing could be more at variance with the truth than such assertions and representations. Our whole argument tends to show that the mere fact that effects are "true to nature" by no means justifies their use in art of high quality. They can be used in this so far only as, in the first place, they are in themselves beautiful, and, in the second place, are, aside from themselves, suggestive, or capable of being made suggestive, of the artist's thought and feeling. Ugliness and vileness are never beautiful in themselves, though, at times, some feature manifesting them may enhance, by way of contrast, the beauty of some other feature which they are introduced in order to offset. When they form the sole theme of paintings, statues, novels, or dramas, as, unfortunately, is the case in many products of many men greatly praised in our own time,—their names need not be mentioned,—the result is opposed to the first principles of æsthetics still more than of ethics.—*The Essentials of Æsthetics*, XVIII.

NOVEL, INFLUENCE OF THE MODERN.

When we recall the Puritanism, the bigotry, and the sectarianism of the last century, we cannot fail to contrast them with the humaneness and the liberality of thought and feeling prevailing in our own times; and, if we ask what has wrought the change, we are forced to ascribe it, very largely, to the influence of the modern novel. Through portrayals of people entirely different in motives, manners, customs, and characters from those with whom the novel's readers have associated, these readers have been enabled to become well acquainted with conditions of thought and of life foreign to their own. The effect has been to broaden their knowledge of the world and of human nature, and to increase

almost infinitely their sympathies with men of "all sorts and conditions." In other words the novel has given millions of people whose real experience, perhaps, has been necessarily confined to the narrow limits of a single village, a substitute in the way of an imaginative experience almost as effective as anything obtained by actual travel. That one normal result of such an imaginative experience is to purify mind and heart through developing wisdom and charity has been proved by the effects which can unmistakably be traced to this form of literature.—*Art in Theory, Appendix III.*

NOVEL, ITS REFORMATORY INFLUENCE.

It is less the influence of the pulpit than of the novel that in our own land, within the memory of some still living, has not only freed the slave and unfrocked the aristocrat, but has snatched the standards of sectarianism from the hands of hypocrites and bigots, and restored for all the Church the one standard of Constantine, and that one not held up by the hands of man, but flaming in the sky.—*Essay on Art and Education.*

NUDE ART.

As applied to the human figure, and to the expression, through every part of it, of some special phase of significance, it is apparent that certain legitimate deductions from this principle are often ignored. When this is said, it must be said also, if we are to deal with the subject with perfect truth, that they are ignored almost as much in certain disguising concealments of the form characterizing some of the customs of civilization, as in certain disenchanting exposures of it characterizing some of the conventionalities of art. Viewing the subject not with the prejudice which supposes that whatever is, is necessarily right, and therefore finds fault with straight skirts on a woman merely because others are wearing hoops, and with knickerbockers on a man merely because others are wearing pantaloons; but viewing the subject in a rational way, it may be said that the human form just as it is, is God-made, whereas human clothing is man-made; and that the latter, even though it drag for yards behind the feet, especially if with just enough exposure to suggest a possibility of more exposure, may be in its tendency less humanizing, in a good sense, than a garb dis-

closing enough, at least, to allow free and natural expression to the soul within. The Hebrew priest was told to sprinkle the blood of a sacrificial victim—representing life that was innocent and therefore spiritual—on the vessels of the temple every time that he had occasion to use them. The people were thus taught that nothing in the world that is material, not even a consecrated implement of the sanctuary, is sacred except when made to represent the presence of spiritual life. Much less is the material clothing of human figures sacred. One might argue that it can never represent spiritual life quite as well as when it faithfully reveals the general outlines of the form which the creative power designed that spiritual life on earth should have. Or—to examine the subject in the light of its practical effects—what artist ever represented a wanton in the scanty short skirts and bare feet of a peasant? What man, so far as form in dress could affect him, would not be conscious of more kindly, tender, generous, and protective impulses awakened in him by the simple clothing of the latter, or of a young girl just entering her teens, than by the trailing silks and laces of the former? This much for one of the many mistakes of civilization. No influence is more indirectly exalting than beauty, and no beauty ought to be more exalting than that of the human form. To veil it wholly, as the Oriental women do their faces, may impair the charm of life not only, but its chastity. When much that is concealed, might, if revealed, put an end both to legitimate curiosity and to purely æsthetic desires, might it not also put an end to much that, when developed, reinforces desires of a less worthy nature? It is certainly a question whether in such cases, complete satisfaction would not often accompany that which satisfied merely the eye. The Japanese, familiar from childhood with an almost total exposure of the form, and notwithstanding traditionally low standards of conventional morality, are believed by themselves, and by others who have studied them, to be, absolutely considered, more moral by nature, in that they are less prone to morbid and soulless forms of indulgence, than are the Europeans. Is not one proof of this—as it certainly is a proof of the delicacy of their sense of propriety and, for that matter, of beauty—afforded by the fact that, in their higher art, complete nudity is never depicted? So much for a mistake of

conventional fashion. Now a few words with reference to a mistake in an opposite direction made by conventional art. The true principle in art is that it should represent life, and, if dealing with human life, should represent that which is in the highest sense humanizing. But that which is in the highest sense humanizing gives principality to mental and spiritual suggestions, and keeps others subordinate. Can this be said to be done when parts of the body, which even barbarians conceal, are exposed, in conditions, as sometimes happens in modern art, so different from those of natural life that one is forced to the inference that they are exposed for the sole purpose of exposure? In answer to this we are referred to Greek art. But Greek art was true to the conditions of Greek life. The legitimate deduction is that our art should be true to the conditions of our life. . . . The truth is that, in this, as in every other practical possibility, there is no end worth seeking, whether it be the representation of human sentiment or of skill in workmanship, that cannot be attained without going to extremes. When one thinks of this fact, and of the liability, if it be disregarded, of having art lower its aims, or if not this, having it antagonize, through creating false impressions of its aims, thousands of those in special need of its influence,—in other words, when one thinks how much might be gained to the world, and how little can be lost, by applying in this sphere the same common sense that all men are expected to apply in other spheres, it certainly seems strange that those who wish to make the most of art should pursue a course, in either criticism or production, fitted really to make the least of it. —*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, vii.

A friend of mine once met, on a Pacific steamship, a Japanese fresh from his own country who represented himself as greatly shocked by some framed photographs of European works of art of excessive disrobement which he had observed hanging in the Captain's cabin. "Why?"—said my friend to him. "It is only what one can see almost every day in the life of your own land." "We have it in life," replied the Japanese, "but we don't thrust it upon attention, and, by elaborating it in our art, make a public confession of how much we have been thinking and feeling about it." It is well to observe that this representative of the most artistic of living races was not influenced by ethics

but by æsthetics,—by the requirements merely of delicate instinct and good taste.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, XVIII.

OBSCURITY, LITERARY, WHEN EXCUSABLE (*see also*
ELLIPSIS).

Frequently, the difference between the artistic and scientific method might be said to be owing merely to the different degrees of rapidity with which the thoughts are moving. This fact will be evident upon recalling the condition usually accompanying the mind's imaginative and, therefore, partially subconscious actions. It will be found to be a condition of emotive excitement. Listen to the children as they watch a display of fireworks. With what facility they recognize resemblances! Roosters, churches, fans, and fountains,—these are what they imagine to be in shapes suggesting nothing to their parents. Yet when some excitement strong enough to appeal to these latter has succeeded in moving them, they, too, will become unexpectedly imaginative. As for the intelligent artist, there is reason to suppose that imaginative results in his case, also, are owing to mental action too rapid for him to be conscious of all its processes. This fact, indeed, is often very effectively represented in artistic products, especially in literature, the words of which are particularly fitted to reveal exactly what is taking place in the thoughts to which the words give expression. Recall the ellipses and consequent obscurity in which writers like Carlyle and Browning indulge. In almost every instance where obscurity of this kind is observable, some additional reflection would have enabled the writer to recall and to reveal the missing links of thought, and thus to give his expressions the effects of careful precision. In many cases we may criticize his not doing this. But had he done it in all cases, would the result have been as artistic as it is? Thus expressed, would it not have represented a conception in all of its details clearly present to the conscious mind? But art, as we have found, represents a conception of a part of which the mind is conscious and of a part of which, owing to the rapidity of its processes, the mind is not conscious. Thus this effect of obscurity, so often recognized as being for some vague reason particularly artistic, is seen to be so because it accords exactly with the requirements of art.—*Idem*, III.

OBSCURITY, LITERARY, WHEN INEXCUSABLE.

The conclusions that have been reached thus far concur in serving to prove that poetry as an art must have form, the very sounds of the single and consecutive words of which must represent the phases and movements, physical, intellectual, or emotional, of which they are supposed to be significant; and it has been shown that great poets like Shakespeare, Spenser, and Milton are great masters of representative expression in this sense. It follows from these facts that there is no artistic warrant for producing effects of sound through insertion, transposition, alteration, omission, or other use of words, that by violating the laws of grammar or lexicography obscures the meaning. . . . This statement agrees not only with the most recent deductions of physiological æsthetics, but also with those of common sense. The test of form in every case is its fitness to represent, at least clearly, if not, as it sometimes should, brilliantly, every line and color, every phase and movement, every fact and suggestion of the ideas to be expressed. If this test be borne in mind, there can still be plenty of poetic failures from lack of poetic ideas, but no failures from a mere lack of the very easily obtained knowledge of the rudimentary principles of poetic technique.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, XIV.

OBSERVATION.

To whatever art we look, in the degree in which a work rises toward the highest rank, it continues to train our powers of observation. One difference between the great poet, for instance, and the little poet is in those single words and phrases that indicate accuracy in the work of ear or eye, or of logical or analogical inference. Recall Tennyson's references to the "gouty oak," the "shock-head willow," the "wet-shod alder." . . . Now can you tell me any study for the young that will cultivate accuracy of observation, that will begin to do this, as can be done by setting them tasks in drawing, coloring, carving, or, if we apply the same principle to the ear as well as to the eye, in elocution and music?—*Essay on Art and Education*.

OBSERVATION, ACCURACY OF, IMPORTANT.

When a fire threatens several places in a street, when a ship seems about to strike another in a storm or fog, when a general is about to meet an enemy upon land on which there

are a few knolls or houses, then that man is apt to be the most efficient who, in the briefest glance, can perceive most clearly the largest number of conditions and possibilities. So in the scientific world, the successful botanist is he who notices with most accuracy every turn of line or color that distinguishes one leaf or limb from another; the successful physician is he who is keen enough not to leave out of his diagnosis a single one of the small and, apparently, insignificant symptoms that separate one disease from other diseases. To be able to observe is equally important in less serious circumstances. I once had a servant in my house who apparently never failed to hear anything said in no matter how low a tone, or to see anything left in no matter how hidden a place. All the members of the household were inclined to feel that, with her about, they were leading rather too conspicuous a life. But when she gave way to another servant, who apparently could hear or see nothing, a cry for help seemed constantly going up that the help for which we were paying never supplied. . . . Hundreds of similar instances might be cited, all illustrating the importance of cultivating, when deficient, habits of observation. All habits, as we know, are cultivated best in childhood. Nothing tends to cultivate accuracy in the perception of every phase of form, as does the effort to draw or to color it. —*Essay on Teaching in Drawing.*

OBSERVATION *vs.* THEORY AS AN ART-METHOD (*see also* MODELS).

Though induction, as a philosophic method, was not formulated till the time of Bacon, it has been practised ever since the origin of the human mind; and in every period of high attainment it has been practised extensively. Nor does the history of art furnish any exception to this statement, though, at many different periods, certain works have been produced in large numbers on the supposition that mere theories of form, originally derived, of course, from nature, but finally held independently of it, could be substituted for continued and careful observation. We find such works among the remains of the arts of Egypt and Assyria, as well as of Greece prior to the time of Dædalus. We find them in the painting and sculpture of the primitive Christians, and of the Middle Ages. We find them in the conventional flowers and leaves wrought into the decorations of the earlier Gothic cathedrals. We find them in many of

the figures and landscapes of the arts of China and Japan; and we find them in designs for illustrations of books and for ornamentations on walls, even in elaborately wrought products of the decorative and what is termed the decadent art of our own day; but we find them in the foremost products of no age or style in which art is acknowledged to have been at its best.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, VII.

OPERA, ITS EFFECTS NOT ALL THOSE OF ART.

What operatic company is successful in our own country in case it contain no preëminent solo-singer? And, aside from the parts in which the music is sufficient unto itself, what does the opera furnish save a species of intellectual dissipation rather than of recreation; save effects that, on account of their variety, are distracting rather than restful,—effects in which there is very little influence resembling that of the “still, small voice” which thrills us when listening to the song of the family circle or to the “pure music” of the concert room, or when reading a beautiful poem or listening to an eloquent address? All parts of the opera furnish changes from ordinary thoughts and occupations; and all changes have their charms. But something more than the effect of mere change must be produced before one can experience that distinctively æsthetic influence which cultivated minds know to be the result of the highest art.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XXVI.

Songs and operas are often enjoyed immensely by persons to whom music as music is a sealed art. Their pleasure in the song is similar to that which attends the utterance of very rhythmical poetry; and in the opera, the gaudy playhouse, the gayly dressed people, the glittering stage, and the movements of the actors are all entertaining on their own accounts. A real musician, however, frequently regards everything of this sort as a distraction; and he enjoys the music connected with it just as much—sometimes more—when the words used on the stage are in a foreign language which he does not understand, or when the harmony is played, apart from either words or scenery, by an orchestra in a concert.—*Idem*, XXVI.

ORATION, FORM OF ONE AS A WHOLE.

An experienced public speaker, unless in a time of unusual excitement, begins his address with his body at rest, with his

tones uttered deliberately, with the pitch of his voice one that is natural to conversation, and with the range of his thoughts not raised much above the level of those of his hearers. In other words, he starts where the audience are, with no more of vehemence, rapidity, or brilliancy than is justified by the condition of thought in their minds at the time. He begins in the plane of ordinary, dignified intercourse, making no statement with which he has not reason to suppose that most of them will agree. But as he advances, his gestures, tones, language, and ideas gradually wax more and more energetic, striking, and original, till he reaches his climax. In the oration, perfect in form, intended to produce a single distinct and definite impression, this final climax, though often preceded by many another of less importance, stands out preëminently in advance of them. In it all the man's powers of action and of language, and the influence of all his separate arguments that now for the last time are summed up into a unity, seem to be concentrated like rays of light in a focus, and flashed forth for the enlightenment or bewilderment of those before him. But the most artistic oration does not end with the climax. At least, a few sentences and sentiments follow this, through which the action, voice, and ideas of the speaker gradually, gracefully, and sympathetically descend to bear the thoughts of his audience back again to the plane from which they started. That is to say, the artistic oration has an end as well as a beginning and a middle. It is a representation in complete organic form of the whole range of experience natural to discussion, from the time when a subject is first broached in ordinary conversation to the time when, having been argued fully and in such ways as to produce a single effect, the mind in exhaustion sinks back, once more, to the level of the conversation that suggested it.—*The Genesis of Art-Form*, VI.

ORATORY, ARTIFICIALITY IN (*see also* ELOCUTION TEACHERS).

Artificiality, in speaking, invariably results from paying attention, and, therefore, giving importance to something that should be treated as if of little or no importance.—*Essay on Elocution in the Theological Seminary*.

ORATORY AS DISTINGUISHED FROM POETRY.

Oratory involves some of the representative characteristics not only of elocution but also—and here it is at one

with rhetoric—of poetry. Like the latter, both oratory and rhetoric result in an external product. But, counteracting this latter fact, is another which causes both to differ not only from the dramatic art but equally from music, poetry, painting, sculpture, and architecture. It is the fact that, at its best, neither public address nor rhetoric is attributable, as we have found to be true of the effects of these arts, to the satisfaction derived from elaborating a form of expression as a thing of beauty aside from an end of utility. Oratory invariably springs from a desire to influence, in certain definite directions, the thoughts and feelings of those to whom it is addressed. This fact makes its rhetoric differ from poetry no less than its delivery does from acting. Anything that attracts attention merely to the manner of expression, to form as form, is injurious both to oratory and to rhetoric *per se*. But it is often essential to the effects of the actor and the poet.—*Art in Theory*, IX.

ORATORY, EXPRESSIVE OF WILL.

Emotion influencing mainly the feelings, leads to music; influencing the thoughts to poetry; influencing the will to oratory. The orator strives to give expression to feelings or thoughts not for the sake of their own intrinsic worth or beauty, but for their influence upon others. As already pointed out, oratory is not so much an æsthetic as a practical art. As soon as the speaker loses all hope of causing others to agree with him, he ceases to harangue them.—*Idem*, XIX.

ORATORY OF WENDELL PHILLIPS.

The orator who, with the least appearance of effort, could produce the most satisfactory effects both of time and of modulation was Wendell Phillips. He could measure off his rhythm without any suggestion of monotony in recurrence; and could pass over all the notes of two octaves so subtly that half of his audience would be willing to take oath that he had not varied his intonations by more than two or three intervals. If a natural effect be the perfection of art, then he was the most artistic elocutionist of his day.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XXIII.

ORATORY, ONE SECRET OF SUCCESS IN IT.

The late Dr. Tyng, formerly rector of St. George's Church, New York, said that the secret of his success as a

public speaker was his imagining everyone before him to be a numskull to whom every little statement must be explained.—*Essay on the Function of Technique*.

ORATORY *vs.* CONVERSATION (*see* ELOCUTIONARY).

When a man turns from conversation to public address, he has departed from the conditions of nature; and unless he have that rare artistic temperament which enables exceptional minds to recognize instinctively the new relationships and proportionments, each to each, of the elementary elements of expression, he cannot restore these conditions except as he acquires skill through following the directions of some instructor who has such a temperament.

Successfully changing private speech into public speech involves much the same process as turning a bug into a bird through the use of a microscope. If you merely put one edge of the glass over his head, or tail, or wing, this appears too large for the rest of his body. Only when you hold your microscope so as to magnify every part of him alike is the result natural. When a man begins to talk in public, he necessarily departs from the conditions of nature by using a louder and higher tone and more breath. As a result, he feels a tendency, at the end of every long sentence, to lessen his force, lower his pitch, and cease to vocalize all his breath. But if he yield to this tendency, which now, as you notice, has, in the changed conditions, become what, in one sense, may be termed natural, he produces, as in what is called the ministerial tone, a series of intonations entirely different from those which, in a far more important sense, can be termed natural.—*Essay on the Function of Technique*.

ORIGINALITY AND ECCENTRICITY (*see* STANDARDS *and* TASTE).

Every schoolboy, musing on the genius of his recitation room, believes originality, and this in the sense, too, of eccentricity, to be not alone the essential but almost the only requisite for success in art. All general beliefs are based upon truths. This belief is based upon the requirement that the artist must be able to make the forms of nature after which he models conform to his individual mentality. If art were nature, it would not be art; and the only possible distinction between the two which can be determined by the conceptions embodied is that the one is characteristic of the mind of the Creator, and the other equally so of the mind of man. Now one whom the world esteems

"a character," and with whom therefore it associates an essential capacity for characterization, is, *par excellence*, a man whose individuality is distinct and definite. The characteristic effects are sometimes produced by traits that are merely eccentric. But whatever may produce them, they are apt to render any individualization of nature that he attempts, distinct and definite. Therefore, the artist and the eccentric character have something in common; and the boy's mistake in judging of the genius of his school, is only that which is common with his elders,—namely, that of taking something to be everything.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XIV.

Another thought is suggested. The tendencies to imitation on the one side and to eccentricity on the other, which have been said to characterize the developments of art where there is no belief in approximately definite standards, is connected with a false conception of what constitutes that originality which everybody acknowledges to be essential to great art. It is the conception that originality is a constituent of mere form. Originality of course is a characteristic of form, in which alone it can be manifested; but the artistic originality which men mean to applaud when they speak of it, is originality of form as expressive of significance, originality that is felt to be a manifestation of mental freshness and uniqueness, therefore of what we term—including in our conceptions both the intellectual and the spiritual—personal force. That it is this force issuing from the sources of the soul to which men mean to refer when praising originality, needs no further proof than that the trait which they praise is not always prevented by imitation of form, nor always helped by eccentricity of form. An actor can show his personal originality by imitating; and a very bashful man can entirely hide his by eccentricity. Notice, too, that the argument against the existence of standards of art founded on the supposition that they may interfere with originality has, for the reasons just stated, no basis in fact. To make external forms conform to a standard is not to interfere with the expression of the originality which is of the soul and mind. Through an application of identical methods, one may give an elocutionary education to two men, making the voices of both equally musical and their movements equally

graceful. Yet the method as carried out in the forms manifested by the one may make him a great and original actor, and the personality behind the forms manifested by the other may result in no greatness or originality whatever. At the same time, the first man, with all the original bent of his genius, could not have become the great artist that he is, without learning to conform his representation to the standards of his art.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, XXVI.

ORIGINALITY, ARTISTIC.

After all, the difficulty, in our age, is not to find new methods of producing genuinely artistic effects, but to find artists with sufficient originality to recognize their possibilities. Nor is there a surer way in which they may be led to realize them than through coming to know and feel and embody in their products the principle that all art, even constructively considered, should be representative.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XVIII.

ORIGINALITY IN ARCHITECTURE (*see* ARCHITECTURE, MODERN).

As has been suggested, proportion, in its character, is not only simple but complex, and its effects cannot be produced on a large scale without the most careful and profound study. These effects, too, are still capable of further development. The forms of Greek, Gothic, Moorish, Romanesque, or Renaissance art have no more exhausted the possibilities of architecture than analogous developments in poetry, painting, or music. In this land and age, we can, and should, have an architecture of our own, to meet the requirements of our climate, as the Greek may not; of our customs, as the Gothic may not; and of our artistic instincts, as the Queen Anne may not. Such an architecture can be thoroughly original, yet if, in trying to make it so, we neglect the principles according to which the minds that are to view it must judge of it, we cannot expect it to commend itself to general approval, even in our own times, and much less in coming times. Whatever may be the nature of his designs, the architect who deals with shapes must remember that shapes fill space just as sounds fill time, and that for the purposes of art the appearances of similarly related measurements in the one are as necessary as in the other. In short he must never forget that which it has been found necessary

to repeat so many times already, that the fundamental principle in art is to group sizes as well as shapes by putting together those that, if not as wholes, in parts at least, can be made to seem alike.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, XIII.

When a style is just beginning to be developed, a builder, having learned nothing from his own experience or that of others, necessarily makes mistakes. His work is the expression of his thought. It is original; but not always artistic. Much later on, in the development of the style, precisely the opposite condition is found. The highest conception of the builder seems to be that his forms should be modeled—not partly, which would be unobjectionable, but entirely,—upon those of preceding buildings, ancient or modern. These preceding buildings are either wholly copied by him, in which case the new product is a mere imitation; or else several different buildings are copied in part and in part combined with other forms that he originates; in which case, because the method in accordance with which such forms as he combines were brought together by the earlier architects is not known, often not even studied, his new product is incongruous. Its effects are produced with too little regard for the considerations which must have influenced those who produced the original forms which are imitated—namely, the requirements of the design of the building and of the eye and mind as affected by great natural laws like those of propriety, proportion, and symmetry.—*Art in Theory*, III.


ORNAMENT IN ARCHITECTURE (*see* ARCHITECTURE, FRAUD IN).

All appropriate ornamentation, as brought out in "Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts," is the result of an adaptation of means to ends. A roof, for instance, is a necessary conclusion in the case of every erection designed for shelter; but towers or turrets are not. Upon a hillside or elevation, a tower may indicate a view; but what is its meaning in a valley or surrounded by a forest? Over a public building a dome may suggest a hall beneath, too lofty and too vast to enable it to afford support to an ordinary roof; but of what is it significant in a private house? In connection with a mosque or church, a minaret or spire may recall a "call to prayer," or suggest a bell or even the heaven above; but who can understand the con-



Cologne Cathedral—Façade

*See pages 4, 9, 10, 15, 19, 73, 81-85, 89, 91, 162, 223-225,
316, 323-327*



nection between these suggestions and a warehouse?—*The Representative Significance of Form*, xxiv.

The representing of a material less difficult to work in material which is more difficult, is usually considered essential to the highest artistic success. While it is deemed appropriate, for instance, to make a stone building represent, as in the case of the Greek temple, noticed on page 376, a wooden building, it is not deemed so to make a wooden building represent a stone one, or to make a wooden balustrade look like a brass one, or stamped paper look like bronze.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, xxi.

The spire of a church enables strangers to know where to find a place of worship. But in part, also, especially as it has been developed, it is monumental and ornamental. For this reason, care should be taken to have it appear not essentially cheaper than the edifice to which it is attached. As a rule, a stone church should have a stone steeple, not a wooden one. On large public buildings, again, such as schools and colleges, a cupola, or any like arrangement, can accomplish a useful purpose. It can serve for a clock tower, belfry, or observatory. But if it cannot do this, it would generally better be omitted. The same can be said of towers on houses situated in city streets, where they are overtopped by surrounding buildings, or placed in positions where they themselves need not be seen from a distance, or where other things need not be seen from them; that is to say where there is no possible use to which they can be put. Only where architecture, which is a development of that which is useful in building, turns into ornamental features things primarily intended to be of use, is it carrying out the principles of representative art. When it is doing anything else, as in arbitrarily introducing unnecessary features in order thus to obtain something that can be made ornamental, it is in danger of carrying out no principles of art whatever.—*Idem*, xix.

PAINT, EXCESS OF, IN PICTURES.

When we look at a picture in which the drawing or coloring is defective, causing disproportion in the parts, unatmospheric sharpness of outline, absence of shadowy gradation—above all, a predominating impression of paint everywhere—the effect is exactly like that of powder and

rouge on a woman's face. It is impossible to see any soul through or past the form.—*Essay on Art and Education*.

PAINTERS, IF GREAT, ARE USUALLY DISCOVERERS.

With scarcely an exception, the greatest painters seem to have attained to fame almost as much on account of their discoveries as of their productions, the inspiration to investigation having apparently proved the surest stimulus to invention. At least, it can be said that the two tendencies have gone hand in hand; and undoubtedly the frequent temporary decline of painting, as of every art, immediately after great achievements, has been attributable in part to the supposition of men of genius that all its secrets had been discovered,—a supposition which has caused them to turn from it to pursuits like philosophy, science, or politics, which seemed at the time to promise a more certain reward for original effort.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, XVII.

PAINTING (*see* COLOR, HARMONY OF COLOR, REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS OF COLORS).

"PAINTING, SCULPTURE, AND ARCHITECTURE AS REPRESENTATIVE ARTS," ANALYSIS OF THE BOOK.

(*Recapitulation:*) In the volume entitled "Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts," first through an analysis of the elements of visible representation, it is shown that large size or deep shading in certain features, when connected with the opposite in other features, suggests, whether in landscapes, figures, or buildings, either conceptions or surroundings characterized by such traits as heaviness, strength, immobility, influence, or nearness; and, again, that outlines formed by the continuity of curves, and also those manifesting irregularity, suggest the normal and natural in landscapes, and the free and unconstrained in figures, whereas straightness, angularity, and regularity suggest the abnormal and artificial, as in effects of volcanic action in nature, of self-conscious and constrained action in men, and of rectangularity in buildings and in most other human constructions. In unfolding this subject, the principles shown to underlie other forms of visible representation are applied to a complete system of expressing thoughts and emotions through the shapes, postures, gestures, and facial movements of the human

body. Following this, comes a discussion of the representative significance of the different colors.

The concluding part of the book treats of the representation of mental conceptions and also of material surroundings in compositions as wholes; first, in landscape, portrait, genre, historic, allegoric, and symbolic painting and sculpture, and, after this, in architecture. In discussing this latter art, it is shown that the constructive conception, as well as the plan, can be represented in the interior and exterior of a building; and, in a series of illustrations presenting various huts and tents as constructed by the natural man side by side with columns, pediments, entablatures, arches, roofs, and spires of perfected art, it is shown that the latter are developed from the former through a picturesque and statuesque and, in this sense, representative motive.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, xxvi.

PAINTING *vs.* DECORATIVE ART (*see also* DECORATIVE).

We may be sure that any theory true as applied to one art is in analogy to that which is true of every other art of the same class; and I, for one, refuse to take from the art of painting its right to be classed among the other higher arts. Why does it rank with the humanities, and not with the merely decorative arts?—why, but because its products so distinctively give expression to human thought,—in other words, so unmistakably suggest significance?—*Essay on Art and Education*.

PAINTING *vs.* LANDSCAPE GARDENING (*see* LANDSCAPE GARDENING.)

When we recall what an inartistic impression is frequently conveyed by the reproducing in a picture of a highly cultivated park, or of a gentleman's homestead,—the house architecturally correct, and the avenues leading to it as clearly drawn as the lines of a geometric figure,—then we may understand with some definiteness what is meant by confounding the conceptions to be expressed in landscape-gardening and in painting. Both ought to represent, as all art should, the effects of nature at first hand; but, in the case of pictures such as those just mentioned, there is danger that the main impression conveyed will be of the effects upon nature of some man, of some landscape-artist. And reflection will convince us that this is the reason—certainly a suf-

ficient one—why such pictures often appear inartistic. They manifest, to too great an extent, the influence of a method of representation appropriate to another art.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XXVII.

PAINTING *vs.* POETRY, COMPARISON AND CONTRAST IN EACH
(*see also* CONTRAST, and POETIC DESCRIPTION).

The difference in painting between high and ordinary art is revealed in the contrast between the picture and nature. In passing through the mediumship of the man, that which came from nature has been changed. Each change has been wrought by an idea, and all the changes together indicate a contrast between what nature really is and the artist's idea of what it might be. Here, at the very beginning of the mental tendency that is represented in painting, we have a beginning of that principle of contrast that enters so largely into the painter's success when using, in a merely technical way, the elements of light and shade and color. While poetry, as in . . . picturesque language . . . uses comparison with only occasional contrast, painting uses both in very nearly like proportions. This more extensive use in painting of contrast might be considered of merely theoretic importance, were it not for that which necessarily accompanies it. This is the fact that the natural appearances treated in painting are, as a rule, perceived outside the mind, whereas those referred to in poetry have been already stored inside the mind. Painters and sculptors reproduce scenes or figures perceived in the external world and they do this through using an external medium like canvas or marble. Poets recall what they have heard of events or of men, like a battle or a Wellington, and reproduce this through using words. Words contain not what is external to the mind, but what is in it. The bearing of these facts is extremely important when considered in relation to the conceptions appropriate for treatment in the different arts. As applied to poetry, the facts seem to rule out of its domain any descriptive details other than those of such prominence that a man observing them might reasonably be supposed to have been able to retain them in memory,—other than details—to state it differently—which have been stored in the mind, and are brought to consciousness because, apparently, the most important factors entering into the general mental effect. In accord-

ance with this principle, it was shown in Chapter XXII. of the author's "Poetry as a Representative Art" that the descriptions of Homer are all mental, fragmentary, specific, and typical. As contrasted with poetry, painting and sculpture represent not that which is inside the mind, and may be recalled in the order of time, but that which is outside the mind, and may be perceived in the arrangements of space. Poetry, though it should not directly represent space, yet may indirectly suggest it. Painting and sculpture may suggest, though they should not directly represent, time.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, x.

PAINTING *vs.* POETRY. CONSCIOUS *vs.* INSTINCTIVE WORK
IN EACH.

Painting and sculpture reveal much more plainly than either music or poetry that the mind has been moved by some outward form which they imitate. But they necessitate, and, in a sense not true of either of the arts of sound, they show that they necessitate, great conscious effort on the part of the intellect in arranging outlines, in coloring canvases, or in shaping marbles, so as to make the forms which are imitated embody the mind's ideas. If the influence be strong enough, musical melodies and poetic passages seem to spring to the lips instinctively. However strong it be, pictures and statues do not fall into shape except as a result of thoughtful work, which is due to the mind and not to that which affects it from without; work, in other words, in connection with which the ideas within the mind emphasize their own separate existence.—*Art in Theory*, xvii.

PAINTING *vs.* POETRY, SUBJECTS OF EACH (*see also* POETIC
DESCRIPTION).

Poetry represents phases of consciousness moving, one after another, in time. So its medium of representation is in words which also move. These are peculiarly fitted to present the various consecutive thoughts suggested, as well as the events detailed, in a story. Painting, on the other hand, represents an influence of fixedness such as appeals to the eye. A painter's first impulse is always to represent shapes as he sees them, and hence in space. A child with a pencil in hand, so far as he can draw at all, thinks of nothing but shapes. But once present his mind with the details, whether appealing to the mind or to the eye, of that which

forms the substance of a story, and he is tempted to represent them also with brush or pencil.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XXVII.

It need not be inferred that painters can never draw their subjects from poetry, or poets from painting. It need merely be inferred that there should be a difference in the ways in which the two arts treat the same subject.—*Idem*, XXVII.

PAINTING *vs.* SCULPTURE, EXPRESSION IN.

Painting, is better fitted to suggest time than is sculpture. This is so because painting, as a rule, can represent a larger space than sculpture,—a space filled with more objects and figures and indicating, therefore, more interchange between them of cause and effect. . . . We seldom see in a picture a figure that stands out from all surrounding figures, asserting such claims to preëminent and exclusive attention as is common in groups of statuary. Continuing this line of thought, we shall soon recall how superlatively we have enjoyed certain statues, for the very reason, apparently, that they were placed so that one could view them apart from anything else,—statues that stand in rows, or in alcoves by themselves.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, x.

PAINTING *vs.* SCULPTURE, THEIR SUBJECTS.

The difference between that which is appropriately represented in painting and in sculpture is very truthfully suggested, though not entirely indicated, by the difference, which all recognize, between the meaning of the terms *picturesque* and *statuesque*. The *picturesque*, as defined on page 280, involves a conception of much and minute variety. And this is just what painting involves. The color that is used in it, and not in sculpture, is never well applied unless it imitates the influences of light and shade in nature to such a degree as to cause slight differences at almost every perceptible point. Besides this, color enables the artist to separate, one from another, and thus to represent clearly, a very large number of small details most of which would be indistinguishable if an attempt were made to indicate them in sculpture. On the other hand, the *statuesque* involves the conception of something that stands out by itself,—something that, because it has bulk or body, can be looked at from every side. Even

when the term applies to the sculpture of mere relief, the solidity of the medium that is used in it, and not in painting, tends to separate every contour from every other by emphatically defined outlines. These outlines, too, must be comparatively few in number and the objects which they delineate comparatively large in size. Thus the limitations of the material used in each of the arts determine the limitations of the subjects which it and it alone can appropriately embody. On account of the minute representative possibilities of color, one can make a painting of a landscape, and can crowd into a small compass a large number of figures and faces, appearing almost immediately beside or behind one another. In sculpture, landscape is wellnigh impossible, and so is any extensive grouping of figures. Even such figures as can be brought together must, owing to the uniformity of color, be very distinctly separated, and, as artistic effects produced through variety of hues are impossible, compensating artistic effects through the use of outlines become imperative. Hence parallelism, continuity, balance, symmetry¹, and kindred methods of æsthetically accenting the requirements of contour become more prominent.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XXVII.

A picture and a statue may both imitate the same model. When we look at the former, we instinctively think of the model. When we look at the latter, we often think only of the effects that human nature in general has had upon form in the abstract. While painting may represent only a person, sculpture is more likely to represent a personage.—*Art in Theory*, XIX.

Painting that depicts leaves, flowers, fruit, and children, or grown people as doing very trifling things, may rank high, because manifesting a high degree of skill in drawing and coloring. The more minute the factors with which both of these deal, the more difficult, often, is it to attain success. Besides this, almost any scene which painting depicts includes a very large number of different objects; and these to an extent may compensate in quantity for what the general subject lacks in quality. But in sculpture the conditions are different. There is almost no comparison between carving the wreath of a column's capital and the

¹ See chart on page 89 of this volume.

contour of a human body; and, if the latter have to be carved at all, the difficulty of the work, the permanence of the material, and the fact that the body, when completed, is to be the sole object of attention, all combine to make it seem especially inappropriate to have it represent a trivial subject. It ought to be a dignified subject, or, in lieu of that, at least a subject treated in a dignified way. As for the dignity of the subject, notice that, in a sense not true of painting, it is appropriate that the figure delineated should be represented in a form greatly exaggerated. Very large pictures . . . sometimes offend us by their very size; and it is almost impossible to conceive of an attractive picture with figures of heroic proportions. But the "Moses" of Angelo or the "Liberty Enlightening the World" in New York do not offend us. On the contrary, very small pictures, as in miniatures, are often extremely pleasing and valuable. But most of us cannot avoid feeling, when we see the bronze doors of the Capitol at Washington, that the small size of the figures makes the work expended upon them hardly worth while, because such subjects could have been represented so much more satisfactorily in pictures.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XXVII.

An art is always fulfilling its best possibilities when it is doing that which it and it alone can do. What painting can do and sculpture cannot, is to produce effects through the use of pigments. What sculpture can do and painting cannot, is to produce effects through the use of bulk, including outlines representing length, breadth, and thickness.—*Idem*, XXVII.

PARTHENON, THE, AS A MODEL.

It is ordinarily supposed that the Parthenon represents the highest point of perfection reached by Greek architecture. It does, and yet it was the beginning of a decline, just as we recognize to have been the case with the poetry of Milton and the music of Wagner, when we notice the effects that the works of each produced upon their followers and imitators. The Parthenon is the building which modern people have studied and imitated most in their efforts to understand and apply the Greek methods. They ought to have it impressed upon their minds that those who first began to study and imitate it were the ones who began

that very process of degeneracy in art, the current of which it is now supposed by some that a return to Greek methods can stem.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, XII.

PERCEPTIBLE, ART DEALS WITH THE.

Art either accepts forms as wholes, or it regards them as combined or developed out of their more prominently perceptible parts.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, VIII.

This is the same as to say that art derives its conceptions from the effective features of objects, sometimes from only one feature, but, if from more, in all cases, from those which are the most perceptible.—*Idem*.

PERSONAL AND SYMPATHETIC EFFECTS OF ART (*see also* GENIUS, INDIVIDUALITY, SUBCONSCIOUS, *and* SYMPATHY).

Now we come upon two apparently anomalous facts. One might suppose that representation, exerting, as it does, an indirect influence, would reveal less of an artist's character, and would also appeal less to the sympathies of others, than would presentation, exerting, as it does, a direct influence. But the truth seems to be the contrary. Nor, when we think a moment, will it seem surprising that this is so. As applied to the revelation of character, it is simply a fact that all of us, in determining what a man is in his spirit, intentionally or unintentionally, judge him by what he appears to be in his subconscious rather than in his conscious nature; therefore more by what he unconsciously represents of himself than by what he consciously presents. This is true in every relation of life. No man ever fell in love with a woman because of her words or deeds that he supposed attributable to conscious intention. So with the products of art. The most professionally trained dancers and singers who prove fascinating to us do so because of slight unconscious peculiarities of movement in body or voice which are characteristic of them as individuals, and cannot be acquired by another with another personality. This fact is true of the effects of any kind of expression embodied in any kind of form. The chief charm of a melody, poem, painting, or statue, even of a building, often lies in certain subtle touches given to it by its producer unconsciously,—in characteristics which it is sometimes impossible for the critic to analyze or even to describe. Yet it is these touches that most surely convey the impression of the artist's individuality. Need it be said that they do not

present his conscious intention? They represent his unconscious method, a method that he cannot, so to speak, avoid.

Closely connected with the apparent anomaly just considered is the other of which mention was made. One might suppose that indirect representation—*i. e.* expression made through the use of forms not at all associated with those of one's own body—would appeal less to the sympathies of others than would direct expression, or what has been termed presentation. But this supposition, again, would not be entirely correct. Owing to the personality of effect indicated in the preceding paragraph as characterizing representative expression, this latter sometimes makes a stronger appeal to the sympathies than does the other form of expression. We all, to an extent, recognize this fact when we quote with approval the maxim that actions speak louder than words. As applied to art, when methods characterizing a product have been made characteristic of an artist's personality, others must be influenced by his work as they would be by his personality. But how are they influenced by this? How do any of us come to have an ideal—or come to take an interest of any kind in anything—that is peculiar to the personality of another? There is but one answer: It is through our sympathies—a word which, as thus used, applies primarily to our emotions, but includes also our thoughts, as influenced by these.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, VIII.

PERSONALITY AND UNIVERSALITY OF REPRESENTATION.

At first thought, the principle previously stated, namely, that the art-product is successful in the degree in which the artist represents his surroundings in such ways as to manifest his own personality, by which must often be meant his individual thoughts and emotions, seems to conflict with the principle just unfolded, which attributes his success to the degree in which the conceptions that he embodies are not merely his own, but those of others. Second thought, however, will convince us that the two principles conflict only seemingly. In practical experience, no one has any difficulty in recognizing the individuality of a Raphael and a Shakespeare in almost every product of their skill; yet this does not prevent the product from being an accurate representation of nature as viewed by all men. Painters, sculptors, dramatists, are greatest when most thoroughly

themselves, yet greatest also when their minds, like mirrors, reflect their surroundings in such ways as to conform most exactly to the observations of people in general. The reason for this, of course, is that no conceptions of the meanings of nature can be universally accepted, except so far as they have been derived from the appearances of nature as universally perceived.—*Idem*.

PERSONALITY AS REPRESENTED IN ART (*see* EXPRESSION FOR EXPRESSION'S SAKE).

Art of the highest rank, in addition to representing rather than imitating the phenomena of nature, and to representing rather than communicating thoughts and emotions, must represent rather than present the personality of the artist, meaning here by the word *personality* that combination of spirit and body which belongs to oneself as an individual, and to no one else. To understand why personality should be represented rather than presented, let us recall, for a moment, what was said in Chapter III. There, the impulse to art was attributed to life-force or energy issuing from the subconscious or spiritual nature, and striving to embody itself in the material. We all know that the spiritual itself cannot appear,—it can merely represent itself in the material. At the same time, of course, representation is involved, to some extent, in every form of expression. All thoughts and emotions, as they exist in the mind, are inaudible and invisible, and, in order to be communicated to others, they must be symbolized through sights and sounds borrowed from nature. But there is a different use of these latter in ordinary expression, and in that of art. In ordinary expression, it is sufficient that the thoughts and emotions should be clearly presented. Upon artistic expression, as in that of a poem or a statue, years of labor are frequently expended in order to secure a result beyond that of mere clearness of expression. Upon what is it that the artist, in such cases, expends his labor? Of course it must be upon that which the expression contains in addition to the thoughts and emotions. What does it contain in addition to these? Nothing more, certainly, than the expressional factors. As it is not the thoughts and emotions, it must be the expressional factors that are intended to be emphasized; and when we recall that it is the expressional factors that are repeated in art, and to what an extent

all art involves repetition, and that, as a rule, repetition necessarily emphasizes, we shall recognize the truth of this inference. Now notice that these effects will be emphatically produced in the degree alone in which the material forms which one uses in his art are not those belonging to his own material body. Every man gives expression to his spirit through using his own body. To give such expression in the most emphatic way, one must do it in an exceptional way; and this can be done alone when, unlike ordinary men, he uses forms that are not an organic part of his own nature (see page 10). Evidently, too, in this case, the external material forms thus used cannot be said to present—they merely represent—himself.—*Idem*.

PERSONALITY, EFFECTS OF, IN ART.

In all the arts, as we know, it is these effects, manifested in what the artist puts into his product or leaves out of it, that largely determine its quality, that differentiate, for instance, a poet from a reporter, or a painter from a photographer. The same principle is illustrated in every relationship in the world in which one life touches other lives. It is the bringing of one's personality to bear upon his surroundings, that makes a man's form better than a carcass, reveals a spirit inside of a body, and proves that life, in any sphere, is really worth the living.—*Essay on Music as Related to Other Arts*.

PERSPECTIVE vs. PROPORTION (*see also* GENERAL AND DISTANT, *and* PROPORTION vs. PERSPECTIVE).

Perspective, to which several chapters are devoted, has to do with the methods of arranging real outlines and with them, of course, measurements, so as to have them produce a certain desired visual result, whereas proportion has to do with the measurements as they appear in the result after perspective has produced it.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color, Preface*.

Though in nature the measurements of an object may fulfil the requirements of proportion, they may not, owing to the operation of the laws of perspective, fulfil them in the image which this object produces on the retina; and, *vice versa*, though in nature the measurements may not fulfil the requirements of proportion, they may, nevertheless, owing to the operations of the laws of perspective,

fulfil them in this image. In short, as applied to proportion as to many other artistic features, a work of art, whether a painting, a statue, or a building, has to be judged by what may be termed, and is, in this sense, its subjective effect after it has begun to influence the eye and mind.—*Idem*. IV.

But enough has now been said to verify the statement that the ancient architects in order to fulfil both visual and æsthetic, both physiological and psychical, requirements erected their buildings with primary reference to their general effects when seen from some definite point or points at a distance. In connection with this it has been shown also that these architects differed materially with reference to the particular methods through which to secure these effects, arriving at their conclusions, probably, as a result of many individual experiences and experiments.

Since the printing of the first edition of this book, Professor W. H. Goodyear has discovered that the methods attributed in this discussion to only the ancient Greeks, the Egyptians, and the Romans, were used also by the early Gothic architects. He himself has measured eighty-five of their churches in Italy which have floors rising between the front door and the chancel, sometimes, three feet, while, often, the successive key-stones of the arches between the nave and the aisles descend in the same direction,—evidently to increase the effect of distance according to the laws of perspective. To what extent the same methods are exemplified in the Gothic churches of northern Europe, has not yet been determined.—*Idem*, xv.

PHILOSOPHICAL TREATMENT OF ART IN AMERICA.

Owing to a lack of breadth and balance characterizing the practical limitations of American culture, a man here who tries to treat art philosophically finds his way blocked at the very threshold of his undertaking by two almost insurmountable obstacles. One is that few of our philosophers have had sufficient æsthetic training to be interested in that which concerns art; and the other is that few of our artists—including our art-critics, though there are noteworthy exceptions—have had sufficient philosophical training to be interested in that which concerns philosophy. Accordingly, as a rule, the philosopher never looks at the

art-book at all; and the art-critic, on whom the public rely for information concerning it, does so merely because he cannot dodge what is tossed directly at him as a reviewer; but the little that he sees of it he usually misapprehends and very frequently misrepresents.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music, Preface.*

PITCH, AN ELEMENT BOTH IN MUSIC AND POETRY (*see also*
REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS OF PITCH)

As most of us know, science has ascertained that all musical sounds result from regularly recurring vibrations caused by cords, pipes, reeds, or other agencies. About thirty-three of these vibrations per second produce the lowest tone used in music, and about three thousand nine hundred and sixty, the highest. That the number of vibrations in any note may be increased and its pitch made higher, it is necessary to lessen the length or size of the cord, or of whatever causes the vibrations. When the vibrating cord is lessened by just one half, the tone produced is separated from its former tone by an interval of sound which in music is termed an octave. Between the two extremes of pitch forming the octave, eleven half tones, as they are called, caused by sounds resulting from different lengths of the cord, between its whole length and its half length, have been selected, for reasons to be given in another place, and arranged in what is termed a musical scale. These half-tones, seven of them constituting the *do, re, me, fa, sol, la, and si* of the gamut, are all that, can be used in music between the two notes forming the octave. There are about seven octaves . . . of pitch that are used in music. In the speaking voice only about two octaves are used, so that in this regard its range is more narrow than that of music. Between any two octave notes, however, the speaking voice can use whatever sounds it chooses; it is not confined to the few tones that constitute the musical scale. For instance, the note of the bass voice called by musicians *C*, is sounded by producing one hundred and thirty-two vibrations a second, and *C* of the octave above by producing two hundred and sixty-four vibrations. Between the two, therefore, it is possible to conceive of forming one hundred and thirty-one distinct tones, each vibrating once a second oftener than the sound below it. It is possible, too, to conceive that the speaking

voice can use any of these tones. Music, however, between the same octave notes, can use but eleven tones. Therefore, the different degrees of pitch used in speech, though not extending over as many octaves, are much more numerous than those used in music. For this reason, the melodies of speech cannot be represented by any system through which we now write music. There are not enough notes used in music to render it possible to make the representation accurate. Nor probably would much practical benefit be derived from an attempt to construct a system of speech-notation; though it, like other things, may be among the possibilities of acoustic development in the future.

In applying to poetic form the principles determining pitch in elocution, let us take up first those in accordance with which certain syllables are uttered on a high or low key. The former key seems suggested by vowels formed at the mouth's *front*, as in *beet*, *bate*, *bet*, *bit*, *bat*, etc.; the latter by *back* vowels, as in *fool*, *full*, *foal*, *fall*, etc. The best of reasons underlies this suggestion. It is the fact that the pronunciation of every front or back vowel-sound naturally tends to the production of a high or low musical note. Donders first made the discovery that the cavity of the mouth, when whispering each of the different vowels, is tuned to a different pitch. This fact gives the vowel its peculiar quality. Instruments, moreover, have been constructed, by means of which most sounds can be analyzed, and their component tones distinctly and definitely noted; and now the theory is accepted that the voice, when pronouncing vowel-sounds, at whatever key in the musical scale it may start them, has a tendency to suggest—if not through its main, or what is termed its *prime* tone, at least through associated, or what are termed its *partial* tones—that pitch which is peculiar to the vowel uttered.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, VIII.

From these facts two inferences follow: First, that whenever two syllables, whether containing sounds of different vowels or consonants or of both, are uttered in succession, we have a succession of tones that differ in pitch. This is the same as to say that whenever we use consecutively words that are not pronounced exactly alike, we produce, in just as true a sense as when singing a melody, an effect

of passing from one pitch to another. The second inference is that whenever sounds of two different vowels or of vowels and consonants that constitute a syllable are uttered simultaneously, they produce a blending of tones that differ in pitch, or, in other words, an effect corresponding to that which is heard in musical harmony. Indeed, the music of the speaking voice, as distinguished from the singing, is characterized mainly by the harmony that results from this blending of the consonant-sounds with the vowel-sounds, the latter being often in singing the only sounds that are heard, and always the only sounds that are made prominent. Of course, too, there is a sense in which the utterance of the component parts of any single syllable, especially when these are the two vowels of a diphthong, resembles more an effect of quality than of harmony. But sometimes, as in the case of an inflection which begins at one pitch and ends at another, there are suggestions of harmony.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music*, XII.

PLAY, DRAMATIC (see MORALITY AS INFLUENCED BY DRAMAS).

It is a law of our nature—that the sayings and scenes by which we are surrounded produce a much greater effect upon our conduct than do any deductions with reference to them that we may draw in our own minds. This is the principle that a thinker is obliged to apply to theatric performances. It is the language, the picture of life—in short, the *play* that is the thing of chief importance—this wholly irrespective of any possible moral that thinking can draw from it.—*Essay on Art and Morals*.

PLAY-IMPULSE IN ART (see ARCHITECTURE ARTISTIC, ART IN THEORY, and EXPRESSION FOR EXPRESSION'S SAKE).

PLEASURE AND PAIN, BOTH PRODUCED BY ART.

If the phases of expression which we find in art, and which depend on such conditions as physical temperament and personality, be recognized to involve the experience and consequent communication of sentiment,—a term implying thought as prompted by emotion—*i. e.*, an intense degree of activity of both thought and emotion—then it seems logical to recognize also that very often art must impart great pleasure. For of what is pleasure a result, if not of activity that is unconscious of control? Knowledge limits both our feeling and our thought, but, in the degree

in which we are indulging in sentiment, the limits are removed, and we are left free to feel and to imagine what we choose. From its very nature, therefore, sentiment implies a certain degree of pleasure. But it brings conscious freedom so far only as this can be experienced in thought . . . and we may derive less acute enjoyment from mental than from physical pleasure. For the same reason also, when a work of art enlists our sympathy with the suffering and the fallen (and, in the degree of the breadth of our culture, with more subtle phases of human weakness and wretchedness), the consciousness which we often have that no material or, so to speak, bodily effort of ours can avert troubles of this kind, imparts to the freedom even of sentiment a limitation that results in the effect of pathos or of horror. To say, therefore, that the objective result of the artistic tendency, as affected by the physical conditions underlying temperament and personality, is sentiment, enables us to give full recognition to whatever truth there may be in the arguments of those who claim that the aim of art is pleasure; and it enables us also, at the same time, to explain satisfactorily, as these arguers do not, both why other things sometimes afford more pleasure than art and why art itself sometimes, as in the pathetic and the tragic, includes the painful.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, xv.

POET, HIS RELATIONS WITH NATURE.

Language involves, as we have found, a representation of mental facts and processes through the use of analogous external facts and processes, which alone are apprehensible to others, and which alone, therefore, can make others apprehend our thoughts. But facts and processes fitted to furnish such representations may be perceived on every side of us in the objects and operations of what we term nature. It is the poet, however, who is most conscious of these analogies, for he, instead of accepting those noticed by others and embodied in conventional words, is constantly seeking for new ones and using these. To the poet, and the reader of poetry, therefore, all nature appears to be, in a peculiar sense, a representation, a repetition, a projection into the realm of matter, of the immaterial processes of thought within the mind.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, xxviii.

POET, INDEBTED TO BOTH TEMPERAMENT AND CULTURE.

By temperament many are constitutionally unqualified to give any utterance to instinctive promptings, to throw themselves with abandon into anything; but, granted this power, it is often the accuracy, breadth, and largeness of the cultivation received that determine the truth, comprehensiveness, and greatness of the result. A wholly uncultivated man may produce a perfect stanza or sketch; but usually not a long poem or a painting.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XIII.

POET, THINKS IN IMAGES.

The poet naturally thinks through the use of images. He seems to see outwardly the things that he describes. He seems to hear outwardly the things that he utters.—*Essay on Teaching in Drawing*.

POETIC DESCRIPTION (*see also* PAINTING *vs.* POETRY).

In the phase of consciousness represented in poetry, the man thinks of certain scenes in the external world because they are suggested, not by anything that he is actually, at the time, perceiving there, but by his own recollections of them as they exist in thought. To one likening his action in a battle to that of Wellington at Waterloo and of Grant at Vicksburg, these men are not really present, only ideally so. As objects of thought they are not outside of his mind, they are in it. In the mood represented in painting, the man thinks of external scenes because they are actually before him. He is clearly conscious therefore of two different sources of thought—one within, the other without. The objective world is really present. If he wish to represent this fact, therefore, he cannot use merely words. Words can contain only what is in the mind, or ideally present. In order to represent in any true sense what is really present he must use what is really before him, *i. e.*, an indisputably external medium, as in painting, sculpture, and architecture. . . . According to the distinction just made, any descriptive details are out of place in poetry other than those of such prominence that a man observing them may reasonably be supposed to be able to retain them in memory;—other than those, to state it differently, which are illustrative in their nature, and truly representative, therefore, of ideas within the mind as excited to conscious activity by influences from without. There is, of course, a

certain interest, though sometimes not above that which is merely botanic and topographic, awakened by verbal descriptions of flowers and fields such as a painter on the spot would be able to give while scrutinizing them in order to depict them. But this interest may be just as different from that which, in the circumstances, is demanded, as it would be were it merely didactic or dogmatic; and a poet with sensibilities keen enough to feel the differences between essentially different motives will be loath to yield to the promptings of that which is essentially not poetic. He will refrain from indulging in the kind of writing just indicated, not because it is too difficult for him to master; not because though living at the present time he is unaware that the prevailing taste approves of it, or that, if he fail to follow its whims, he will be accused of having too little love of nature or sympathy with it; but because he wishes to be true to his art, as he recognizes that all the greatest masters have been; and because he knows that, when the present fashion passes away, as it surely will, only that poetry will live which is poetic in the most distinctive sense.—*Art in Theory*, XIX.

All lengthy descriptions or declamatory passages that have nothing to do directly with giving definiteness, character, and progress to the plot, detract from the interest of the poem, considered as a whole. The effect of these things upon the form is the same as that of rubbish thrown into the current of a stream—it impedes the movement, and renders the water less transparent. This is the chief reason why the works of the dramatists of the age of the history of our literature commonly called classical, like Dryden, Addison, Rowe, Home, and Brooke, notwithstanding much that is excellent in their writings, have not been able to maintain their popularity.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, XXII.

POETIC FORM, ARTIFICIALITY IN.

Poetic form, for instance, as used by Shakespeare, Coleridge, Scott, and Burns, was characterized by apparent ease and facility. Whatever art there was in it, if not wholly concealed, at least called attention, not to itself, but to the thought and feeling for the expression of which alone it is of any use. It is true that, in the times of Queen Anne, form like this was considered insufficient for the purpose. It is also true, though the fact is not often acknowledged, that in

our own times there is a similar opinion. But we have learned that the styles of Pope and Dryden were artificial. What will our successors learn about our styles? Certainly, if those older poets cultivated an unnatural rhythmic swing, ours are cultivating an equally unnatural melodic swag, the straightforward movement, which alone is logically appropriate in an art, the medium of which is a series of effects in time, having given place to a succession of side-heaves, occasioned by endeavors to lug along heavy epithets. In the overloaded form, there is scarcely more drift, which used to be considered essential in poetry, than in a fishing smack with every line on board trailing in the water, and every hook at the end of it stuck fast in seaweed. From the levy made upon every possibility of ornamentation within reach, one would suppose that the contemporary muse were the mistress of a South Sea Islander, who never sees beauty where there is no paint.—*Essay on The Function of Technique*.

POETIC FORM ESSENTIAL TO POETIC EFFECT (*see also*
TECHNIQUE).

Poetry is more than thought; it is more even than a strong and metrical expression of thought. The mere fact that a girl was drowned on the sands of Dee, or that three fishermen were lost at sea, is not enough to account for the interest that we take in Charles Kingsley's "O Mary, Go and Call the Cattle Home," and "The Fishermen." It is his poetry that interests us; and by his poetry we mean the representative way in which he has told these tales. . . . The important thing that needs to be borne in mind in judging of poetry, is that it is an art, and partakes of the nature of the fine arts; and that, as such, its one essential is a representative form appealing to a man through that which causes him to admire the beautiful.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, xxvii.

Not all, but some of these quotations show us that poetic effect is not dependent wholly upon the presence or absence of poetic thought. On the contrary, that which in verse charms the ear, fixes attention, remains in memory, and passes into a precept or proverb, is sometimes dependent for its popularity almost entirely upon consecutive effects of sound, so arranged as to flow into one another and together form a *unity*. Certainly, in many cases, the same thought, expressed in sounds less satisfactorily arranged, would not

be remembered or repeated.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music*, VII.

POETIC FORM, EXCESSIVE ATTENTION TO.

The peculiarity of poetry consists in the fact that its medium is composed of words, which words, in turn, are forms of thought. If, therefore, attention be directed too exclusively to the form as form, the thoughts, which alone give it real value, will not produce their legitimate effects. For this reason, there is always an inartistic tendency in any excessive use of alliteration, assonance, or rhyme. . . . There is a sense in which all art-products are artistic in the degree in which they are natural. They appear most natural, of course, when they appear most spontaneous. But too great attention expended upon the mere selection of letter-sounds interferes with spontaneity of effect. Excessive alliteration, assonance, and rhyme suggest calculation, contrivance, effort, and this of a character not very choice in quality. They are all in themselves comparatively easy to produce; and, unless entering into the formation of a word exactly fitted to convey the meaning that is intended, they suggest an unwarranted sacrifice of sense to the mere jingling of sounds, and, therefore, a cheap form of ornamentation.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music*, IX.

POETIC FORM IN POEMS CONSIDERED AS WHOLE.

A poem is a development of language, and language is a representation of thought, and thought always involves motion. A poem, therefore, is a representation of thought and also of motion, or, rather, of thought in motion. But more than this, it is a single art-product; therefore it must represent a single thought in a single motion. This implies, first, one thought to which all the other thoughts of the work must be related by way of complement, or subordinated by way of principality; and second, one motion of thought—*i. e.*, one thought moving in one direction, having one *beginning* from which all the movements of all the related and subordinated thoughts of the entire poem start; a *middle* through which they all flow; and an *end* toward which they all tend.—*The Genesis of Art Form*, VI.

In speaking of the plan of his "Excursion," Wordsworth, in several places, tells us that his conception of it was that of a cathedral to which his minor poems should stand related

like chapels opening from the aisles. In other words, he acknowledges that a method of thought or expression not natural to poetry, but to another art, an art, too, necessitating a body filling space, was present to his mind when considering the general form of his poem. So far as this method had influence, his motive, therefore, was that not of the poet but of the architect. A poem modelled after a cathedral! One might as well talk of a picture modelled after a symphony, or a statue after a running stream. To be sure, if the stream were frozen stiff, and so far lifeless, the statue might image it. Only so far as thought were in a similar condition could a poem that was really like a cathedral, embody it.—*Representative Significance of Form*, XXV.

This requirement of *organic form*, as manifested by the arrangement of the chief features of an artistic product, differs not whether a poem be short or long. The degree of excellence in its conception is measured by the degree in which it presents an image of the phase of life with which it deals in a distinct form, by which is meant a form in which are preserved the organic relationships of all the parts to one another and to the whole. When, in speaking of a long poem, such as the "Iliad" or "Paradise Lost," "Hamlet," or "Faust," we commend its unity and progress, or the consistency, continuity, and completeness with which certain ideas of which it treats are developed, we mean merely that the poem as a whole presents in distinct organic form a whole image of that which it is designed to present. The difference, therefore, between the ability to produce a long poem and a short one, or what is sometimes the same thing, a great poem and a small one, is simply of the same nature as that which exists between a high and a small order of intellect in other departments,—a difference in the ability to hold the thoughts persistently to a single subject until all its parts have been marshalled into order.—*The Genesis of Art-Form*, VI.

None of these poems deserve to be placed in the highest rank, because they lack the qualities which, as we have found, must characterize the products of an art, whose form is apprehensible in time. They lack the qualities because they lack the *form* that necessarily would show these; and they lack the form—*i. e.*, the *representative form*,

—because their authors did not start to compose them with *representative conceptions*. When Dante, Shakespeare, and Milton first conceived their greatest works, it must have been a *picture* that appeared to loom before their imaginations. It is doubtful whether Wordsworth, Cowper, and Campbell thought of anything except an *argument*.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, XXVII.

POETIC FORM, ITS INFLUENCE UPON THOUGHT.

When a man polishes a diamond its beauty is due, in a sense, to its appearance, and to what his polishing has added to its appearance; but, in another sense, the beauty is due still more to the surrounding light which his polishing has enabled the diamond to reflect. The poet who never allows himself to use an imperfect rhyme, or, except for reasons in the sense, to use words containing consecutive letter-sounds that do not harmonize, is likely, on account of the very attention that he pays to the expression, to make the expression seem worthy of attention; and, not only so, but to make that which is expressed seem worthy of attention. We wonder, at times, why certain modern poets prefer to write plays in blank verse. Most of us ascribe the reason to the influence of tradition. But there is a better reason than this. Foot and line impose limits upon expressional form. The necessity for conciseness in the language impels to conciseness in the thought. Thought like light never becomes really brilliant, never flashes, except from a form in which its rays are concentrated. The sun's influence on a bright day is pervasive; it is everywhere; but its beams never sparkle from the whole surface of a pool or lake,—only from places where in this they touch some single small drop, or collection of small drops.—*Essay on Music as Related to Other Arts*.

POETIC FORM, ITS RICHNESS COMPENSATING FOR POVERTY IN IDEAS.

As this poetry lies concealed in ordinary life, the poet is compelled to do more than simply to represent ordinary life. He must make this appear to be more than it seems to be; and he must do so by making more of his poetic form than can be done in *direct* representation. We all know how ladies taking up a temporary residence for the summer in small seaside cottages, erected without paint or plaster, make up for the lack of other beautifying elements, by

tacking all over the walls Japanese fans and scarfs of innumerable hues, intermingled with wreaths of evergreen and myrtle; or how, when they rent furnished houses in which the colors of the carpets, chairs, and wall papers do not harmonize, they spread tidies, afghans, and ornaments of all possible shades over sofas and mantles, so as to produce effects pleasing by way of combination and variety, where it is impossible to have simplicity and unity. All this is an illustration of cheap ornamentation. Yet it is justifiable in such circumstances. The tendency producing it is exercised unjustifiably only when an architect or upholsterer, with an opportunity to rely upon more worthy methods, tries to produce similar results not as means but as ends. *Illustrative* representation in poetry is often produced by bringing together all sorts of elements, very much as the Japanese fans are brought together in seaside cottages; and it is justifiable when it is necessary to make thought attractive which otherwise would not be so. To illustrate how poetry can make this sort of thought attractive, take this description of a luncheon in Tennyson's "Audley Court." In most of the passage we have *direct* representation; but all the better for this reason, it serves to illustrate what I mean by saying that form can make the unpoetic seem poetic. What could be more unpoetic or commonplace than a meal? Yet notice how by the introduction of picturesque elements like "wrought with horse and hound," "dusky," "costly made," "Like fossils of the rock," "golden" "Imbedded," and the graphic account of the conversation,—all such as could be observed by one looking on, the poet has rendered the whole poetic. It is an admirable illustration of a legitimate way in which by richness of form a poet can make up for poverty of ideas.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, XXIII.

POETRY AS AN ART (*see also* REPRESENTATION, A CHARACTERISTIC OF ÆSTHETIC ART).

Poetry is acknowledged to be an art, ranking, like music, with the fine arts,—painting, sculpture, and architecture. It is acknowledged, also, that the peculiar characteristic of all these arts is that they have what is termed *form* (from the Latin *forma*, an external appearance). This form, moreover, is æsthetic (from the Greek αἰσθητός, perceived by

the senses); and it is presented in such a way as to address the senses through the agency of an artist, who, in order to attain his end, represents the sounds or sights of nature. All these arts, therefore, in a broad sense of the term, are representative. What they represent is partly the phenomena of nature and partly the thoughts of man; partly that which is imitated from things perceived in the world without, and partly that which is conceived in the mind of him who, in order to express his conception, produces the imitation. Both of these factors are present in all artistic forms, and cause them to be what they are. That painting and sculpture represent, is recognized by all; that music and architecture do the same, needs to be proved to most men. As for poetry, with which we are now to deal, all perceive that it contains certain representative elements; but few are aware to what an extent these determine everything in it that is distinctive and excellent.—*Idem*, 1.

“POETRY AS A REPRESENTATIVE ART, ANALYSIS OF THE BOOK.”

(*Recapitulation:*) In the volume entitled “Poetry as a Representative Art,” as well as in the essay on “Music as a Representative Art,” it is shown, for instance,—to mention only a few particulars as illustrative of many more,—that, both by way of suggestion and of imitation, solemnity, gravity, and dignity are represented by long syllables and notes causing slowness of movement as contrasted with the opposite; that self-assertion and vehemence are represented by distinctness of accent and loudness of tone as contrasted with indistinctness and softness; that conclusiveness, decision, affirmation, and satisfaction are represented by downward as contrasted with upward movements either in the tunes of verse or of song; and also that feelings like fright, amazement, indignation, contempt, horror, awe, surprise, solicitude, delight, admiration, and determination are each represented by different qualities of tone, whether indicated in vowels and consonants or in musical instruments.

In the last halves of the essays, both on poetry and on music, the elements which are considered separately in the first halves are examined as representing mental conceptions or material surroundings when combined in completed art-products, the purpose being to bring out clearly,

if possible, as applied to both theme and treatment, whether plain or figurative, the distinctions between the poetic and the prosaic, the musical and the merely sonorous.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, xxvi.

The theory underlying all that has been said thus far is, that poetry is an artistic development of language; its versification, of the pauses of natural breathing; its rhythm and tune, of the accents and inflections of ordinary conversation; and the significance in its sounds, of ejaculatory and imitative methods actuating the very earliest efforts of our race at verbal expression. The inference suggested has been that these effects produced by sound are legitimate in poetry, because, like language, and as a part of it, and far more significantly than some forms of it, they represent thought. This inference necessarily carries with it another, which it seems important to emphasize before we leave this part of our subject. It is this,—that no effects produced by sound are legitimate in poetry, which fail in any degree to represent thought. If a man's first impression on entering a picture-gallery come from a suggestion of paint, he may know that he is not in the presence of the masters. So if his first impression on beginning to read verse come from a suggestion of jingle, of sound, or of form of any kind not connected in some most intimate way with an appeal to his thinking faculties, he may be well-nigh sure that the lines before him do not entitle their author to a high poetic rank. As I intend to show further on, all artistic poetry must produce the effects of form, but these include impressions recognized not only by the outer ear, but also by the inner mind. It is because of the exceeding difficulty of perfectly adjusting sound to thought and thought to sound, till, like perfectly attuned strings of a perfect instrument, both strike together in all cases so as to form a single chord of a perfect harmony, that there are so few great poets.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, xiii.

POETRY AS PICTORIAL *vs.* MUSICAL (*see also* POETRY *vs.* MUSIC, GENESIS OF EACH).

In primitive times, the poetry of a word or phrase was determined by its appeal less to what we may term the ear of the mind than to its eye. By words appealing to the ear, I mean those like *hiss, rush, roar, rattle*, evidently originated by the recognition of resemblances between

meaning and sound. By words appealing to the eye, I mean those like *upright*, *shady*, *forerunner*, *turnover*, used in what is termed a metaphorical sense, and evidently originated in a desire to represent or picture certain conditions or relationships of thought that are not visible, being inside the mind, through references to conditions or relationships that are visible, because in the external world. It is words of this latter kind upon which the earliest poets seem to have depended mainly for their effects. . . . Attempts to cause poetry to represent its meaning through the use of mere sounds were very limited until long after the period of the most ancient poetry. Rhythm, assonance, alliteration, rhyme, and particularly what are termed the tunes of verse, and the selection of different metres for the presentation of different sentiments and subjects, were all of them more or less late developments in the history of the art.—*Essay on Music as Related to the Other Arts*.

The general result is represented in poetry through the use of articulated words, and in music through the use of inarticulated tones. Words represent conceptions which are sufficiently intelligible to be clearly defined. Tones represent conceptional tendencies, which are not always sufficiently intelligible to be clearly defined. The consequent difference between the effects of the two arts is this: Both influence the imagination, and, while doing so, conjure pictures which pass in review before it; but while poetry indicates definitely what these pictures shall be, music leaves the mind of the listener free to determine this, the same chords inclining one man, perhaps, to think of his business, and another of his recreation; one of a storm at sea, and another of a battle-field. Now notice a further fact,—that words make thought definite because they appeal to the imagination as is done through the sense not only of hearing but also of sight; and this, not only because they can be printed as well as spoken, but because, as a rule, they refer to objects, as in the cases of *hut*, *farm*, *road*, and *horse*; or to actions, as in the cases of *come*, *go*, *stop*, and *hurry*; or to other conditions, as in the cases of *near*, *far*, *with*, and *by*, that can be seen, and that are seen by imagination whenever the words are used. Musical tones, on the contrary, appeal to imagination almost exclusively as is done through the sense of hearing irrespective of sight. This is a difference

which is radical, and extremely important. Poetry of the highest order, as we read it, calls attention to visible objects. Through doing so the lines transport us into a realm of imagination, and this not of our own making, as in music, but of the poet's making. So far as he fails to lift us into this realm, and to keep us in it, his poetry fails of one of its most important possibilities. Notice in the following how clean-cut and concrete every figure is, how it stands out in relief, rising visually before the mind, the moment that the words are heard. . . . In much modern poetry, musical effects are either entirely substituted for visual effects, or are allowed to overbalance the visual to such an extent as to obscure them. This is one reason why poetry is so little read, and has so little influence, in our own times.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, ix.

One takes up a magazine or a book of the day, and sees type arranged in the form of verse. He notices in the successions of syllables an abundance of music, perhaps. But the writers have evidently forgotten—not wholly but largely—that which, when poetry began, gave it its nature and value. In what he reads, he finds little visualizing of invisible thought, little formulation of unformed suggestions, little projection of definite ideas from regions of indefiniteness, little illuminating truth shining out brilliant as a star from vague depths of apparently unfathomable significance. He can read page after page of this modern so-called poetry from which it is hardly possible to obtain by mining a single word or phrase such as is everywhere on the surface, and which the most casual glance reveals sparkling like a gem, not only in the products of the ancient classic poets, but of all the great modern poets like Dante, Shakespeare, and Goethe.—*Essay on Music as Related to Other Arts*.

I used to wonder why it was that foreign critics—French and German—almost universally fail to assign very high rank to the poetry of Tennyson, while they do assign it to that of Byron. I am quite sure now that the line of thought just suggested, explains, in part at least, both facts. The depreciation of Tennyson seems to be owing to his overbalancing appeal to the imagination through the methods of sound. Those not familiar with the sounds of English words and the more subtly associated suggestions of these

sounds often fail to recognize his artistic qualities. Tennyson, however, was a great poet. His work very frequently appeals to the imagination through the methods of sight.—*Essay on The Literary Artist and Elocution.*

In the following, for instance, all of us will be conscious of a musical flow of syllables, but most of us will not be conscious of seeing images rise in succession before the imagination; we shall not be lifted into that realm of visual surroundings to which it is the peculiar province of poetry to transport one. On thinking it over, too, we shall probably recognize that the same could be said of much of the ordinary—the very ordinary—poetry of the present, though it, too, is often extremely musical.—*Idem.*

In poetry, the sounds of the words have little to do with poetic achievement except so far as by being picturesque—individually and collectively—they represent the forms—some of them audible it is true, but most of them merely visible—that are moving forward and carrying to successful development that which is in the poet's imagination. I once heard a remark attributed to the French dramatist, Scribe, to the effect that when he was composing he always seemed to be looking at his characters moving before him on the stage. This tendency to think by describing what appears to be seen, is common, in fact, probably necessary, to all those who produce works of the imagination. It is because of the ability to perceive inward experiences as if they were outwardly present, that many great poets—and some of the very greatest—poets like Dante and Milton, have been what we may term natural, if not proficient, mathematicians, or, at least, geometricians. In speaking of University experiences at Cambridge, you may recall what Wordsworth says of

The pleasures gathered from the rudiments
Of geometric science. . . .

—*Essay on Teaching in Drawing.*

POETRY AS PRODUCING MUSIC.

There is no doubt, too, that this influence of music upon poetry has, to an extent, been beneficial. At the same time nothing human, whether we apply the term to character or to characteristics, is ever wholly benefited in case external agencies be allowed to master traits peculiar to its own individuality. Poetry whose distinctive features are sub-

ordinated to those of music or of any other art, may become unpoetic; and if they be only partly subordinated, it may become partly unpoetic. No form of influence that a man can exert in this world is so certain to prove successful that, in his efforts to produce it, he can afford to ignore the importance of concentration.—*Essay on Music as Related to Other Arts.*

How can one be expected to appreciate that which has caused poets like Shakespeare, Milton, or Tennyson to put their thoughts into verse, if his ear have never been made acquainted by nature or by training with the relations and the meanings of sounds? Upon such a man, all the time and the care that these poets have expended in arranging their words in another form than prose have been wasted.—*Essay on The Literary Artist and Elocution.*

With all this preponderating devotion to the supposed requirements of form, there appears to be, both in Pope and Dryden, a marked absence of any desire to produce the finer qualities of sound, like those of assonance, phonetic syzygy, and gradation, which make poetry really musical. With all their transpositions, they never succeeded in producing the purely melodious effects of Tennyson and Longfellow.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, XIII.

POETRY, BASED ON COMPARISON.

Poetry results, . . . when the motive which previously has influenced the thought indefinitely, and which therefore could be represented appropriately in only indefinite or inarticulate sounds, reaches the region of definite thought. . . . It seems to be a necessary condition of definite thought, that there should be, in the first place, conceptions already in the mind, and, in the second place, a motive owing to the influence of which they are revealed to consciousness. Ordinarily a man conceives of both the conceptions and the motive as one. He does so, however, according to the same principle that leads him, when he sees ice moving in the river, to say that the water is moving. The two things, ice and water, are different. It is the mind that unites them. At the same time, thought is conscious, all the while, that they are two things, and not one. The motive in poetry, as in music, sweeps the emotions onward to instinctive action. But in poetry, the ideas, caught up in the tide, clearly repeat, or, as we may say, reinforce the motive; and that which

causes the mind to consider both motive and idea as one thing and not two is the fact that, with, of course, some contrasts, they compare together, and also the fact that the mind is conscious that they do this. Conscious comparison, therefore, rather than the unconscious phases of it and of association that lead to the developments of music, lies at the basis of poetry.—*Art in Theory*, XVIII.

POETRY, HOW DEVELOPED.

Similar facts are true of poetry. A man like an animal could express his actual wants in a few different sighs, cries, grunts, and hisses. But from these he develops, in their various forms, the innumerable words and phrases that render possible the nice distinctions of language. These words and phrases are often freshly invented by the poets, and they are almost always invented as a result of what is recognized to be the poetic tendency latent in all men. As for poems considered as wholes, their metres or rhymes are never produced as immediate subjective utterances, such as we hear in ordinary speech. They are always the work of the imagination, bringing together the results of experience and experiment, according to the method termed composition. In other words, even aside from the fact that they are usually written or printed, but necessarily when considered in connection with this, they evidently involve the construction of an external product. Nor can we explain their existence at all, except by attributing them to the intense and unadulterated satisfaction which the poet derives from elaborating them, not for ends of material utility, but for effects of beauty that pertain only to themselves.—*Idem*, VIII.

POETRY, HOW ITS REPRESENTATION INFLUENCES THOUGHT.

Poetry, as we have found, is an art; and art does not consist of thoughts, explanations, or arguments concerning things, but of substituted realities representing them; and there can be no legitimate re-presentation, except of what may be supposed to be perceived. If, for instance, certain persons are doing certain things, one will probably draw some inferences from their actions with reference to their motives, and he will have a right to tell his inferences—in prose; but not, as a rule, in poetry. In this, he must picture what he has observed, and leave others, as free as he himself has been, to infer what they choose. At the same time,


in the degree in which he is an artist, his picture will be of such a character as to impel others to draw from it the same inference that he himself has drawn.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, xx.

POETRY, ITS LANGUAGE IN A SCIENTIFIC AGE.

As a language grows conventional and scientific, it loses much of its imaginative and poetic force. When men have arbitrary symbols to express precisely what they wish to say, their fancies do not search for others to suggest what, at best can but vaguely picture it. We hear them speak of engines and of locomotives, not of "horses breathing fire." . . . Amid circumstances like these must poetry succumb? If not, in what way can the poet overcome them? Certainly in one way only—by recognizing his conditions, and making the most of the material at his disposal. He must use a special poetic diction. In doing this two things are incumbent on him. The first is to choose from the mass of language words that have *poetic associations*. All our words convey definite meanings not only, but accompanying suggestions; and some of these are very unpoetic. . . . But there is a second thing incumbent on the poet. . . . He must choose from the mass of language words that embody *poetic comparisons*,—choose them not only negatively, by excluding terms too scientific or colloquial, which, with material and mean associations, break the spell of the ideal and spiritual; but positively, by going back in imagination to the view-point of the child, and (either because arranging old words so as to reveal the pictures in them, or because originating new expressions of his own) by substituting for the commonplace that which is worthy of an art which should be æsthetic.—*Idem*, xvii.

POETRY, ITS LANGUAGE NOT NECESSARILY FIGURATIVE.

Direct pure representative poetry, as has been intimated, pictures to the mind, without the use of figurative language, a single transaction or series of transactions in such a way as to influence the thoughts of him who hears the poetry, precisely as they would have been influenced had he himself perceived the transaction or series of transactions of which the poetry treats. The works of Homer, as in fact of all the classic writers, are filled with examples of this kind of representation.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, xx.



St. Isaac's, Petrograd

*See pages 4, 9, 10, 12, 73, 81-85, 89, 91, 162, 223-225, 301, 316,
323-327, 385*



POETRY, ITS LANGUAGE *vs.* PROSE.

Poetic form necessitates a peculiar selection and arrangement of words and phrases. But if these violate the laws of natural expression or of grammatical construction, as exemplified in the language of prose, their meanings may be obscured entirely, or, if not so, will, at least, be conveyed through forms that seem artificial. It was for these reasons that Wordsworth argued that there should be no difference between the language of poetry and of prose. In his own practice he sometimes carried out his theory only too faithfully; but a truth underlay it, which always needs to be borne in mind. The problem in connection with all versification is, how to arrange words. . . . so as to produce. . . . rhythmical and musical effects, without impairing, somewhat, the naturalness of the phraseology. The departures from naturalness, in order to satisfy the demands of sound, usually manifest themselves in one of five different ways, viz: in the *insertion*, the *transposition*, the *alteration*, the *omission*, or the *misuse* of words. —*Idem*, XIII.

When we get to the bottom of the subject, that which distinguishes prose from poetry is that the latter influences us through the use of *imitation* or through *imaging*. As shown on pages 208 to 212 of "Poetry as a Representative Art," we can present the thoughts and feelings which an appearance of nature suggests, in ordinary language, *i. e.*, in prose, if we choose. But if so, we seldom present them artistically, or poetically. We do the latter only when we repeat the methods of nature, and re-present that which nature presents. Just as we re-present the natural inflections of the voice in musical melody, the figures and scenes of nature in painting and sculpture, so in poetry, we re-present through descriptive or figurative language. In one sense it is true, as the modern so-called Aristotelians tell us, that the effects of art, even in poetry, do not depend upon the subject. They depend upon the appeal which the subject makes to the imagination, and this depends upon the *imaging*, or upon what Aristotle terms the *imitation*. At times, but only at times, the subject itself is such that necessarily, the moment it is presented, the imagination thinks of a picture. At other times this is not the case. When it is not, the poet, through the use of *imitative* or *imaging* language,

or, as we say, of figurative language, must make the different parts of the subject seem picturesque.—*Art in Theory, Appendix III.*

POETRY, ITS PRACTICAL UTILITY.

This interpretation of the meaning of nature, natural and human, by those who have learned to interpret it, while striving to have it convey their own meanings, lies at the basis of all the practical uses of poetry. Therefore it is that its products bring with them an atmosphere consoling and inspiring, both enlightening and expanding the conceptions and experiences of the reader. Just as each specific application of Christianity,—all its warnings, consolations, and encouragements, which develop purity within and righteousness without, in the individual, in society, or in the state, spring from the one general conception of universal and divine love manifested in the form of the Christ, so do all the specific applications of poetry spring from the one general conception of universal and divine truth manifested through the forms of material and human nature.—*Poetry as a Representative Art, XXVIII.*

POETRY vs. ELOCUTION.

Viewed in itself, poetry is an end,—a series of words representing the comparative processes of imagination. Viewed in connection with elocution, poetry is a means. If a written product happen to suggest acting, this fact alone, irrespective of its merit as poetry, may commend it to the elocutionist. It follows therefore that the subject-matter of each of the two arts must be judged by a different standard,—a fact which, if regarded, would save our critics of poetry many a slip, and our orators many an hour uselessly employed in the vain attempt to produce an oratorical effect through the medium of that which is distinctively poetic. It is logic aimed to affect reason and will, rather than analogy aimed to affect imagination and sentiment, that renders the oration powerful. The poetic end is important; but not in circumstances where the essential matter is to influence reason and will.—*The Representative Significance of Form, XXVI.*

POETRY vs. LOGIC.

Poetry does not reveal truth to us in logic, but in light.—*Poetry as a Representative Art, XXIV.*

POETRY *vs.* MUSIC, GENESIS OF EACH.

When a man, or any living creature, gives vocal expression to moods that control him, there are two distinct forms which this may assume, both of which, however, all creatures cannot always produce. The sounds may be either sustained or unsustained. A dog, for instance, howls, and also barks; a cat purrs and also mews; a bird warbles and also chirps; a man sings and also talks. If these forms be at all representative, the sustained sounds must represent something sustained, and the others something not sustained. As a rule, an internal mental process is continued or sustained because it is not interrupted. As a rule, too, that which interrupts is external to the thoughts and feelings which constitute the factors of this process. Interrupt the creature producing the sustained sounds,—go out at night and speak to your howling dog, take the milk from a purring cat, the nest from a warbling bird, or the plaything from a singing child, and at once you will hear sounds of the other form,—barking, mewling, chirping, or scolding in words. We may say, therefore, that the sustained form is mainly subjective, or spontaneous, and that the unsustained form is mainly relative or responsive. Birds and men instinctively sing to meet demands that come from within; they instinctively chirp or talk to meet those that come from without. The singing sounds continue as long as their producer wishes to have them; the chirping and talking sounds are checked as soon as they have accomplished their outside purpose, and are continued only by way of reiteration or else of change, in order to suit the changing effects that they are perceived to have upon the creatures or persons toward whom they are directed. It is not essential that the sustained, singing sounds should convey any definite intelligence to another, because there is no intrinsic necessity that he should understand them. But the unsustained sounds must convey definite intelligence, because this is their object.

These two conditions respectively correspond, as will be observed, to those that underlie effects in music and in poetry. It is to be shown, in the discussion which follows, that there is a sense in which the former art as well as the latter is representative; but it is important to notice that the two arts are not representative of the same conditions. Therefore they do not represent in the same

way nor to the same degree either mind or nature. Music gives expression to certain classes of sustained and subjective moods, joyous or sad, concerning which there is no outside or objective reason for imparting any specific or definite information. The moment intelligence of a particular mood needs to be communicated thus, as in cases of outside emergency of an ordinary character, or of those exciting one to extraordinary petulance or rage, then the dog barks, the bird chirps, and the man, in order to make himself distinctly understood, uses his throat, tongue, and lips in the various ways that cause the distinct articulation which characterizes words.

It is important to notice, too, that this difference distinguishable between the lowest and most elementary forms of these two methods of vocal representation is the only one that is fundamental. All the other distinctions that can be made between sounds characterize alike those of song and of speech. As will be shown in the following chapter, sounds differ in *time*, *force*, *pitch*, and *quality*. According to the first, one sound may have more duration than another. Artistically developed, in connection with force, this difference leads to rhythm. But there is rhythm in poetry as well as in music. According to the second, one sound may be louder than another. But this kind of emphasis is as common in conversation as in chanting. According to the third, one sound may be higher in the musical scale than another. Artistically developed, this leads to tune. But the voice rises and falls in speaking as well as in singing. According to the fourth, one sound may be more sweet and resonant than another. But the differences between pure, orotund, guttural, pectoral, and aspirated tones, are as decided as are those between the tones in different parts in singing and between the characters of the sounds produced by different musical instruments.

When we come to use the word *sustained*, however, we can say that in music a tone is sustained in time, with a degree of force, at one pitch, and with one kind of quality, in a sense that is not true as applied to speaking. We may use articulated words in a song, yet there is a radical difference between singing them and talking them; and so far as concerns merely musical effects, these can be produced, as is often the case not only in instrumental but

even in vocal music, without any of the effects produced by articulation.

It is possible to separate even more clearly the original germ of musical representation from that of poetry. As shown in Chapter XX. of "Art in Theory," the elementary tendency mainly developed in music, is found in those instinctive and always inarticulate ejaculations or more prolonged utterances, as of fright or of pleasure, which are natural to a man, and these utterances, when, intentionally or artistically repeated for purposes of expression, come to mean what they do in fulfilment of the principle of *association*. The elementary tendency mainly developed in poetry is found in those forms of articulation used after expression ceases to be wholly instinctive and becomes reflective; and in these forms of articulation, as shown in Chapter I. of "Poetry as a Representative Art," a man begins to imitate what he hears and to make his utterances mean what they do in fulfilment of the principle of *comparison*. At the same time, as pointed out in the same place, association and comparison are closely allied; and, even when they are most different, expression is developed with completeness in the degree only in which it manifests some traces of both.

Even speech, for instance, while meaning what it does on account mainly of articulation, is, in part, also dependent, precisely as is music, upon that which is not articulation—but what we term intonation. A babe too young to talk, a foreigner using a language unknown to us, or a friend talking at such a distance that his words are indistinguishable, can each, notwithstanding this disadvantage, reveal to us something of his meaning. We can tell from his tones, aside from his words, whether he be excited or calm, elated or depressed, pleased or angered, earnest or indifferent. The effects thus produced spring, evidently, from a natural tendency which causes the movements or directions—what we might term the general methods of the voice—to correspond to those of the motives that actuate one.

On account of this expressional tendency to fulfil, either by way of association or of comparison, what may be termed *the principle of correspondence*, the intonations of speech may be said to be, in a true sense, representative. All of us must be aware that an acquaintance can be recognized in the dark largely because his conversation is characterized

by similar ways, at certain definite intervals, of moving and checking and pitching his utterances; in other words, because he has a certain rhythm and tune of his own. Make one a public speaker or a reciter of stories, like the minstrel of former ages, and these movements of the voice will be made by him with more art and more regularity. Hence the origin of rhythm, as well as of chanting, among those story-tellers who were the first poets. Make the rhythm a little more marked and regular and arranged in clauses of the same length, on the principle of putting like with like, and we have verse. Make the rhythm still more marked, by the use of similar sounds at regular intervals, and we have rhyme. Vary the rhythm to express different ideas or classes of ideas, and we have the various kinds of metre. Vary the rhythm still more, as well as the upward and downward movements of the voice constituting the tune or chant, and, in connection with this, pass from unsustained to sustained tones, and we have a musical melody. "We are justified in assuming," says Helmholtz, in Part III., Chapter IX., of the "Sensations of Tone," "that, historically, all music was developed from song. Afterward the power of producing similar melodic effects was attained by means of other instruments, which had a quality of tone compounded in a manner resembling that of the human voice." Of course, in connection with the development of melody and the invention of musical instruments came the arrangement of notes in musical scales and the beginning of harmony; but these have to do not with representation in music, but with the methods of elaborating the form of representation. At present, it is sufficient to notice that, when once we have a melody sung in the notes of a scale, we have but to combine certain of these notes, that is, to sound *do, mi, sol*, not successively but simultaneously, and we have harmony. If, now, we produce both melody and harmony on different musical instruments, and, in connection with these, sing without articulating words, as, in fact, most singers do, we can yet produce intelligible music; or we can cease to use our voices at all, and still do the same.

Evidently, there is nothing to prevent the sounds as thus developed from continuing to be representative. At the same time, as has been intimated, there is no reason why they should be representative in a way as unmistak-

ably distinct and definite as we find in language; and they are not so. Berlioz, we are told, used to amuse himself by singing tunes with Italian words, and waiting till his hearers had demonstrated how successfully the character of the Italian verse had inspired the composer, when he would inform them that the music was from a symphony of Beethoven. We must all have noticed, too, how scores of different sets of words, describing or expressing by no means the same experiences or conceptions, may often, with equal appropriateness, be sung to the same melody. But, while this is so, it is worthy of note that in certain general features, especially in expressing certain phases of feeling, all these verses must be alike. They must all, for instance, be either joyous or sad, or represent either elation or depression. With this general and mainly emotive method of representation, music must be content.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music: Music as a Representative Art*, 1.

POETRY *vs.* PAINTING AND OTHER ART-FORMS (*see* FORM, STUDY OF).

Poetry bears the same relation to the arts of sound that painting and sculpture bear to those of sight. All three are largely imitative. Poetry reproduces in an artistic guise what might be heard in nature, if a man were telling a story, or if several men were conversing. Painting and sculpture reproduce in an artistic guise what might be seen in nature. For this reason it is possible to be interested, though not artistically interested, in the products of each of these arts, on account merely of that which they portray, irrespective of the style or form in which they portray it. But the converse is true with reference to music and architecture. These arts are only slightly imitative, and if we be interested in them at all, it is owing almost entirely to their style or form. But we must not make the mistake of inferring from this fact that style or form is unimportant in the former arts; in other words, that the laws of tone as tone must not be fulfilled in poetry, or of color as color in painting. It is chiefly with reference to poetry that this mistake is likely to be made. Admirers of Whitman might possibly—were they logical, which, fortunately, they are not—be ready to deny that the laws of sound apply to poetry in the same sense as to music. And yet they are

as imperative in the one art as in the other, though, of course, in a different degree and way.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music*, VII.

POPULARITY AS A TEST OF ART.

It is because no soul can sympathize with a conception higher than its own best possibilities that popular art, as a rule, embodies views of life which are common to all men, rather than peculiar to a few. It is because love is universal, that love-stories are the most universally popular. At the same time, of course, popularity is not a sufficient criterion by which to judge of art—any more than of anything else. The value of the popularity depends upon its quality, and, in art, which involves an appeal to intelligence and experience, it depends upon the quality of these.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XIV.

PORTRAIT, WHEN RANKING HIGHEST.

The portrait and the bust, which reproduce the forms of nature most perfectly, are not necessarily entitled to the highest rank; and when they are entitled to it, like the works of Titian or Velasquez, they rank thus not merely on account of the accuracy of their imitation, but also because, in addition to this, they have the quality to which Sir Joshua Reynolds referred when he snapped his fingers, saying of a work, "It wants *that*." No matter, at present, what this quality is. . . . Just now, it is enough for us to recognize that the value of a portrait or a bust does not depend alone upon its accuracy as a copy. Nor, even were this the case, could "natural," as the term is used, be applied to it with any more propriety than to a picture of the Madonna, whom Raphael never saw; or to a landscape of scenes in Greece which Rottmann never beheld; or to a statue of the struggles of a Laocoön, which existed only in the brain of a Virgil.—*Idem*, XII.

PORTRAITS, HOW MADE IDEAL.

It may be said that when any portrait is to be painted, that of which the great artist thinks is not merely outline and color, but the thoughts and emotions which outline and color, in the particular face before him, can be made to suggest. He asks what is the character, and what is the influence upon the mind, of the particular character that is to be portrayed. Take a boy. If he be athletic in his tendencies, his character may be best brought out by stand-

ing him up in a lawn-tennis suit with a racket in his hand: if studious, by sitting him down with a book. In both cases, the pose can be made to tell its own story. In the latter case, if he be gazing up from his book with a dreamy, far-away look in his eyes, the picture, though a portrait, may be made to have all the interest that might attach to an idealization named "The Young Newton," or "The Young Scott"; and, no matter whose boy it may be, he will seem interesting to every one. What makes any portrait the opposite, is less the fact that the person portrayed is uninteresting, than the fact that the artist has not had enough penetration to discover what the traits are that are interesting, uniformly and universally; or the ingenuity to extract them from their lurking-places and reveal and emphasize them.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XIV.

PORTRAITURE, IDEAL.

To go back to portraits. By the exercise of a little brain-work it is always possible, in picturing a person, to introduce something which, without verbal interpretation, will represent, and enable the mind to recognize, his *character*. This causes what is termed ideal portraiture.—*Idem*.

PRACTICAL AIM IN ART-STUDY (see STANDARDS).

In any study of art, however, it must always be borne in mind that to reach a philosophical result is not the sole or the chief aim. This aim is practical; and it was a practical aim that first suggested this series of volumes. At a time when their writer was an author and a teacher, looking for guidance and finding none, most of the criticism of the day, whether of poetry, painting, or architecture, revealed an absence of any standards of judgment, if not a disbelief in the possibility of their existence. Indeed, some of the foremost leaders in criticism took the ground that there are no such standards, an opinion virtually maintained, despite all protests to the contrary, in what are, perhaps, the freshest and most suggestive of the books on æsthetics that have been produced even very lately.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, XXVI.

PRACTICE AND ART-PRODUCTS (see also DRILL, INSPIRED, and SKILL AND REVISION).

It is true, of course, that no amount of practice can enable some to become artists, and that, in exceptional cases or

upon extraordinary occasions, some may produce genuine works of art who have practised little; but, as a rule, practice is indispensable if one wish to attain the characteristics supposed to be possessed habitually by the great artists.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XIII.

PRACTICE AND PROFICIENCY.

In all education, as in musical, in which everyone recognizes the fact, later proficiency is the result of early practice and patience. The expert in using all the elements of sound began his familiarity with them by being introduced to them, one by one, and over and over again, because he could not otherwise remember them; and the thrill that we get when he masters his forces is the direct result of the drill that he got from those who mastered him when a boy.—*Essay on Fundamentals in Education*.

PRACTICE, ITS EFFECTS (*see also* INSPIRED, THE, *and* SKILL).

Exactly what was it that practice had thus done for Beethoven? . . . It had given his fingers muscular flexibility, enabling them to sound upon an instrument whatever notes a composition demanded. But besides this, practice had given the brain controlling his fingers what also we might term flexibility; and it had given the mind, too, lodged in his brain, a mental habit of using the right fingers in the right places, and all the fingers in the right orders of succession. Beyond this, it had enabled his mind to comprehend in a single glance large groups of notes on a printed staff and, no matter how numerous and complex, to send his knowledge of them through the nerves, and transfer them to sound with precision and yet with the rapidity of lightning. Moreover, all this, which, when he began, had involved the slow and painful process of consciously thinking of each note on a printed staff, and of each corresponding key on an instrument, practice had enabled him to do at last unconsciously at the same time that all his conscious powers were employed in giving expression to the general effect.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XIII.

PRACTICE OF ELEMENTS, ESSENTIAL TO PERFECTION.

My theory is, that, in the degree in which any essential characteristic of delivery is defective, there is not a movement of the elbow, wrist, or fingers, of the lungs, larynx, palate, or tongue, which can be freed from defect except as a result of automatic action acquired through a slow and

laborious practice of exercises, every feature of which has been accurately described by the instructor and put into execution by the pupil; for no matter how rapid or how slight a gesture or a tone may be, the eye or the ear will be sure to detect and feel any defect whatever in its expressional quality.—*Essay on The Function of Technique.*

PRINCIPALITY IN ART.

In hearing the song of a bird or a man, we may observe chiefly the time filled by the different tones or their movements up and down the scale; in looking at a tree we may observe chiefly the outlines formed by its leaves, branches, or general contour, or by its color; but whatever we may observe, it seems to be a law of the mind that usually only one of the many features perceived attracts special attention. The fact that this is so, has much to do with causing the song or tree—notwithstanding the different effects of its component parts—to appear to be one thing and not many. That which attracts special attention in these cases—whatever it may be—is that which seems to the observer to have *principality*¹. Everything else, of course, appears *subordinate*,¹ while the degree in which all the factors together—whether principal or subordinate—blend so as to suggest the completeness or equilibrium of the whole gives the measure of the *complement* or *balance*¹.—*The Genesis of Art-Form, III.*

PROGRESS, AS REPRESENTED IN ART.

It is almost impossible to conceive of any painting or statue, however small, in which the *progress*¹ of the idea in its advance to take possession of the whole body of the subject or subjects, might not be represented. In a human figure, the expression of the face may be in advance of that of the arms or hands, the expressions of these in advance of that of the lower limbs, while at the same time the adjustments of the clothing may give scarcely any indications of that which has begun to influence the body underneath it.—*Idem, XVII.*

PROGRESS, REPRESENTED IN ARCHITECTURE.

Nor is it less possible to represent the effects of *progress*¹ in buildings. In many of the English cathedrals the whole development of Gothic architecture from the Norman, through the pointed, decorated, and perpendicular, can be

¹ See page 89 of "An Art-Philosopher's Cabinet."

traced literally in the different forms used in different parts. But progress in such a literal sense is not essential, nor is it always consistent with *unity*¹. When, according to the method of *gradation*¹ described a moment ago, one form of arch is used above the lower openings, and another sharper development of the same over higher openings, and another still sharper over the highest, we have a representation of progress of a more desirable kind. So, too, we have the same in the interior of a cathedral, when the arches above seem to grow like limbs of trees out of the shafts below them, and when the chancel beyond the nave, to which so many lines of the walls and ceiling point, seems, with its finer elaboration of the resources of outline and its grander wealth of color in window and altar, to burst upon the vision like a flower, for which all the rest has furnished only a splendid preparation for unfoldment.—*Idem*, XVII.

PROPORTION (*see also references to the subject under ARCHITECTURE, PERSPECTIVE, and RHYTHM*).

The term proportion, when used in a non-technical sense, signifies frequently little more than measurement. When we say that a house has the proportions of a palace, or a growing boy the proportions of a man, we mean merely that the one is as large as the other, or has the same general measurements. In addition to this, however, there is often connected with the term, when carefully used, a conception of a comparison of measurements. When we say of a man that his feet are out of proportion, or of a copy of a Greek temple, that its pediment is out of proportion, we are probably recalling a normally developed man or an ancient Greek temple. If so, we mean that, in the specimen before us, the measurements of the parts mentioned are not the same as in the specimen of which we are thinking.

There may be two reasons why these measurements are not the same: one reason, because they are absolutely larger or smaller than in this specimen; the other reason, because they are relatively so, a hand or a limb being said to be in proportion because its measurements, whether large or small, bear the same relation to the parts or to the whole of a body that they do in the typical man which is supposed to be the artist's model.

¹ See page 89 of "An Art-Philosopher's Cabinet."

But proportion has still another meaning. From this, any conception of imitation, whether or not suggested by any particular model, is absent; and a part is said to be in proportion because of the relationship which its measurements sustain to the measurements of other parts or to the whole of a product. This seems to be the meaning when we speak of the proportions of the human figure, irrespective of any references to attempts to copy any particular model; and it certainly is the meaning when we speak of the proportions of a building in a style such as has never before had existence, . . . in this sense, proportion includes the ideas, both of ratios or relationships, as in 1:2, and also of likeness or equality in ratios, as in 1:2::3:6.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, II.

The view expressed in Gwilt's "Encyclopedia of Architecture," and still quite prevalent, to the effect that proportion is "but a synonym for fitness," is entirely ignored. This is not because of any undervaluation of the æsthetic importance of fitness, but because it is recognized that this latter characterizes many other artistic arrangements of form, as those of rhythm, tune, and color; and because it is recognized also that no amount of mere fitness could cause, or even suggest, that which is generally meant not only by artists but by people in general when they speak of proportion. When using this term in any strict or technical sense they almost invariably refer to an effect of measurements indicating a certain mathematical relationship between the parts of a product as compared with one another and with the whole.—*Idem*, *Preface*.

Artistic proportion is based in this volume, as all acknowledge rhythm to be, upon the principle of *comparison*. It is held that, fundamentally, measurements go together because they appear to be exactly alike, that is, as 1:1; and that the mind accepts the ratios of certain small numbers that are not alike, like 1:2 or 2:3, because it is able to recognize in the first that which corresponds to 1:1+1, and in the second that which corresponds to 1+1:1+1+1.—*Idem*, *Preface*.

If, however, the relationship be not that of 1:1, the next easiest to recognize is that of 1:2. . . . Nor is it difficult to recognize the relationship of 1:3, as between the second pair of lines in this figure, or of 2:3, as between the third pair.

But it is evident that as the values of the numbers representing the ratios increase, these become less recognizable; as, for instance, when they are as 4:5 or as 5:7, as between, respectively, the fourth and fifth pairs of lines in this Fig. 16. When, at last, we get to a relationship that can be expressed only by large numbers like 10:11, or 15:16, the mind is no longer able to recognize even its existence.—*Idem*, IV.

What has been said will show us a good reason, too, why, as affirmed by W. W. Lloyd in his "Memoir on the Systems of Proportion," published with Cockerill's "Temples of Ægina and Bassæ," p. 64, "the Greek architects attached great value to simple ratios of low natural numbers." Of course, the simpler the ratio, and lower the number, the more easily could each be recognized.—*Idem*, II.

Notice, again, that proportion, as it is thus attributed to measurements that are compared, is merely a statement of a fact; nor is it essential that the mind, before stating this fact, should recognize what the ratio is, only that it has existence. The same principle applies here as in rhythm. To experience the effects of this, we do not need to be able to tell what the metre is—whether long or short, iambic or trochaic—only that there is a metre. But while this is true, the metre must be capable of being analyzed; and we must feel that it is so, although, perhaps, we ourselves do not actually go through with the analytic process. *Idem*, II.

The mind takes satisfaction not in the ratio *per se*, but in that which the ratio enables it to recognize, which is that, in fulfilment of the fundamental art-method, measurements have been put together which are alike as to their parts. . . . This is not the explanation usually given for effects of proportion. But it is the explanation most consistent with that usually given for effects of rhythm; it is the explanation most consistent with all the methods of art as unfolded in "The Genesis of Art-Form" (see also chart on page 89 of the present volume); and, finally, it is the explanation which can render most easy and simple the practical application of the principle to all possible visible effects.—*Idem*, VIII.

As rhythm starts by putting together similar small parts such as feet and lines, and produces the general effect of the whole as a result of the combined effects of these parts, so does artistic proportion. For instance, the height of the front of the Parthenon is to its breadth as 9:14. But we need not consider the architect as aiming primarily at this proportion; or that it is any more than a secondary, though, of course, a necessary result of the relations, the one to the other, of the different separate measurements put together in order to form the whole.—*Idem*, *Preface*.

PROPORTION AND RHYTHM NATURAL TO MAN.

There is no primitive kind of ornamentation, no matter how barbarous the race originating it, of which one characteristic, perhaps the most marked, is not an exact division or subdivision of spaces, the mind, apparently, deriving the same sort of satisfaction from rude lines of paint and scratchings upon stone, made at proportional distances from one another, that it does from the rhythmical sounds drummed with feet, hands, or sticks to accompany the song and dance of the savage.—*Idem*, II.

An appreciation of rhythm is usually supposed to furnish the earliest evidence of æsthetic capability on the part of either a child or a savage. In fact, almost the only form of musical harmony over large sections of the earth to-day continues still to be merely a rude development of rhythm. But what is rhythm? A result of making, by series of noises or strokes, certain like divisions of time—small divisions, and exact multiples of them in large divisions. But the moment that the smaller become so numerous that the fact that they exactly go into the larger divisions is no longer perceptible—as often, when we hear more even than eight notes in a musical measure, or more even than three syllables in a poetic foot,—the effect ceases to be rhythmical. A like fact is true of proportion. Owing to the very great possibilities and complications of outlinings, as in squares, angles, and curves, its laws are intricate and difficult to apply; but, as will be shown in the volume of this series entitled “Proportion and Harmony in Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture,” the harmonic effects of proportion all result, in the last analysis, from exact divisions and subdivisions of space in every way analogous to the methods

underlying the effects of rhythm in time.—*Art in Theory*, XII.

PROPORTION AND RHYTHM RECOGNIZED BY CONSCIOUS MEASUREMENT.

The effect of proportion is attributed in this volume to the mind's *conscious* as distinguished from *unconscious* measurements. This distinction is the logical result of a conception of an essential correspondence between proportion and rhythm. In the latter the mind is always consciously able to count, if it choose, the notes, syllables, feet, bars, lines, phrases—in other words the measures or measurements—which cause the effect. This is the same as to say that proportion in the arts of sight is not, as has been almost universally supposed (see Chapter III.), the analogue of harmony in the arts of sound. Harmony is produced in these arts whenever the number of vibrations *per second* determining the pitch of one tone sustains a certain ratio to the number of vibrations *per second* determining the pitch of another tone. But only the investigations of science have been able to discover that this is the reason for the effect. The mind cannot count the vibrations. It is not conscious of them; but only of an agreeable thrill or glow experienced when different rates of vibration sustain to one another the required harmonic ratio. Now if we go upon the supposition that the measurements determining the effects of proportion are ascertained just as are those determining the effects of harmony, it is evident that we must suppose ourselves dealing with factors of which the mind is unconscious; and must remain ignorant until science has come into possession of certain data not yet discovered. Is it any wonder that those accepting this supposition who have tried to explain the effects, have either held that they cannot be explained at all, or have made attempts at explanation which may be said in a general way to have failed to prove convincing? Is it any wonder that, even when acknowledging that the Greeks once had a knowledge of the subject, very many in our own times, after seeking for this knowledge in wrong directions, have conceived of the subject as hidden in almost impenetrable mystery,—as involving principles which it is well-nigh useless for present artists to attempt either to understand or to apply?—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, Preface.

PROPORTION DEPENDENT ON APPARENT MEASUREMENTS
(see GENERAL AND DISTANT *vs.* SPECIFIC AND NEAR
EFFECTS).

This effect of proportion thus interpreted is further limited in this book by being ascribed to measurements that are *apparent* as distinguished from *actual*. It is shown that we judge of the proportions of the parts of a body or of a building when viewing each from a distance, not when examining it near at hand.—*Idem*, *Preface*.

An apparent measurement necessitates, at times, not only a different result from an actual measurement, but also a different conception of what should be measured. As an instance of a different result, consider how the leg between the heel and the place where it separates from the body is apparently divided at the knee into two equal parts. This is not a result of having the half below the knee of the same length as the half above it. Being slimmer, the lower half would appear longer, were it not in reality slightly shorter. Again, as an instance of a different conception, consider the measurement of the ankle. Ordinarily, we should suppose this to be a dimension determined by its circumference. But, when considering effects of appearances, it is not the circumference that concerns us, but the apparent distance from one side of the ankle to its other side, as it is seen from a single point of view.—*Idem*, VIII.

When a man with a yardstick is measuring, close at hand, the parts of the Parthenon, then, according to the generally accepted representation, he is studying proportion. But he is really doing nothing of the sort. He is studying proportion, when he is standing at a distance from the building and noticing the parts of it, which, from that distance, appear to fulfil the requirements of those comparative measurements which proportion necessitates. When he is close against the building with his yardstick, he is more apt to be learning the differences between measurements as they are, and as, from a distance, they appear to be, the consideration of which differences and the methods of obviating them furnish the subject-matter not of proportion but of perspective. In the case of the Greeks, too, as we shall find, the principles of the latter were applied in order to produce distant appearances of proportion not only, but also of height, breadth, straightness, parallelism, and other

effects, which, in addition to those of proportion, were deemed desirable. As said in the preceding chapter, a chief reason why the requirements of proportion are supposed to be involved in impenetrable mystery, and why, therefore, the neglect of them in our own day is supposed to be excusable, is traceable to this confounding of these two entirely different subjects of inquiry.—*Idem*, IV.

As the principles of proportion have reference to appearances and to these alone, they cannot be fulfilled in a satisfactory way without regard to circumstances. A number of straight lines enclosed within a space, for instance, increase the apparent length of that space in the direction in which they point or incline. Any other spaces containing no such lines, yet intended to appear of equal length with it, ought really, therefore, to be a little longer. Again, if when we are looking at a building a projecting cornice hide part of a wall, window, pediment, or roof that is above the cornice, so that this upper part appears too short or too low to be in good proportion, then, as we shall find was the case in the Parthenon, it must be made longer or higher, no matter what its real measurement may be. The end to be attained is not factors with like or related measurements, but factors that appear to have these.—*Idem*, IX.

Whether applied to exteriors or interiors, the important consideration is that there should be some apparent relationship between the length, height, and breadth. If we perceive that there is such a relationship, our minds are satisfied. If we fail to perceive it, they are confused; the effects are distracting and disquieting. As will presently be shown, the use, on exteriors, of window-caps, string-courses, cornices, pilasters, pillars, and also of some of these, as well as of color and of upholstery in interiors, may sometimes counteract a confusing tendency. But sometimes, too, it cannot; and when needing to suggest relationships that do not really exist, it can never do so except by apparently shortening or lengthening actual dimensions.—*Idem*, IX.

It is well-nigh impossible to distinguish such effects as are attributable to the measurements, from such as are attributable to the outlines that are measured. For instance when one says that the angles described by the coverings over the gable-windows, turrets, and different

parts of the roof in Fig. 27, page 51, are not in proportion, he necessarily refers to appearances produced both by measurements and by shapes. In the mind of the observer, therefore, the two different classes of effects are often confounded.—*Idem*, IX.

PROPORTION DEPENDENT ON APPEARANCES.

A very convincing proof of this may be obtained from the façade of St. Sulpice, Paris. Has any one ever looked at this church without finding himself involuntarily asking why it is that its proportions seem so unsatisfactory? And yet it is not because the measurements, as applied to the building as a whole, violate any of the principles of proportion. The extreme width of each tower is to the width of the space between the towers exactly as 1:2. Could any scheme of ratios be more simple? Why, then, does it not appear so? Why, but because of the five divisions made by the pillars in the space between the towers? How can the mind recognize that each tower's width is to the space as 1:2, or, what is the same thing, as 2:4, when it sees five instead of four divisions in this space? It cannot do so, or, at least, not without at first being confused. Were there a pediment above the cornice over the nave, the apex of this would divide the space there into two equal parts; or were the central door of the nave made more prominent than the two doors each side of it, then the present unfortunate effect would be prevented. But if such changes cannot be made, the mind would be better satisfied, in that it would judge the proportions to be more correct, even on a supposition that they were 2:4, in case there were between the towers only four divisions of the width of the present ones, making the proportions, in fact, less correct.—*Idem*, IX.

PROPORTION, GREEK, MISUNDERSTOOD.

There were many of the dimensions which the modern Hellenist would follow slavishly, which the Greeks used on account not of what they were, but of what they appeared to be. Nor, even admitting that the proportions were used on account of what they were, is it certain that the parts of the buildings which modern students suppose these proportions to determine are the parts which the Greeks intended them to determine. When, for example, the height of a temple, pediment included, is to its breadth as 7:12, or 9:14, is this ratio the cause of these dimensions,

or only an incidental and, therefore, almost accidental result of arrangements for which the cause is to be sought elsewhere,—for instance, in a desire to make the entablature and pediment appear of the same height, and both together to appear to sustain a certain ratio to the columnar space below them?—*Idem*, XI.

PROPORTION IN ARCHITECTURE.

Architecture, like music, deals with forms that to only a limited extent can be said to result from an imitation of nature. In some regards, this fact gives the builder greater freedom for invention than is possible in painting and sculpture. He is not expected to accept forms as he finds them. Like the musician, who is at liberty to shorten and lengthen sounds so as to make them rhythmical, he is at liberty to shorten and lengthen shapes so as to make them proportional. But this fact places him, in some regards, under peculiar restraints. If the effects of the proportion produced by him must depend upon his own invention, it is particularly necessary for him to understand what the right proportions should be. A painter not knowing this may succeed because he may be able to copy accurately the proportions of objects that form his models. But the architect, barring the instances, necessarily limited, in which he may exactly imitate the buildings of others, must design his own forms. In such circumstances, so far as beauty depends on proportion, if ignorant of its requirements, he will fail as certainly as a musician attempting to compose a march, without knowing how to produce rhythm.—*Idem*, IX.

PROPORTION IN ARCHITECTURE, THE RESULT OF EXPERIMENTING.

The Parthenon was not sketched in its completed form upon paper, and then let out to some contractor to be erected in so many months. It took, as some say, ten years, and, as others say, sixteen years to complete it; and most of the marble in it—each column, for instance, with its capital—is said to have been shaped after being lifted to its place. We know that some of the Gothic cathedrals were almost entirely pulled down and rebuilt, because their appearance was not satisfactory. Why should it not have been the same with the Greek temples? In the age in which they were constructed other artists believed—why

should not the architect?—that a man should study upon a product, if he intended to have it remain a model for all the future. It is natural to suppose that the structural arrangements intended to counteract optical defects, or to produce optical illusions, were largely the results of the individual experiments of individual builders. If they were not so, why were they invariably different in different buildings? But if they were so, and if, therefore, it be justifiable to compare the methods of arranging the outlines of these buildings to the methods of arranging outlines according to the laws of perspective in painting, then why is not the general principle which these ancient architects endeavored to fulfil of more practical importance than any particular manner in which, in any particular case, they fulfilled it? More than this, why might not the architects of our own time, by applying, each for himself, as a result of his individual experiments, the same general principle, produce approximately successful results? But these they certainly cannot produce (for reasons stated on page 26) until they get out of their heads the conception that the measurements in the ancient buildings are merely representative—in some mysterious way not possible to fathom—of ratios related to one another as are those of pitch in music. As applied to this case, at least, we have an illustration of how utterly destructive of true practice in art is a false theory.—*Idem*, XIV.

PROPORTION IN ARTISTIC PAINTING OF NATURAL SCENERY.

Natural speech is not always rhythmical, at least not in that higher sense in which it is also metrical. Yet a dramatic poet, in his artistic representation of speech, may make it so. In the same way, why may not a painter or sculptor, whether or not a form or collection of forms manifest proportion in nature, make it do so in his artistic treatment? The main requisite of proportion, as we have found, is to have some apparently like standard of measurement into which certain parts or sets of parts in an object of sight are divided; and there are innumerable methods, not involving any lack of exactness in imitation, through which this result may be attained. Take a mountain scene. A selection of one point of view only a hundred feet away from another may entirely change the suggestion of like divisions afforded by the lines of distant and nearer ridges,

of snow or flora of different characters, or of the borders of lakes or rivers.—*Idem*, VI.

The painting accurately represents nature, and nature deprived of none of its variety. But if the artistic representation did not fulfil the requirements of proportion, it might be no more entitled to be considered a work of art than would be a poem, if devoid of rhythm.—*Idem*.

PROPORTION IN HUMAN FORMS, AND CLOTHING.

To speak of the originator of styles of clothing, it is sometimes supposed that these latter need fulfil no æsthetic principles,—that men will think beautiful any style to which they have become accustomed. But they will not think it beautiful—whatever word they may use in order to express their thought of it; at best, they will merely think it fitting, because it is conventional; and for the same reason, too, they may think any other style inappropriate. But in some way, which possibly they cannot explain, perhaps not even recognize, life for them will be deprived of certain legitimate æsthetic influences, the presence of which might enrich their experience. This statement applies not only to the use of form and color, but also of proportion. How easy it would be to cause the cut of the garments to reveal the four, five, six, or eight parts of equal lengths into which the height of the well proportioned body is divisible! A line below the knee, whether of skirt or breeches; a line at the middle, whether of girdle or waistcoat; a line in the centre of the breast, whether of bodice or vest, together with other lines, always divide the figure satisfactorily.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, VI.

PROPORTION IN HUMAN FORMS, AS DETERMINED BY REAL OR IMAGINED LINES.

When we come to consider the human body it might be supposed that the influence of such lines as are drawn through it or through parts of it, might not be felt because they are not actually present. Nevertheless, because they are ideally present, they have some influence. If, for instance, a person be facing us, it is almost impossible not to suppose an imaginary vertical straight line drawn from the middle of his forehead to the middle of his chin, and if we find this line passing through the middle of his nose, we obtain an impression of regularity which, so far as

concerns it alone, is an aid to the agreeableness and consequent beauty of the effect; but in the degree in which the middle of the nose is out of this vertical line, not only irregularity but ugliness is suggested. A similar tendency of thought causes us to suppose other imaginary vertical straight lines, drawn, at equal distances from this central line; and from them we may gain an impression of relative regularity by noticing to what extent the lines pass through corresponding sides of the face. Besides this, we are prompted to suppose horizontal lines drawn, across the forehead, eyes, and mouth; and from these lines, too, we form judgments with reference to the degrees of regularity. If the hair be farther down on one side of the forehead than on the other, or if the arch of the eyebrows be not symmetrically rounded, or if the sides of the mouth incline downward or upward, or a lip be larger on one side than on the other, we notice the fact. Of course we do this, only so far as we compare the result with that of an imaginary straight line drawn through the feature. The same is true, too, with reference to lines dividing other parts of the body. If one part of an eye or ear or if a neck, or hand, or trunk, or leg, be, relatively to other features of the frame, too long, or too short, we perceive the defect almost immediately; but we can only do it as a result of ideally drawing such lines and measuring and comparing the distances between them. In the same way, the similarity in curvature suggested by the outer lines of calves, thighs, and shoulders, prompts us to imagine similar curves drawn; and in case there be any deviation in outline from conformity to a segment of one of these curves, the eye will observe the fact; and the parts of the contours about which they are described will not seem to be constructed on the same lines, as we say, and, therefore, will not seem to be in proportion. So much as to the general principles in accordance with which such lines are made the basis of æsthetic judgments, either because they are actually delineated or are merely imagined.—*Idem*, VII.

For instance, take the outlining conditions of pictures produced upon stained glass, especially in windows. Such windows are always constructed on a network of bars which cannot be hidden; and these necessitate dividing whatever is represented on the glass into certain parts. Why has it

never occurred to artists to have these bars divide human forms, when crossing them, into parts of like longitudinal dimensions? Straight lines, cannot give us, perhaps, the most important indication of the measurements determining the proportions of the human form. But such lines can give us some indication, and, so far as they do this, the artist, alive to his opportunities, will utilize them, it being an elementary principle in art that its necessary limitations should be made to add to its effectiveness.—*Idem*, VI.

PROPORTION IN HUMAN FORMS INDICATED BY LIKE CURVES.

Figures of various outlines can be made to seem to be in proportion, when they are, or can be, framed not only in like rectangles, but in any like figures whatever. The rectangle is used as an actual or ideal standard of comparison merely as a matter of convenience. It is comparatively easy to recognize whether or not straight lines, such as rectangles have, are of the same lengths, or are the same distances apart, or have, in other regards, other measurements that are in proportion. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the standard of measurement is, or, in all cases, can be rectangular. Take the human form. It is ordinarily divided into equal parts by horizontal lines, and these lines are undoubtedly an aid in determining the proportions. But, as will be shown on page 68, effective aid may be afforded by circles also. . . . There is a reason for the use of these circles as a standard of measurement derived from the physiological requirements of the eye, especially in binocular vision. This reason will be found unfolded in Chapter XVI. Here it is sufficient to say . . . that when all the circumferences of the circles described about the same figure are the same, the eyes are supposed to be focussed for distinct vision at exactly the same distance. At a certain distance from the form, for instance, all the circles are of one size, but nearer than this all of them are of another size. . . .

A very interesting illustration of the aid afforded by. . . the perception of the fact that like is put with like, may be observed in . . . the curve which Ruskin, in his "Modern Painters," declares to be the most common in nature. The curve is one so described as to show a constant tendency to become straight, although never becoming straight. . . .

. . . Any one who will go over any representations of the human figure with compasses will be surprised to find how large a part of a segment of exactly the same curve fits either the bend of the calf, forearm, thigh, abdomen, chest, or back. If then his experience—say at a bathing-place—causes him to recall the æsthetic influences of such formations as a long arm or leg combined with great leanness, or a small chest combined with an abnormally large abdomen, he will find upon reflection that the effects of disproportion, while attributable partly to association, are also attributable partly to a recognition of an absence of like curves. Or, to illustrate this fact from a contrary condition, everybody admires a small ankle and a good-sized calf. Yet the moment the calf becomes so large proportionately as to interfere with the suggestions of a like curve in this, and in the outlines of the hip, almost everybody is conscious of receiving a suggestion of disproportion.—*Idem*, v.

PROPORTION *vs.* PERSPECTIVE (*see also* GENERAL AND DISTANT *vs.* SPECIFIC AND NEAR EFFECTS, *and* PERSPECTIVE).

As indicated in either opinion or production, the artistic intelligence of our own time has, as yet, scarcely an apprehension, and no comprehension whatever, of that which is acknowledged to have formed the chief visual excellence of Greek art. The author is convinced that this fact is owing almost wholly to a misunderstanding of the aims of proportion, together with a confounding of it with perspective.—*Idem*, *Preface*.

It will be recognized that the supposition that all these buildings were constructed with primary reference to producing a certain apparent effect when viewed from some point or points at a distance, is the only one that can furnish the same reason, and a sufficient one, for all the different methods of producing these effects,—methods as different, for instance, as that in the forward curve of the entablature and as in the upward curve of the entablature or of the stylobate. Moreover, such a supposition is the only one that can give the same reason, and a sufficient one, for the application of the same method in order to produce the same effects, yet with almost infinite differences in measurements, in different temples. Here are some of these measurements . . . they probably have nothing to do with proportion, *per se*, but merely with producing the appear-

ances to which, after being made to appear as they do, the principles of proportion apply. The best clue to the interpretation of these irregularities seems to be afforded by the methods of introducing perspective into painting. It is not considered necessary in this latter art to apply the laws of perspective with mathematical exactness. Each draftsman, in arranging his outlines, feels at liberty to stand off from his drawing, and, as a result of repeated examinations and experiments, to use his own ingenuity. Indeed, even if these laws were applied with mathematical exactness, the required measurements would differ with every foot by which a man stood nearer to his product, or farther from it. Precisely so in architecture . . . as Vitruvius says, very unequivocally, in book iii., chapter iii., "To preserve a sensible proportion of parts, if in high situations or of colossal dimensions, we must modify them accordingly, so that they may appear of the size intended." —*Idem*, XIV.

Every painter knows that colors and shadows as examined close at hand in the external world often differ greatly from what they appear to be to one who judges of them by the image on the retina. To him an actually checkered surface may appear to be of a single color, and a color, owing to the influence of surrounding hues, may appear unlike that which it actually is. The same fact is true with reference to outlines. The eye is rounded and therefore the mind behind it sees everything through a rounded surface. If one look into a convex mirror he will find all of the dimensions of the natural world slightly altered. As a rule, for instance, the straight upward lines of a square object with its base on the middle line of the mirror will appear not to be parallel but to approach one another. The effects in the mirror merely exaggerate the effects already exerted upon nature by the rounded formation of the eye. As applied to natural surroundings, we become accustomed to these effects and never judge lines to be curved or lacking in parallelism merely because they are so in the image on the retina. On the contrary, unless they were so in this image, we should judge the lines to be neither straight nor parallel. Accordingly, when men try, as in drawing a picture, to reproduce the appearance of such an image, it becomes important for them to carry out what are termed

the laws of linear perspective. These are laws, as will be explained in Chapter XIV., in accordance with which all the outlines of an artificial image, whether drawn, painted, carved, or constructed, or however changed in size, are made among other things to sustain somewhat the same relations as in an image naturally produced on the retina.

Notice, moreover, that to fulfil these laws of perspective so as to make this artificial image correspond to the image in the eye is one thing; and that to make the respective dimensions of this image appear to fulfil, each to each, the laws of proportion is another thing. Yet it is quite easy and natural to confound the two. We need not be surprised, therefore, to find them almost invariably confounded in theories of proportion, especially in those which have had most influence in causing men to think that the subject is too complex and mysterious for solution. Those who have advanced these theories have failed to recognize that the analogue of proportion is not harmony but rhythm. Moreover, as rhythm is an effect of the conscious action of the mind, its general principles are comparatively easy to ascertain; and, by carrying out the analogies suggested by them, the explanation of the effects of proportion may be rendered comparatively easy. But the processes through which the ear becomes cognizant of the harmonic relations between musical notes and chords are difficult to ascertain, for the very reason that the mind is not conscious of these processes. No wonder, therefore, that a theory identifying with them those of proportion by which the mind, through the eye, becomes cognizant of the relations existing between spaces, should involve difficulties.—*Idem*, III.

QUALITY (*see* REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS OF COLORS, *and* REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS OF TONES).

RANK OF A WORK OF ART.

The rank of a work of art is determined not only by its aim, but by the degree in which it attains this aim, whatever it may be; and the higher the aim, the more difficult often is it to reach. But just as a drama, if successful, is greater than a ballad, so a painting in which the representation of thought and emotion is directly necessitated, is greater than one in which this is not the case.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XIV.

READING, TO ACQUIRE LITERARY STYLE.

Most of us know that a good literary style is cultivated by acquaintance with good literature even more than by studying rhetoric, in however excellent a manual; and we know, too, that no small part of the beneficial influence of this literature, whether oratory or poetry, is derived from testing how it sounds, which involves getting the benefit of its distinctively elocutionary effects.—*Essay on The Principles of Writing and Speaking the Same.*

REALISTIC ART (*see* EPIC, *etc.*).

REFLECTIVE AND INSTINCTIVE MENTAL ACTION IN ART-WORK.

By instinctive mental processes are meant those which are conducted according to unconscious methods, and are analogous, for this reason, to the results of the promptings of instinct in the lower animals. It is in this instinctive way that the child utters ejaculations, to which, as shown on page 4, certain of our words owe their origin, and it is in the same way that melodies and verses are sometimes composed, singing themselves into existence, the musician or poet hardly knowing how or whence they come. In the same way, too, children and the uncultivated gesture, and even draw and carve and build, the action of mind in the elementary processes of these arts not being essentially different from that in which the bees or birds or beasts construct their honeycombs or nests or dens. But poetry and music deal also with words, notes, and phrases, originated with a clear reflective consciousness of surrounding phenomena with which, by way of imitation or description, the sounds used in the arts are made to compare. It is the same in the arts of sight. What is there constructed by an animal showing thought and discrimination,—and, in this sense, reflection with reference to surrounding appearances—of the same quality as that which characterizes the forms used in painting, sculpture, and architecture? It is owing, more than to anything else, to this *reflective* action of the mind, working according to the calculating methods of reason that, even though general conceptions of paintings, statues, or buildings may result from sudden and *instinctive* inspirations, all of them, if works of art, are, as a rule, produced slowly, and with a clear conception of the reason for the introduction of each detail.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, I.

REFLECTIVE AS WELL AS INSTINCTIVE MENTAL ACTION IN
ART-WORK.

Of course, all nature has some effect upon the mind, whether or not one is distinctly conscious of the fact. It is conceivable, therefore, that a picture composed with no higher purpose than that of exact imitation might prove—just as would the natural scene which it imitates—exceedingly significant. Many a man who desires to do no more than tell a good story in a tale or a ballad does this so graphically that it is as full of imaginative suggestiveness as if he had intended to make it so. The same result follows in landscape painting. The art of a product must be judged by the effect which it produces, not by the method of producing this. If a painter happen to select a suggestive scene, his imitation of it may be equally suggestive. But it is simply a fact, and one that needs always to be borne in mind, that notwithstanding some exceptional successes of this kind, no story-teller or painter can, as a rule, produce a series of successful products except as a result of an intelligent adaptation of artistic means to artistic ends.—*Idem*, XIV.

REGULARITY IN ART (*see also* IRREGULARITY).

The two sides of even a very symmetrical tree do not exactly correspond, and a tree depicted in art is most apt to have the appearance of life, if the same be true of it. The two sides of a man's body are more nearly alike than those of a tree; but in the degree in which he possesses life and consequent grace, they will, while suggesting likeness, be made unlike by the positions which he assumes.—*The Genesis of Art-Form*, XI

A picture in which paths or trees or bridges are arranged in uninterrupted rows as geometrically regular as the threads of a spider's web, seems to be in the highest degree unnatural. Even though a literal copy of some park in actual existence, we feel like blaming the artist for not choosing to copy a scene giving more evidences of nature as God left it. In this, we should usually find places where lawns, bushes, forests, rivers, hills, or other paths, trees, or hedges crossed or stopped the straight lines, or made them bend away in other directions.—*Idem*, XIV.

REGULARITY IN ART, WHAT IT MEANS (*see also* BEAUTY HUMAN, *and* PROPORTION IN HUMAN FORMS).

In the arts of sight, regularity is a result, primarily, of

like effects produced by measurements, just as in poetry and music it is a result of like effects produced by measures. As outlines surround both spaces and shapes, these like effects may be produced by resemblances either in the one or in the other. For instance, if, in a door, a square panel alternate with a circular one, and the opposite sides of the square be the same distance apart as those of the circle, *i.e.*, if the diameters of both figures have the same measurements, then men consider this arrangement an illustration of regularity, though the likeness is in the spaces occupied not in the shapes occupying them; or if in a human face there be the same distance or measurement between the hair of the forehead and the eyes, and between the eyes and the nostrils, and between the nostrils and the chin, men say that the features, so far as this fact can make them so, are regular, though there is likeness only in spaces not in shapes. But the term is applied sometimes to shapes alone. When each part of a curve or angle, as in an arch over a window, bears the same relations to the whole, that each part of another curve or angle bears to another whole, which nevertheless occupies less space; or when one part of a curve or an angle is like another part of the same curve or angle, as is sometimes the case with the curve over the eyebrows; or is related in the same way to some third feature, as the eyebrows are to the nose,—in these cases, too, because the mere shapes are alike, there is said to be regularity.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, VI.

REGULARITY IN NATURE AND ART

The impression that we most *instinctively* form of nature, so far as man has not touched it, is that of irregularity. As a rule, this and nothing else is what mountains, valleys, rocks, lakes, whether we consider their outlines or arrangements, seem to us to illustrate. For this reason, in a thoroughly successful painting of nature, the contours of hills, dales, rivers, foliage, and the forms of animals and men are never arranged along the lines of a framework with a too inflexible regard for such characteristics as radiation, parallelism, or balance¹; or, if they be, these methods are concealed so as not to be recognizable without study. Otherwise, the result would seem not even artistically

¹ See page 89 of this volume.


natural but unnatural and artificial, regularity of outline being almost invariably an indication of the effects upon natural appearances of the *reflective* characteristics of man. This can be exemplified equally from landscape gardening and landscape painting. An artist, especially one of an early historic period, is almost as likely to arrange bushes and trees in symmetrical groups, if not rows, in the latter art as in the former, provided he can find or imagine a viewpoint from which this can be done; and, when depicting living beings capable of being moved about, he is sure to arrange them thus. Even in most imitative paintings, he sometimes changes the outlines of hills and valleys, or, if he cannot do this, he introduces regularity through the use of color. When it comes to architecture, where he is left free to design the whole appearance, regularity is usually the main characteristic.—*Idem*, vi.

RELIGION AIDED BY ART (*see* ARTISTS *vs.* SEERS).

It would be a mistake to suppose, however, that art, because different from religion, is antagonistic to it. The truth is just the contrary. It can be said, almost without qualification, that in all times of extreme traditionalism and unenlightenment art has proved the only agency that, without offending ignorance and superstition, has been able to counterbalance their influence. It has done this by using the forms of nature, and contenting itself with the truth as represented in them. Guised in familiar aspects, appealing to the mind by way of suggestion which leaves the imagination free to surmise or to deduce whatever inference may appeal to it, the thoughts expressed in art do not, as a rule, repel even the most prejudiced, or excite their opposition. A man in Italy, in the thirteenth century, would have been sent to the stake if he had made a plain statement to the effect that a pope could be kept in hell, or a pagan admitted to paradise. Yet when Dante pictured both conditions in his great poem, how few questioned his orthodoxy! So with the themes of painting and of sculpture. What a rebuke to the bigotry and the cruelty of the Middle Ages were the countless products of the arts of those periods, pleading constantly to the eye against the savage customs of the times for the sweet but little-practised virtues of justice and charity! Within our own century, too, notwithstanding the traditions of society, the State and the

Church, which have often exerted all their powers to uphold and perpetuate slavery, aristocracy, and sectarianism, recall how the modern novel chiefly, but assisted largely by the modern picture, has not only changed the whole trend of the world's thought with reference to these systems, but has contributed, more, perhaps, than any other single cause, to the practical reorganization of them, in accordance with the dictates of enlightened intelligence. Notice, too, that this influence of art extends to the whole region covered by religion, whether pertaining to this world or to the next. In ages like our own, when men rely chiefly upon the guidance of the conscious mind, it is extremely difficult for them to be brought to realize that there is any trustworthy guidance attributable to the action of the subconscious mind. Art does not discuss this guidance, but presupposes it. Through the results of the subconscious mind coalescing with those of the conscious mind it everywhere surrounds the material with the halo of the spiritual, causing those who will not even acknowledge the existence of the latter, to enter upon a practical experience of it in ideas, and to accept, when appearing in the guise of imagination, what they would reject if presented in its own lineaments. So the artist, though not a seer, always has within him the possibility of being the seer's assistant.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, III.

Probably no art-product has ever continued to influence ages succeeding its own, except in the degree in which it has shown itself to be the work of a man deeply interested, as a matter of sentiment at least, in religious, moral, social, or intellectual problems, and in their effects upon humanity. The oldest music that we have is all of it religious. So, when it is not merely ethical, is the oldest poetry. This is true not only of that which is in the Bible, and the Vedas of India, but in the Iliad, the Æneid, and in all the greatest tragedies of the Greeks. So is much of the best of modern poetry also,—that of Dante, Racine, Spenser, Milton, Wordsworth, Schiller, and Shakespeare. Very nearly as large a proportion of quotations having to do with the right conduct of life can be taken from this last poet as from the Bible itself. Nor are they brought into his plays incidentally, though they are brought in artistically, *i. e.*, in such ways as to aid in the representation of the characters



Doorway of a Church in Ják, Hungary

See pages 24, 25, 82-85, 147, 148, 162, 268, 385



depicted. Yet even to aid in this, they are often so unnecessary as to prove that their author is intentionally availing himself of an opportunity to introduce thought of a distinctly religious or moral tendency.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, xv.

When an artist depicts nature just as it is, if there be any such thing as natural religion, he produces upon the mind something of the effect of natural religion. If he depict humanity, he produces—if there be any such thing—something of the sympathetic effect of social religion. And in both cases he adds to the effect the influence which each has had upon his own character, and produces, if he have any, something of the effect of personal religion. Art combines the influences of God in nature, God in humanity, and God in the individual. It makes an appeal that is natural, sympathetic, and personal; but it does all this in a way that seems divine, because the factors of representation are reproductions of the divine handiwork.—*Essay on Art and Education*.

In the old, and by no means beautiful chapel at Princeton, the faculty were never able to repress entirely certain irreverent forms of disturbance,—like keeping step with a Freshman when he walked to his seat. When the time came to move into the new Marquand Chapel, some one suggested, in a meeting of the faculty, that the students be particularly requested and warned not to continue these practices. After discussion, however, it was decided to postpone action until something had been done to necessitate it. Nothing ever did necessitate it. Every tendency to disorder was, apparently, completely suppressed by a mere change to a more æsthetic environment.—*Essay on Art and Morals: Note*.

Under the pediment of the temple, the arches of the cathedral, the dome of the mosque, always, too, in the degree in which these are great works of art, the predominating impression is that of the universal fatherhood of God, which all alike represent.—*Essay on Art and Education*.

The student of art cannot keep from learning through personal experience how months and years of exercise in voice and gesture, in playing music, in drawing, in painting, in carving, give one a mastery over the physical possibilities of the body not only, but of the mind. He is forced to

realize as others cannot that there comes to be a time when every slightest movement through which music, for instance, passes with the rapidity of electricity from a printed score through the mind and fingers of a performer, is overseen and directed by mental action which, while intelligent, works unconsciously, all the conscious powers of the mind being absorbed in that which is producing the general expressional effect. The student of art has thus before him constant experimental evidence of the way in which the higher mental nature can gain ascendancy over both the lower physical and the lower psychical nature. He knows practically as well as theoretically in what sense it can be true spiritually that the man who is to enter into the kingdom of heaven, who is to become with all his powers subject to the spirit that is sovereign there, and who is, without conscious effort, to embody in conduct its slightest promptings, is the man who consciously starts out with scrupulous and often painful efforts to do the will of the Father who is in heaven.—*Idem*.

RELIGION AN AID TO ART.

But a man would mistake if for these reasons he were to suppose that art can be an entire substitute for religion. It can no more be this in that which has to do with inspiration than it can be a substitute for science in that which has to do with investigation. In an age in which there is little scientific accuracy, there is little artistic accuracy; and in an age in which there is little religious inspiration there is little artistic. The subconscious mind works in accordance with suggestion. The stimulus of religious suggestion is needed by art in order to attain the loftiest heights of imaginative effort. Of course this suggestion can be experienced in the degree only in which there is a certain practical belief in the relation of subconscious to conscious mental action, even if there be not a clear theoretical understanding of it.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, VII.

RELIGION AND SCIENCE AIDS TO ART.

It would be difficult, in fact, to discover a single element necessary to success in religious or scientific endeavor which, if held in due subordination, is really not available in the realm of art. Religion is an aid to it because, to interpret the truth of nature in all its depth and breadth

of pureness and of charity, one must have a spirit capable of being often drawn into sympathy with that which is purest and best in nature. . . . And science, too, is an aid to art; and in the same category with science we must place all those phases of life which are appropriate subjects of investigation, everything that can enlighten man with reference to the laws of nature or of mind, or to the histories of either.—*Idem*, XIII.

RELIGION *vs.* ART (*see* ARTISTS *vs.* SEERS).

Religion unfolds like a plant from within. Its germs are of a kind hidden in nature, in the animal and in man, and when it reaches the thoughts, words, and deeds over which the mind exercises conscious control, it influences these in a manner peculiar to a tendency of instinct, a prompting of conscience, a motive to action. Of course a tendency, a prompting, a motive, cannot be expressed outwardly except as a man uses something like bodily speech or action that can be heard or seen. Like art, religion, therefore, is obliged in all forms of expression to exert more or less of a material influence upon the material body and its material surroundings. But in religion the essential matter is that these material forms of expression should always be subordinate to the promptings of the higher spiritual nature. . . . In art the conditions are different. It involves no necessary subordination of the outward to the inward. There is always a coöperation between the two, in which sometimes the one seems the more prominent and sometimes the other, but in no case does the mind fail to recognize the demands of its material surroundings, or to aim at conformity to these. It is the essential condition of art that it should manifest this conformity: that it should produce a dramatic imitation, a melody, a metaphor, a picture, a statue, a building, whatever it may be, which in some way emphasizes the influence of these surroundings. Even as applied to ordinary action, a man who can be specially commended for the *art* which he manifests in conversation or in conduct is not the one who would most naturally be selected as an exemplification of that faith which underlies the disregard of material conditions involved often in speaking the truth, and always in marching to martyrdom.—*Idem*, IX.

Religious effects are seldom produced by what are recog-

nized clearly to be copies of mere forms. A Christian man through his conduct, and a church through its services, may represent the Christian life, but the moment that the representative element in either is emphasized, the moment that it is brought to our attention that the man's actions, attitudes, or facial and vocal expressions are assumed for the purpose of representing, he suggests to us a Pharisee, if not a hypocrite. With art it is the opposite. Its object is to represent; and the actor upon the stage, or any imitator of real life as delineated in the drama or the novel, or depicted in the picture or the statue, awakens our approval in the exact degree of the unmistakably representative character of his performance.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, III.

RELIGIOUS *vs.* ARTISTIC TRUTH.

There is much religious truth in "Paradise Lost," for instance, but there might have been just as much of this in a poorly written prose work. What makes Milton's religious truth artistic, is its poetic embodiment; and the poetry is just as artistic, so far as concerns this alone in places in which there is no suggestion of religion.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, VII.

REPETITION IN ART.

Repetition and everything associated with it have their origin in the exigencies of form. At the same time, we cannot be reminded too frequently that all forms, as used in art, are methods of representing thoughts or feelings by rendering them more concrete and emphatic. . . . The slightest perceptible rubbing or scratching against any part of our body, if repeated a sufficient number of times, will cause inflammation. The slightest perceptible vibration that can affect the organs of hearing or sight, if repeated with sufficient rapidity and persistency, will produce a sound or a color, and nothing except repetition will do this. The same is true of its use when appealing more directly to the mind. "What a wonderfully complete system of police signalling these Germans have!" said an English gentleman to me in Stuttgart. "They are at it now, as they have been for nights past." We stepped out upon a balcony which stood high on a hillside, and looked down upon the moon-lit city. "Listen," he said; "first you hear a whistle off there at the railway station;

then one at the palace; then one farther up here on the hill." I listened; and what I heard, and what he had heard, came from tree-toads in the garden under us. A single note would not have attracted his attention. It was the repetition of the notes that had filled his imagination with visions of socialists, and the efficiency of police supervision under a military government.—*The Genesis of Art-Form*, XII.

REPRESENTATION A CHARACTERISTIC OF ÆSTHETIC ART.

A few words may be in place in order to make more clear the reason for the use of the term *representative* to express the general effect produced by all the art-forms. This term is not a new one, though it has not previously been applied without more limitation. Nor has it been selected in ignorance of the distinction which certain English critics have made between what they call the representative and the presentative arts; but in the belief that this distinction springs from misapprehension, and in its results involves that tendency to error to which misapprehension always leads. The way in which the term came to be chosen was as follows. In order to simplify the task of art-criticism, it seemed important to search for a single word expressive of an effect, the presence or absence of which in any work should determine the presence or absence in it of artistic excellence. This word representative, without any distortion of its most ordinary meanings, was found to meet the requirements. It was found, moreover, that it could be applied to all the art-forms considered in either of the two relations which exhaust all their possibilities; considered, in other words, either as expressive of thought and feeling in the mind of the artist, or as reproducing by way of imitation things heard or seen in the external world. To illustrate this—and from an art, too, which we are told is merely presentative—let one be listening to an opera of Beethoven or Wagner, and desirous of determining the quality of the music as conditioned by its power of expression—how can he do this?—In no way better than by asking: first, what phase of feeling is the music intended to represent? and, second, does it represent what is intended? With equal success, he can use the same questions with reference to the story told in a ballad, the characters delineated in a drama, the events depicted in a painting, the ideal typified in a statue, the design embodied in a building. He can

apply the same questions, too, to the forms considered as imitations of things heard or seen. Handel's "Pastoral Symphony" and the music of the Forest Scene in Wagner's "Siegfried" express not only certain phases of feeling, but these as influenced by certain surrounding conditions of external nature; and though, for reasons to be given hereafter, music is the least imitative of the arts, it is not, for this reason, as some have claimed, merely presentative. Such works as have been mentioned must contain at least enough of the imitative element to represent, by way of association, if no more, the surroundings suggested. The same may be affirmed of the accessories or situations in a ballad or a drama; and of the colors, proportions, or natural methods of adapting means to ends in a painting, a statue, or a building.

The term representative, as thus applied, moreover, is appropriate not only in the sense indicated by ordinary usage, but in the specific sense indicated by its etymology. The peculiarity of art, and of all art, is that it not only presents, but literally re-presents; that is, presents over and over again in like series of movements, metaphors, measures, lines, contours, colors, whatever they may be, both the thoughts which it expresses and the forms through which it expresses them.—*Art in Theory, Preface.*

In the volume of this series of essays entitled "Art in Theory," an endeavor was made to show that art in general is nature made human, and that art of the highest character is nature made human in the highest sense. It was pointed out that, for this kind of art, only such forms of nature are available as are audible and visible; and that these forms in such art are well used only when made significant of thoughts and emotions. In accordance with this understanding, it was maintained that all the higher arts are representative, and this in two senses,—representative rather than communicative of thought or emotion in the mind of the artist, which fact causes them to be appropriately termed the humanities; and representative rather than imitative of that which is audible or visible in the mind's material environment, which latter fact causes them to be appropriately termed the arts of form, *i. e.*, of appearance, or æsthetic, *i. e.*, fitted to be perceived.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts, I.*

(*Recapitulation:*) In treating of each of the arts considered separately, the discussion is begun by showing that it is natural as well as necessary for a man to express his thoughts and emotions through audible or visible forms; and that a certain method of developing these forms causes them to be artistic. It is shown, besides, that, even before thus developed, the forms are all of them methods of communicating thoughts and feelings through using, for this purpose, certain external factors which, in themselves, are devoid of thought or feeling; in other words, that artists, owing to an application of the principle of association or of comparison, reveal operations of the mind through employing, either by way of appropriation or reference, the physical phenomena of nature; and that, for this reason, we can understand the arts fully only so far as we consider them as representative, on the one hand, of mental conceptions, and, on the other, of material surroundings. In the volumes devoted to this subject, therefore, it is shown that it is possible for every natural method of expression to become thus representative, at times, both of the human mind and of external nature. The elementary factors of expression are shown to be, in the arts of sound, intonations and words, and, in the arts of sight, gestures, drawings, carvings, and other objects made by hand. From these primarily it is argued that form in representative art is developed. The ways in which it is developed are indicated, first, by analyzing the methods in which these factors are made to be expressive, and observing for what phase of representation, either mental or material, each phase of expression is fitted; and later by observing the general effect of the representation produced when the methods and phases are combined in a completed art-form. Expression is found to be produced through different methods of using, in the arts of sound, duration, force, pitch, and quality of tone, and—respectively corresponding to these, in the arts of sight—extension, strength of line, hue, and mixture of hues. It is from these methods that we derive and, as affected by instinctive, reflective, or emotive tendencies, that we appropriate for representative purposes such effects as those of movement, pause, accent, versification, metre, tune, tone, and other characteristics of rhythm and harmony of sound; and such effects as those of size, shape, shading, tinting, and other

characteristics of proportion and harmony of line and color.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, xxvi.

REPRESENTATION, BY MEANS OF ASSOCIATION AND COMPARISON (*see* COMPARISON AND ASSOCIATION *and* WORDS, THEIR MEANING).

As thoughts and emotions cannot be heard or seen in themselves, they cannot be presented or communicated to another directly. They must be *represented* indirectly; *i. e.*, through the use of a medium differing from themselves in that it can be heard and seen. This medium the mind must find in material nature, the sounds and sights of which it can accept, imitate, modify, and develop for the purposes of expression, but cannot originate. While saying this, however, it was also said that, among the sounds of nature which may be used for artistic purposes must be included any sounds whatever, even though traceable to men. Their material bodies are manifestations of material nature; and, this being so, of course the same is true of their instinctively used, and what we may term natural, as distinguished from artistic, vocal utterances. Among the sights of nature, again must be included, for the same reason, any visible movements or constructions of men; and, this being so, of course included among them must be also their instinctively used gestures. Owing to the imperceptible character of that which is within our minds, all outward expressions of this, and, therefore, all art, even of the most ordinary kind, must exemplify the principle of representation. But the highest art must do so most emphatically. This is because it must give expression to processes of thought and emotion of the highest, in the sense of the most subtle, quality, and as these processes are the most distinctively mental, they are the most distinctively different in essence from any material form through which they can be expressed. It is, therefore, particularly necessary that when used as a vehicle for them the form should manifest this difference; and it can do so in the degree only in which it manifests clearly what is its own nature as contrasted with theirs; in other words, in the degree only in which its representative, as contrasted with any possibly presentative character, is particularly emphasized by being made particularly apparent. This statement suggests that there is a connection between the use in art of the term representation, as meaning the expression of thought and emotion, and its

more ordinary use in the second sense mentioned in our opening paragraph, *i. e.*, as meaning the imitation of external phenomena. This connection arises from the fact that the communicative intention of the forms of expression can be made particularly apparent in the degree only in which the imitative character of the factors composing the forms—that is of the sounds and sights of external nature—is made apparent. This is the ground taken in Chapters VI. and VIII. of “Art in Theory,” which are devoted to showing that the representation of thoughts and emotions and of external sounds and sights necessarily go together. An artificially shaped machine, it was said, at once suggests the question, “What can it do?” But a drawing or carving with a form resembling something in nature never suggests this question, but rather, “What did the man who drew the object think about it or of it that he should have made a copy of it?” The principle that renders it possible for the forms of art to represent, in the senses just indicated, both mental processes and material surroundings is, in general, that of *correspondence*. But subordinately, there are two different, though closely related, principles in accordance with which this correspondence may be manifested. One principle—which is the one mainly involved in the representation of thoughts and emotions—is that of *association*; the other, which is mainly involved in the representation of the appearances of nature, is that of *comparison*.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, I.

REPRESENTATION IN ART.

The conceptions of science are due, as we have found, to an investigation, so far as possible, of every condition preceding an apprehended phenomenon. Of course, what is thus obtained can be imparted to others just as it is, only so far as every factor entering into the knowledge communicated has been given expression in the outward form of communication, or, as we may say, has been *formulated*. On the contrary, the imagination of art draws its ideas and constructs its ideals of a whole class of phenomena from observing a few conditions only, which are the more apparent ones and are taken as *representative* of all of them. It is evident that what is thus obtained can be imparted to others just as it is experienced in the mind, only so far as these same few conditions can be given expression in the

outward form in such ways as to exert on the minds of others the same *representative* effects.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XII.

REPRESENTATION IN ART *vs.* COMMUNICATION.

Just as *representation* is a more appropriate term than *imitation* through which to indicate the result of an artistic reproduction of the appearances of nature, so the same word is more appropriate than *communication* or any like term through which to indicate the artistic expression of thoughts or feelings. If this were not so, if the primary object of art were to communicate, then would it not do this more successfully than do other forms of expression? But does art do this more successfully? To say nothing of music and architecture, which all men know to be very deficient in the matter of communicating definite information of any kind, do poetry, painting, and sculpture give a more satisfactory communication with reference to thought or feeling, in the sense of indicating more clearly exactly what a particular thought or feeling is, than do sounds and sights as they are used in ordinary speech and writing? The moment we ask the question, we are ready to answer, No. A frequent effect of making any method of communication more artistic is to make it less intelligible. As a rule, sighs, shrieks, wails, can communicate, and cause a listener to realize, too, the particular thought or feeling to which they give expression far more unmistakably than is possible for a musical passage, unaccompanied by words, whatever may be the amount of its hush, trill, force, or complexity. As a rule, a plain, direct utterance of sentiment, or statement of fact, is far more readily apprehended, if that be all that is desired, than the most imaginative effort of poetry. As a rule, a few objects carelessly but clearly drawn or carved, even if as rudely as in an ancient hieroglyph, a few tree-trunks roughly built together for support and shelter, can convey intelligence of their purpose much more distinctly than works of painting or sculpture or architecture upon which men have expended years of labor. Were the communication of thought or feeling the object of art, it would be a very senseless undertaking to try to attain this object and expend years of labor upon it by making the forms of communication from which art is developed less communicative.

Yet, evidently, these forms of natural expression—in-tonation, speech, drawing, coloring, constructing,—just at the point where most satisfactory as means of communicating thought and feeling, lack something that art needs. What is this? It is not difficult to tell, and is clearly suggested by all that has been unfolded thus far in this essay. They lack that which can be given, in connection with expression, by the reproduction of the effects of nature. Penmanship and hieroglyphics lack the appearances of nature that are copied in painting and sculpture. Prose lacks figures of speech and descriptions that in poetry are constantly directing attention to the same appearances; and even the elements subsequently developed into music and architecture lack traces of a very keen observation and extensive use of effects in nature which would not need to be observed or used at all, were the end in view attainable by the mere communication of thought or feeling. Were communication the end of any art, the elaboration of the forms of nature would cease at the point where they became sufficient for this purpose. But it does not cease there, and it does not do so because art must express thought or feeling by way not of communication, but of *representation*.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, VII.

The method of the appeal to the mind in art is not through direct unequivocal statements, but through indirect suggestive representations, which awaken interest in order to stimulate the processes of imagination.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XIV.

What is imagination? It is the faculty of the mind that forms images. Of course, in the degree in which the appeal is made so definite that nothing, as we say, is left to imagination, it is not stimulated. Let us apply this principle now to poetry. Words apparently convey definite meanings, yet it is a fact that they can also be representative. If not, they are merely presentative or communicative, and, therefore, not poetic, but prosaic. To understand this distinction is necessary to an understanding of poetic art. Take, for instance, these verses by Longfellow. What he wishes to say is that death may overtake the artist before he acquires the skill on which his heart is set. Had he merely communicated, or stated, this fact, he would

have written prose; but he represented it, and therefore we call what he wrote poetry, *e. g.*,

Art is long and time is fleeting,
And our hearts, though stout and brave,
Still like muffled drums are beating
Funeral marches to the grave.

The Psalm of Life.

—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, VII.

Poetry may be strictly representative of external sights and sounds,—may confine itself to that which reproduces for the imagination a picture; and yet may be equally and in the highest sense representative also of those ideas and feelings which exist in only the mind.—*Idem*.

No matter how perfect rhythm or rhyme one may produce through arrangements of words, the result is prose, not poetry, unless the thought, instead of being presented directly, is represented, as we may say, indirectly, so as to cause it to afford virtually an argument from analogy. Frequently, one judges of poetic excellence by the degree in which the thoughts or emotions could not be communicated at all unless they were thus suggested rather than stated; by the degree, therefore, in which their essential character is subtle, intangible, invisible—in short, spiritual.—*Essay on Art and Education*.

REPRESENTATION IN ART *vs.* IMITATION (*see* IMITATION *vs.*).

According to Webster, *to represent* means "to present again either by image, by action, by symbol, or by substitute," and there is no possible use of natural forms in art that cannot be included under one of these heads. Imitation, which is, undoubtedly, a frequent process in art, can be included thus; but so can many other processes that are not imitative. Representation has a broader applicability, and by using this term we can get something expressing the exact truth in all cases. An orchestral passage in an opera, or a declamatory scene in a drama, cannot, strictly speaking, copy or imitate, but it can *represent* an exchange of thought between a demigod and a forest bird, as in Wagner's "Siegfried," or a conversation between historic characters as in Shakespeare's "Henry the Eighth." A painting of a man on canvas, or a statue of him in marble, does not, strictly speaking, copy or imitate a man, who, actually considered, can be neither flat nor white; but it does

represent him. Columns, arches, and roofs do not, by any means, copy or imitate, but they do *represent* the trunks and branches and water-shedding leaves of the forest. Nothing in fact that a man can make of the materials at his disposal can, strictly speaking, copy or imitate in all its features that which is found in nature; but he can always represent this.—*The Essentials of Æsthetics*, vi.

Of whatever art we may be speaking, it will not do to say that its sole aim is to imitate nature, not even, putting it in a milder form, that it is to reproduce the appearances of nature. . . . The most that can be said with truth is that the forms of nature are reproduced by the artist with the aim of having them appeal to others as they have appealed to himself, as they have exerted an effect upon his mind, as they have influenced his thoughts and feelings. Of course, in order to accomplish this aim merely, he must represent the appearances so as to recall their state in nature, and, where imitation is demanded, he must imitate with accuracy. But he would be the last in the world to acknowledge that he has added to his work nothing originated in his own brain, and that what he has produced is a simple reproduction. He considers it a representation.—*Art in Theory*, iv.

A like fact is true of the photograph. For the very reason that it is an imitation, in the sense of being a literal presentation, of every outline on which the light at the time when it was taken happened to fall, it does not awaken in us the kind or degree of imaginative interest or of sympathy that we feel in paintings or statues. Unlike the impressions that we receive from the photograph, in gazing at these latter, we feel that we are looking through an artist's eye, seeing only what he saw or thought fit for us to see, and that everything in them is traceable to the skill displayed by him in transferring what in nature is presented in one medium into another, as in delineating flesh and foliage through the use of color and in turning veins and lace into marble. The same principle applies in architecture. The man of the backwoods who came to an early centre of civilization, and stood before the first stone colonnade that he had seen, was not charmed with it because it imitated so exactly the row of poles that supported the projecting eaves of the huts which for centuries had

been constructed by his ancestors; his delight was owing to the fact of his perceiving in another material, exceedingly difficult to work, that which *represented* the forms presented to his view at home.—*Idem*.

REPRESENTATION IN BUILDING (*see* ARCHITECTURE, REPRESENTATIVE, *and* ARCHITECTURE REPRESENTATIVE OF THOUGHT).

REPRESENTATION IN HARMONY.

As represented in sound, it may be said that every mood that is absolutely normal, because healthful, strong, buoyant, joyous, or unimpeded, or, to state this in a general way, every mood in which the conditions appear to the mind to be *satisfactory*, naturally tends to harmonic expression. On the contrary, every abnormal, unhealthy, because weak, depressed, sad, or impeded mood, or every mood in which the conditions appear to the mind to be *unsatisfactory*, because leaving conceptions in a state of suspense, naturally tends to inharmonic expression. This latter is what we hear, therefore, in the moaning and crying of weakness, in the fretting and complaining of hopelessness and misery, and in any habits of tone, like the so-called "ministerial," which are produced by dwelling upon the more pathetic aspects of subjects. . . . As represented in music, this inharmonic effect is expressed in what is termed the minor interval which, while itself not absolutely inharmonic—if it were so it could not be used as a factor of musical harmony,—is, nevertheless, suggestive of a lack of harmony; and it is this fact that accounts for the associations that all have with this interval. It is the musical adaptation of that which, in speech, represents suspense, and, therefore, the depressed and pathetic. There are other conditions, too. . . . That for which, when listening to a series of chords, the musical ear is in search, is harmony. Whenever, therefore, it does not hear this, . . . the impression conveyed is that thought and feeling are waiting for a desired consummation that delays coming. . . . It is forced, by a law of nature, to desire to have the movements of the chords continue till the perfectly harmonious is reached. For this reason, the chord of the seventh augments the feeling of unrest and dissatisfaction, and prepares the mind, by way of contrast, for the restful, satisfying closing effect of the chord of the keynote when,

at the next sound, the phrase is brought to a conclusion.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music: Music as a Representative Art*, v.

REPRESENTATION IN MELODY.

I can now recall no melody of great popularity in which underneath all the decorative vestiture of the form, however much the pitch may be pushed up here or pulled down there, it is not possible to detect general outlines true to certain first principles of vocal expression. Some melodies, indeed, like "Comin thro' the Rye" can be talked off with absolute fidelity to every musical note. But if melody be thus developed from speech, the same must be remotely true of harmony, for this, in its turn, as shown in Chapters XII. to XV. of "Rhythm and Harmony," is itself, in its incipency, a development of melody.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, Preface.

What is true of this melody is true of almost every melody that proves to be permanently popular. Beneath what is sometimes great exaggeration, we can detect the intonations natural to the speaking utterance of the sentiments expressed. This is the same as to say that, in such cases, music, while in no sense imitative, is nevertheless representative of the intonations of speech. In other cases, it might be said to be a development of something that lies behind the intonations of speech; and which, though having the same cause, antedates them, *i. e.*, a development of humming in which almost every one, at times, indulges. A man, in the subjective, absent-minded condition in which he takes to humming, is usually unconscious of the presence either of surrounding persons or of sounds. He is not in a mood, therefore, either to address the persons distinctly, or to repeat the sounds accurately. But while this is true, it is also true that his method of expression will necessarily, not in a specific but in a general way, represent his surroundings. If he have ever heard, especially if he have heard frequently, sounds like the humming of bees, the whistling of winds or of railway locomotives, or the notes of squirrels, quails, whippoorwills, robins, catbirds, or of songs sung, or of exclamations or speeches made by men and women about him, in nine cases out of ten his own tones, at times unconsciously to himself, but nevertheless actually, will imitate some of these sounds

all of which, being external to himself, are, so far as he is concerned, those of external nature. Music, therefore, may be said to represent not only the natural intonations of the human voice, but natural sounds coming from sources that are not human.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, VI.

REPRESENTATION IN MUSIC (*see also* PITCH).

Some have declared it to be *presentative* rather than representative, not recognizing that a use of such elements of duration, force, pitch, and quality as enable us to distinguish between a love-song, a dirge, and a tragic passage would altogether fail to convey their meaning, unless there were something in the movement to *represent* ideas or emotions which we were accustomed to associate with similar movements perceived in nature.—*Idem*.

It is evident that music may be representative in the ways indicated without being in any distinctive sense imitative. All that is necessary is that its successive phases should follow a general order similar to that to which we have become accustomed in certain series of sounds or sights in nature. We have noticed, perhaps, a quiet rill developed into a cataract, and this again into a quiet pool; or a clear sky developed into a storm and this again into a clear sky; or peace developed into war and this again into peace; and one or the other of these series of phenomena is suggested to us when we hear a series of musical effects developed in what appears to be a similar order. The reason why these or any other phenomena are suggested is because of the principle of correspondence, which, as has been said, underlies all methods of expression, especially those exemplified in discursive elocution. According to this principle, it is instinctively felt, even when not consciously thought, that different phases of invisible and inaudible moods follow one another in analogy to phases of a visible or an audible character.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music: Music as a Representative Art*, VII.

REPRESENTATION IN MUSIC AND IN VISIBLE FORMS.

I once went over the motives of Wagner with the most broadly cultured musician whom I knew, and I found that while he perceived, at once, the representative elements in what are ordinarily termed imitative passages, he failed to perceive them, till pointed out to him, in many other passages so unmistakably developed from the intonations of

speech that to me they seemed to talk—of course only in the sense of voicing the trend of emotive processes which alone is possible to music—almost as plainly as if the notes were words. . . . What he lacked was my twenty years' experience in teaching the melody of speech. So with the significance of visible form. One whose experience has forced him, as mine has, to the conclusion that every shape of the human body, natural or assumed, has a meaning peculiar to itself, though possibly beyond even an expert's power of interpretation, finds himself, very soon, according to the principle of association, drawing the same conclusion with reference to all shapes, whether human or not human. Those who think it not essential to discuss the general accuracy of this conclusion, as applied to all phenomena audible or visible; or who imagine that, if true, art has no mission in revealing and emphasizing it, have, simply, not learned all that life is designed to teach them; or those who conceive that the methods through which art can fulfil this mission can be apprehended and appreciated without their stopping to think over each detail of the subject, to examine the exemplifications of it, and to apply many original tests of their own to it, have not yet begun to learn the methods through which life can teach them anything of deep importance.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts, Preface.*

REPRESENTATION IN POETRY, ALLOYED AND PURE (*see* LANGUAGE, PLAIN AND FIGURATIVE).

It has been said that whatever is added to representation of such a nature as to change it from pure to alloyed, must come from the poet. This is true, and yet he may not always be himself the primary source of these additions. He may get them either from his own mind or from nature,—a term used here to apply to everything external to himself. If he get them from his own mind, he will carry into excessive development the tendency which has been termed the instinctive, underlying ejaculatory sounds and all plain language; and his product will manifest a preponderance of the features making up the *thought* that he desires to express. If he get his additions from nature, he will carry into excessive development the tendency, which has been termed the reflective, underlying imitative sounds and all figurative language; and his

product will manifest a preponderance of the features employed in the form for the purpose of *amplifying* and *illustrating* his thought. The first tendency, carried to an extreme, will leave the form void of representation, and make it *explanatory* or *didactic*; the second will overload it with representation, and make it *florid* or *ornate*.

Taking up these tendencies in their order, we will examine now the former of them, and first, as exemplified in poetry modeled upon *direct* representation. In this form, as we have seen, the poet uses no similes nor metaphors. He states precisely what he wishes to say—only what he says, if put in the form of poetry, must *represent* his thought. If it merely *present* this, he gives us a product not of the ideal art of poetry, but of the practical art of rhetoric. This latter appeals to the mind through what Sir William Hamilton termed the elaborative faculty, and is characterized by a particularizing of details in explanatory words and clauses, termed amplification,—all of which details together enable the hearer to weigh the evidence that is offered, and to draw from it trustworthy conclusions. Poetry, on the contrary, appeals to the representative faculty, and is characterized by an absence of any more details or explanatory elements than are needed in order to form a picture, and this for the reason that nothing appeals so strongly to the imagination as a hint. At the same time, as poetry and rhetoric both communicate ideas, there is a constant tendency for the one to pass into the other, for the poet to forget that the poetical depends not upon ideas alone, but also upon the forms given to the ideas,—in fact, to forget that, while great poetry must necessarily embody great thoughts, very genuine poetry, at times, may do no more than give to the merest “airy nothings a local habitation and a name.”

We have now to examine the effects of the ornate tendency, in which considerations of form overbalance those of thought, and in which therefore there is failure because of an excess of representation. It is simply natural for one who has obtained facility in illustrating his ideas to overdo the matter, at times, and to carry his art so far as to re-illustrate that which has been sufficiently illustrated or is itself illustrative. The first form that we need to notice, in which this tendency shows itself, is a poetic development and extension of what rhetoricians term the “far-fetched”

simile, a simile in which minor points of resemblance are sought out and dwelt upon in minute detail and at unnecessary length. The fault in this mode of illustrating, or representing, lies in the fact that it does not illustrate nor represent. The poet, in writing it, has made the form an end and not a means. His thoughts, and methods of developing them, are suggested by the representation, and not by that which it is supposed to represent, and which his readers naturally expect it to represent. Accordingly, his readers cannot distinguish the main thought from the illustrating thought, nor this again from the re-illustrating thought, and the whole passage is necessarily more or less obscure. The poet has not made his subject stand forth in clear, concrete outlines, as art should do; but has so veneered and besmeared it with excess of ornamentation that no one can tell very decidedly just what his subject is. . . .

Now, suppose a man in conversation were to let his thoughts run on in this way, deviating from the line of his argument or description, whenever he happened to strike a word the sense or sound of which suggested something different from that of which he started out to speak. What should we think of him? One of two things,—either that he was insane, or had a very poorly disciplined mind. Precisely this is what is represented, so far as anything is represented, by this kind of poetry. Yet, as we all know, the finest and highest art must represent the finest and highest efforts of the finest and highest powers of the mind. If this be so, then poetry modeled upon a form which is the legitimate and natural expression of an insane or a poorly disciplined mind, is not poetry of the finest and highest order.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, XXIV.

We will examine now the form of representation which, in contrast to pure, has been termed alloyed. This latter, as has been said, while following in the main the methods of picturing the thoughts that are used in pure representation, always introduces something into the picture in addition to what would naturally be *perceived* in connection with circumstances like those that are being detailed. At first thought, it might be supposed that these additions would not greatly impair the poetry in which we find them. But the fallacy of this supposition will appear, when we recall that poetry is an art, and that all art is representative.

It follows from this that the purer the representation, the purer will be the art, and in the degree in which anything is added to the representation,—anything, that is, of such a nature that in like circumstances it could not presumably have been perceived,—in that degree will the product be likely to lose its artistic qualities.

Some who may not recognize the truth of this statement, when viewed from a theoretical standpoint, may, when viewed from a practical. Let us look at it in this way then: whatever is added to the representation must come, in the last analysis, from the artist; and from him, when not exercising his legitimate artistic functions; when, instead of giving us a picture of nature and man, as he finds them, he has begun to give us his own explanations and theories concerning them. Now all explanation and theories, as we know, are necessarily the outgrowth—if not of ignorance or superstition—at least of the intellectual or spiritual condition of the age in which one lives. For this reason, to a succeeding age they are not satisfactory, even if they do not prove to be wholly fallacious; and a work of science or philosophy that is made up of them usually dies, because men outgrow their need of it, and do not care to keep it alive. A work of artistic poetry, on the contrary, lives because its pages image the phenomena of nature, and of human life, which can really be *perceived*, and most of these remain from age to age unchanged. A writer who confines himself to these, which alone can be used legitimately in representation, is, as Jonson said of Shakespeare, “not of an age but for all time”; and this fact can be affirmed of men like him alone. Out of the thousands of poems written in the past, only those have come down to us, and are termed classic, which are characterized by an absence of explanations and theories, and a presence of that kind of representation which has here been termed pure. How important, then, it is for the poet of the present to understand just what the nature and requirements of this pure representation are, and what are the methods of rendering it alloyed that should be avoided.—*Idem*, XXIII.

REPRESENTATION IN SCULPTURE.

Most of the Venuses, like those of the Medici, of Dresden, and of the Capitol, are represented in the attitude instinc-

tive to a woman surprised in a state of nature. The inference, therefore, on the part of the spectator, is clear enough. She is thinking, and her attitude obliges the spectator to think, of her physical appearance, or beauty. The difference between the significance expressed in such a statue and in that of the Apollo Belvedere, who with outstretched arms and uplifted brow seems wholly unconscious of aught save his own godlike mission to the race, is very great. And what is the important matter to be observed is that this difference is owing to movement not detailed but suggested, not such as could be represented in poetry, or in any form of language, but such as can be represented in a manner strictly appropriate to only painting or statuary, and yet, even in this, in a manner sufficiently distinct to render the impression of life and of a distinctive character of life unmistakable.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XXIV.

REPRESENTATION IN SENTENCES FROM WHICH POETRY
DEVELOPS (*see* LANGUAGE, PLAIN AND FIGURATIVE).

Language is a form for thought, and thought implies mental activity, a process, a series of sensations and experiences, all of them exerting more or less influence upon one another. A single idea might be represented in a single word, but a series of ideas necessitates a series of words. How, now, can these series of words represent, with anything like accuracy, internal processes of the mind, together with the necessary relationships and interactions that must exist between their constituting elements? Or, to begin at the right place, how can any series of external and material elements, even though they do represent a process, represent a process that takes place in thought? If we can come to understand this, it will be easy for us to understand how, according to a similar analogy, series of words can do the same. Those of us who have been in countries with the languages of which we were not familiar, have, perhaps, improved our powers of origination, as well as started original conceptions in the minds of those about us, through presenting our internal processes of thought to men who had not ears to heed our English, in the form of pantomime. What other resource could we have, when thirsty or sleepy or wishing to hire a hack or take a sail? But suppose that we had been shut out from pantomime, and shut in to

sound, how, according to the same analogy, could we have expressed our processes of thought through the latter medium? Had we possessed the power of rendering intelligible to others our references to our internal sensations, as well as to external objects and operations, by the use of exclamations, imitative sounds, and words derived from them by association and comparison,—how could we have combined all these elements in such a way as to represent in sound a process of thought? Is not the answer simple? Instead of taking two objects and joining or separating them, could we not have taken two names for these objects, and joined or separated these? or, if we wished to make our meaning still more intelligible, joined the names by putting between them an intervening exclamation expressive of assimilation, or separated them by putting there an expression of aversion? Could we not thus have represented in words what circumstances had prevented us from representing in pantomime? Instead of emphatically flinging ourselves on the floor, or pathetically resting our heads upon our hands, when, tired out in the evening, we desired to show our wish to go to bed why might we not have exclaimed “I—bed,” or “I—oh—bed”? Is not this precisely what, though put in different forms, we have heard the foreigner do, a hundred times, perhaps, when trying to express in sound the thought which his ignorance of our language prevented him from expressing fully? Is not this precisely the method through which every child begins the difficult process of conversation—*i. e.*, by placing two words together, which thus constitute a compound word; or by uniting the two, one of which is used for the subject of a sentence and the other for its object, by a third, which serves the purpose of a predicate? And it is well to notice, too, in this connection, that, whether used by a foreigner or a child, the predicate is always the last essential factor of a perfect sentence to be used with accuracy. “I seen him,” cried a street-boy under my window the other day; “and I throw’d a stone at him.”

While on this subject, in order to show that the use of the exclamation for the verb in an expression like “I—oh—bed,” though, wholly supposititious, is not entirely out of analogy with what is really done in language, it may be interesting to recall what Max Müller says of one of our most common grammatical forms—*it is*. He tells us that

this sound can be traced back almost as far in language as we can go. The German says *ist*, the Roman *est*, the Slave *yeste*, the Greek *esti*, and the Hindoo *asti*. But *asti* is a compound of the pronoun *ti* and the verb *as*, the root of which signifies to breathe. Whatever breathes exists or is; so that in the oldest language in which we find the verb, it seems to be only an expression representative of the fact, and, very probably, of the act of aspiration or breathing.

But, to return from theory to fact, we have found how it is possible to put words together in such a way as to indicate a process. Indeed, whenever we put them together in the right way, they necessarily do indicate this; for in such cases we put together sentences, and sentences invariably represent, if not physical, at least mental, processes, the subject, as a rule, indicating the beginning of them, the predicate the continuation of them, and the object, if there be one, the end of them. In fact, all the different grammatical parts of speech and modifications of them, viewed in one light, are merely methods of representing dependencies and relationships of different parts of whole processes, which, with more or less completeness, are represented by the sentences.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, XVI.

REPRESENTATION IN SOUND AND SIGHT IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES.

It is true that it is said of the melodies of speech, as well as of the movements of gesture, such as are considered in the present volume, that their significance differs in different countries. But those who say this, as some have done, imagining the statement, however true, to involve a refutation of any principle advanced in this series of essays, merely show how superficially they have read them. As applied to music, for instance, such a statement is not made with reference to time, force, or volume—only with reference to pitch, as used in the inflections. But in "Rhythm and Harmony," pages 265 to 267, it is very carefully shown that the inflection is not representative of the phraseology but of the motive expressed in the phraseology, many instances being cited in which precisely the same phrases are rightly uttered with exactly opposite inflections. This being understood, the objection mentioned falls to the ground. When, for

instance, for reasons which the reference just given will indicate, an American says to you at the table, "Will you please pass me the bread?" with a rising inflection on the last word, what is uppermost in his mind is to indicate his acknowledgment that your action in the matter is questionable; and that he leaves it open for you to do as you choose. But when an Englishman asks the same question, as he almost invariably does, with a falling inflection, what is uppermost in his mind is to make an assertion with reference to his wishes, and to indicate, as, in other matters, he is apt to do to such an extent as to seem, at times, slightly dictatorial, that it is not open for you to differ from him in thinking that, if you are a gentleman, you are expected to do as he—gently—bids you. People of Southern Europe, even Irishmen, sometimes end what seem positive assertions with an upward turn of the voice. But they are not positive assertions. They are grammatical forms of assertion as uttered by men with habits acquired by being constantly contradicted, or, at least, obliged to subordinate their own views to those of others, who alone are supposed to have a right to speak with authority. Of course, such methods of intonation, once acquired, may be continued from father to son by imitation. But despite the tendency to this latter, they usually cease to be continued after social and religious conditions change. One generation of residence in America will train any foreigner, whatever his language, to express his decided sentiments just as in his own land his own babe, before learning to imitate, invariably does, without any such questionable suggestion. Again a Bedouin will beckon you toward himself with a quick movement of his hand, the palm of which is not turned up, as with us, but down. What does this form of gesture mean? Very clearly, that the Bedouin, while he wishes you nearer himself, is not opening his whole heart to you, or asking you to occupy a position on a social or sympathetic level with himself. On the contrary, unconsciously, perhaps, he is on his guard against you and intends to keep you in a safe and proper place. . . . In fact, the character of his gesture affords an almost positive proof of the hostile nature of those with whom he and his fathers have for years been accustomed to associate.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts, Preface.*

REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS IN ART, THEIR GENESIS (*see also* EXPRESSION DEVELOPED FROM POSTURES AND GESTURES).

All forms of expression possible to art of the highest rank are developments of a man's use, for this purpose, of his vocal organs and of his hands. This statement at once suggests an inquiry into the methods through which vocal organs and hands can be made to express, or represent, thoughts and emotions. Evidently, only after we have ascertained this, can we be prepared to understand how the same can be expressed in the arts developed from these methods.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, XII.

REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS IN ARTS OF HEARING (*see also* REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS OF PITCH and OF TONES).

On comparing the accented and unaccented syllables of words like *barbarous*, *murmuring*, *tartarize*, *Singsing*, and *papa*, we can clearly detect four elements. The accented syllable differs slightly from the unaccented—first, in *duration*: it is sounded in longer time; second, in *force*: it is sounded with more energy; third, in *pitch*: it is sounded on a key that, if used in music, would be relatively higher or lower in the musical scale; and fourth, in *quality*: it is sounded with more fulness or sharpness of tone. . . —*Poetry as a Representative Art*, III.

With reference to the significance of these elements, while it is true that all, in a general way, represent, as has been said, emotive effects, all of them represent also certain peculiar phases of such effects. . . . In discursive elocution, *duration measures* the utterance—that is, it represents the mind's measurement of its ideas,—one indication, by the way, of the appropriateness of the poetic term, *meters*, or *measures*, which result from giving different kinds of duration to syllables; *force energizes* utterance; *pitch aims* it; and *quality tempers* it. Of the last three, again, *force* imparts *physique* to delivery; *pitch*, *intellectuality*, and *quality*, *emotion* or *soul*, by which, as has been explained, is meant that balancing and blending of physical and intellectual tendencies which manifest the degree in which the man is master or slave of body or mind.—*Idem*, III.

REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS IN ARTS OF SIGHT.

It will be observed also . . . that each particular effect in the elements of sight, as in those of sound, is representative; and that it is so because of an application of the

principle either of association or of comparison; or, sometimes, as is frequently the case, of both of these together. . . . We shall find, as applied to the representation of mind—as distinguished from the representation of external phenomena, which, being mainly imitative, usually interprets itself—that the degree of *extension* or the *size* indicates what the artist conceives to be—and, therefore, uses to express—the degree of material and, in this sense, *physical* influence; whereas the other effects indicate what he conceives to be—and, therefore, uses to express—the degree of *mental* influence. Of these effects, *touch* or handling, as manifested in the relative strength, gradation, or regularity of lines or their shading, naturally suggests the relative expenditure of *will-power*. Pitch, as manifested in the relative brightness either of hues or of the light that is in them, naturally suggests the mental *motive*, a brilliant color attracting the attention and a dull color doing the opposite; and quality, as manifested in the relative purity or mixture of hues, as in blues or reds as contrasted with grays or browns, naturally suggests the mental *feeling*. Thus we may say that extension *measures*, touch *energizes*, the degree of color *aims*, and the quality of color *tempers* the appearance; that the first determines the *scope of influence*; the second, the *degree of executive force*; the third, of *intellection*; and the fourth, of *emotion* or *soul*.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, II.

REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS IN DURATION

What is indicated by fast time, and by slow time? Evidently these, respectively, imitate effects in nature that move rapidly and slowly. In addition to this, by way of association, rapidity is indicative of moods that are *joyous* or *mirthful*; or, as applied to special thoughts or feelings, of such as seem deserving of only brief consideration because they are *light* or *trifling*. *Slowness*, on the contrary, is indicative of *grave* and *serious* moods, of thoughts and feelings worthy of long consideration; therefore, of moods of *dignity* and *importance*. In other words, duration represents the *mental estimate*, or *degree of valuation*. What has been said hardly needs illustration. Every one can recall the general difference in rapidity between ordinary dance-music, as it is termed, and church music; or between a horn-pipe and a hymn; and he knows, too, that this difference is

determined not alone by the necessity of conforming the music to actual outward movements, as in the dance, but also by the fact that the dance and the hornpipe represent, by way of association, *joyous, mirthful, light, trifling* moods, and that the church music and the hymn represent the opposite. . . . Precisely the same principles are fulfilled in poetry.—*Idem*, XII.

It is evident that in elocution duration may be short or long, or both; in the latter case making possible all the artistic developments of metre. Both experience and reflection show us that in the degree in which utterances are instinctive, as they are when under the influence of mere spontaneity, they find expression in short duration, or—what is the same thing—in fast time. But when one becomes conscious of surrounding influences to which he must conform his phraseology, these put him into a reflective mood, and under the sway of his impressions, he stops to think—sometimes to think twice—of what he is to say, and so uses slow time; or, to look at the subject from a different view-point, a speaker, when not desirous of conveying to others the impression that what he is saying demands their serious consideration, may talk rapidly. But when he wishes to convey the opposite impression—that they should weigh his statements with the utmost care,—he talks slowly.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, IV.

In elocution, quantity may sometimes be prolonged at will; in poetry, it is usually determined by the letter-sounds forming the syllable. The rule is, that syllables composed of short vowel-sounds, and of consonant-sounds easy to pronounce, are short. . . . A predominance of these short sounds in the style fits it to represent comparatively *unimportant* ideas, . . . and, also, *things that move rapidly*.

A predominance, on the contrary, of decidedly long vowel-sounds, or of consonant-sounds difficult to pronounce, makes the rhythm move slowly, and fits it, therefore, according to the principles already unfolded, to represent *important* ideas, . . . and, also, *things that move slowly*.—*Idem*, III.

REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS IN EXTENSION (*see also* EMOTION OR SOUL).

Not only in painting and sculpture, but in architecture also, relatively large and small extension, corresponding

in this regard to relatively long and short duration, have inevitable representative effects. Either by way of association or of comparison, or of both, they respectively indicate what is *heavy, strong, substantial, immovable, important, influential, dignified, near*, on the one hand; or else, on the other hand, what is *light, weak, unsubstantial, movable, unimportant, uninfluential, undignified, remote*. It is this principle that causes us, when looking at objects, to think more of a statue than of a doll, more of a cathedral than of a cottage, more of the fingers on a statue than of the fringe on which, perhaps, they rest, and more of the towers and domes of a building than of its chimneys and ventilators. The same principle applied in connection with the natural laws of perspective, causes us to give more consideration to the full-sized figures in the foreground of a painting than to the minute objects in its background. If the picture be designed to interest us in animals, this fact is represented by large size that brings them to the front; if in a pasture in which they are feeding, by small size that sends them to the rear. Overbalancing foliage, with a cherub's face just visible in it, emphasizes the prodigality of inanimate nature. A full-sized statue, with a few flowers about it, emphasizes the preëminence of man.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, III.

Huge stones in a doorway, or huge pillars in a porch having heavy masonry above them, are so evidently necessary in order to afford the needed *physical* support, that it seems as if the builder must have chosen them *instinctively* rather than *reflectively*. But the light steel rods and bars in suspension or cantilever bridges are so evidently indicative of the results of experiment and contrivance, that we cannot avoid the impression that they were determined upon as the result of *reflection*. Often, however, the heavy doorway or column may be so carefully carved, so minutely divided by outlines into all sorts of details of shape, that it suggests not only the physical but also the mental, not only the *instinctive* but also the *reflective*; and it is then that, in accordance with what was said on page 11, we have that *emotive* manifestation universally attributed to that artistic development of the technicalities of building which we term architecture.—*Idem*, II.

REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS IN FORCE, ACCENT, LIGHT AND
SHADE, ETC.

The next rhythmical element of expression to be considered, is force. This is to sounds what different degrees of light and shade are to objects of sight; and is essential to the effects of rhythm in the same way that shading is to those of proportion. In elocution, no one in feeble physical health can manifest an excess of force, while, at times, without it, his delivery may be characterized by the greatest amount of intelligence and soul, of thought and the emotion that is connected with thought. For these reasons, it seems right to infer that force represents physique rather than intellect or spiritual feeling; in other words, energy that is instinctive and connected with the physical nature rather than anything that is reflective and connected with the psychical.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, v.

In the arts of sound, especially in poetry, the effects of *force* and *pitch* usually go together. If, in a poetic foot, we accent one syllable, we almost invariably give it a different pitch from that of the unaccented syllable following it. There is the same connection between the corresponding elements in the arts of sight. When we give more force to a color in painting by increasing the effects of light and shade, we usually change the kind, or, what may be termed the *pitch*, of the color; and though certain buildings and statues seem to be devoid of color, we cannot, except by using many different kinds of it, make pictures which will reproduce with absolute accuracy such effects as have just been attributed to relative degrees of massiveness or of energy of touch.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, XIII.

REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS IN GESTURES OF THE ARM.

There are three planes in which the stroke of a gesture may be made. One is *on a level* with the breast, which is the seat of the motive or emotive nature, or, as we may say (see page 12), of the soul. One is *below* it, and one is *above* it. The principle underlying the phase of thought represented by the hand, when carried to either of the three planes, is as follows: Every soul inside of a body conceives of itself as the centre of the universe, which the horizon rims, the earth grounds, and the zenith domes. Every man, even the least egotistic, is compelled to think that not only the world but the universe revolves around

himself. Perhaps he is right—who knows? If God be really in that fourth dimension within us, and the human soul be really a focus in which the rays from earth and heaven meet and blend, how far is this from the truth? But whether right or wrong, a man cannot rid himself of this conception. When he gestures, he cannot do otherwise than give expression to it. His hands are carried *on a level* with the breast to represent what he conceives to be on a physical, and hence, by analogy, a mental or moral level with himself. They move *before* him to indicate that which he really sees there, or to refer ideally to the truth or hope that he anticipates in the future. They move *behind* him to indicate that which is really behind him, something that he has abandoned or turned from possibly with loathing or regret; or they may refer ideally to a condition of opinion and life beyond which he has progressed. They move *to one side* to refer to some actual physical presence there, or, ideally, if the gesture indicate exclusion, to something that is a side issue from the main line of thought; possibly to some course that is a diversion from straightforward action. But if the gesture indicate inclusion, it refers to the general and comprehensive. The hands are carried *below* the breast to represent that which one conceives to be physically, mentally, or morally below himself; *i. e.*, below his sight, comprehension, or control; to indicate a pathway, an idea that he can understand, a power that he can master. They are carried *above* the breast to represent that which he conceives to be physically, mentally, or morally above himself; above his sight, conception, or control; to indicate a star, a grand idea, a mighty force.

In applying these principles, it must always be borne in mind that the different directions taken by the gesture represent not what actually is, but what a man conceives to be. Most of the published discussions of this subject do not sufficiently emphasize this fact. We are told, for instance, that good and God must receive upward gestures, and bad and the Devil downward gestures. But this depends entirely upon one's point of view, upon his conception. The expression, "Get thee behind me, Satan," would require a downward and backward gesture, because the speaker would conceive of Satan as below and behind himself morally; but the expression—

There was a Brutus once that would have brooked
The Eternal Devil to keep his state in Rome
As easily as a king—

Shakespeare: *Julius Cæsar*, i., 2—

would require an upward and forward gesture, because in it Satan is conceived of as a foe of overwhelming force, whom one is facing, therefore as one physically above and before the speaker, and not by any means below or behind him.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, IX.

REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS IN GESTURES OF THE HAND.

The first, the broadest, *roundest* form that the hand can assume, represents, as nearly as any shape possible for it, vital and physical emphasis, *i. e.*, will-power applied to the impression of ideas. Just as a fist threatens with a power greater than one's own, if held above one's head; and with one's own power, if held on a level with one's breast, so it manifests strength of conviction and a determination to pound the truth into an opponent, if made in connection with a downward gesture of emphasis.

Equally evident is the meaning of the pointing finger. It is the *sharpest* form that the hand can assume, and, according to what has been said, should represent interpretive mentality. This it undoubtedly does. When we point to an object, we do so not as an exhibition of will or emotion, but of thought. Nor do we wish others to do anything beyond concentrating their thought upon it. There are two forms of the gesture with the fingers and thumb unfolded from the palm . . . namely, the *closing*, in which the palm is averted, *i. e.*, turned away from the body, where the speaker cannot see it, and the *opening*, in which the position is reversed, where the palm is held so that the speaker can see it. The *closing* gesture seems to push downward, upward, backward, forward, or sideward, as if to keep all external things or thoughts from touching or influencing the one who is gesturing. It seems to *close* all channels of communication between him and the outside world. The *opening* gesture seems prepared to give and receive things or thoughts from every quarter; and thus to *open* these channels. Both gestures, therefore, seem to represent the motive or emotive attitude. To extend what has been said, the *closing* gesture being used to reject, to ward off, to deny, what is unpleasant, threatening, or un-

truthful is used descriptively to refer to anything having these characteristics, to anything, therefore, like a storm, an avalanche, a disgusting sight, a foe, or any supposed source of plotting or hostility. For an analogous reason, as applied to abstract thought, this gesture is used by one who is in a mood to dogmatize, to dictate, or to express any conception, concerning which he is not in a condition to receive suggestions from others. . . . The youngest child never points with the palm up to things that have definite outlines. The palm is always down. It is not an *open* question how one shall conceive of a particular horse or dog; and so the *closing* gesture with the index finger shuts out all appeal. The mind of the speaker cannot be satisfied unless the hearer conceives of these objects just as he does. . . .

The *opening* gesture indicates exactly the opposite. Being used to welcome or impart what is pleasant, interesting, or important, it naturally refers, in a descriptive way, to any thing or thought having these characteristics, to anything conceived of, therefore, as being freely given or received like a gift or purchase, or like friendship, joy, knowledge, prosperity, or blessedness. As accompanying an expression of abstract thought, this gesture is in place whenever one submits an opinion as an *open* question for others to consider and to decide as they may deem fit. It is the gesture, therefore, of inquiry, persuasion, and appeal. The pointing finger, too, when the palm is in the position of an *opening* gesture, does not mean the same as when it is in the position of the *closing* gesture. In the former case it does not point merely to definite objects; it points to open possibilities.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, XIII.

REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS IN HUMAN FORMS.

After cautioning the reader to bear in mind that few individual forms manifest the features of any one type exclusively, it will suffice to say that, according to the principles of physiology and phrenology, *roundness* of form or feature, *i. e.*, curvature, represents the degree of vital or physical power; that *sharpness*, *i. e.*, angularity, represents the degree of mental or interpretive power; and that *length* represents the degree of motive or emotive power, *i. e.* the degree of that self-control or lack of it which is sometimes termed moral power. . . . If we separate the sugges-



"The Descent from the Cross," by Rubens

See pages, 73, 82, 88, 89, 91, 162, 331, 385



tions of different parts of the body, the torso seems best to represent the vital or physical; the extremities, especially the head and hands, to represent the mental or interpretive, as, for instance, in the hand-gesture; and the chest, shoulders, elbows, and knees, to represent the motive or emotive, as, for instance, when one is excited or embarrassed. Facial expression seems based upon the principle that the chin and lower lip best represent the vital or physical; the eyebrows and forehead best represent the mental or interpretive; and the nose and eyes best represent the motive or emotive. The movements of these features to represent particular conceptions correspond, when the head is lifted or lowered or turned sideways, to the arms; and when the countenance is contracted, expanded, or drawn down, to the hands.—*Idem*, XIII.

REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS IN HUMAN POSTURES.

Now let us consider, as related to representation, the action of a man's body. We shall find that, in the degree in which his expression is *instinctive* in the sense of being spontaneous and unconscious, because uninfluenced or unimpeded by conditions that come from without, his gait, postures, and gestures all tend to assume the forms of free, large, graceful curves. But in the degree in which his expression is *reflective*, in the sense of being made responsive and calculating in order to meet conditions from without, especially in the degree in which these conditions check, impede, and embarrass him, and make him conscious of this fact, or self-conscious, as we say,—in this degree we shall find that his bearing is stiff, constrained, and awkward, imparting to all his movements a tendency to assume the forms of straight lines and angles. Both these extremes are *emotive*, as is all human expression; but sharp angles and short curves will give way to straighter lines and longer curves in the degree in which outside conditions do not wholly overcome a man's spontaneity, but cause him to make his instinctive promptings reflective, as in exerting the moral influence of confident assertion, or enthusiastic persuasion. But angles will predominate in the degree in which he is conscious of interference, as in supposed opposition, whether this be mental, or material or both together, as in fighting. The latter condition will double up his frame and throw his neck, elbows, knees, and hips

into shapes that will make his form the best possible representation of what can be described by only the term angularity; yet from this appearance in such cases, curves are never entirely absent.

REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS IN NATURAL OUTLINES.

So much for the meaning of outlines assumed by the body. Now let us notice how, as manifested not in the human form but in the inanimate appearances of nature surrounding it, similar outlines are fitted to represent, and so to awaken, corresponding conceptions in the mind of the spectator. The curve has been ascribed to the *instinctive*, or, as we may term it, the physically normal action of the human form. Is there any truth in the supposition that similar appearances external to man may be ascribed to sources similar in character? Why should there not be? The eye itself is circular, and the field of vision which it views, at any one moment, always appears to be the same. So does the horizon and the zenith, and so, too, do most of the objects that they contain—the heaving mountain, the rising smoke or vapor, the rolling wave, the gushing fountain, the rippling stream, even the bubbles of its water and the pebbles of its channel, and every tree, plant, and animal, whether at rest or in motion. For this reason, curves, wherever seen, necessarily suggest more or less of that which is normal, or, as applied to natural animate life, of that which has the buoyancy, freedom, and joyousness which we instinctively associate with the possession of this.

The straight line with its accompanying angles we have found to be produced by a man chiefly as a result of the *reflective* action of his mind. How is it with similar effects in the appearances surrounding him? Do not rectangles with their straight, parallel sides, as in buildings and in so many other objects made by men, invariably suggest results of construction, and, therefore, of reflection expended upon them? Nor are such suggestions confined to objects with reference to which a man's interference with the normal action of nature is unmistakable. By way of association, the horizontal hilltop, the sharply perpendicular cliff, the pointed peak, cause us to think and often to say that they look precisely as if a man had been at work upon them, leveling or blasting. Few natural objects, indeed, have outlines absolutely straight or angular; but always, in

the degree in which they are so, the impression naturally produced by curves, which is that of a growth outward from normal vitality within, is lessened. We feel that life has in some way been literally blasted. As a rule, it is the great convulsions of nature, whether produced by fire, frost, wind, or earthquake, that leave behind them, if their progress can be traced at all, such results of crystallizing, cracking, and rending, as are manifested in straight lines and angles. No wonder, therefore, that wherever seen they are associated in our minds with the work of extraneous force acting upon the forms from the outside, as the volcano does when it rends the rocks and throws the lava through and over them, and as the tempest does, when it bends the trees and tears off their branches.

Now let us consider the possibilities of *emotive* effects between these two extremes of form. When, notwithstanding curves or angles, the general appearance of a shape approximates that of straight, parallel lines, it must be then that the appearance is most suggestive of *reflective* influences. This being so, in the degree in which the lines are long and absolutely straight, they must suggest reflection or thought of the most unchanging as well as distinctive character, as in *persistence*, *seriousness*, or *dignity*. Now notice that these straight lines may tend to be either horizontal or vertical. Does it require any argument to show that, if horizontal, they are suggestive of *persistence*, *seriousness*, or *dignity in repose*, and, if vertical, of the same *in activity*. What is so firmly fixed in position as a long straight beam, lying flat on the ground; and what is so hard to get or easy to keep in position as the same placed vertically? It is strictly in accordance with the principle of correspondence, therefore, that the former should represent restfulness, and the latter difficulty overcome by effort, and, if through human agency, by human effort, or by that in the soul which makes the effort possible. For this reason, therefore, as well as because, by pointing upward, it carries the thought upward (which is the ordinary way of explaining the effect), the vertical line may be said to represent *aspiration* and *elevation of aim*. Of course, too, because composed of lines very nearly vertical, sharp angles pointing upward, as in Gothic window-caps and spires, represent the same. Observe, too, how in this architectural style the parallelism of the vertical lines repeats and em-

phasizes the emotive effect due to their directions, and augments it by regularity.

Curves and angles, when their lines are greatly broken, suggest the changing and transient, and also, when crossed, the complex. Because complex, they are perplexing; and provided they are nevertheless disposed in such ways as to render the fact of some design indisputable, they are exciting, as far as lines can be so, to the imagination, constantly stimulating it, as they do, to solve the mystery of their mode of arrangement. Such being their effects, one would expect to find the natural forms characterized by them proving more exciting to the emotions than those already considered. And when we examine the appearances about us, is not this exactly what we do find? Is it not when complicated curves and angles outline natural trifles that they fascinate and make men imitate them in their curios? Is it not when curves, straight lines, and angles join in natural forms of grander import, when the tree and bush are wreathed about the precipice, when the dome-like mountain and the rolling cloud lift above the sharp peak and cloven crag, and far below them lies the flat plain or lake,—is it not then, in connection with such combinations, that the most exciting appeal is made through the emotions to the imagination?

That the facts are as here suggested, will be evident to any one who will make a careful study of the subtle effects upon the mind of different scenes in nature, and of the imitations of them in art. In this place a good way, perhaps, of discovering the representative capabilities of these different appearances, is to recall the use that is made of them by the landscape gardener. Is it not a fact that, in case he desire to direct attention to the beauty of nature in itself, *i. e.*, to the capabilities of nature with the least possible suggestion of the intervention of a human mind,—that in this case his plans will develop into gradually rising mounds and circuitous drives, winding among trees and shrubs planted in clusters but not in rows? On the contrary, if he desire to produce a distinctly different impression, causing thought to revert from nature to man, either to the artist who has arranged things as they are, or to the resident or visitor for whose convenience or guidance they have been so arranged, then will he not plan for distinctly different effects, as in the long avenue bordered with its rows of

trees, or in the terrace, or the hedge, or the flower garden with straight and rectangular pathways? Or, once more, if he desire to produce more emotional impressions by means of which the observer may be drawn more into sympathy with his designs and the ingenuity of them, will he not make more use of variety and contrast, combining the winding walks of the ramble with sharp angles, perpendicular rocks with rounded moss banks, or shooting cataracts with still pools?

Is it strange that similar principles should apply to painting and sculpture? They are equally applicable when constructing buildings. The most ordinarily accepted classification made of the different styles of these is according to their bridging of openings or spaces by straight lines, curves, or angles, which three methods are supposed to indicate the differences between the architecture of the Greek horizontal entablature, of the Byzantine or Romanesque round arch, and of the Gothic pointed arch. But notice that straight lines abound in all these forms, the horizontal ones in Greek architecture being no more prominent than the vertical ones in Gothic architecture. It is well to observe, too, that of all architecture appealing to the emotions the latter does this in the most powerfully effective way, for the reason not often noticed that in it alone is it possible to blend all the possibilities of outline. Sometimes there are no curved forms at all in Greek buildings. Sometimes, too, there are no sharp forms in Byzantine or the allied Romanesque buildings. But in Gothic buildings there is invariably a blending of both. Moreover, as if also to emphasize the existence of each, both are developed to excess, the curves being made particularly round and the angles particularly sharp.

Now what is the architectural significance of a predominance of each of these methods of bringing outlines together, namely, through curves, through angles, or through both in combination? Is this difficult to determine? To begin with, what is the shape most instinctively produced by the creatures below man, when they indulge in construction? What is the shape of ant-hills, birds' nests, or beavers' dams? What is the shape of that which a man constructs in the forest when he breaks off the limbs of the trees, and, binding them together, builds himself something in which to sleep? Rounded, curved, is it not?

The huts represented in Chapter XX. of this book are all symmetrical, and so would be recognized at once as products of man; but which of them should we be most likely to imagine to have been constructed by some more intelligent animal? The same principle holds good with reference to buildings of a more elaborate character; though it must not be overlooked that, in the degree in which any forms are artificially elaborated they come to have complex and therefore (see page 11) stronger emotive effects. But, as applied to the predominating or germinal shapes in such buildings, is it not true that the impression conveyed by any rounded arch, as in a bridge for instance, is that the small stones available have been made to span the space under it in accordance with a natural law which needs only to be perceived by the builder in order to be instinctively fulfilled by him? And if this be so, is it not logical to infer that all such forms can cause one to associate their appearance with a fulfilment of natural law? Do not their curved outlines make Figs. 40 and 43 look as if, according to natural law, they *grew* into shape in a sense not true of Fig. 42? Possibly, therefore, there is a reason why rounded doorways and bending domes should have seemed to so many in so many different lands appropriate to represent not only, as stated on page 38, a place in which crowds are expected to gather, but also a centre from which emanates the authority of law, either civil, as from a state capitol or courthouse, or spiritual, as from a cathedral.

Again when we find buildings showing no such desire to accommodate the methods of construction to the requirements of natural law, as is apparent in the round arch, but rather a determination, on the part of a man, to erect something designed by himself without any special regard for these requirements, as is the case wherever we see a predominance of straight lines and angles, then is it not true that the impression mainly conveyed is that of a form due to human reflection? Moreover, if, in connection with this general impression, the predominating lines be horizontal, and the angles flat, so as to produce, so far as angles can, an effect of horizontality, is it not true that, combined with the seriousness and dignity suggested by straight lines, they represent repose? . . . If, on the contrary, the predominating lines be vertical, and the angles, by being sharp, aid the effect of verticality, is it not true

that, combined with the seriousness and dignity suggested by straight lines, they represent elevation of soul or aspiration?

Once more, when we look at buildings in which the curves as well as straight lines are prominent, or in which curves, straight lines, and angles, all three, are prominent, can we not perceive a more æsthetic emotive effect than in a building in which the curves are greatly subordinated? And in buildings in which either curves, angles, or straight lines are combined in excess of what are needed, as is often the case in both Greek and Gothic architecture, where columns, entablatures, or arches, are introduced and are all shaped alike evidently for the purpose of ornament alone, and to enhance, by way of correspondence, the appearance of artistic unity, then is it not true that the forms represent a special appeal to the æsthetic emotions?—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, v.

REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS OF COLOR AS INFLUENCED BY
LIGHT (*see also* COLOR AS PERCEIVED BY THE EYE
and HARMONY OF COLOR).

Let us notice now the representative possibilities of color. We can best come to understand these by considering what color represents in extreme cases. When there is no light there is no color. When there is little light, we can see forms, but not colors, except as they seem to be very dim and dark. In this condition, the mind is not greatly interested in them nor aroused to thought by them; so far as they affect the appearance of nature, they are not, as a rule, satisfactory, interesting, cheering, or inspiring, but, on the contrary, they sometimes cause depression and even solicitude. With more light, however, the outlines and colors become more visible, bright, and varied; and not only the satisfaction but the excitation derivable from them is increased? These effects continue to be enhanced up to the time, if it ever arrive, when the colors are no longer distinguishable, for the reason that the light has become too dazzling. But at this point the disagreeableness of the effect is produced, not because attention is aroused too slightly, but too greatly, as, for instance, by the direct rays of the sun or by a flash of lightning. In all cases, however, even in these last, notice the additional excitation to the emotions produced by variety. Sunlight

or lightning is never so vivid as when made to contrast sharply with absolute darkness, as in a cave or a cloud. Nor is a bright red or yellow ever so effective as when placed directly against a dull blue-green or indigo. We may say, therefore, that, as a rule, *dark* colors—or shades of them which result when the colors as determined by the spectrum, are mixed with black—as also *unvarying* colors, are less exciting to the emotions than are bright and varied ones.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, XIII.

REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS OF COLORS (*see also* REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS OF TONES).

For the purpose not merely of indicating the unity of method in different parts of this system, but also for the purpose of accomplishing that for which this unity of method is intended to be serviceable, it seems well in this place to try to interpret the meanings of the *colors* through what we know of the meanings of the different elocutionary, musical, or poetic *tones*. Of these tones, the *normal* and *orotund* are musical and unmixed. It will be shown presently that the two, respectively, correspond to the *cold* and the *warm* colors. . . .

We will take up, first, the distinction between the *normal*—sometimes called the *pure*—tone and the *orotund*. In elocution, the former is not necessarily a cultivated tone, but the latter, the *orotund*, is. The former therefore suggests the natural, and the latter the artistic. Is not the same true with reference to the classes of color to which these have been said to correspond? Just as the normal tone is that of ordinary natural intercourse, are not the cold colors, the greens, blues, and purples, those of ordinary natural life? Is it not true that for nine-tenths of all the time, nine-tenths of all the surfaces of the globe—*i. e.*, the lakes, skies, hills, forests, fields, rocks, distant and near—are robed in these colors? The warmer colors, the reds, oranges, and yellows, appear occasionally in nature in the sunset sky, the autumn foliage, the hues of flowers, the plumage of birds, and the coating of animals; but it is remarkable how seldom they appear at all, how little surface, comparatively, they cover when they do appear, how infrequently they appear in their full intensity, and how universally, when they do appear in this, they are considered exceptional and worthy of

remark. They certainly are not nature's normal colors. Man cannot dye anything bluer or greener than he can often see in the sea and sky and forest; but nowhere in the world can he raise a red or orange flag that will not instantly be recognized as something different from anything in nature, and, therefore, as something that is signaling the presence of man. Hence the use of these colors, especially of red, by surveying parties, and on railways, piers, and battle-fields. Such colors are the ones that are most suggestive of human interference. As used in art, therefore, they are the colors representing the condition upon which the thought and feeling of the artist have had the greatest influence.

With these facts, however, we need also to bear in mind that which is a logical inference from what was said on page 254, namely, that all very low and uniform shades, even if of yellows, oranges, and reds, have a quieting effect, and all very high and—because contrasts emphasize one another, and most contrasts of cold colors are warm—all contrasting tints, even if of purples, blues, and greens, have an exciting effect. To compare these conditions with those of pitch in elocution and music, this, if low and monotonous, indicates what is *serious*, *grave*, *dignified*, and *self-controlled*, and, if high and varied, the opposite. Does it require an argument to show how perfectly these analogies are carried out as applied to colors? Do we not all recognize the more exciting and exhilarating effects of these when full of brightness, and also, in connection with this, of contrast? Who has not noticed the difference in influence between a lawn and a flower-bed? or between a room decorated with evergreens and the same decorated with chrysanthemums? or between a uniformly clouded gray sky, and a sky lighted up with the diversified glories of the sunset? or between the dulness and monotony of a business street when the shop-entrances are hung with dingy clothing for sale, or the sidewalks filled with people in dark business suits, and the same streets when hung with bright and varied flags on a gala day, or crowded with throngs decked out in the gay and checkered trappings of a carnival or holiday parade? Of course, uniformity of color, like uniformity of outline—as in parallelism,—produces a certain seriousness and dignity of effect; and any procession, the members of which are dressed alike and

march-alike, will produce something of these irrespective of the quality of the coloring. But there is a vast difference between the degree of seriousness and dignity in the effect of a procession of priests and nuns robed in black or gray in a funeral or at church, and in that of militia uniformed in bright colors on a holiday or in a theatre. In the latter case, it is impossible to conceive that any child, or a crowd of any kind, should require explanation, aside from those suggested by color alone, to arouse them to excitement and enthusiasm. There was philosophy as well as fancy, therefore, underlying the former use of red in the costumes of soldiers. Nothing in the way of color can surpass red in effectiveness. This fact has been explained according to the principle of association. It has been said that red is the color of blood and of fire, and suggests them. But does it suggest them to the bull and other animals whom it excites to fury? In these cases does it not act physically? Physicists agree that there is no color that agitates the optic nerve so violently. There seem to be, therefore, just as in the case of outlines, principles both of association and of nature which cause certain colors, and, to a less degree, all colors, when at their brightest, to be representative of emotive excitation, and certain other colors, and, to a less degree, all colors in their lower tones, to be representative of the opposite.

All the great facts of nature are felt long before they are formulated. When the man born blind expressed his conception of the color red by saying that it was like the sound of a trumpet, he uttered not a poetic but a literal truth. Just as red is the color that is farthest removed from the ordinary colors of nature, the blast of the trumpet is the sound that is farthest removed from the ordinary sounds of nature. All pastoral symphonies abound in passages executed by the flutes and clarionets, and the violins and other stringed instruments. With the music produced by these, it seems natural to associate the sounds produced by the sighing and whistling of the wind, the rushing and dashing of the waters, and the occasional piping of a bird and the lowing of an animal. The drum and cymbal, too, may remind one of the exceptional thunder of the storm, or the roll of the earthquake. But when the flutes and stringed instruments give way to the trumpet and allied instruments, then we feel that man is asserting

his influence in the scene, and we listen, almost instinctively, for the sound of his tramping feet. It is only man that marches. It is only man that wages war, and it is only in martial music and in the expression of the passion of conflict and the pride of triumph that the blasts of the trumpet, announcing, as they do, more distinctively than any other musical sounds, the power and presence of the human being, realize to the full their representative mission. No wonder that even a blind man, at the end of the play, just as the curtain drops on the victorious conquerors, should be able to imagine how there should be an æsthetic connection between the brilliant climax that is heard and the brilliant colors in the costumes and flags which are described to him as surrounding these conquerors and waving above them.

The same principles must apply, of course, to the significance of color as used in painting and architecture. In the ordinary portraits of great men, in such paintings as Raphael's "School of Athens," the seriousness and dignity of the subjects are such that we do not feel the need in the pigments of much brightness or contrast. But whenever anything is intended to produce, primarily, a powerful impression, whether gay or grave in tendency, the contrary is sometimes true. Hence one reason why Rubens with his high and varied coloring is so transcendently great in such representations of profound excitement as in the "Lion Hunt" and "The Descent from the Cross," and is so correspondingly gross in subjects of a lighter character, as in some of those in the Old Pinakothek at Munich.

But there is another reason for this fact, and, in connection with it, there is another confirmation of the general truth of the statements just made. It may be recognized by noticing the effects produced by colors upon pictures of the human countenance. So far as this latter is more than a mass of lifeless flesh, so far as it is something fitted to be transfused and transfigured by the seriousness of intelligence and the dignity of spirituality, is there any doubt that it should be represented in colors neither very brilliant nor greatly varied? May there not be a sense in which it is a literal fact that the blue veins of the aristocrat are far more suggestive of sentiment and soul behind them, not only than the bloated flush of the inebriate, but even than the ruddy hues of the peasant? . . .

So, too, in sculpture. Is it not universally recognized that statues of dark gray, blue, or black marble, granite, or bronze, as in the case of some of the Egyptian remains, while fitted for subjects presented in proportions sufficiently large to secure great seriousness and dignity of effect, are much less appropriate than pure white marble for subjects of the same general character when presented in the proportions of life? And is it not equally true that subjects of a lighter character and smaller size are far more appropriately represented in the warmer-colored bronzes?

In architecture, outline has usually more to do with effects than has color. Yet here, too, few fail to recognize the influence of the latter. Who can be insensible to the congruity between the seriousness, gravity, and dignity of impression produced by blue shades of gray or even of white, as they loom before us in the outlines of the cathedral, or of the large public edifice? But who finds it agreeable to have the same conceptions associated with buildings designed for domestic purposes? Observe how cold, as we very appropriately say, and therefore how devoid of that which is homelike and inviting, is the impression sometimes produced by the blue-gray or white of a mansion, as contrasted with the appearance of a house constructed of material in which there is a more liberal admixture of the warm hues, as in stone or brick of a yellow, orange, or brown shade. And what of the warm colors when used with contrasts? Is there any one who is not conscious of the joyous, gay, and exhilarating suggestions imparted by the bright and varied tints that invite one to the pavilion of the park or the veranda of the seaside cottage? The same principle, of course, is exemplified in interiors. Cold colors on the walls, an exclusive or excessive use of blue, or of green, will always affect the sensitive like the clouds of a lowery day, while the warmer colors, used either wholly or in part, will correspondingly enliven them. No one can deny the impressiveness of the gray of the stone arches that bend over the "dim religious light" of the church. But even the effect of this needs to be counteracted by warm colors in the chancel; and would be wholly out of place in a theatre.—*The Essentials of Æsthetics*, XIII.

REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS OF COLORS WHEN MIXED.

Now let us consider the mixed as distinguished from the pure colors. Going back, for a moment, to mixed tones,

the first of them that was mentioned was the aspirate. This, as was said, is a whisper, and its characteristic is an absence of any tone whatever. Of course, that which, in the realm of color, corresponds to an absence of tone must be, according to its degree of intensity, black or white, or else some gray quality formed by mixing the two. The whisper, in its forcible form, the analogue of which, in the realm of sight, would be black, indicates apprehension, as in fright; and in its weaker form, the analogue of which, in the realm of sight, would be white, indicates interest, as in the secrecy of a love-scene. In both forms the whisper adds feeling to the tone, which, as a rule, is usually uttered, if not simultaneously with it, at least before or after it. This tone, of course, considered irrespective of the whisper that is joined with it, must resemble either the normal or the orotund. If it resemble the normal, the forcible whisper causes it to have that passive effect of apprehension characterizing the expressions of *awe* and *horror* represented in the mixed quality which is termed pectoral. If the tone resemble the orotund, the forcible whisper causes it to have that active effect of apprehension characterizing the expression of *hostility* represented in the mixed quality which is termed guttural.

In the realm of sight, nothing could be perceived if everything were absolutely black. Black, therefore, as well as white, must always be blended with other shades. When blended thus, the effect of being side by side is much the same as of actual mixture. At a slight distance, we cannot tell whether the appearance is owing to the latter or merely to the fact that two shades happen to be near together. Now bearing this in mind we may say that the effect of black, when blended with the cold colors, corresponds to that of pectoral quality, and, when blended with the warm colors, corresponds to that of guttural quality.

Notice, first, the combinations of black with the cold colors. In such cases the black, of course, must be very prominent, and, merely to render the objects depicted clearly perceptible, it must be offset in some places by cold colors of comparatively light tints. But where light tints are blended with absolute black, there must be some violent contrasts. Violent contrasts of themselves, as shown on page 194, represent excitation. Excitation,

however, in connection with blackness,—to go back to what was said, on page 193, of the effects of light from which we have developed those of pigments—is excitation in connection with more or less indistinctness causing perplexity and involving apprehension. At the same time, as this apprehensive excitation is connected with the cold colors, it is passive, or, as one might say, chilling and benumbing, rather than active, or, as one might say, heating and inflaming. For this reason its effects seem appropriately compared to those of *awe* and *horror* represented by the pectoral quality. Of course, color alone, without other means of expression, can only approximate a representation of these; but let the outlines justify it, and what hues, mixed with those of the countenance, can make it so ghastly as dark blue and green; or can make the clouds of heaven so unheavenly as very dark blue; or the sod of the earth so unearthly as dark blue-green; or anything so deathlike and appalling as these colors used with excessive contrasts of light and shade? Is it any wonder that it is with these combinations that Gustave Doré produces most of the harrowing effects in his series of pictures illustrating Dante's "Inferno?"

Now let us add black to yellow, orange, or red, either mixing the two or placing them side by side, and notice the effect. As said before, the very dark shades cannot, in painting, be used exclusively. If they be, the outlines cannot be made clearly perceptible. But to use black in connection with the lighter tints, introduces that variety which, as said on page 194, always increases the excitation of the effect. Warmth, in connection with black, or, as explained in the last paragraph, with apprehensive excitation,—emotive heat causing active resistance to that which is dreaded,—does not this describe, as nearly as anything can, a condition attendant upon *hostility* such as is represented to the ear by the guttural tone. In the case of the warm colors, too, still more than in that of the cold, nature seems to have enforced the meanings of the combinations so that we shall not mistake them. Yellow and black, orange and black, red and black, or, in place of black, very dark gray, green, blue, or purple, which are allied to black,—is there a particularly venomous insect or beast, or appearance of any kind, from a bee, or snake, or tiger, to the fire and smoke of a con-

flagration, or the lightning and cloud of a storm, in which we do not detect some presence of these combinations? No wonder, then, that so often in former times, at least, soldiers wore them on their breasts when girded for the contests of the battle-field!

The whisper, in its weaker form, was said to represent not apprehension, but a more or less agreeable degree of interest. Of course, the weaker form of a negation of color, at its extreme, must be represented by white. As applied to tones, there is no separate term of designation for this whisper when added to normal or orotund quality. Elocutionists merely speak of an aspirated normal or orotund, saying that, when aspirated, feeling is added to the effect of each. Let us recall now combinations of white with blue, green, or purple. Is there any difficulty in recognizing how closely the result corresponds to that which is produced by an aspirated normal tone? We have all seen such combinations in summer costumes, as well as in tents and awnings over windows or verandas. In such cases, is there not a more exhilarating effect produced by them than could be produced by white alone? or by one of these colors alone? Yet, at the same time, is not the effect far cooler, and, in this sense, less exhilarating, than is produced by combinations of white with red, orange, or yellow?

In these latter we have, as has been said, that which corresponds to the effect of the aspirated orotund,—the tone used in earnest advocacy or description of something which is felt to be in itself of profound interest. Think of the combinations of white with these warmer colors. Could any language better than that just used designate their peculiar influence? What than they are more exhilarating or entrancing in the decorations of interiors, or in banners and pageants?—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XI.

REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS OF PITCH IN MUSIC AND POETRY (see also PITCH and VERSE MELODY and HARMONY).

In accordance with the principle of correspondence, the conditions of *pitch* high or low, or its movements in directions upward or downward in the musical scale, seem to be in exact analogy with correlated conditions and directions with which we are all familiar in the external world of space

about us; and, like them, to indicate the mental *aim* or *motive*. When, for instance, one is elated, he holds his head high, and his movements are varied like those of a buoyant schoolboy. When one is depressed, his head bends downward and his movements are few. It is the same with the utterances. A soaring birds sings in a high and changing key, a crouching man threatens, or a dog growls in a low and monotonous key. High and varied tones, therefore, seem to represent elation of spirit, or that which is felt to be elevating in its influence; and low and uniform tones represent depression of spirit, or that which is felt to be impressive.

The same is true with reference to movements in the *directions* of pitch. Its tendency, when two or more tones at different pitch are heard in succession may be upward or downward, or both upward and downward. In the last case, as in the circumflex inflection, there is merely a combination of the meanings in the other two cases, and we need not consider it here. (See the author's "Orator's Manual," pp. 56-59.) When directed upward or downward, pitch follows laws applicable to all movement. Men lift their bodies, limbs, and feet, when they start to do something. They let their hands fall at their sides and sit down or lie down, when they get through with what they have to do. The lungs rise in inspiration and fall in expiration. So with voices in speaking. Their sounds rise when a man feels inspired to begin to say something, *e. g.*, "If só, I will go." They fall when the inspiration is over, because he has ended saying this, *e. g.*, "If so, I will gò." In other words, upward and downward movements of pitch represent the *mental motive*. The voice rises when one is moved to open, and falls when moved to close, the expression of an idea. It must be borne in mind, however, that these directions of pitch depend upon the relations of utterance to the sense, and not merely to the sentence. If the sense does not close or open where the sentence does, the tones may fall before its close and rise at its end, *e. g.*, "I will gò, if só," "Will you gó?" Nò, I will nòt, if he's thère."

We may extend, and, at the same time, explain this by saying that the voice rises for the purpose of *opening* or *broaching* an idea; that is to say, for the purpose of *pointing away* from the thought immediately expressed, *i. e.*,

when one is inclined to consider the utterances merely *anticipative* or *indecisive*, in the sense of being in themselves *subordinate*, *insignificant*, *trite*, *negative*, or *questionable*, as contrasted with something that is expected to be, or that has been, expressed by the falling inflection. On the contrary, the voice falls for the purpose of *closing* or *completing* an idea; that is to say, for the purpose of *pointing to* the thought immediately expressed, *i. e.*, when one is inclined to consider the utterances *conclusive* or *decisive*, in the sense of being in themselves *interesting*, *important*, *noteworthy*, *affirmative*, or *positive*. It falls whenever it gives its sentence in the sense either of having completed the expression of a sentiment or of having uttered something sententiously. . . .

That similar principles apply to the movements of pitch in the melody of music, we might infer as a result of considering the subject theoretically. But we can not only infer it, but perceive it as a result of a practical study of facts. Notice the following text,¹ which was connected with the notation of the Gregorian chants, written in the sixth century. . . . These chants to which, or through which, all modern music is traceable, were deliberately composed in order to be representative, and nothing else.

It might be supposed that there would be nothing in poetic form corresponding to these upward and downward movements. But, as a fact, any metre causing a line to begin with an unaccented syllable, or to end with an accented syllable, produces, in what are termed the tunes of verse,—unless, as sometimes, the sense requires a different inflection,—the effect of an upward movement. Therefore, this metre naturally suggests the *anticipative*, *indecisive*, *subordinate*, *questionable* effect of the upward inflection.

On the other hand, a line beginning with an accented, or ending with an unaccented syllable, produces the *final*, *decisive*, *interesting*, *important*, *affirmative* effect of the downward movement or inflection.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, XII.

REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS OF TONES IN POETRY AND MUSIC.

The last elocutionary element, the influence of which upon poetic form we have to consider, and the second

¹Containing directions for singing so as to indicate a comma, a period, an interrogation mark, etc.

that has to do with the tunes of verse, is quality; or, as it is sometimes called, on account of that to which it corresponds in painting, tone-color. Its different varieties are determined by the relative proportions in which noise and music are combined in them; or, in other words, by the different actions of the organs of utterance in causing more or less of the breath, while leaving the lungs, to be vocalized and rendered resonant.

What different kinds of quality are fitted to represent, it needs but little observation to discover. It certainly is not physical energy. When Patti passes from a loud to a soft, or from an abrupt to a smooth tone, she changes greatly the kinds of energy, but her voice still retains the same Patti-quality. Nor does quality represent mere intellectuality. A man, without changing in the least an habitual nasal or wheezing quality, may give every inflection needed in order to represent the merely mental phases of that which actuates him. But if we *frighten* him severely, we may make it impossible for him to use any other sound than a *whisper*; if in connection with this, we *anger* him, he will *hiss*; or, if at length he recover his voice, he will use the harsh, jarring, interrupted hard-g quality of tone, termed the *guttural*; or, if that which he would repel be too great to make anger appropriate, it may widen and stiffen his throat so as to produce the hollow, almost inarticulate indication of *awe* and *horror* given by what is termed the *pectoral* quality. Release him now from the influence of affright, anger, or horror, and put him into a *gently satisfied* mood, and he will use his nearest approach to *pure* quality. Stir him then to *profound emotion*, inspired by what is *deeply satisfying*, and all his vocal passages will expand again, and he will produce his nearest approach to the full, round, resonant quality termed *orotund*.

For these reasons, it seems indisputable that quality represents the feelings, the temper, the spiritual condition of the higher emotive nature,—what I have termed the soul, by which is meant, as needs scarcely be said again, the principle of life holding body and mind together—influencing and influenced by both. The soul communicates with the external world never wholly through the instinctive nature, nor wholly through the reflective, but always through one of the two modified by its connection with the

other. The quality of sound, therefore, represents the quality of the feeling that vivifies the soul. This feeling, on its physical side, and with its most physical coloring, gives us, first, the serpent-like *hissing aspirate*; next, with an intellectual coloring, the *guttural* quality; and last, with an emotional coloring, the *pectoral*. On its intellectual side, it gives us first, with a physical coloring, the soft *whispering aspirate*; next, with an intellectual coloring, the *pure* quality; and last, with an emotional coloring, the *orotund*. Of these six forms of quality, the first four are classed in a general way as *impure*, because there is in them more breath or noise than vocal tone or music; and the last two are classed as *pure*.

The first three again refer to what one wishes to repel: the *hissing aspirate* indicating feelings like *affright*, *amazement*, *indignation*, and *contempt*; the *guttural*, as has been said, *hostility*; and the *pectoral*, *awe* or *horror*. The last three refer to what, if not wholly satisfactory, at least, excites in one no movement aimed against it. The *soft whisper* indicates feelings like *surprise*, *interest*, or *solicitude*; the tone termed distinctively the *pure* represents *gentle contemplation* of what may be either *joyous* or *sad*; and the *orotund*, *deep delight*, *admiration*, *courage*, or *determination*, as inspired by contemplation of the *noble* or *grand*.

All these different qualities can be given by good elocutionists when vocalizing almost any of the consonants or vowels; but the poet for his effects must depend upon the sounds necessarily given to words in ordinary pronunciation. For instance, certain consonants, called variously aspirates, sibilants, or atonics, viz.: *h*, *s*, *z*, *w*, *sh*, *wh*, *th*, *p*, *t*, *f*, are aspirate in themselves; that is, we are obliged to whisper when we articulate them. Therefore in poetic effects, considered aside from those that are elocutionary, the aspirate must be produced by using words containing some of these consonants; and, if it be the repellent aspirate or the hiss, by using also consonants giving guttural effects, like *g*, *j*, *ch*, and *r*.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, XI.

As in the cases of duration, force, and pitch, so all these forms of quality, too, have their correspondences in effects of nature as manifested in other departments. Applied to effects of water, for instance, a rushing stream would represent the harsh aspirate, a rocky stream the guttural,

a roiled stream the pectoral, a rippling stream the gentle aspirate, a clear stream the pure, and a full, deep stream the orotund.

That analogies exist between quality as used in elocution and in music, scarcely needs to be argued. As produced by the human voice, there can be no radical differences between possibilities in speaking and in singing; and, as produced by constructed musical instruments, it is inevitable that the mind should associate with each certain representative features, and should determine them by the resemblance, or supposed resemblance, of their artificial tones to the quality of some tone natural to the human voice, or else produced in some other way in nature. In determining these resemblances, too, one would be influenced, of course, by the uses which, as a rule, are made of the particular instruments which he is hearing. It is undoubtedly owing to associations of this kind that we read of the stirring tones of the fife and drum, the solemn tones of the organ, the purity and softness of the flute, the gayety and triumph of the trumpet, the woe and complaint of the bassoon, the pathos and humaneness of the violin. When, for instance, in listening to an opera, we hear predominantly the clash of the cymbals or rattle of the kettle-drums, associated, as these usually are, with the sharper tones of the metallic instruments, we know that the sounds, as in the last act of Mozart's "*Don Juan*," where hell is supposed to await the hero, represent, according to the degrees of their intensity, not only the startling, but the hostile and menacing effects which, in the human voice, we associate with guttural quality. If any action of the play must follow what we hear, we expect to see some violent conflict full of malignity and peril. When the predominating sounds are those of the bass drums and the lower, more hollow tones of either the wind or the stringed instruments, we know that, as in the orchestration which in Wagner's "*Siegfried*" accompanies the hero's encounter with the dragon, they represent the presence of that which inspires to awe and horror such as, in the human voice, we associate with the pectoral quality. The resemblance to this tone in its milder forms is undoubtedly that which imparts a solemn effect to the music of the church organ. When, again, the predominating sounds are those of the wood instruments—the clarinet, the flute, even, to some extent,

the organ—we feel that these represent the gentle, passive contemplation, sad or joyous, which, in elocution, is indicated by pure quality. . . .

When, instead of the wooden wind instruments, we hear the metallic, either as in the organ or in trumpets and instruments of similar character, we feel that these represent the more profound emotions, the admiration, enthusiasm, courage, determination, that we are accustomed to associate with elocutionary orotund quality. To such music we expect to see troops march on to the stage, as in the Soldiers' Chorus in Gounod's "Faust," giving vent to their confidence in anticipation of victory, or to their joy in view of its accomplishment. Once more, when we hear the stringed instruments we recognize that it is their peculiar function to impart intensity of feeling, just as is true of the elocutionary aspirated quality. Hence, the reason for the use of the violins in that scene in Wagner's "Meistersinger" which takes place in the house of Hans Sachs; or in the Venus music of his "Tannhäuser"; or in the waltz music of Gounod's "Faust." Just as in the case of the elocutionary aspirate, too, so here the effects of these stringed instruments may partake of those of any of the other instruments. Not only when associated, as in orchestral music, with the instruments that have been mentioned, but even when not associated with these, the sharper tones of the strings suggest the aspirated guttural, their lower hollow tones the aspirated pectoral, their struck tones, as in the piano, the guitar, and the harp, the aspirated pure, and their tones as produced by the bow, the aspirated orotund.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music: Music as a Representative Art*, VI.

"REPRESENTATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF FORM" (ANALYSIS OF THE BOOK).

"The Representative Significance of Form" begins with the presumption that form, even as it exists in nature, always represents some significance; and that it is from nature, therefore, that, directly or indirectly, a man derives, in the main, the conceptions which he embodies in art. The methods of deriving such conceptions are first considered, and then it is shown how each class of conceptions may be represented in each of the different arts. Advancing from that which is more elementary to that which is more com-

plex, there are treated in this way the conceptions of space, time, existence, matter, movement, force, arrangement, operation, method of operation, organism, life, import, and, finally, of the infinite, the eternal, and the absolute, together with conceptions of truth in the abstract and in the concrete, as embodied either in formulæ or in action. In all cases it is shown that significance and form necessarily go together. After this, the different emphasis which the ways of blending the two give to the one or to the other is shown to distinguish artistic from religious truth, and also from scientific; and the various conditions, methods, and purposes are unfolded, in connection with which development and expression are given to each of the three. In accordance with the distinctions thus made, it is then pointed out that, as manifested in art, the basic principle of the religious tendency prompts to the instinctive, spontaneous, spiritual subordination of form to significance, which we have in the sublime and the grand, the most artistic expression of which is in epic art; that the basic principle of the scientific tendency prompts to the reflective, responsive, materialistic equipoise of significance and form, found in the picturesque and the simple, the most artistic expression of which is in realistic art; and that the basic principle of the distinctively artistic tendency prompts to the instinctively reflective, emotive, and idealistic subordination of significance to form, found in the brilliant and the striking, the most artistic expression of which is in dramatic art. The same three respective tendencies, considered both in their tragic and their comic phases, are shown to be at the basis also of the more important subdivisions of epic, realistic, and dramatic art; after ample illustrations to exemplify and confirm which propositions, the book closes by finally indicating as developed from the same tendencies certain expressional differences, as well as correspondences, between the arts of Music, Poetry, Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture—*Recapitulation in Proportion and Harmony*, XXVI.

RHETORICIANS, AS COLLEGE PRESIDENTS.

At that time, the presidents of all our prominent colleges—men like Nott, Griffin, Hopkins, Woods, Wayland, Lord, Kirkland, Humphrey, Finney—were rhetoricians, if not, as was the case with many of them, elocutionists. The

whole curriculum was made a unity by aiming it in the direction of expression, which certainly is a wise thing to do, if the problem of education be, as has been stated in this paper, how to get knowledge not into the mind, but out of it.
—*Essay on the Literary Artist and Elocution.*

RHYME, ITS INFLUENCE ON THE MIND (*see* VERSE AN ELEMENT).

It is evident, from what has been said, that the chief effect of *rhyme*, or the recurrence of similar sounds at the ends of lines, is to introduce into the verse the element of *sameness*. This sameness of itself, as has been intimated in another place, increases the effects of *versification* by directing attention to the ends of the lines and thus separating them. Besides this, especially when the rhymes are used at like intervals, as is generally the case, they tend to give *unity* to the form. Their influence in this regard is precisely analogous to that of the cadences and half cadences, which, coming at the ends of musical phrases, give the effect of unity to musical composition. . . .

Like these similarly ending cadences and half cadences in music, rhymes furnish a framework about which, or rather within which, all the other form-elements of the verse are brought together. This is the reason why it is easier for beginners to write poetry in rhymes than in blank verse. All successful verse must have form, and rhymes of themselves tend to give it this. Not only so, but—what is of main importance in our present treatment of the subject—they serve equally to furnish a framework for the poetic thought. The *rhyming words*, especially the last of two or three that rhyme, always appear to be especially *emphatic*. In fact, they seem to add to the emphasis in almost every possible way. They augment the effects of duration or quantity, because at the end of the line, where the rhyme usually is, the voice, as a rule, pauses; of force, because rhyming syllables, at least the last ones in which a sound is repeated, appear to be pronounced more strongly than others; of pitch, because, as we have found, where the vowel-sounds are the same, the pitch seems the same; and of quality, as we shall find, because the likeness of the rhyming syllables necessarily attracts attention. For all these reasons, rhymes necessarily tend to thrust into prominence the ideas expressed in them. . . . They convey the impression, therefore, that something important has been said;

and if they occur frequently, they suggest that many important things have been said, and said in a short time, or—what is equivalent to this—that the thought in the poem is moving on rapidly, an effect that could not be produced by the same words arranged differently.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, x.

RHYMES, EFFECTS OF.

To perceive parallelism in unrhymed blank verses, it is often necessary to see them printed; but in successive lines ended with the same sounds, the ear recognizes it at once.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music*, ix.

Placed, as they are, at the ends of lines, they serve to separate these, one from the other, and to emphasize the element of form in their composition. They do this, moreover, by satisfying the distinctively artistic tendency of the mind to compare and classify effects that are alike, indicating clearly the length of each line, and which lines are meant to correspond.—*Idem*, viii.

RHYTHM (*see also* ACCENT, PROPORTION, PROPORTION AND RHYTHM, *and* VERSE, CLASSIC *vs.* MODERN).

Art did not originate rhythm nor the satisfaction derivable from it. Long before the times of the first artists, men had had practical experience of its pleasures. Long before the age of poetry, or music, or dancing, or even of fences or schoolboys, the primitive man had sat upon a log and kicked with his heels, producing a rhythm as perfect, in its way, as that of his representatives of the present who in Africa take delight in stamping their feet and clapping their hands, and in America in playing upon drums and tambourines, in order to keep time to the movements of dancers and the tunes of singers.

When we come to ask why rhythm should be produced thus, either by itself or in connection with poetry or music—in short, why it should be, as seems to be the case, a natural mode of expression, we cannot avoid having it suggested, at once, that it corresponds to a method characterizing all natural movement whatever, whether appealing to the eye or ear, or whether produced by a human being or perceived in external nature. There is rhythm in the beating of our pulses, in the alternate lifting and falling of our chests while breathing, in our accenting and leaving unaccented the syllables of our speech, in our

pausing for breath between consecutive phrases, and in our balancing from side to side and pushing forward one leg or one arm and then another, while walking. There is rhythm in the manifestations of all the life about us, in the flapping of the wings of the bird, in the changing phases of its song, even in the minutest trills that make up its melody, and in the throbbings of its throat to utter them; in the rising and falling of the sounds of the wind, and of the swaying to and fro of the trees, as well as in the flow and ebb of the surf on the seashore, and in the jarring of the thunder and the zigzag course of the lightning. In fact, rhythm seems to be almost as intimately associated with everything that a man can see or hear, as is the beating of his own heart with his own life. Even the stars, like the rockets that we send toward them, speed onward in paths that return upon themselves, and the phrase "music of the spheres" is a logical as well as a poetical result of an endeavor to classify the grandest of all movements in accordance with a method which is conceived to be universal. No wonder, then, that men should feel the use of rhythm to be appropriate in art-products modeled upon natural products. No wonder that, connected as it is with natural movement and life and the enjoyment inseparably associated with life, it should seem to the civilized to be—what certainly it seems to the uncivilized—an artistic end in itself.

Nor is this view of it suggested as a result merely of superficial observation. It is substantiated by the more searching experiments of the scientists. There have been discovered, for instance, in addition to the regular beat of the heart, and independent of it, rhythmical contractions and expansions of the walls of the arteries, increasing and decreasing at regular intervals the supply of blood. Such processes . . . may be checked by cutting the nerves connecting . . . the vaso-motor system; and this fact is taken to indicate that there is a rhythmic form of activity in the nerve-centres themselves. . . . The rhythmic character of nerve-action seems to indicate a possibility of the same in mental action. Acting upon this suggestion, Dr. Thaddeus L. Bolton, Demonstrator and Fellow in Clark University, conducted, a few years ago, a series of interesting experiments. "The first and most important object" of these experiments is said to have been to determine "what the mind did with a series of simple auditory impressions, in

which there was absolutely no change of intensity, pitch, quality, or time-interval." As a result it was found that, out of fifty who were asked to listen to clicks produced by an instrument prepared for the purpose, two alone failed to divide these clicks into groups, the number in each group being determined, mainly, by the relative rapidity with which the clicks were produced. The groups were usually of twos or threes, though, with greater rapidity, they passed into groups of fours, sixes, and eights, always, however, when the members were many, with a tendency to divide into twos, threes, and fours. It was found, moreover, that, whenever a second, third, or fourth click was made louder than the others, the inclination to divide the clicks into corresponding groups of twos, threes, or fours was increased.—*The Essentials of Æsthetics*, xvi.

Rhythm is an effect produced by a consecutive series of sounds, or multiples of sounds, which, in themselves, may be varied and complex; but each series of which is of like duration. In other words, it is a result, as is everything that is artistic, of *grouping* according to some one principle—to that of time in this case—the *like partial effects of unlike complex wholes*.¹—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music*, v.

Speech we find composed of syllables each uttered with an individual stress, which separates it from other syllables; but, more than this, we find that every second or third syllable is apt to be accented, and, largely because accented, is apt to be prolonged more than are the other syllables. The reason for the accent is physiological. The vocalized breath flows through the throat—as water through the neck of a bottle—with what may be termed alternate active and passive movements. The former of these movements is that which, in every second, third, fourth, or fifth syllable, produces the accent. In our language all words of more than one syllable have come to have an accent that is fixed—as distinguished from variable, which may be affirmed of words in the French; and all our monosyllabic articles, prepositions, and conjunctions are unaccented, unless the sense very clearly demands a different treatment. These two facts enable one to arrange any number of our words so that the fixed accents

¹ See page 89 of this volume.

shall fall, as natural utterance demands that it should, on every second, third, fourth, or fifth syllable. . . . Let us turn to speech again. Here we find that certain smaller groups composed of combined accented and unaccented syllables are themselves combined into larger groups, which are separated from other larger groups of the same composite character by the necessity experienced of pausing at certain intervals in order to draw in the breath. . . . Nature, therefore, furnishes speech with two characteristics,—accents after every two, three, four, or five syllables, and pauses after every four, six, eight, nine, ten, twelve, or more syllables. Those who have read the former volumes of this series are now asked to recall what was said in “The Genesis of Art-Form,” with reference to the necessity universally experienced by the mind of conceiving of effects—so as to have a clear apprehension of them—as a *unity*; also . . . that grouping to be effective in securing a general result of unity, must be made in accordance with the principle of *comparison*, *i. e.*, of putting like with like,—a principle which in science leads to classification, and in art to the analogous results of composition.¹ . . . Accent thus used has a tendency to form the larger rhythmic groups, such as are developed into poetic lines, before it forms the smaller ones, such as are developed into measures. The effect of each accent is that of one click, and, no matter whether many unaccented syllables or none come between the accented ones, a certain number of the latter, so long as all are separated by like intervals of time, constitute one group such as forms one line of verse.

Bréak, bréak, bréak,
On thy cöld gray stónes, oh séa.
And I wóuld that my tóngue could útter
The thóughts that arise in mé.

Break, Break, Break—Tennyson.

Later, however, but only later, it is perceived that the effect of each syllable too is that of one click, and that, by attaching a certain fixed number of unaccented syllables to each accented one, smaller groups can be formed, such as constitute poetic measures. That this is the natural order of development of the tendencies that lead to lines and measures, can be confirmed by the slightest observation of

¹ See page 89 of this volume.

ordinary talking and reciting. In these we always find an inclination to introduce the accented syllables with approximate regularity. This inclination needs only a little artistic development, and they can be introduced with absolute regularity. When this has been done, the form seems made up of equal parts determined by the emphasized syllables.—*Idem*, II.

“RHYTHM AND HARMONY” (ANALYSIS OF THE BOOK).

In the volume entitled “Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music,” as also in the present volume, this method of putting like with like, as modified by the conditions of variety everywhere characterizing the materials with which art has to work, is shown to be at the basis of all the different developments of form as form with which the art of our times is acquainted. Rhythm and proportion are traced to effects produced by a grouping, of which the mind is conscious, of like or allied measurements, or multiples of measurements, in time or space; and harmony, whether of spoken words, of musical notes, of outlines, or of colors, is traced to a grouping, of which the mind is not conscious, of like or allied measurements, or multiples of measurements, in vibratory movements. To exemplify the truth of this statement, as evinced in every detail of the forms of these arts, has necessitated much explanation and no little repetition. But these are excusable if they have suggested any important considerations not before recognized. For instance, the latest, and perhaps the best, book produced in our country which discusses poetic form, is developed from the same limited conception of it indicated in the definition of Poe in his essay on “The Poetic Principle,” namely, “the rhythmical creation of beauty.” No one would say that in “Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music” there is any lack of thoroughness in the treatment of rhythm in poetry or of its various applications and possibilities,—to say nothing of the freshness of the treatment, owing to the circumstance that a year before the book was published, the scientific investigations that suggested, perhaps, the most important conclusions in it had not been made. At the same time, no one can read that book carefully and not recognize that harmony, too, as distinctly differentiated from rhythm, plays as noteworthy a part in the general effects of poetry as in those of music; that, different as are

both factors and effects as used in poetic and in musical harmony, nevertheless, the methods of it in both arts illustrate identical principles. That an analogous fact is true, not only in these arts, but also in painting, sculpture, and architecture, has been shown in the present volume, concerning the line of thought in which, however, nothing need be added here.—*Proportion and Harmony*, xxvi.

RHYTHM AND PROPORTION, DETERMINED BY EQUAL SUBDIVISIONS (*see also* PROPORTION).

Rhythm is a result of making, by series of noises, or strokes, certain like divisions of time—small divisions, and exact multiples of them in large divisions. But the moment that the smaller divisions become so numerous that the fact that they exactly go into the larger divisions is no longer perceptible—as, often, when we hear more even than eight or ten notes in a musical measure, or more than three or four syllables in a poetic foot,—the effect ceases to be rhythmical. A like fact is true of proportion. Owing to the very great possibilities and complications of outlining, as in squares, angles, and curves, its laws are intricate and difficult to apply; but, as is shown in the volume of the author entitled, “*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color in Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture*,” the effects of proportion all result, in the last analysis, from exact divisions and subdivisions of space in every way analogous to the divisions and subdivisions of time that produce rhythm.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, II.

RHYTHM AND PROPORTION IMPORTANT AND COMPLEX (*see also* PROPORTION).

In this life, it usually takes very little to start that which may develop into very much. Rhythm is apparently of little importance. If one knew nothing about art, what could appear more absurd than for an intelligent man to think it worth while, when wishing to say something, to count the syllables that he utters, so that they shall reveal exact divisions and subdivisions of time, such as the negro makes when he beats his hands and feet for dancers? Yet it is out of this simple method of counting, that art has developed the most important element in the form of poetry, as well as an element extremely important in the form of music. When we come to examine the different combinations of effects attributable to rhythm, we find that

we are by no means dealing with a subject so simple as at first appeared. The same is true of proportion. Before deciding, for instance, that a foot or a nose is disproportionately large or small, it must be compared not only with other feet and noses, but with the sizes of all the other surrounding features in the animal or man in which it appears. The same feature may look too large with small surroundings, and too small with large ones. Indeed, the number and variety of measurements that any extensive knowledge or application of proportion involves are almost incalculable. When we try to determine exactly what it is that causes its results to be satisfactory, in the human form . . . then we begin to perceive that this characteristic, as is true of every other entering into the effects of beauty, is capable of complexities as well as possibilities almost infinite.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, II.

Savages and young children with no musical training, and their elders who have no ability to appreciate changes in quality or pitch, all show appreciation of rhythm. Nothing could be more perfect than that in the poetry of Pope, Scott, or Byron. Yet it is said that neither of these was able to distinguish one tune from another. So with many dancers. One need not be able to follow a tune as a tune, in order to keep time to its rhythm.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music*, VI.

SCIENCE AIDED BY ART (*see also* IMAGINATION AS AIDING SCIENCE).

Many scientists have a subtle, even a pronounced disbelief, in that arrangement of nature in accordance with which matter and mind, knowledge and surmisal, always move forward on parallel planes with the mind and its surmisal some distance ahead. Their disbelief is owing to a lack of imagination, and this is often owing to a lack of the kind of culture which they might derive from giving attention to some phase of art. And yet the majority of them, perhaps, believe that art is a mere adjunct to intellectual training,—an ornamental adjunct, too, introducing, like the carving on the keystone of an arch, what may be interesting and pretty, but is not essentially useful. This is a mistake. In important particulars, it may be said that art is not the carving on the keystone, but the keystone

itself, without which the whole arch would tumble.—*Essay on Art and Education*.

SCIENCE AS AN AID TO ART (*see also* ART, BREADTH OF, GENIUS AND LEARNING, *and* INFORMATION).

Art is a development of natural tendencies, of which we are not always conscious. As a rule, it is only after science has brought these to light that they are recognized as sustaining the relationship, which they do, to the forms in which they have developed.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music*, III.

SCIENCE FOLLOWING THE LEADING OF ART (*see also* ART, THE CONNECTING LINK).

Pythagoras was studying music when he began the discovery of the laws of sound, and Leonardo and Chevreul were studying art when they made their contributions to the understanding of color; and, though the time has now come when those composing the advancing army of science have moved into every remotest valley of the invaded country, apparently needing no longer any leadership of the kind, they never would have begun their advance unless, like the hosts of almost every conquering army, they had at first marched behind a standard that in itself was a thing of beauty.—*Essay on Art and Education*.

SCIENCE *vs.* ART (*see also* ARTISTIC *vs.* SCIENTIFIC MENTAL ACTION).

What causes the difference in aim between one who devotes himself to science and one who devotes himself to art? This: the scientist must be an informer, the artist a performer. Science develops the powers of understanding and increases knowledge. Art develops the powers of expression or execution, and increases skill.—*Essay on Artistic vs. Scientific Education*.

Science and art are different, and they satisfy different mental cravings, one demanding stimulus for knowledge and the other for imagination. Nor was there ever a time when the normal mind did not demand both. To suppose that it can be satisfied with one of them is like supposing that thirst can be assuaged by giving food.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XXVI.


SCIENCE *vs.* ART IN EDUCATION.

No man can use his eyes, ears, memory, as science necessitates, to say nothing of his powers of analysis and generaliza-

tion, without learning a very great deal. But think how much more he can learn, when he is forced into the repetitious and conscientious practice which is always necessary before one can acquire that skill which is essential to success in art.—*Essay on Art and Education.*


SCULPTURE, GREEK, BASED ON MODELS (*see also* MODELS, and OBSERVATION *vs.* THEORY).

One fact always affords a strong argument in support of the theory that Greek sculpture was produced mainly by an application of mathematical principles, and this is the conventional character of the face of the statue. With few exceptions, the nose, mouth, eyes, and forehead all show the results of the same relative measurements; and the question is asked very pertinently, If the face were conventional why was not the form also? To answer this question, makes it necessary to direct attention to something which we moderns find it difficult to understand, . . . that character and thought are expressed in the whole human figure. Of this, the face forms a very small part. If we be in circumstances where we can see the whole figure, there, by a necessary law of the mind, we think mainly of that which occupies the main part of the field of vision. If we have analyzed our own thoughts, when witnessing a scene in which the clothing of the performers was less ample than that allotted by our standards of civilization,—an athletic exhibition, or the bathing of boys on the seashore,—we shall recall that those with the finest forms and most graceful movements invariably attracted our attention and won our admiration, no matter how ugly may have been their countenances. In such circumstances, we scarcely seem to notice countenances at all. . . . Many beautiful forms that served as models for the Greek artists were undoubtedly surmounted by ugly faces. The Greek did not believe in ugliness anywhere; and for this reason, in place of the faces that he found, he may have substituted his conventional face, probably itself a copy of some face which common opinion had pronounced beautiful. Moreover, by using this face and no other, he would avoid giving offense to those who might desire to have him reproduce their countenances as well as forms. Besides this, too, large numbers of his statues represented gods, and it would scarcely have been considered appropriate had he repre-



The Death of Ananias—Cartoon by Raphael

See pages 73, 82, 88, 89, 91, 162, 177, 318-321



sented these by using a literal portrait of a living person. Once more, it must not be supposed, even though it be admitted that the Greek used models freely, that he was often content to have all the parts of any one statue literally reproduce all the parts of any one model. On the contrary, the history of the best period of his art is a record of changes in forms, as these were developed with more or less gradualness, the one from the other. . . . There is another consideration which, in studying the proportions of the human body, necessitates taking the observation of nature for the point of departure. This is the fact that different forms of men, even when conforming to accepted standards, or conforming sufficiently to be all equally well proportioned, differ in their measurements. . . . Such variations may be ascribable to differences not only in occupation, age, and sex, but also in temperament,—the mental, the vital, and the motive which are respectively expressive of very different intellectual and physical traits, each tending to a different general contour.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, VII.

SCULPTURE, SUBJECTS OF (see PAINTING vs. SCULPTURE, THEIR SUBJECTS).

SCULPTURE SUGGESTING MOVEMENT.

Statuary is the representation of arrested movement, not of movement in itself; and to work upon the supposition that it is the latter is to deviate from the legitimate purpose of the art. At the same time, the statue must suggest that some movement has taken place or is to do so. The opposite tendency can be made too prominent only at the expense of impressions of intelligibility and animation. That which was meant for a statue will then become, like many of the monuments of our public men, merely an effigy,—as if, forsooth, its object were to remind one, above all things, that the man is dead!—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XXIV.

SELECTION, IN ART WORK.

One of the most interesting things in this world is an ant-hill. We come upon it in a grass-plot, or a rocky waste, or a field of loam of a certain hue or texture, and it usually consists of a gathering together, grain by grain, of materials and colors not interesting in themselves, yet made so by being selected from surrounding ones. Man has a way of making things interesting through an exercise of a similar

faculty of selection. That from which he selects usually comprises two elements—substance and appearance; more strictly, substance not having form and substance having it, or needing to be made to have it in order to be that for which it is of value. It is with this latter, with substance having form, that art is concerned.—*Essay on Teaching in Drawing.*

SENTIMENT CHARACTERISTIC OF ART-APPRECIATION (*see also*
ARTISTIC NATURES).

A slight attempt to recall the foremost trait of expression distinguishing any man who has given himself to the study and production of art will verify by facts this conclusion of Schiller. Is it not true that artists and poets, and often even mere admirers of music, painting, sculpture, or poetry, are persons given above all things to sentiment? Can we not perceive this sometimes in their very gaits and gestures, in the involuntary waverings of their lips, in the unconscious bewilderment of their eyes? Does not the very sight of them often make us feel that they are men who have been exhilarated, if not intoxicated, by drinking in thoughts that brim above the commonplace; that they are men whose moods are loyal to an all-pervading sovereignty of soul? Can we not often detect, behind all that they do or say, the spiritual force of unseen ideality, the unselfishness of non-material purpose, the virtue of uncompelled industry, the enthusiasm that revels amid dim twilights of inquiry and starry midnights of aspiration? How different is their mien from that of those who manifest none of their vaguer, softer qualities, but pride themselves upon the fact that they are sharp! And, verily, too often they are sharp, their very visages whittled to a point like snow-ploughs on a wintry track that always draw attention downward and cleave through paths that chill. The brightness of their eyes is that of diamonds that are used only to cut, the summons of their voices that of trumpets that are ever blowing of their own sufficiency. No radiance of a spiritual light that streams from inward visions is haloed from the one. No call toward a sphere too subtle to be heralded by aught except "the still small voice" is echoed from the other. What is lacking in the methods of mental action of men like these, as every one who knows the highest possi-

bilities of art can testify, is the kind of culture which leads to the conception within and the expression without of sentiment—not sentimentality, which is always selfish, as well as a caricature, and an effect not based upon facts; but vigorous manly sentiment, something rooted deep in common-sense but yet not common; rather its uncommon development when the material branch and leaf, grown upward, burst into that which sheds the fragrance of the spirit's flower.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, III.

SERENADE.

It is mainly, too, by the contrast afforded between a realm known only to the soul and one apprehended only by the senses; by the transition from the subjectivity of dreaming to the objectivity of listening, that such transcendent sweetness is sometimes imparted to the serenade at midnight, and also to the songs of the birds at daybreak.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XII.

SIGNIFICANCE AND FORM IN ART (*see also* FORM AND SIGNIFICANCE, *also* FORM *vs.* SIGNIFICANCE).

Art involves the representation not merely of significance nor merely of form; and those who wish to further its interests cannot do so by directing the energies of the artist exclusively to either. The captain of a yawl tossed by ocean waves might as well urge every one on board of it to rush to one side of it or to the other, and expect to reach his landing without capsizing.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, xv.

The two tendencies of art thus exemplified, and the constant inclination of the mind, when perceiving the deficiency in the one, to turn altogether away from it to that which, when regarded in itself alone, causes equal deficiency in the other, make one feel, at times, as if it were wellnigh hopeless to try, as has been attempted in these volumes, to introduce into the conceptions of American artists and critics even a beginning of that balance between the two which always characterizes the highest art,—that of ancient Hellenism, for instance, which was equally careful to reproduce only the ideal in thought and only the beautiful in form. I have concluded that nothing could more certainly accomplish the desired end than a practical recognition of the relationship of art both to religion on the one hand and to science on the other, together with a recognition of the

natural limitations to art which such a double relationship necessarily involves.—*The Representative Significance of Form, Preface.*

Depending partly upon outward form, which mainly requires a practice of the method pursued in classic art, and partly upon the thought or design embodied in the form, which mainly requires a practice of the method pursued in romantic art, these artistic effects appeal partly to the outward senses and partly to the inward mind; and only when they appeal to both are the highest possibilities of any art realized.—*Art in Theory, III.*

We judge of others by ourselves. We judge of their art by the art which is possible to ourselves. While great art requires great breadth of view and distance of aim, the majority of men are not great. Their views are narrow, and their goals are near them. When their attention is directed to significance, they forget to attend to the requirements of form; and when attention is directed to form, they forget about significance. That which they themselves do, they naturally suppose that everybody must do. Human nature being what it is, they naturally come to think too that this is what everybody ought to do. For, unless they are to admit that they, themselves, are not entitled to rank with artists of the foremost class, what can be allowed to determine excellence in art except their own standards? At periods like the beginning of the nineteenth century, or in countries like England or Germany, where value in art is mainly thought to be determined by significance, this is that for which they aim; and in the degree in which they are forced to recognize that there can be no accurate reproduction of appearances without thorough study of the methods of the best artists, and facility acquired by persistent practice, they will be anxious to convince themselves and to persuade others that mastery in significance can compensate for a lack of mastery in technique. On the other hand, at a period like the present, and in countries like France and our own, where value in art is mainly thought to be determined by success in reproducing appearances, they will aim to do this; and, in the degree in which they are forced to recognize that significance cannot be given to an art-product without great constructive exercise of imagination and invention, they will be anxious to

believe for themselves, and to persuade the world, that success in technique can compensate for success in rendering the product significant. . . . But is it a fact that attention to significance is inconsistent with an equal degree of attention given to form? Why should this be the case? In poetry a metaphor or simile is not less but more successful in the degree in which to the representation of the thought involved it adds fidelity to the scene in nature by a comparison with which this thought is represented.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XIII.

SIGNIFICANCE, AN ELEMENT OF THE FORM DEVELOPED BY ART.

The general, if not the æsthetic, public, upon whose judgment the rank of the art-work must ultimately depend, know and care little about technique, except so far as it has enabled the artist to secure for his product a certain satisfactory representative effect. But this effect depends in some cases as much upon what may be termed the expressional norm chosen for the nucleus of development, as upon the method of its development; in other words, as much upon that which is significant in the work as upon that which is excellent in its form. Successful art is always the insignia with which the play-impulse decorates that which, before the decoration, has shown in practical relations its right to receive it. Just as a successful drama is an artistic development of imagination at play with the words of natural conversation; so a successful melody is a development of the same at play with the intonations of natural conversation; and a successful picture, of the same at play with the outlines and colors of natural scenes. What imagination does is to elaborate the form, this being accomplished in our own day through carrying out the laws of complicated systems of rhythm, harmony, drawing, or coloring. But the forms that art, if high art, in each case elaborates, are forms of expressing thought and emotion.—*Idem*, *Preface*.

SIGNIFICANCE IN ART (*see also* FORM AND SIGNIFICANCE).

By significance in art is meant its mental as distinguished from its material effects, whether these material effects be produced by the external form itself, or by the image of this form which reflectively appears in imagination; and thought and emotion are effects as inseparable in

mental experience as perception and feeling are in the experience of the senses. Indeed, in the term *humanities*, so often applied to the arts, we may recognize a conception equally suggestive of the sources of understanding and of sympathy. These arts address not only the senses and the sense-influenced imagination, but, through them, the whole range of the mind's activities.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, I.

SIGNIFICANCE IN ART-FORM

Thoughts and emotions are stirred to activity when the eye perceives objects, just as inevitably as rays of light surround a match when it is struck. Inseparably, in such cases two elements of interest are present. One is the result of the effect perceived by the eye; the other, of the effect experienced in the mind. This latter effect consists of imaginative processes which, according to the methods unfolded in Chapter I., are suggested by way of association or of comparison. It is when faces appear to be thinking or feeling something, when figures, alone or in connection with other figures, appear to be doing something, when fields, houses, hills, waves, clouds, give indications of culture, comfort, convulsion, storm, or sunshine, whatever it may be,—it is then, and in the exact degree in which this is so, that the objects in connection with which we have these suggestions prove most interesting. The worth of a diamond is measured by the quantity and quality of the light emitted by it. The worth of an object of perception is measured by the quantity and quality of "that light which never was on sea or land"—in other words, by the amount and character of thought and emotion which it awakens.

If this be so—and who can deny it?—why does it not follow that the art which represents these visible objects can be successful in the degree only in which it represents also the thought or emotion upon which so much of their interest depends? Such certainly must be the conclusion of all except those who pretend to hold a theory which even they themselves do not seem to understand, namely that, given the art-form, the art-thought appropriate for it will be suggested necessarily. As a critic of "Art in Theory" took occasion to say: "Art is simply, wholly, and entirely a matter of form. . . . The best critical

opinion, nowadays, assumes the identity of the art-form with the art-meaning." The only trouble with this answer is that, in the sense in which one would naturally interpret it, it is not true. All art-significance must be expressed through art-form; but precisely the same natural form selected for art-imitation may convey a very different quality of significance according to the treatment given it by the artist. One thing that he can always do, is to arrange features so as to make them express what he wishes them to express. It is always possible for him to analyze and separate a form charming in itself from a significance which could make it still more charming. He can paint a face in such a passive condition that it will appear to have no mind behind it; or he can rouse his model to reflection or laughter, or imagine for himself the results of these, and transfer from the face to his canvas only such colors and outlines as give one a glimpse of the soul. Still more can he do the same when it is possible, in accordance with the principles of pantomime, to arrange for his purposes the pose of the whole figure; and the result may be rendered yet more effective through the opportunities afforded by the mutual relations, each to each, which may be indicated through the poses of several figures. The same principle applies also to landscapes. It is one thing to represent the material effects of sunshine and storm, and another thing to represent their mental effects,—the effects which they have upon the imagination; and a painter can content himself with doing the first, or, if he choose, he can do both. This is not to say that, if he do merely the former, his product will have no significance. Wherever there is form there is some significance, if only because there is a lack of it. What is meant by the ground taken in this paragraph is that unless the artist have it in mind to represent significance, his work, as a rule, will reveal only such as is of trifling importance, such as has no distinctive meaning; and art that is not distinctive in a direction in which it might be so, is not art of a high quality.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XIII.

SIGNIFICANCE IN PAINTING.

The world in general judges of subjects by the possibilities of significance in them. There are both greater opportunity and necessity for manifesting thought and emotion in

connection with a landscape than with a dish of fruit or a vase of flowers; and in connection with human figures than with landscapes. Of course, many pictures of fruits and flowers are superior, as works of art, to many pictures of human figures; but in case of equal skill displayed in the representation of form, the art-work ranks highest which necessitates thought and emotion of the highest quality. This principle enables us to rank as subjects not only flowers and fruits below landscapes, and landscapes below human figures, but to rank below others certain products representing exactly the same objects. For instance, flowers, oranges, grapes, apples, or wine or beer in a glass,—all these may be portrayed so skillfully as to be exceedingly artistic. But it is easy to perceive that the appeal of the picture as a thing of significance may be differently determined by different circumstances. A vase of flowers represented as being in a room upon the sill of a closed window, beyond which, outside the house, can be seen snowdrifts and frost-laden trees; or fruits and viands represented as heaped upon a table where nevertheless a half-empty plate and glass and an unfolded napkin give evidence that some one has already partaken of all that he wishes, with, perhaps, a window near by, through which a half-starved face of a child is wistfully peering,—arrangements like these, or hundreds of a similar character, which might be thought out or felt out, would put thought and emotion into the picture; and thus make it representative of these. Can anybody deny that pictures thus made significant by means of arrangement, if equally well executed, would rank higher than pictures merely imitative?—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, VII.

When we see a party of children, we may be interested in them on account of the symmetrical outlines of their forms, or of the glow of health in their faces. But there are other considerations that may increase our interest. One is the fact that we see them doing something which their actions indicate. Another is that they are expressing something which their countenances indicate; and, still another, that they are children whom we know and love. Nor is it true that any of these latter considerations, which increase our interest, necessarily interfere with the degree

of interest excited in us by their grace or beauty of form.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, xv.

A picture of a child represents by way of association any child, and therefore causes a mother, upon seeing it, to recall instinctively her own child, and, doing so, to take an interest in it. But in the degree in which the picture, besides this, represents her child by way of comparison—in the degree in which agreement in each detail of sex, age, size, dress, and countenance satisfies her critical reflective powers, in this degree will the interest awakened in her pass into emotion. The same principle applies to scenery. Owing to their associations with some particular lake or mountain, certain persons are instinctively interested in a painting of any lake or mountain. But the distinctively emotional effects of the picture are always increased in the degree in which all the details, the more men reflect upon them, are perceived to resemble those of the particular lake or mountain with which they have associated it. So with sculpture and architecture. Because of the principle of association, certain persons cannot avoid an instinctive tribute of reverence when they enter any chapel and stand before the statue of any saint. But let the chapel or statue either in its general form or in certain of its details—as of flowers, leaves, symbols, etc.,—recall, distinctly, by way of comparison, that particular chapel or personality with which they associate it, and their reverence will be the result of a deeper phase of emotion. Thus we find both logic and experience confirming from a new point of view what was said in “Art in Theory” with reference to the importance in high art of having the art-form represent both mental conceptions—to represent which alone it would need merely to suggest a certain association of ideas—and also audible or visible material phenomena, to represent which alone, it would need merely to manifest imitation.—*Idem*, I.

“He is what I call a vulgar painter,” said a critic, some time ago, when speaking of an artist. “Are you getting ethical in your tastes?” was asked. “Not that,” he answered, “but don’t you remember that picture of a little girl by Sargent in the National Academy Exhibition last year? You couldn’t glance at it, in the most superficial way, without recognizing at once that it was a child of high-

toned, probably intellectual, spiritually-minded, aristocratic parentage and surroundings. Now, if the man of whom I was speaking had painted that child, he could not have kept from making her look like a coarse-haired, hide-skinned peasant." It is easy to perceive that, if this criticism were justifiable, the fault indicated would be largely owing to the failure of the artist to recognize the thoughts and feelings that men naturally associate with certain appearances of line and color. It would be largely owing to the fact that he had never learned that the round, ruddy form of the vital temperament that blossoms amid the breeze and sunshine of the open field has a very different *significance* from the more complex and delicate curves and colors that appear where the nervous temperament is ripened behind the sheltering window-panes of the study. An artist believing in significance merely enough to recognize the necessity of representing it in some way could, with a very few thrusts of his knife, to say nothing of his brush, at one and the same time relieve the inflammation of chapped cheeks, and inject into the veins some of the blue blood of aristocracy.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, v.

SIGNIFICANCE IN POETRY.

Think of the literary prospects of a country, of the possibilities of its receiving any inspiring impulses from its poets at a period when new authors, writing with the acknowledged motive of Dante, Milton, or Wordsworth, would, for this reason and for no other reason, fail to commend themselves to the leaders of literary opinion! Yet one who has followed the views expressed in what may be termed the professional critical journals of our country, would not be far astray in claiming that this accurately describes our own condition. The same France from which we have derived the notion that significance is not essential to painting, has also taught us, and the lesson has been accepted and subtly assimilated so as to become, almost unconsciously to ourselves, a part of the literary belief of some of us, that it is not essential, either, to poetry. In fact, Max Nordau's statement in "Degeneration," that "The theory of the importance of form, of the intrinsic value of beauty in the sound of words, of the sensuous pleasure to be derived from sonorous syllables without

regard to their sense, and of the uselessness and even harmfulness of thought in poetry has become decisive in the most recent development of poetry," could be applied to France not only but to our own country. . . .

The reason why such writers fail to comprehend that which is true of representative significance, is easy enough to understand. Art is a complex subject. Significance is no more essential in it than is technique; and the mere rudiments of this it takes years to master. As both Goethe and Longfellow have told us, the pathway to art, even if by this we mean merely the art of versifying, or of coloring with proficiency, is long. Unfortunately for many it is so very long that before they are fairly in sight of its termination they have apparently lost sight of everything else.—*Painting, Sculpture and Architecture as Representative Arts, Preface.*

SIGNIFICANCE NECESSARY IN ART.

Effects, though beautiful in nature, are wrongly used in the highest art, if they be used on the supposition that, even in their most insignificant features, they are not vehicles of expression. A painting ranks higher than a photograph and a play than a phonograph mainly because one can read the thought, share the emotion, and sympathize with the purpose behind not only its general conception but every minutest part—every line or word—through which the conception is presented. It is illogical to argue that this fact does not rule out of the domain of high art a very large proportion of what artists and critics of less delicate æsthetic sensibility—not to say sense—fancy that some cannot stomach merely because they have no artistic taste.—*The Essentials of Æsthetics*, XVIII.

SIGNIFICANCE *vs.* THE FORM IN ART.

There is a clear distinction, the recognition of which is philosophically essential, between the effects of a form physically fitted to produce a certain physiological result in the ear or the eye, as do some of the phenomena of tone or of color, or else artistically fitted to produce a certain psychological result or image in imagination,—there is a clear distinction between these effects and the implicit or suggestive, rather than explicit or arbitrary, effects upon thought or emotion, which, invariably, when the mind perceives art's real or imagined outlines, seem to surround

these outlines as by a halo. This halo of thoughts and emotions surrounding the natural form as represented in the art-product, or surrounding the image of this product as represented in imagination, constitutes what will be termed the *representative significance*.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, I.

It is not significance that makes a picture ordinary: this merely makes it a picture rather than a product of decorative art. That which makes it ordinary is the form in which the significance is presented. To change a theological essay into a "Paradise Lost," it would not be necessary to drop the significance: that could be kept; but it would be necessary to change the form.—*Essay on Art and Education*.

SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXITY.

Simplicity is the door through which alone intelligence can enter into the complex.—*Proportion and Harmony*, Preface.

SINCERITY IN ART (see ARCHITECTURE, FRAUD IN, and ORNAMENT).

The term *sincerity* indicates one's conception that the artist has employed material which really is what it seems to be,—wood, if it seem wood; stone, if it seem stone; iron, if it seem iron. *Sincerity* even discards, at times, the use of paint, on the ground that it conceals the genuine substance. So, too, owing in part also to the intrinsic beauty of the graining of almost any kind of wood, the same principle has led to a method of finishing this so as to reveal its natural character. It is useless to do more than point out that, as illustrated in all these cases, *sincerity* is merely one way of applying the broader general principle that architecture should represent nature.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XXI.

SINGING TOGETHER.

Do you know that there is a theory that the tendency of singing is to cause the hearts and pulses of all those joining in the music, even listening to it, to beat in unison?—to cause the currents of life in the veins, nerves, brains, even souls of those affected by it, to move according to similar methods?—in fact, to produce an inner as well as an outer harmony.—*Suggestions for the Spiritual Life*, xx.

SINGLENESSE OF AIM IN ART.

Even though one be not a German, then, he may be inclined to think, at times, that there is philosophy as

well as comfort in the German's way of listening to classic music in a plain beer-hall, with the outlines of that but half revealed behind the fumes of tobacco. We may conclude, too, that there is artistic tact as well as adherence to custom in the twilight vesper services of the cathedral, where the choir is hidden in the gallery, and about one is nothing distinctly visible save the mighty arches of the nave looming in misty forms above, and the vague outlines of the multitude bowing beneath it. . . . Art, like everything else that is human, is effective, for one thing, in the degree in which its efforts are directed toward one aim that is made distinct and separate from all else whatever, whether appealing to the ear or to the eye. Why could there not be, if not a style, at least a mode of rendering music in the future, which should be to that of the present what the most thrilling choral of the cathedral is to the most trivial chorus of the barroom?—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XXVI.

SKILL, HOW ACQUIRED (*see also* DRILL, INSPIRED, THE, AND THE ARTISTIC, *and* PRACTICE, ITS EFFECTS).

Skill can be acquired only through practice; and this practice, like that of one learning to play on a musical instrument, always involves thought and labor expended not upon completed results but upon certain analyzed elements.—*Essay on Artistic vs. Scientific Education*.

SKILL WITH REVISION NEEDED IN ART.

Those who confound religious with what is termed artistic inspiration, will almost necessarily estimate musicians, actors, poets, orators, and even sculptors, painters, and architects by the unconscious facility which they manifest in conception and execution. But, though owing to the pliability of his conscious nature to subconscious influence, the artist does, in certain moods, manifest this facility, it is not too much to say that no product of genius has ever, even in such moods, sustained itself on a high, artistic level, except as a result of much previous study and practice which has developed skill; nor, even then, has work thus produced been able to satisfy the highest demands of art, unless it has been very carefully and consciously revised. This is a fact essential to recognize, but very difficult to get into the minds either of the young who wish to become artists, or of the general public, or even of critics upon

whom both artists and the public depend for instruction.—
The Representative Significance of Form, VII.

SKY-SCRAPERS (*see also* ARCHITECTURE, EXPRESSIVE OF
CHARACTER, *and* MORALITY AS INFLUENCED BY
ARCHITECTURE).

No one can deny that it is representative. The trouble is that it does not represent what is agreeable or inspiring. It represents, alas, New York. It represents the commercial spirit entirely overtopping the æsthetic and sanitary in general; and the religious and domestic, as manifested by the church and house to the left, in particular. In more senses than one it represents selfishness and greed, entirely throwing into the shade beauty, health, kindness, rationality, and safety. Were it possible for any artistic motive to appeal to our legislatures, they would pass laws enabling owners of churches and houses afflicted as are these at the left of this picture, to obtain from any one erecting a building like the tall one, damages of an amount to render its erection impossible. Beautiful building as it is, considered only in itself, it makes worse than wasted every penny ever expended for the purpose of giving the adjoining buildings architectural dignity or value.

Of course, nobody can imagine that our legislators will ever be influenced by æsthetic considerations. But they might be reached by other considerations. To say nothing of preventing risk to life through earthquake or conflagration in edifices, fireproof too often only in name, some law should be found to prevent robbing one's near neighbors of sunshine and health, as well as one's distant neighbors of real estate values, which a less grasping appropriation of fortunately situated lots would distribute more generally. In fact, the conditions are such that it would not be strange if, at no distant date, the practical and moral aspects of the subject, aside from the æsthetic, would so appeal to public sentiment that offices and hotels in these high buildings would be as much avoided as now they are sought.

It may be urged that high building cannot be prevented in this country, because it is free. But it is not free—for those who interfere with even the convenience, not to say the rights, of others. There is a law in certain states of Germany that no façade can be higher than the width of the street which it faces. Some such law passed in our

own States, in order to secure health and safety, would do this not only, but probably attain also the desired æsthetic end. Architects, assured that no building could exceed a certain height, would be quite certain to prevent other buildings from overtopping their own, by seeing that theirs were carried up to the exact limits of possibility. Were this done, our streets would have a uniform skyline. Meantime, while legislation falters, why should not the æsthetic considerations influence individuals? Why should not those interested in the development of new streets have introduced into the deeds sold a prescribed height beyond which façades should not be carried? Or, to enlarge the question, and this in a practical direction, why should not trustees of institutions of learning pass laws prescribing not only the sky-line, but the color and style of new buildings erected by benefactors.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XIX.

SMALL CAUSES OF GREAT RESULTS.

A wave breaking upon the seacoast with its spray dashing up to sparkle in the sunshine has a grand and beautiful effect. But what makes the wave?—An innumerable number of little springs hidden in obscure places in the mountains. In the little springs there are no waves. But there would be none anywhere, were it not for the cumulative effects of all the springs together. So with great achievements in art. They are the cumulative effects of little degrees of knowledge and skill, started in thousands of obscure places, and apparently wasted as they sink into depths of greater obscurity. Special attainments in this world are based, as a rule, upon general attainments. That which towers high must have broad foundations.—*Essay on Teaching in Drawing*.

SMALL PERFECTION NECESSARY FOR GREAT PRODUCTS.

Probably, Homer would not have stood where he does in the history of poetry, had he not spent his entire mature life in traveling about the country, and repeating and, therefore, constantly and inevitably revising his *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. In fact, as every artist—but, unfortunately not every critic—knows, it is largely in the subtle small points that a superior production differs from an inferior one. It is these that determine the quality of the work, that make it fine-grained, and cause the difference between

the products of a master and of an amateur. The great logician never drops a single link that will strengthen the chain of his argument. The melody and rhythm of every line of the great poem pulse with the living presence of the artistic ideal that inspires the whole. The great painting can stand the test of the microscope. "Turner never passes his brush over one thousandth of an inch," says Ruskin, "without meaning."—*Suggestions for the Spiritual Life*, XIV.

SPIRIT OF THE AGE, AS EXPRESSED IN ART (*see also* GENIUS *and* SUBCONSCIOUS MENTAL ACTION).

If there be anything which, very often, the higher arts are distinctly not, it is the expression of the spirit of their age. Greek architecture of the fourth century before Christ, and Gothic of the thirteenth after him, may have been this; although even they were developments of what had been originated long before. But all the unmodified examples of Greek or Gothic architecture produced since then—and at certain periods they have abounded to the exclusion of almost every other style of building—have been expressions not of the age in which they were produced, but of that long past age in which their models were produced. The same in principle is true in all the arts. The forms most prevalent in poetry, painting, sculpture, even in music, are always more or less traditional, determined, that is, by the artists of the past. As, in its nature, the traditional is not essentially different from the historic, it is doubtful whether these conditions will not continue in the direct degree in which, in the study of art, this latter is made to dominate; and it is not at all doubtful whether the criticism calling itself historic is not belying its title when . . . it ignores the historic fact that forms, which logically ought to develop according to the spirit of an age, very often, owing to a servitude to conventionality that interferes with a free expression of originality, do not so develop.—*Art in Theory*, Preface.

SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT TRACEABLE TO ART.

Nor is there a statue or a painting which depicts natural life, especially human life, as we are accustomed in our own day to see it—yet notice that this argument could not apply, even remotely, to anything approaching deformity or vulgarity—but every curve or color in it seems to frame at times the soul of one to be loved, not by another, but by

ourselves; and, so far as Providence sends spiritual development through imparting a sense of sympathy with friend, brother, sister, father, mother, wife, or child, there, in the presence of art, that development for a while is experienced.—*Essay on Art and Education.*

SPIRITUAL IN ART RELATED TO THE SUBCONSCIOUS.

To say nothing of religion—what a revival of art there might be, in an age which many deem too materialistic to be at all poetic, if only what is unfolded in these pages with reference to the subconscious and the spiritual could be widely recognized to be true!—*The Representative Significance of Form, Preface.*

SPIRITUAL SUGGESTIVENESS OF ART.

Notice how important is any agency that can lift people who have no theories admitting the possibility of inspiration, into a practical realization of it. This is what art does. Through the results of the subconscious mind, coalescing, as we shall find by-and-by, with those of the conscious mind, it everywhere surrounds the material with the halo of the spiritual, causing the minds that will not even acknowledge the existence of the latter, to enter upon a practical experience of it in ideas, and to accept, when appearing in the guise of imagination, what they would reject if presented in its own lineaments. So in an age like our own, art may do a large part of the work peculiar to religion. The artist though not a seer always has within him the possibility of being the seer's assistant. No wonder therefore that those not versed in making discriminations should identify the poets with the prophets. Perhaps the majority of all expressions to which we attribute inspiration are, in their form, poetical; and there is no truth so exalted, so infinite, eternal, absolute, that the artist, by reproducing the forms about him, cannot suggest it to imagination; nor any truth so spiritual and unfamiliar, or capable of being realized in only so remote a future, that he cannot present this truth in forms in which many minds, however prejudiced and material their tendencies, will not be glad to welcome it.—*Idem*, VII.

STANDARDS OF CRITICISM (*see* CRITICISM, EFFECTS OF, ORIGINALITY AND ECCENTRICITY, *and* TASTE, STANDARDS OF).

As a result of having or acknowledging no standard, about all that criticism can attempt is to observe a poem,

a painting, or a building, and praise it, in case it resembles some other product of a like kind—say by a Tennyson, a Corot, or some Greek or Gothic builder—which has been previously praised by some other critic. Judgments formed according to this method either exalt imitation in production into artistic excellence, as well as imitation in opinion into critical acumen; or else, because there seems some defect in such conceptions, they confound in their search for the opposite of imitation the indications of mere eccentricity with those of genuine originality. Meantime, the art either imitative or eccentric that is developed by such conceptions continues to prove satisfactory to men so long only as the temporary fashion that occasions it continues in vogue. There is not a library, or picture gallery, or street, or campus of any size in this country, that is not filled almost to overflowing with modern compositions which were extravagantly praised by the foremost authorities of a few years ago, but which to-day are acknowledged to be well-nigh worthless as specimens of art; and the sorriest feature of the condition is that this race toward worthlessness is still going on between many upon whose works enormous sums of money, to say nothing of undeserved and misguiding laudations, are now being lavishly expended.—*Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color*, XXVI.

So long as the author of this series of volumes, upon the principle of "Live and let live," refrains, as he has always consistently done, from personal attacks upon artists and critics and patrons of art, to some of whom, in his own conceptions, he is now very definitely referring, he cannot be rightly accused of being willing to attain notoriety in that easiest way possible in our own age,—at the expense of others; even if he cannot expect to be recognized as one who, in all that he has written, has been mainly anxious to be helpful to them. But whatever they may think, he is certain that he will prove helpful in reality, in case he succeeds in doing no more than directing attention to the fact that the conditions of art that have just been described must always continue so long as opinion or performance is based upon the conception that there can be no approximately definite standards. And if this be so, it is not being theoretical but practical, to maintain that in art, as in all other departments of life, these standards can be discovered.

We can find that upon which everything else on the earth's surface rests, if only we can get down deep enough. We can find the basic method of art, if only we can do the same. To find this, has been the object of these volumes. Nor is it assuming too much to hope that the physiological as well as the psychical investigations of the present day have been carried so far that no further discoveries, much as they may add by way of confirmation to the theories here unfolded, will necessitate any material change in their general trend.—*Idem*, XXVI.

STUDY AS RELATED TO ARTISTIC INSTINCT.

We shall find here a noteworthy illustration of the fact, often exemplified, that the last result reached through artistic methods is not essentially different from that which in certain circumstances antedates any study of art whatever.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music*, III.

STYLE, NEEDED IN PRESENTING SUBSTANCE.

A howling mob summoned by a cry for help may bring together substance to protect those in danger. But the coming sound of martial music, and the tread of disciplined troops, will be more likely to adjust the matter in a style that will recall the feeling of nationality, the authority of government, and the supremacy of law, thus reestablishing permanent order. In this utilitarian age, we might get along without certain poetical rhapsodies of literature; but our practical arguments cannot afford to be without those forms of language which, by giving stimulus and suggestion, like the sparkle and flash that sometimes shoot out from an electric current, light up the course of thought on either side of the straight line of logic. It is not enough to show men the grounds of an opinion. Grounds may contain nothing beyond sand and gravel. To recognize and realize and relish all that there is in the world of proof, men need to know something of the glaciers of its mountains, the verdure of its valleys, the fragrance of its flowers.—*Essay on Fundamentals of Education*.

SUBCONSCIOUS MENTAL ACTION IN ART (*see also* GENIUS, PERSONALITY, AND UNIVERSALITY, *and* SPIRIT OF THE AGE).

What is it to be affected by the "*zeit geist*," the "spirit of the times," of which we so often hear? What is it to be "the spokesman of one's age"? What is it to be able, in the particular individualizations of art, to express the universal?

What is it to be able, while depicting the phases of the present, to foretell the unfoldings of the future? All these things, every one admits to be characteristic of the great artist. But what are they all, except so many proofs of his possessing a subconscious mind, delicately susceptible to influences exerted by other minds surrounding him, and moving forward with him,—possibly, as in cases of prevision, already borne beyond him? Finally, what is the very substance of the art-product which we term a work of imagination? What is it but a result, the general outlines of which are taken from real objects or events in the external world, yet the significant substance of which is built out of the well-nigh infinite variety of material which has been stored in the subconscious mind? And when we consider the forgotten experiences that have invariably been brought to light, in order to be combined into the result, we have no difficulty in recognizing that art is not nature, but nature as mirrored in the mind,—mainly in the subconscious rather than in the conscious,—a fact which will be perceived to be true both of the simplest elementary exercise of comparison in which a single thing perceived reminds one of another single thing previously perceived, and equally true also of that more complex and most difficult exercise of constructive imagination in which a composite series of things perceived reminds one of another composite series previously perceived.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, VII.

SYMPATHIES, ART APPEALING TO THE.

Plays and novels that make us spend hours with people such as we never meet, or meet only to avoid; and statues and pictures equally objectionable, do not represent for us real life as we know it, and cannot appeal, therefore, to our sympathies as art should.—*Essay on Art and Morals*.

SYMPATHY AND ORIGINALITY.

One who is to preserve his own originality, and yet, at the same time, derive from the forms and suggestions of nature the same conceptions that others derive from them; one who is to have the personal force to incorporate in a form peculiar to himself that phase of truth, natural or spiritual, which most readily commends itself to all, must evidently be a man of sensibility, as well as of rationality, a man able to sympathize as well as to infer. . . .

Only such a man can be controlled by his surroundings, and yet manifest the freedom from control which is essential to that play of the mind which is characteristic of all imaginative results.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XIV.

SYMPATHY, APPEAL OF ART TO (see PERSONAL AND SYMPATHETIC).

As human beings, men crave sympathy not merely with the voluntary movements of their minds but often with the involuntary. But the universe which surrounds them is a constant mystery and source of speculation. They believe that there are causes for its forms and movements, spiritual meanings back of its material symbols. Yet these are apprehended only vaguely, looming dimly, as they do, from the regions of the unseen. Accordingly when a work of art, produced by one whose subconscious or hidden intellection is able to commune with these regions, embodies these vague views of men in material forms, appealing in such ways as to reveal to each one's consciousness the truthfulness of his previous unformed apprehensions, it is inevitable that his soul should experience intense satisfaction. He feels that his own views have been confirmed by another's intellect not alone but, at the same time, have been felt also by another's heart. This recognition of the sympathetic appeal of art gives us one reason why those susceptible to its influence—and who would trust the critical insight or appreciation of any man who was not?—are often, especially in early life, so completely mastered by the significance of certain art-products. Sometimes, in wandering through a gallery, they come upon some painting or statue, and are so wonderfully thrilled by it that they sit and watch it till the tears come, and the room grows dim, and hours pass by, of which they are unconscious; and when, in the end, they arouse themselves and leave the place, they wish for no further sight, each other seeming vulgar and profane beside that holy thing with which, for the time, they seem to have come in contact.—*Idem*.

TASTE (see *also* CULTURE AS RELATED TO TASTE).

Mention, perhaps, should be made of *taste*, a term in common use, indicative of that within the mind enabling one to recognize an artistic effect, and to judge in some way of its quality. The term originated in an adaptation

to a feeling in the mind of that which can be actually experienced in only one of the senses, and this a lower sense. As originally used, too, taste indicated a passive state; but even when referring to the lower sense it may indicate an active. A cook whose taste is good can prepare a dish to the taste of others. In a similar way, in art, the word may indicate a man's appreciation and also his application of the laws of beauty. Again, when referring to the lower sense, men are said to have a *natural* and a *cultivated* taste; and the same is true with reference to their attitude toward beauty.

As applied to the whole range of artistic effects, the relation of taste to the æsthetic nature seems to be precisely that of conscience to the moral nature, and of judgment to the intellectual. Enlighten a man's soul, his conscience will prompt to better actions; increase his wisdom, his judgment will give better decisions. According to the same analogy, cultivate his æsthetic nature,—*i. e.*, improve the accuracy of his ear or eye, his knowledge of the different appearances of life, or of modes of each life,—and his taste will be cultivated and improved. He may never reach a position where he can know what is absolutely beautiful any more than what is absolutely right or wise; but he may be constantly approaching nearer such a knowledge. Hence, as applied to art, the old adage, "*De gustibus non est disputandum*," is not, in every sense, true.—*Essentials of Æsthetics*, II.

TASTE, DISCREPANCIES IN, JUDGING OF HUMAN PROPORTIONS.

The fact that the whole human form and every part of it owes the beauty which we recognize in it largely to its representation of a certain phase of significance, furnishes the best possible explanation for those discrepancies in taste, which are nowhere more apparent than in the judgments which different persons, equally cultivated, form with reference to precisely the same human proportions. These judgments differ because men differ in their views of adaptability and fitness, and in the recollections which they associate with persons characterized by certain features; but more than all, because they differ in their feelings of companionship with those possessing traits which these features represent. Owing to one or the other of these reasons, there are, for all of us, certain forms

so adjusting themselves into the framework of vision and mind that they fit into what men term their ideals as into a vise, and hold sympathy spellbound. Certain movements in these forms seem regulated to such a rhythm that, in unison with it, all our currents of vein and nerve leap from the heart and brain and thrill along their courses. They do so very likely because of the operation of those universal laws of vibration, the connection between which and the effects of beauty was suggested in Chapter XII., and also in Appendix I. of "Art in Theory." But the exact reason lies deeper in nature than any plummet dropped by human means can fathom. We cannot know the cause any more than what, when all conductors are in place, speeds the impulse of an electric current. We only know that a reason exists at all because of the results which we experience. Just as certain organs of the ear or eye respond and glow with a sense of complete freedom and delight in the presence of certain harmonious elements or combinations of sounds or sights, so does the spirit as a whole. There may be some so constituted physically, or so incapable of analyzing what they feel, that they confound this apprehension of beauty, which only we are now considering, with something less pure and elevating. But those who have never made their souls the servants of their bodies, and whose æsthetic as well as ethical natures have, therefore, developed normally, are aware that the influence which flows from beauty and beauty alone is different in kind from anything debasing, and allied to that which is wholly spiritual. It is not without strength in extreme youth, nor lost in old age, and in its power to give delight and even to arouse romance, it is stronger, often, when exerted by man upon man and woman upon woman, than when exerted by one upon another of another sex. These æsthetic effects, when they reveal their sources through the outward forms in which they are expressed and embodied, do this mainly through what we term the proportions. What if these latter in themselves be merely a collection of like or related measurements? Is this not exactly what we should expect of anything the effects of which can be ultimately traced to vibrations? Cannot the same be affirmed not only of the minute waves that underlie results in melody and harmony of tone, but even of the larger waves of rhythm? And, if without rhythm there can be no effective music or poetry, how should

there be effective painting or sculpture without proportion?—*Proportion and Harmony*, VII.

TASTE, STANDARDS OF, IN ART (*see also* CRITICISM, EFFECTS OF, *and* STANDARDS OF CRITICISM).

Just as moral or intellectual character is shown by the way in which the balance is maintained between conflicting material and spiritual motives appealing to the conscience or the judgment, so artistic character is shown by the way in which the balance is preserved between the physiological and psychological requirements of art. To a great extent, as has been shown, the former requirement follows fixed natural laws, as is the case, in fact, with everything merely material; but the latter requirement depends upon the range of thought and feeling characteristic of the mind of the individual artist as a result of his temperament or experience. While therefore two artists may equally preserve the balance of which mention has just been made, they can never do it in exactly the same way. The psychological contribution, in each case, must be different. It seems to be mainly for this reason that some argue that there can be no standard of taste. But the same kind of logic would lead one to conclude that there can be no standard of right for conscience or judgment. It is undoubtedly a fact that moral and intellectual standards are actually accepted to an extent and in a sense that is not true of those of taste. But why is this the fact?—Why but because the decisions of conscience and judgment lead to actions; and actions always have some tendency to become injurious to others. Therefore, for mutual protection, men have agreed to accept conventional codes and creeds, and to abide by them. Artistic taste, on the contrary, does not, as a rule, lead to actions, or at least not directly; and accordingly it is not supposed to be injurious and is not treated as such. In it the expression of personality, and with this of originality, is left unfettered. Spiritually considered, the artist is almost the only freeman. But the fact that he is this is due, more than to anything else, to the lucky accident of his not happening to be engaged upon that which has a direct practical, utilitarian bearing. There is nothing in the condition to rid him of the obligation to endeavor, at least, to discover and to fulfil certain artistic principles, any more than the fact of living where no con-

ventional creeds or codes had been framed, would rid one of the obligation to endeavor, at least, to discover and to fulfil the principles of truth and righteousness.—*Art in Theory*, XIV.

TASTE, WHEN DEGENERATE.

What kind of taste is being cultivated to-day?¹ It is safe to say that, twenty-five years ago, no American publishers of respectable standing would have allowed their imprint to appear on the same page with the artistic vulgarities which our foremost firms are now flaunting upon one's eyes from the posters and even covers of their periodicals; nor, if so flaunted, would any one, old enough to live outside a nursery, have looked at such effects a second time. But now they are supposed to commend themselves to the taste of several millions of people, many of whom, after the schooling that they have received through gradations downward to the present low level, are actually expected to think them interesting and, if critics, to speak of them as artistic! Nor is there any commercial excuse for this abuse of artistic opportunity. It seems to be owing to sheer æsthetic wantonness irresponsibly debauching popular taste.—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XII.

TEACHERS AND BEES.

Not all the bees in a hive have to do with developing the queen-bee. Yet one appears every season, and this because of the work of all. Meantime, they all have also contributed to the provisioning, the comfort, the prosperity, and the sweetness of the whole corporate life. So with teachers of drawing in primary schools.—*Essay on Teaching in Drawing*.

TEACHERS, QUALIFICATIONS OF, IN ELOCUTION.

Some decry all physicians on the ground that they kill off their patients. But this is true, as a rule, only of quacks. There are certain physicians who benefit their patients; and the same is true of some elocutionists. If those called upon to select the latter would only exercise a little common-sense, it might be true of almost all of them. A man's credentials for such a position should be examined. Has he studied the art, and with whom? Has he had experience in teaching, and with what results? More than

¹This was printed in 1895.

that, what kind of a man is he in himself? Has he good judgment and insight? Has he modesty, so that he will give his pupils merely what they need, not what he thinks that he himself needs in order to increase their regard for him? Above all, has he the artistic temperament?—that supremacy of instinct over reflection and that flexibility, mental and physical, which enable a man to remain master of himself and of his material, notwithstanding any amount of the latter with which instruction and information may have surrounded him? How does he himself, in his own reading and speaking, manifest the results of the system that he purposes to teach?—*Essay on Elocution in the Theological Seminary.*

TECHNIQUE (*see* FORM AND SIGNIFICANCE, FORM, STUDY OF, FORM *vs.* SIGNIFICANCE, *and* SIGNIFICANCE *vs.* FORM).

In the degree in which he comes to take an interest in his work, he will begin to perceive the fascination that there may be in the study of form as form; and no man ever became an artist or able to appreciate art in any department, until he had begun to perceive this. The young seldom perceive it. They are more apt to feel suppressed than stimulated by talk with reference to fine discriminations in the selection of words, or artistic ingenuity in the arrangement of them. Always ready to admit in a general way the value of style, in trying to detect its qualities for themselves they are apt to use tools too big and bungling to discover any except superficial excellences. Like the savage, they stand agaze at the huge, the loud, and the coarse; they fail to notice the delicate, the gentle, and the fine. They believe in the realm of the telescope, not of the microscope; in that which can wing itself among the clouds, not in that which must watch and walk while keeping the motive power of flight alive. They forget that the eagle has eyes, as well as pinions; and that the keenness of his sight does not prevent him from soaring, but prevents him, when he soars, from losing himself.—*Essay on the Literary Artist and Elocution.*

TECHNIQUE AND NATURE (*see* FORM AND SIGNIFICANCE *and* NATURAL EFFECTS REPRODUCED IN ART).

When technique is mastered, and its results become automatic, they, themselves, though not those of nature in its primary sense, become those of a second or acquired nature;

and, in this condition, the highest compliment possible for them, as well as the highest tribute to their success, is given when they are termed natural.—*Essay on the Function of Technique*.

TECHNIQUE IN PAINTING SUBORDINATED TO REPRESENTATION.

When one enters a gallery, the work of the great master is most likely to be that which, at first glance, might be mistaken for a mirror reflecting nature outside the window; in other words, a work, in which technique, however perfect in itself, has been carefully subordinated to the requirements of representation.—*Idem*.

TECHNIQUE IN POETRY.

It is not strange that one who has thoroughly at command the resources of the music of verse like Swinburne, or of suggestive ellipses like Browning, or of picturesque details like Morris, should occasionally, in the heat and exuberance of his creative moods, push his peculiar excellence altogether beyond the limits of legitimate art; but it is strange that the critics who make it their business to form cool and exact estimates of literary work, should so seldom have sufficient insight to detect, or courage to reveal, wherein lie the faults that injure the style of each, and how they may be remedied. How can criticism be of any use except so far as in a kindly way it can aid in the perfecting of that on which it turns its scrutiny? And yet it is doubtful whether, amid all the eulogy and abuse which have greeted all the works of Robert Browning, any one, in private or in print, has ever told him plainly what those faults are—all so easy to correct,—but for which the man with the greatest poetic mind of the age would be—what now he is not—its greatest poet. And if criticism of this kind is needed by authors who have attained his rank, how much more by those who, with the imitative methods of inexperience, are always prone to copy unconsciously, and usually to exaggerate, the weak rather than the strong points of the masters! Many a young writer, doing this at that critical period of his life when a lack of stimulus and appreciation may wholly check one's career, has failed, notwithstanding great merits. All his ability in other directions has not compensated for his ignorance of the requirements of poetic technique.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, XIV.

TEMPERAMENT AS INFLUENCING ART-PRODUCTS (*See also ARTISTIC vs. SCIENTIFIC MENTAL ACTION, and GENIUS*).

The artist is one who, owing to temperament or training, is able, to an exceptional extent, to manifest in speech or action the results of his subconscious intellection. What does he obtain through this form of intellection? Surmisals, which, sometimes, as has been shown, correspond to the absolute truth. Nevertheless, even if they do, he obtains this truth in those forms only in which his own temperament, as influenced by his training, is able to interpret, and, according to the method indicated, to frame into an ideal the scenes or sounds that suggest the truth. And what does he communicate? Nothing again but his own surmisals, interpretations, or ideals. Moreover, if he be a genuine artist, producing nothing but effects which represent those of nature, he communicates his surmisals in such forms only as cause others, as a result of their own imaginings, to make similar surmisals. The artist therefore interprets nature according to his own temperament, and causes others to interpret it as he does.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XIV.

THEORIES, MADE TO SUIT OUR OWN PRACTICE.

The truth is that art-theories, like religious creeds, are framed not so much for the purpose of adjusting conditions to the demands of truth, as of advocating the conditions, whether of truth or of falsehood, which the framers recognize to be their own. The majority of us, though usually unconscious of the fact, would rather keep all the world below us than, by pointing to a level higher than our own, risk having someone discovered there who, instead of ourselves, has attained it.—*Essay, on the Function of Technique*.

THOROUGHNESS, AMERICA'S NEED AND MUSIC'S INFLUENCE ON.

Thoroughness as a characteristic of mental process or material production is very greatly needed among our people. We have qualities that, in certain directions, seem sometimes capable of taking its place,—an unusual development of intuition, insight, ingenuity, and power of initiative. Nine times out of ten, perhaps, when an American jumps to a conclusion, he can make a successful landing; but the wise ought always to bear in mind the fact that a single slip, at a critical moment, may lose a whole race.

Is there nothing to awaken reflection in the fact that Germany, the one country in which there has been not only the highest but the most universal development of musical culture, is also the one country universally acknowledged to stand without a rival as an exemplification of the results of thoroughness in all forms of scholarship? Is there not something in this fact to suggest a patriotic as well as an æsthetic reason for desiring to promote in our own land every form in which music can be studied?—*Essay on Music as Related to Other Arts.*

TIME (*see* REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS IN DURATION, *and* RHYTHM).

TRADITIONALISM AND MATERIALISM, AS AFFECTED BY ART
(*see also* RELIGION AIDED BY ART *and* SPIRITUAL SUGGESTIVENESS OF ART).

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that, because not directly an aid to religion, art is not indirectly so, and this even where strictly confined to its own sphere. In ages like our own, when men rely chiefly upon the guidance of the conscious mind, it is extremely difficult for them to be brought to realize that there is any trustworthy guidance attributable to the action of the subconscious mind. Those in this state may be divided into two classes. One class of them holds that many years ago this inspirational form of guidance prevailed, but that now it does not. They believe in inspiration that was, but not in inspiration that is. They prize highly that which was once received in this way. But, so far as concerns a similar method of receiving the truth now, their own spiritual instincts are not allowed to guide them even to the extent—which might involve no great changes of opinion—of interpreting the spirit of the old according to the form of the new. The result is what is termed traditionalism; and it is needless to argue that the tendency of this is to cause the mind to hold on to that which has formerly been conceived, and to hold on so firmly as often to be prejudicial to development, and even to activity, of thought. The other class maintains that there never was, and never can be anything worth regarding in this inspirational form of guidance. They deem nothing trustworthy except that which results solely from the action of the conscious mind. This leads to what is termed materialism;

and, so far as it has its perfect work, it is still more deadening to effort and ideality than is traditionalism.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, VII.

TRAINING, PHYSICAL AND MENTAL (*see also* DRILL, INSPIRED, PRACTICE, ITS EFFECTS, *and* SKILL, HOW ACQUIRED).

Training can do much more for artistic development than some suppose. It can produce facility not only in outward expression, giving the singer, orator, or actor a flexible voice or a graceful body, or the musician, painter, or sculptor dexterity in the use of fingers, brush, or chisel. It can produce facility in the methods of inward preparation for expression, enabling the mind to draw at will from the subconscious resources that which is the subject-matter of artistic invention and inspiration.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XIII.

TRUTH (*see* ART AND BEAUTY, *and* NATURE TRUTH TO).

TRUTH AND THOUGHT REVEALED IN NATURE.

Here is a rose-bush. When it begins to grow, it is small and weak and simple. As it develops, it becomes large and strong and complex. So does every other plant in nature; so does a man; so does a nation; so does all humanity; so, as far as we can know, does the entire substance that develops for the formation of our globe. One mode of operation, one process, we find everywhere. If this be so, then to the ear skilled to listen to the voice in nature, what is all the universe but a mighty auditorium—in which every tale is reëchoed endlessly beneath, about, and above, through every nook of its grand crypts and aisles and arches? But, again, if all created things bear harmonious reports with reference to the laws controlling them, what inference must follow from this? In view of it, what else can a man do but attribute all these processes, one in mode, to a single source?—and, more than this, what can he do but accept the import of these processes, the methods indicated in them, the principles exemplified by them, as applicable to all things,—in other words, as revelations of the universal truth? So the poet finds not only thought in nature, but also truth.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, XXVIII.

UGLINESS IN ART (*see* ART AND BEAUTY).

Nor need it be supposed that what has been said endorses the mistaken view that any subject which is “natu-

ral" is legitimate for artistic treatment. The truth seems to be that ugliness, simply because it is repulsive, is not legitimate in art except so far as, by way of contrast, as in the case of shadows which throw that which they surround into brighter relief, the ugliness enhances the beauty to which it is kept in manifest subordination. What the particular phases of this beauty shall be must be determined, of course, by the taste of the artist. But their effectiveness will depend upon his powers of observation and his study of the analogies of nature. Beauty is never so attractive as when it appears in the dignity attaching to the creative proportions there; truth is never so operative as when it manifests the sanction of the laws of the Creator that are there embodied.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XII.

UNITIES, THE LAW OF, IN DRAMATIC ART.

Harmony of effects among different elements of significance in form as they appeal to recollection, association, or suggestion, is due mainly to perceiving that the objects made to go together are such as we are accustomed to think of as going together. For instance, this phase of harmony is fulfilled in an opera or poem, when all the scenes or events representing a certain country or period conform strictly to the conditions of each. It was this that was sought to be fulfilled in the old law of criticism ascribed to the Greeks, enjoining that a drama should contain only as much as might be supposed to take place in the *time* given to the representation, or, at most, in one day, and in one *place*, and with one kind of *action*, by which latter was meant with either tragic or comic situations, but not with both. This "law of the unities" of time, place, and action, as it is called, although it cannot be applied universally, is based at least upon a true principle. Brevity, local color, and directness are always elements of artistic excellence.—*Art in Theory*, XIII.

However acceptable this "law of the unities" may have been to the ancient Greeks, who were less interested than people of our day in the analysis of motives and the development of character, it does not allow sufficient *comprehensiveness* for the purposes of modern literary art, least of all of the dramatic. Anything in art is right which enhances an effect legitimate to the product in which it is used. In

order to show the results of the influences at work in motives and character, length of time is often indispensable. So, too, is change of place; while the incongruous association of tragedy and comedy in the action, not only prevents monotony, but, as universally in the case of contrast, increases the distinctive impression of both. Imaginative people never have so strong an inclination to laugh as at a funeral, and tears never flow so freely as immediately after a burst of merriment.—*The Genesis of Art-Form*, IX.

UNITY, EFFECT OF, IN MUSIC.

Where consecutive single notes are used, we are best satisfied if all or a large number of those that are essential to the same melody are produced by an instrument of the same kind, thus fulfilling the principle, of putting like elements of sound together. For instance, even were it possible, we should hardly take pleasure in hearing a first note of a melody sounded on a violin, a second on a flute, a third on a pianoforte, etc., and this because the effect would lack *congruity*, which is the first condition enabling the mind to compare the qualities of successive tones, and thus perceive unity in them. If, however, instead of consecutive single notes, we hear consecutive chords, then, provided the same part be played in consecutive chords by the same instrument, the more numerous the kinds of instruments used, the more pleasure, as a rule, do we receive. A chorus, accompanied by an orchestra, is usually more enjoyable than a single voice accompanied by a piano, and the latter is more enjoyable than a voice unaccompanied by any instrument. The reason is that in the chord of the orchestra the ear recognizes, and is able to compare, a much larger number of like or allied effects. Moreover, as all these instruments are sounded in successive chords, their music continues to preserve from note to note the same general compound quality, notwithstanding the variety caused by differences of pitch in the notes of each chord and of successive chords. It is because the effect of *unity*,¹ together with that of the greatest possible *variety*, is attained in this complex form of music as in no other, that the orchestra and chorus combined is sometimes supposed to exemplify the highest possibilities of the art.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music*, XIII.

¹ See page 89 of this volume.



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See pages 73, 82, 88, 162, 230-232, 280, 281, 309, 318-321

UNITY IN ÆSTHETIC SYSTEMS NECESSITATES A COMMON
ART-CHARACTERISTIC.

If for instance we emphasize the fact that art reproduces the appearances of *nature*, we thrust sculpture and painting into prominence. We term these "the fine arts," and music or poetry on the one hand, and architecture on the other, are classed in the same company only by a doubtful courtesy which allows them to cling to the skirts of the former. If, again, we emphasize the fact that the arts are *human*, in that they are means of communicating thought and feeling, then literature and poetry are unduly exalted. Nor does the emphasis of either fact do justice either to music or to architecture. But is it not surmisable that each of these facts should result from some other fact, and that this fact should be equally recognizable in the reproduction of forms in nature and in the expression of the formative thought and feeling in the artist's mind? If so, is it not evident that we can classify all the arts according to the one fact, and arrange them according to the influence upon each art of each of the other two facts, and that, thus doing, we can find a place somewhere where each art, when so arranged, can stand without danger of having the qualities that render it artistic either exaggerated or belittled?—*Art in Theory*, IV.

UNITY IN ALL ART-WORKS (*see* CLASSIFICATION AS THE FOREMOST ART-METHOD, *and* PAGE 89).

UNITY IN ARCHITECTURE, SUGGESTED BY CONTINUITY.

Every one must have observed occasionally in connection with mouldings and buttresses, with divisions and cappings of windows and porches, with external and internal arches and ridgepoles of roofs, gables, and ceilings, but especially in connection with the sides of towers and spires, and with innumerable ornamental details, outlines that seem to suggest, at least, a desire to point the thought away to another feature of principal interest with which they are organically connected. . . . Undoubtedly it would add to the effects of buildings if more were made of this possibility, as might easily be done by bestowing a little more care upon the arrangements of the necessary lines and arches. Certain it is that, in any art, the mind, in glancing along in the direction to which an outline thus related points, takes pleasure in finding other lines continuing it or converg-

ing somewhere with it, and, even without consciousness of the reason, derives from this arrangement impressions both of principality¹ and unity¹ in connection with the whole, which nothing else could give.—*The Genesis of Art-Form*, XI.

VASE (*see* ELLIPTIC LANCEOLATE).

VENUS (*see* REPRESENTATION IN SCULPTURE).

VERSE AN ELEMENT OF ARTISTIC UNITY.

What is verse? A little reflection will reveal that every known phase of it is a method of causing the flow of the words as they present themselves in *time*, to be interrupted sufficiently and with sufficient regularity to convey an impression like that produced when like objects appear side by side in space. Lines, feet, alliteration, assonance, rhyme,—all have the effect of retarding or preventing an absolute change; and thus of causing the composition to manifest not movement only, but unity of movement. Consider, for instance, the lyric. Its thought usually moves on very impetuously. The artistic requirement in its mode of expression, therefore, is that it manifest, in some way, that there is unity in the movement. But how can this be done better than by arranging the sounds in certain like groups, indicating unity of method? And how can we find like groups more clearly indicated than in the regular recurrence of accents, as in feet, or of tones as in alliteration or assonance, and especially as in rhymes at the ends of lines. These latter, in particular, cause the thought, at like intervals, to pause, as it were, and to connect the sound heard with another like sound that preceded it. A similar impression is also conveyed when successive stanzas end with a like refrain or chorus. . . . Without them, the thought of the lyric might often seem to roll forward as lifelessly and with as little evidence of organism as a log. These make it step and fly,—give it a regularly recurring motion like that of a living creature.—*The Representative Significance of Form*, XXII.

VERSE, CLASSIC *vs.* MODERN (*see* ACCENT *and* RHYTHM).

It may be asked, have we not derived our system of versification from that of the classic languages, and was this not based upon quantity rather than upon accent? Certainly; but, while observing these facts let us observe

¹ See page 89 of this volume.

also that the classic system was not an elementary but a late development of rhythm. . . . Poetic measures, as we have found, result, primarily, from force given to syllables at regular intervals of duration. But careful observation will reveal that, as a rule, the application of this force necessarily involves also an increase in the duration of the accented syllable. This increase is made in speech unconsciously; in music it is made consciously; and that this was the case in the classic metres, furnishing one proof, which is confirmed by others, that they were results of an effort to intone verses—*i. e.*, to make music of them. But besides this let us notice another fact. As accent is necessarily accompanied by an increase in quantity, it is impossible that our own metres also, though determined by accent, should not manifest some traces of the influence of quantity.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music*, II.

In constructing verse the Greeks and Romans subordinated accent to quantity. Unlike ourselves, if in composing they came to a word in which long quantity and the ordinary accent did not go together, they seem always to have been at liberty to disregard the accent, and occasionally, too, they could change the quantity. In fact, they could change both quantity and accent in order to produce a rhythmic effect when chanting, analogous to that which we produce when reading. Our poets, on the contrary, have gone back to the primitive methods, antedating those of Greece, and base the rhythms of their verse on the accents of speech. The result, as compared with the language of our prose, is more natural than that reached by the other method; and in its way is fully as artistic. Nor, in other regards, is English inferior to the classic tongues in its capabilities for artistic treatment. Owing to an extensive use of terminations in nouns, articles, pronouns, adjectives, and verbs, in order to indicate different grammatical relationships, the Greeks and Romans could change the order of words in a sentence without changing its meaning. In their language, "The dog ate the wolf," with slightly varied terminations, could read, "The wolf ate the dog." For this reason, they could alter their phraseology, in order to accommodate it to the requirements of metre, as is not possible for us; and so far they had an advantage over us. Nevertheless, for some reason, when they came

to put their words into verse, as every schoolboy who tries to scan knows, they produced a language which, like the present French poetic diction, sounded unlike that of conversation. Even supposing, with some scholars, that in reading they did not scan their verses as we do now, nor even chant them invariably, as some infer was the case, their poetic language was not the same as their spoken language. Aristotle tells us, when mentioning things which it is legitimate for the poet to do, that he can invent new words, that he can expand old ones, either by lengthening vowels or by adding syllables, that he can contract them by shortening vowels or omitting syllables, and that he can alter them in various other ways. Spenser and others since him have applied similar methods to English poetic diction; but, at present, such changes, except in rare instances, are not considered admissible, and this because they are recognized to be unnecessary. The fact that they are not admissible in our language, and were admissible in the classic languages, proves that, in one regard at least, our language is superior to them as a medium of metre.—*Idem*, II.

In the classic languages metre was determined by the quantities or relative lengths of the vowel-sounds or consonant-sounds composing the syllables. Our own language is not spelled phonetically, and therefore we fail to notice the effect of similar elements in it. Yet they are present to a greater extent than we ordinarily suppose, as will be brought out clearly when we come to consider quantity, especially that which is used in the English hexameter. Any one acquainted with the subject, knows that it is a mistake to hold that quantity has nothing whatever to do with the movements of our metres, and an analogous mistake, probably, would be made in supposing that the emphasis of ordinary pronunciation had nothing whatever to do with the classic metres.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, II.

VERSE, ITS GENESIS (see POETRY vs. MUSIC, GENESIS OF EACH).

We all must have noticed that a child too young to talk, a foreigner using a language unknown to us, a friend speaking at such a distance from us that his words are indistinguishable, can all reveal to us, with a certain degree of

definiteness, the general tenor of their thoughts. Their tones, aside from their words, enable us to understand such facts as whether they are hurried or at leisure, elated or depressed, in earnest or indifferent, pleased or angered. This is so because these facts are directly represented by their intonations. Developed with design, these may be made to resemble those of the foremost actors and orators. Hence the art of elocution. Developed without design, they instinctively come to imitate those of the people with whom one most associates. Scotchmen, Irishmen, Englishmen, and Americans can all be distinguished by the different ways in which they utter the same phrases. No two of them will emphasize precisely alike a simple expression such as "I can't go there to-day."

Not only men of different nations can be distinguished thus, but even different individuals. Any one well known to us can be recognized in the dark by what we term his voice, by which we mean his method of using his voice; the way, peculiar to himself, of pausing at certain intervals and hurrying at others, of sliding his sounds up and down on certain syllables and phrases, and also, perhaps, of giving in certain places an unusual stress or quality of tone. All these methods impress his individuality on everything that he has to say. When he becomes a public speaker, his peculiarities in these regards become still more marked. Unconsciously, if not consciously, he develops them so that, in his delivery, similar intonations recur with a certain degree of regularity; in other words, he comes to have what may be termed a rhythm and a tune of his own. The reason why he comes to have these is, undoubtedly, . . . owing to a natural tendency to economize labor. Just as the swinging of the hands enables one to walk more easily, so what may be termed the swinging of the tones enables one to talk more easily. So, also, as we shall find by-and-by, do verse and measure, to which these intonations naturally lead. The two together separate the words and syllables, and make them accord with the natural actions of the lungs and throat.

But let us waive this thought, until we reach it in its proper place. Before the age of books those who prepared literature published it by repeating it in public. Every man who did this had, of course, his own peculiarities of utterance, which, as he continued to repeat his produc-

tions, he would cultivate and render more and more peculiar; just as is the case to-day with the venders who cry in our streets, the clerks who read in our courts, and the priests who intone the services in our churches. These peculiarities, moreover, would be shown not only in the elocution of the reciter, but in the arrangement of his words and sentences, so as to fit them to his elocution. At the outset, every literary man would have his own style of delivery and composition, and confine himself to it. But after a little, just as men of the same districts, and preachers and exhorters of the same religious sects—Quakers, Methodists, or Episcopalians—imitate one another; so these public reciters would drift into imitation. Before long, too, it would be found that one style of expression, or form of words, was better suited for one set of ideas, and another for another set; so, in time, the same reciter would come to use different styles or forms for different subjects. Only a slight knowledge of history is needed in order to prove that this is what has actually taken place. Pindaric metre, and possibly Homeric, as also the Alcaic and Sapphic stanzas of the Greeks, were used first by the poets whose names they bear; but to-day they are used by many others who find them the best forms through which to express what they wish to write.

But to return to our line of thought. A further development in the direction already indicated, would cause these reciters after a time to use versification, so that their rhythms and the variations in them might be more clearly marked; and still later, that the precise length of their verses might be apparent, as well as to assist the memory in retaining them, they would use rhymes. Further developments in the direction of rhythm and tune, introducing greater variety in both, and making the tones more and more sustained, would lead to the singing of songs—that is, to poetry set to musical melody.—*Idem*, II.

VERSE, ITS PHYSICAL BASIS (*see* ACCENT and RHYTHM).

The elements of all verse as well as of elocutionary forms, can be traced to the physical requirements of the organs of speech, and to these not as they are used in singing, but, distinctively, in talking. One can sing without suggesting any thing that can be developed into verse or rhythm; but it is impossible for him to talk, without suggesting what can

be developed into both. In order to recognize the truth of this statement, we have merely to listen to a man talking. As we do so, two characteristics of speech will at once attract our attention. One is the pause or cessation of sound, following groups of syllables which form phrases or sentences, containing anywhere from two to a dozen words; the other is the accent, given to every second, third, or fourth syllable. . . .

The *pause* results, primarily, from the construction of the human lungs; the *accent*, from that of the human throat. The speaker checks his utterance in order to breathe; he accents it because the current of sound—in talking, but not in singing—flows through the vocal passages in a manner similar to that in which fluid is emptied from the neck of a bottle—*i. e.*, with what may be termed alternate active and passive movements. . . .

It is only necessary to observe these facts in order to recognize that the line in verse, at the end of which, when regularly constructed, the reader necessarily pauses, is an artistic development of the phrase, which we find in all natural conversation. In fact, Aristotle, in his "Rhetoric," seems to hint at some such a development in prose, for he says the period must be divided into clauses, easily pronounced at a breath ἐν ἀνάπνευστος. It is generally acknowledged that the principal mental process involved in art-construction is comparison. This causes all men, both consciously and unconsciously, both for convenience and pleasure, to take satisfaction in putting like with like. The moment this tendency is applied to groups of syllables separated by pauses, it leads men to place, if possible, a like number of syllables in each group, and thus have between the pauses like intervals of time. But an arrangement of this kind is the primary characteristic of verse.—*Idem*, II.

VERSE, MELODY AND HARMONY OF (*see* HARMONY IN POETRY, REPRESENTATIVE EFFECTS OF PITCH, *and* PITCH).

The poetic effects, corresponding to the rising and falling of the voice, especially as used in the inflections, will now be examined. There is a sense in which these movements of the voice enter into the pronunciation of every syllable containing more than one letter-sound. In uttering, for example, the word *an*, the sound of the *a* is at a different

pitch from that of the *n*. In talking rapidly, however, the two sounds seem usually uttered, not in succession but simultaneously. Their effects, therefore, when combined, are analogous, not to those of musical melody, but of harmony, and of these much more closely than at first might be supposed. In flexible, well-trained voices, belonging to those familiar with the relations of musical tones, there is a tendency to sound the two at such intervals of pitch from each other as to form a true musical chord. One reason why vocal culture increases the sweetness and resonance of the speaking voice is because it enables one to sound distinctly all the elements of tone needed, in order to produce this speech-harmony.

The rising and falling of the voice with which we have to deal now, however, are not those subtle ones allying speech to harmony, but those more obvious ones which give it a very apparent melody. The effects in poetry corresponding to elocutionary inflections, are produced by the same arrangements of the syllables in the line that we have already noticed when considering metre. In our language, as a rule,—a rule which the elocutionist, of course, can violate in order to produce what for him are the more important effects of delivery,—an accented syllable is sounded on a key higher than an unaccented one. To illustrate this, in the ordinary pronunciation of *cōnjure*, meaning to practise magical arts, the *con* is sounded higher than the *jure*; but in *conjūre* meaning to summon solemnly, the *con* is sounded lower. Therefore, if a line of poetry end with an accented syllable, or have what is termed a *masculine* ending, the voice in pausing on this, as it generally does at the end of a line, will pause, as a rule, on a key higher than that on which it has uttered the preceding syllable.

For similar reasons, if a line close with an unaccented syllable, having what is termed a *feminine* ending; or begin with an accented syllable, the effect is that of a constant repetition of the falling inflection. In fact, the Greeks, though arriving at their result through a different process, actually termed lines ending thus *catalectic* or *falling*.—*Idem*, ix.

Probably few have noticed to what an extent pitch enters as a factor into the effects of poetry. They know in a general way, of course, that in early modes of communicating thought, intonations, like gestures, were almost as significant as words; but they do not realize that the

same is true in our own day, least of all that changes in pitch are and always must be elements entering into the significance of the effects produced by poetic rhythm. They know, again, if at all acquainted with the history of the art, that there was a time when poetry was associated with both dancing and music. It was so, as we are told, in the time of King David, who, on one occasion, at least, danced as well as sang his psalms before the ark. In Greece, not only lyric but dramatic poetry was chanted, and often accompanied by the lyre. As late as the sixteenth century, declamation accompanied by music, flourished in England and in Italy. In the latter country it then passed into the opera, which did not follow, as some suppose, but preceded all that is noteworthy in the development of the pure music, unaccompanied by words, of modern times. In our own day, however, when poetry is merely read, the movements of the waltz, the polka, the sonata, the symphony, seem to belong to an art so different, that it is difficult to conceive that it was once appropriate to speak of ballad poetry, because the Italian *ballare* meant to dance, or of a sonnet, because the lute was *sounded* while poetry was being chanted. The truth is, however, that even to-day, also, poetry and music are allied. As has been said already, the chanting of verse was not originally the cause of its tunes, but the result of them, springing from an endeavor to develop artistically the tunes natural to speech. These tunes our poetry, notwithstanding its present separation from music, still retains. They differ from those of music, yet are analogous to them. Let us consider the more important of the resemblances and differences between the two.—*Idem*, VIII.

VIBRATION, AS RELATED TO TONE AND COLOR (*see also* HARMONY *and* HARMONY OF COLOR).

That which separates the phenomena of rhythm and, as will be shown in another place, of proportion from those of harmony is the fact that, of the divisions of time or of space respectively causing effects of rhythm and proportion, the mind is directly conscious; whereas of the divisions causing the effects of harmony, the mind is not conscious, and has come to know of them only indirectly, as a result of the investigations of science. These investigations have discovered that, back of the outer ear which is

shaped so as to collect the sound, and back of the drum too, is an inner ear filled with a pellucid fluid in which float the extremities of the acoustic nerve. Under the influence of impulses of sound from without, the drum is made to vibrate. Its vibrations are communicated to the fluid behind it, and, through this, they set into motion one or more of the delicate organs of sensation—minute pendulous rods and also ossicles that rub together. It is only when the vibrations are very frequent—some say sixteen in a second of time—that the ear derives from them the impression of any sound whatever. As they increase in frequency, and, at the same time, lessen in size, the sound becomes higher in pitch, its mere loudness depending not on the relative rate of vibrations, but upon the violence of the stroke producing them. When at last, the vibrations become too frequent for the ear to be aware of them—as when there are forty thousand of them, as some say, in a second of time—the effect upon the ear is the same as if there were no vibrations at all, and the sensation of sound is conveyed no longer. Very similar to the operations that take place in the ear, when recognizing pitch, are those that take place in the eye when recognizing color. Passing through the pupil of the outer eye and the transparent crystalline lens behind it, rays from objects of sight reach the vitreous humor which extends to the retina, an expansion of the optic nerve. The effect of color in this is considered to be a result—but exactly how produced scientists are not as yet agreed—of certain vibrations of the organism. As in the case of sound, too, less frequent vibrations cause one hue and more frequent vibrations cause another.—*Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music*, vii.

VIBRATORY THEORY, APPLIED TO MIND AS WELL AS MATTER (see also ARTS, THE, AS INFLUENCED BY NATURE AND MIND).

Effects causing rhythm and proportion, which are consciously measured by the mind, and those causing harmony of sound and color, which are not consciously measured,—these effects having been discovered by science to be the same in principle, it is argued that all æsthetic effects are the same in principle. Moreover, it has been discovered that not only do the nerves of the eye and ear vibrate as affected by sound and sight, and communicate to the brain intelligence of particular degrees of pitch and hue as deter-

mined by the rates and sizes of the vibratory waves, but it has been proved beyond a doubt that the nerves constituting the substance of the brain vibrate also, and thus give rise to thoughts and feelings; and, not only so, but that the vibrations of the nerves in particular parts of the brain give rise to thoughts and feelings of a particular character; such, for instance, as those connected with particular exercises of memory in recalling general events or specific terms. This fact has been ascertained through various observations and experiments in connection with the loss or removal of certain parts of the brains of men or animals, or with the application of electricity to certain systems of nerves accidentally or artificially exposed or else naturally accessible. Of course, such discoveries tend to the inference that all conscious mental experience whatsoever, precisely as in the case of sensations excited in the organs of the eye and ear, are effects of vibrations produced in the nerves of the brain. If this inference be justified, the line of thought that we have been pursuing apparently justifies the additional inference that all conscious mental experiences of the beautiful are effects of harmonious vibrations produced in the nerves of the brain. . . . There are many facts that warrant us in holding it. In holding it, however, let us not neglect noticing, as do many of its advocates, certain other facts. Through the experiments of mesmerism and hypnotism, it has come to be acknowledged that the outer senses can be completely deadened and yet the inward processes of intelligence kept in a state of activity; and not only so, but that sometimes, merely at the mental suggestion of an operator, irrespective of any appeal to the eye or ear, irrespective therefore of any possible vibrations in the ether or air to account for vibratory effects upon the physical organs of the senses, the one operated upon is made to see pictures and to hear music. In fact, do we not all have experiences of a realization of the same conditions in our dreams? Now, in such cases, either actual physical vibrations take place in these organs, or else they do not take place for the simple reason that they are not necessary to the result; and whichever of these theories we adopt, we are forced to the conclusion that the effects of beauty are dependent upon influences operating in what we understand to be the sphere of the mind. They are awakened there by the mesmerizer irrespective of any appeal through the

outer senses, and, when awakened, they operate so powerfully that they produce either actual vibrations in the senses, or if not, at least results identical with those caused by actual vibrations. Assuming now what it does not seem possible to doubt—namely, that the existence of these vibrations constitutes the substance of that of which we are conscious in æsthetic effects; that these vibrations are, so to speak, indispensable to the operation of the battery of the brain, which without them cannot communicate their peculiar influence to intelligence,—what are we to infer, when we find that they can be set in motion not only from the physical side, but—as in cases of hypnotism, telepathy, dreams about music and painting, etc.—from the non-physical side?—what but that on this latter side also the same vibrations exist, or, if not so, a force capable of causing the same; and that the sphere in which we are mentally conscious of the vibrations, or the sphere of personal consciousness, as we may call it, occupies a region between the material and what we may term—because we cannot conceive of it as otherwise—the immaterial? Add to this another fact universally admitted, which is that vibrations harmonious in the sense that has been explained are particularly agreeable, whereas inharmonious vibrations are particularly disagreeable; and why have we not, from modern science, a suggestion of the possibility of there being exact truth in the theory of Pythagoras and the earlier Greeks, who held that the mode of life, so far as it is normal, true, divine, blissful, is not only physically but spiritually a mode of harmony, a mode fitted to produce a literal “music of the spheres”? As has been said, our minds are conscious of experiencing from a world which we can see and hear harmonious effects which are identical with effects coming from a world of which we can only think and feel. Now if by scientific analysis we can ascertain the method through which they come from the one, why have we not a right to argue that it is through the same method that they come from the other? Nor does it necessarily lessen the force of this argument to point out—if indeed this can be satisfactorily done—that the sensations of music cannot be communicated from the immaterial side to those who have been born deaf, nor the sensations of color to those who have been born blind. These facts prove simply an absence of the needed condi-

tions, an absence, that is, of a nerve-battery sufficiently developed to be able to record vibrations physically recognizable only through the eye or ear, without which battery the mind as limited by its present physical surroundings can, perhaps, be made distinctly conscious of nothing.—*Idem*, XII.

These questions, however, concerning the possibility of exciting to mental processes in other ways than through the senses, pertain to psychology rather than to æsthetics. Whether or not, as some think, this possibility implies the existence of a spirit capable of acting independently of the body though now temporarily connected with it, there is no doubt that, in view of the influence which the vibrations of the nerves undoubtedly have upon mental processes, as well as the mental processes upon the nerves, the supposition is rational that the mental processes themselves, together with whatever may be their organic sources, are in some way subject—just as are heat, magnetism, and electricity, which certainly approach them in subtlety—to the same laws of vibration, the harmony of the effects of which produces the sensation of beauty in the senses. So rational, too, is the supposition, that no system of æsthetics can afford to ignore it. This would be just as injudicious, to use no stronger term, as to treat it, in our present state of uncertainty with reference to it, as the sole determining consideration. In this system nothing will be found inconsistent with the universal applicability of the vibratory theory, though its spiritual aspects will be recognized as resting upon no more infallible foundation than an argument from analogy.—*Idem*, XII.

VOICE-BUILDING

Voice-building is the only known way in which to give an uncultivated rustic the tones of a gentleman, or of training growing lungs to draw blood into every part of them, and, through doing this, into every part of the brain. It does seem strange that materialists, of all men, should not recognize how much this blood is needed. There is no subtly philosophical, only a physiological reason, why many a student too dull to take interest in other branches has been led through elocution to discover interest in them, and, ultimately, to develop not only brightness but brilliancy.—*Essay on Fundamentals in Education*.

VOICE-CULTURE, ITS MENTAL EFFECTS.

Even the department of English devoted to vocal culture has to do with more than merely giving the strenuous but too often uncultured country lad who comes to college the accent and bearing of refinement, desirable as would be this result alone. It is a theory of one of the Oriental cults that to make a man spiritual—in the sense of having an imaginative and inventive mind—you must first teach him how to breathe, because spirit and air—or breath—are one and the same. This explanation is not scientific, but the effort to represent it as such will not appear wholly absurd when we recall men like Beecher, Phillips, Guthrie, and Spurgeon, who, according to their own accounts, began their careers by learning how to breathe, and only subsequently developed their imaginative and inventive powers, until the results became, as Beecher expresses it, “as easy as to breathe.” The truth seems to be that when one habitually clarifies the blood in every cell of his lungs—and about every man that I have ever known needs to learn how to do this—he does the same with the blood in every cell of his brain. This makes all of the brain active. If you could make it all sufficiently active you would have genius. Every man would be a genius, if only he could combine the fever-like glow which sets imagination on fire with the healthful steadiness of pulse which keeps the reason cool.—*Essay on Artistic vs. Scientific Education: Note.*

VOICE, NOT WHOLLY EXPRESSIVE OF CHARACTER.

Not three weeks ago, I read an article in a paper supposed to represent a knowledge of the conditions of culture, attempting to show that the quality of the voice does not depend upon methods of breathing, but entirely—not partly as everybody admits—upon character. I once had a pupil who, when a babe, had dropt upon his head and spine, with the practical result of telescoping his lungs and keeping his chin very near his abdomen. Though a dwarf, he was anxious to be a speaker; but it took a full year of hard practise for him to learn to make, in a satisfactory way, a single elementary vowel-sound. Two years later, he had a voice more sweet, rich, and powerful than any man in his large class. I refuse to believe that the change was owing to a change in his character. Nor will I admit that, deformed as he was, his organs of expression were in need of

reformation in any sense not true of those of scores of his fellows whose lungs, if not actually telescoped, had cells as effectually shut up as if this were the case. The light in a cathedral, after nightfall, when shining through the unhewn stone and wooden beams that occupy the space where will be the rose window, as yet unfinished, does not give expression to the Gothic character of the building; nor can it give this, until the work of art has chiseled the stone, and filled the interspaces with delicate tracery and color. A similar relationship often exists between the result of elocutionary art and the expression of human character.—*Essay on The Literary Artist and Elocution.*

WALL, WHEN NOT REPRESENTING SUPPORT.

The objection to the whole is, that the wall of a building should represent support. This square form does not represent the method of support; nor does it, apparently, support anything itself. Therefore it appears to be a sham. Moreover, it produces mental perplexity. It causes one to ask: What, exactly, is the shape of the roof? and, even though this can be guessed, to ask again: How is such a roof affixed to such a wall?—*Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts*, XVIII.

WORDS, THEIR MEANING AS DETERMINED BY ASSOCIATION AND COMPARISON (*see also* LANGUAGE, PLAIN AND FIGURATIVE; POETRY, ITS LANGUAGE; REPRESENTATION IN POETRY, *and* REPRESENTATION IN SENTENCES).

We shall find it possible to class all combinations of words under two heads, corresponding to those under which we have already grouped single words. The first class includes those depending for their meaning upon the principle of association, and the second, those depending upon the principle of comparison. To get our bearings here, let us recall briefly that it has been said, with reference to the first class of words, that the times and circumstances in which a certain exclamatory sound like *mama* or *papa* is used, cause men, on account mainly of its associations, to accept it as a word, meaning what it does; and that later, after a vocabulary has been partly formed, the same principle of association causes them to ally something for which they have a name with some other thing, and to use the same name for both, as when they call towns or implements after their founders or inventors. It has been said

again, with reference to the second class of words, that a certain sound proceeding from an object perceived by men is imitated by their vocal organs, and, on account of the *comparison* between the two sounds, the one that they have produced is accepted as a name for that which originally produced it, as when *cuckoo* is adopted as a term of designation for a certain bird; and that later, after a vocabulary has been partly formed, the same principle of comparison causes them to perceive that some conception for which they have a term, is like some other conception, and to apply the same term to it also, as when they use the word *clear* to refer both to the atmosphere and to the mind.

In accordance with the analogy of these two methods of determining the meanings of words, when used singly, we shall find that we determine also their meanings when used conjointly, *i. e.*, either by the *associations* which, when combined in phrases and sentences, the words suggest, or by the *comparisons* which they embody. To illustrate this, suppose that one says: "Their cultivated conversation and attire interfered with the effects of their depravity." The sentence, so far as concerns its meaning, is perfectly intelligible, and this because we have learned to *associate* with each of the words used, *cultivated*, *conversation*, *attire*, etc., a certain definite conception; and this conception comes up before the mind the moment that we hear them. But now, suppose the same thought is expressed, as in this sentence of Goldsmith: "Their finery threw a veil over their grossness." In this latter case, neither the word *finery*, nor *threw*, nor *veil*, nor *grossness*, has precisely the meaning that we are accustomed to associate with it. We do not understand the sentence precisely, until we consider it as a whole, and then not until we consider that the whole expresses a comparison. In other words, the sentence means what it does, not mainly on account of the ordinary associations of its words, but on account of the comparison which it embodies. Take another pair of sentences which perhaps will illustrate this difference more clearly. Let one wish to express an unfortunate change in the character of a man hitherto honest. He may say that "His integrity is impaired by severe temptation"; and in this case the meaning will be obvious, because men associate definite meanings with the words *integrity*, *impaired*, *severe*, and *temptation*. Instead

of using this language, however, the man may select words indicating a comparison, and a series of comparisons. He may make a picture of his idea, representing the process of the change in character, by describing the process of an analogous change in nature. He may say: "His uprightness bends before some pressing blast." Notice how much more definitely we perceive the comparison, the picture, in *uprightness* than in *integrity*, in *bends* than in *impaired*, in *pressing* than in *severe*, in *blast* than in *temptation*. In this last sentence, we perceive at once, as in a picture, the character that stood straight up, the clouds that gathered, the storm that burst, and the ruin that ensued. The immaterial process is represented literally in the material one, and only in connection with this latter have words like *bends*, *pressing*, and *blast* any relevancy.—*Poetry as a Representative Art*, XVI.

WORDS, THEIR MEANINGS AS DETERMINED BY THE PRINCIPLE OF REPRESENTATION.

In forming words by comparison, as by association, terms applicable literally to material conceptions alone come to refer after a time to those that are immaterial. Take words, for instance, describing the operations of the mind. We say that a man's thoughts are *pure*, *clear*, *mixed*, *muddled*, or *clouded*, and that he *expresses* and *impresses* them upon others; but only to material things like water, wine, or the atmosphere, can the former class of terms be applied literally; and only *into* or *out of* a material thing can another, and this only a material thing, be literally *pressed*. Evidently terms of this kind are used as a result of comparing the mental to the material process, to which in some regards it is analogous. Were it not possible to symbolize the one process in the other, it is obvious that many things which we desire to communicate, would remain forever unexpressed. We see, therefore, how essential to the very existence of language is this power which enables us to figure or picture an object or operation through referring to something which, though like it in some respects, is wholly different from it in others; as different from it as the paint and canvas of a portrait are from the flesh and blood of the person portrayed. We see, too, how the element of representation, which is essential to all art, is a factor in the very consti-

tution of language from which poetic art is developed. We see also how the means of representation are furnished mainly by the objects and operations of nature; and this not only by those appealing to the ear, the sounds of which can be imitated, but also by those appealing to the eye, the appearance of which suggests words like *express* and *impress*.—*Idem*, xv.

Revelations, multiplied by almost the whole number of words employed, must flash light through all the hidden depths that underlie the surface forms of one's vernacular, before he can understand them, and use them with absolute appropriateness. Especially is this so in the case of the words with which we are now dealing,—the words formed as a result of comparison; because these contain, far more decidedly than those derived from association, a representative or picturesque—what grammarians term a figurative—element.—*Idem*, xv.

WORDS, WHEN FOREIGN TO A LANGUAGE USUALLY UNPOETIC
(see ANGLO-SAXON).

The lack of representative power in the majority of words introduced from foreign languages, is probably one reason why, from Homer to Shakespeare, poets have ranked high who have written at an early stage in the history of a nation's language, before it has become corrupted by the introduction of foreign words and phrases. It may furnish one reason, too, why Dante, near the end of his life, thought fit to deliver lectures to the people of Ravenna upon the use of their vernacular. It may explain why Goethe, at the beginning of his career, turned his back upon the fashionable French language, and gave himself to the cultivation of the neglected tongue of his fatherland. At any rate, it does explain, as has been said before, why most of the great poets of England, from Chaucer to Tennyson, have been distinguished among other things for their predominating use of words derived from the Anglo-Saxon. These words still exist in our tongue; and fortunately, notwithstanding the natural tendency of all words to grow less poetic, they have lost little of their original significance and force; because side by side with them there exist other words, almost synonymous, derived mainly from Latin sources. The fact that these latter by common consent are used almost exclusively

for the technical purposes of science, philosophy, and trade, thus leaving the Anglo-Saxon terms to the slighter changes and deteriorations that take place in literature, may furnish the best reason that we have for hoping that this composite language of ours will continue to be for centuries in the future, as it has been in the past, perfectly fitted to give form to the grandest poetry.—*Idem*, XVII.

WRITING, ITS STYLE DETERMINED BY THAT OF SPEAKING.

In the early ages, the styles of both orators and storytellers grew out of the methods of speech. When the storytellers became artists, they turned the requirements of accent and inhalation into measure and line, and thus developed verse. All verse, even of an epic, died with its composer, unless its peculiar fitness for recitation caused succeeding minstrels to echo it down the ages; and even a lyric died unless its lines, when they were read, could sing themselves into a song so full of sweetness that the world could not forget it.—*Essay on The Literary Artist and Elocution*.

THE END.

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